May
22

Madoff and Trustee Incentives

We've been pretty quiet about Madoff on this blog, so I think it's time for a few words on the matter. I want to quickly recap two critical decisions in the case and then raise the issue of the alignment of incentives between the trustee and the Madoff victims.

(1) Where things stand with clawbacks.  

The big issue in the Madoff bankruptcy is how much money the trustee, Irving Picard, will be able to claw back in to the estate under fraudulent transfer actions from net winners in the Ponzi scheme (and various aiders and abetters).  

Last September, Judge Rakoff made a major ruling in the Madoff case (Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (SDNY 2011)). He ruled that the 546(e) settlement payment defense bars most actions by the Madoff estate's trustee, Irving Picard, unless actual fraud is alleged under 548(a)(1). If that ruling stands, then the trustee cannot pursue clawback actions using section 544 of the Code, which allows the trustee to use state frauduluent conveyance law.  The result is to deprive the trustee of the very favorable 6-year statute of limitations under the New York version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Instead, the trustee is limited to pursuing "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" actions under 548(a)(1), which have a 2-year statute of limitations. In other words, the ruling chops off 2/3s of the clawback period. The ruling is thus extremely favorable to net winners to the extent that their winnings were in three to six years before the bankruptcy.   

Judge Rakoff expanded that ruling last month in another important opinion that explains that the clawback can only be applied to net winners (on an all-in/all-out basis irrespective of time) and then only to the extent of their withdrawals in the two years pre-filing.  Rakoff, however, also held that the trustee had stated a sufficient case to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on his 548(a)(1) claim. because the defendants' 548(c) good faith taker for value argument--namely that the payments were made to them in satisfaction of the debt Madoff, as a stockbroker, owed them based on holding their accounts--doesn't fly.  

While I have normative issues with the settlement payment defense being WAY too broad, it's pretty clear that Rakoff applied it correctly. The best argument for the trustee was that there were no settlement payments because there were no securities--everything was bogus--but as Rakoff rightly observed, there is a fraud exception built in to 546(e), and that's and only that is what the trustee can argue. Yet, it is kind of hard to square Judge Rakoff's rejection of the trustee's argument about 546(e) with his acceptance of the trustee's argument about 548(c). Yes, Judge Rakoff's ruling on 548(c) is consistent with general Ponzi scheme jurisprudence, but the inconsistency in the opinions about whether the formalities of the transactions will be respected (for 546(e) purposes) or disregarded (for 548(c) purposes) is noticeable. The result, though, is to split the baby and let the trustee pursue clawbacks, but only for a limited period and against a limited number of investors for a limited amount. Lots more that could be said about all of this, but I assume it is all going up to the 2d Circuit, which I would expect to confirm both rulings. 

(2) Trustees and Settlement.

The dynamics of the Madoff case raise some questions about the incentives of bankruptcy trustees. Before I proceed, I want to emphasize that I have no reason to think that the trustee in this case is acting in anything but good faith. Instead, I am making a more general point about the structure of trustee arrangements.

The trustee is ultimately operating the estate for the benefit of the claimants. Many of the Madoff claimants were counting on their investments for own retirements or for their business's pension plans. These tend to be claimants who need money now, rather than in five or ten years. They have immediate liquidity needs, so they are likely claimants who would settle for a smaller recovery sooner. This goes for net winners (who still come away with much less than they thought they had) and net losers. And net winners have the uncertainty of the clawbacks hanging over their heads making financial planning difficult. They don't know if they are looking at 2 or 6 years or if they are looking at clawbacks at all.

All of this suggests that many of the defendants (net winners) and economic plaintiffs (net losers) in the clawback litigations have real incentives to settle--or sell their claims (I'm not sure what the Madoff claim market looks like). The real plaintiffs in interest--the net losers--are not at the table, however. Instead, they have the trustee litigating and negotiating for them. 

This structure makes sense given the collective action problems involved, but only so long as the trustee's incentives align with the net loser's. They don't. The trustee does not have the liquidity pressures of Madoff net losers, which makes him less likely to cut deals and settle with the net winners, even if the net winners are willing to settle at a price that the net losers would take because of their liquidity discount.

There is some sort of personal reputational gain possible for the trustee that probably correlates roughly with the total dollar figure for recovery, but I don't think that's likely to be affecting things. More importantly, the trustee's law firm gets compensated before the victims as an administrative expense of the estate. I've got no quarrel with administrative expense priority--you gotta pay the grave digger--but the trustee's firm's compensation is not based on the recovery, but on hourly billing, which would seem to create a disincentive to reach quick settlement.

Two factors might mitigate against this. First, there is supposedly a 10% discount from the trustee. As far as I can tell that's a discount from an arbitrary price that is designed to make the trustee appear to be operating in the spirit of economy; I don't think of this as a pro bono case. Second, and more important, there is a further 20% holdback on fee payments (after the 10% discount) until the conclusion of the case. That means there is a time value discount on the heldback fees, which is tantamount to a further discount from face (but probably not a 20% discount from face).

All else equal, the holdback would seem to help align the trustee's interests with those of the victims. But a few factors might reduce the effectiveness of the holdback. First, I imagine that the trustee's law firm is charging more than would be charged if the services were put out for auction, so that premium might offset the 10% discount and the timevalue discount on the holdback. (And given that other legal services are auctioned, why not do this in bankruptcy for trustee's counsel...)  

Second, the holdback might be too large or too small to properly align incentives, although it might help optimize them, even if they remain suboptimal. And third, the trustee (or really his law firm) might be able to monetize the holdback now, say by borrowing against in on a non-recourse basis. While there would be a time value cost, that would easy any liquidity pressures created by the holdback. Borrowing against the holdback would raise some eyebrows (and I  have no reason to think it is occuring), but law firm finances (and litigation finance in particular) is really a black box.

In the end, we have a situation in which both the victims and the trustee are at least nominally time sensitive, but in which they also both have theoretical possibilities of monetizing delayed cashflows. As far as I can tell, however, there haven't been a lot of settlements in the case other than a few splashy big dollar ones like with the Wilpons. That makes me wonder if the trustee-victim incentives are properly aligned. There's no way to really test things, but I think the Madoff case provides a nice illustration of the role that liquidity demands can play in shaping bankruptcy cases.  

Apr
30

Research Grants from NCBJ

As many readers of this blog will know, the Endowment for Education from the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges has supported many research projects that have contributed to a better understanding of all sorts of issues involving debt and bankruptcy. Judge Dennis Dow, the current chair of the Endowment, contacted me and advised that it has a substantial amount of money available to make grants and is actively soliciting applications. If you are a scholar looking for support for the expenses connected with empirical research, the Endowment may be a great resource for you. Instructions, forms, and eligibility guidelines are available at the Endowment's web site.

Apr
13

Recovery | Tax Refunds Being Used to Pay for Bankruptcy Filings

Tax refunds being used to pay for bankruptcy filings Some Americans spend their tax refunds on high-tech gadgets and long-awaited vacations. Others use the cash to file for bankruptcy. More than 200,000 money-strapped households will use their tax refunds this year to pay for bankruptcy filing and legal fees, says a new study by the … Read more Related posts:
  1. Muselman v. Deutsche Bank, U.S. Bankruptcy Court | A Valentine from Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge Karen S. Jennemann on Feburary 14, 2012
  2. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., Appellant, v. LISA MARIE CHONG, LENARD E. SCHWARTZER, BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE
  3. Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims
Mar
28

MERS | All in One Basket – The Bankruptcy Risk of a National Agent-Based Mortgage Recording System

All in One Basket: The Bankruptcy Risk of a National Agent-Based Mortgage Recording System John P. Hunt University of California – Davis School of Law (King Hall); Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy Richard Stanton University of California, Berkeley – Finance Group Nancy Wallace University of California, Berkeley – Real Estate Group February … Read more Related posts:
  1. Mass. Bankruptcy Judge Voids Foreclosure of MERS Mortgage – Judge Tells Lenders You Can’t Have Your MERS Cake & Eat It Too
  2. California | Bankruptcy Judge Denies MERS, Foreclosure Sale Void, “MERS System is not an Alternative to Statutory Foreclosure Law”
  3. Statement by CEO of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) “The MERS System is not fraudulent, and MERS has not committed any fraud.”
Mar
14

Ruiz v. 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC | Minnesota Appeals Court: Foreclosure By Advertisement Is Void Unless Strict Statutory Compliance Is Met

Minnesota Appeals Court: Foreclosure By Advertisement Is Void Unless Strict Statutory Compliance Is Met In a recent ruling by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the court issued a reminder that, for a foreclosure by advertisement to be valid in Minnesota, strict compliance with statutory requirements is met. Accordingly, it reversed a lower court ruling adverse … Read more Related posts:
  1. STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS | Foreclosure Judgments REVERSED – MERS May NOT Foreclose by Advertisement
  2. California | Bankruptcy Judge Denies MERS, Foreclosure Sale Void, “MERS System is not an Alternative to Statutory Foreclosure Law”
  3. NY Appeals Court Dismisses Lender’s Lawsuit; Says Bank Failed To Strictly Comply With State Anti-Foreclosure Ripoff Law
Feb
17

Muselman v. Deutsche Bank, U.S. Bankruptcy Court | A Valentine from Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge Karen S. Jennemann on Feburary 14, 2012

A Valentine from Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge Karen S. Jennemann on Feburary 14, 2012 The Court cannot avoid suspecting that the second allonge indeed was created solely to rebut the trustee‘s assertions in this litigation and did not previously exist. If so, the Court suggests Deutsche and Ms. Faber individually consider the possible consequences … Read more Related posts:
  1. United States vs Deutsche Bank | Deutsche Bank Faces US Mortgage Fraud Lawsuit
  2. Complaint | United State of America vs Deutsche Bank and Mortgageit, Inc
  3. Ohio Court of Appeals | Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Hansen – Court Erred in Admitting Screen Shot as Evidence of Amount Due for Purposes of Granting Summary Judgment
Jan
06

American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc. (AHMSI) Improper Move on Van Horne Home Gets $50,000 Rebuke from Judge

A bankruptcy judge has ordered one of the nation’s largest mortgage servicers to pay $50,000 to a Van Horne couple for seeking permission to foreclose on their house after failing to tell them their payments had increased. American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc. (AHMSI) of Texas, which has gotten in trouble with regulators in several states, … Read more No related posts.
Dec
29

Anna Nicole Smith, the Constitution, and Bankruptcy

To all law profs out there who plan to attend next week's Association of American Law Schools annual meeting, be sure not to miss the Creditors' and Debtors' Rights section program Saturday morning at 8:30.   The theme of the program:  "Marathon at 30:  A Retrospective on Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction in the Shadow of Article III."  Bankruptcy Judge J. Rich Leonard will moderate a discussion featuring Douglas Baird, Susan Block-Lieb and Troy McKenzie.  The panelists will consider, among other issues, the confusion sown by the Supreme Court in the process of resolving claims to the estate of Anna Nicole Smith's billionaire husband in Stern v. Marshall.  For some background on the case, see CS posts here, here and here

Aug
24

Mass. Bankruptcy Judge Voids Foreclosure of MERS Mortgage – Judge Tells Lenders You Can’t Have Your MERS Cake & Eat It Too

Mass. Bankruptcy Judge Voids Foreclosure Of MERS Mortgage Judge Tells Lenders You Can’t Have Your MERS Cake & Eat It Too The sophisticated financial minds who wrought the MERS regime sought to simplify the process of repeatedly transferring mortgage loans by obviating the need and expense of recording mortgage assignments with each transfer. No doubt … Read more
Aug
18

Principal Pay Down in Chapter 13 as a Means of Foreclosure Prevention

As we have discussed recently, here and here, the Federal Housing Finance Agency has asked for ideas about how to dispose of foreclosed properties in bulk.  But there is no reason we shouldn’t take this request as also encompassing reducing foreclosed inventory by preventing foreclosures to begin with.  FHFA has the power to implement either type of program for loans or properties controlled by Fannie or Freddie, the government-sponsored entities under FHFA conservatorship.

So let’s talk about the idea of Principal Pay Down (PPD) in chapter 13 bankruptcy as a foreclosure prevention strategy.  FHFA could direct the GSEs to go along with chapter 13 plans that propose to pay down principal over five years, thus affecting a broad swath of home mortgages.

Here are the elements of PPD

(with thanks to Norma Hammes for the particulars):

  • This plan restructures certain undersecured (underwater) mortgages in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases so the homeowner can pay down the loan principal and reduce negative equity and acquire equity faster than with the existing loan.

 

  • This is accomplished by reducing the interest rate to 0% for five years, letting the borrower’s entire monthly loan payment go directly to the principal.

 

  • During the five-year period, the borrower’s minimum monthly housing payment is calculated similar to a HAMP modification payment, at 31% of gross income.

 

  • At the end of the initial five-year period, the remaining principal balance is amortized over 25 years at the Freddie Mac survey rate.

 

  • The bankruptcy judge, with the assistance of the Chapter 13 Trustee, reviews the borrower’s budget to confirm the eligibility of the borrower and feasibility of the payments; and they oversee the implementation of the plan.

 

  • There is no cramdown – the benefit to the borrower is achieved by actually paying down the loan.

 

  • In exchange for this benefit, the borrower agrees to a general settlement of all claims against the lender and servicer and avoiding future title and loan litigation.

 

  • The federal government and US taxpayers’ substantial liability on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (all GSE) owned and insured loans would be reduced by this plan.

 

  • Private mortgage investors will benefit similarly.

 

  • Everyone wins with this plan – even the borrower’s community and local government benefit from improved neighborhood stability.

 

Here is an example.  Say the borrower has a $120,000 mortgage loan on a home worth $90,000.  This borrower is $30,000 (25 percent) underwater and thus can’t refinance or sell and pay off the loan.  Over five years in chapter 13, however, principal pay down could allow the debtor to pay down $1,000 a month or a total of $60,000 over 60 months, and end up with $30,000 in equity (rather than $30,000 underwater), assuming the home neither depreciated further nor appreciated in the meantime.  PPD thus here gives a cushion for further depreciation, which is still occurring in the hardest hit parts of the country.  In this example, the mortgage interest would have gotten paid $60,000 over five years, and the borrower would get credit for all of that toward the principal balance.

PPD is different from either principal write-down or shared-equity refinancing, discussed recently by Adam Levitin.  With PPD, there is no write-down but rather a pay down, and all equity thus acquired would go to the borrower.  This program would give many homeowners a stake in their properties by getting the mortgage balance below the value of the home, while also making their loans sustainable and helping to stabilize the housing market.

The compromise involved in PPD is that there is no write-down and that pay down occurs in chapter 13 bankruptcy, something borrowers are not going to do just to get a break on their mortgages if they can afford to pay them.  Chapter 13 involves court supervision for the length of the plan and is an arduous road for debtors.  PPD in chapter 13 thus addresses the moral hazard argument, that giving breaks on mortgages will draw those who don’t need them. If anything, PPD may be too tough a program.  Both PPD in chapter 13 and equity-sharing refinancing outside bankruptcy could both be implemented by FHFA at the same time to increase foreclosure prevention to a meaningful level and experiment with alternatives to see which ones prove most attractive and effective.

Full disclosure:  As noted in my bio, I am a member of the board of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, which supports PPD.

Feb
15

The Automatic Earth

Post from Automatic Earth

Merscorp Inc., operator of the electronic-registration system that contains about half of all U.S. home mortgages, has no right to transfer the mortgages under its membership rules, a judge said.

automatic-earthU.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Grossman in Central Islip, New York, in a decision he said he knew would have a “significant impact,” wrote that the membership rules of the company’s Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, don’t make it an agent of the banks that own the mortgages.

“MERS’s theory that it can act as a ‘common agent’ for undisclosed principals is not supported by the law,” Grossman wrote in a Feb. 10 opinion. “MERS did not have authority, as ‘nominee’ or agent, to assign the mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific written directions by its principal.”

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Jun
04

Box Case Slams BAC for Lack of Standing

Missouri 6 03 10 RE-BOX-Order-Denying-Motion-for-Relief-From-Stay1

US Trustee opposed the relief, not the debtor.

IN RE BOX
In re: MARTY EUGENE BOX and TAMMY JEAN BOX, Debtors.
Case No. 10-20086.
United States Bankruptcy Court, W. D. Missouri.
June 3, 2010.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY
ARTHUR B. FEDERMAN, Bankruptcy Judge

BAC Home Loans Servicing LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing (“BAC”) seeks relief from the automatic stay to allow it to exercise its rights under state law as to the Debtors’ real property. The Debtors do not oppose the motion, but the Chapter 7 Trustee has challenged BAC’s standing to seek relief from the stay. The Trustee asserts that the Note and Deed of Trust were not properly assigned to BAC and, because it is not the holder of the Note and Deed of Trust, it lacks standing to seek relief from the stay to enforce those documents. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(a), and 157(b)(1). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that BAC has not proven that it is the holder of the Note. Therefore, it lacks standing, so its motion for relief from stay will be denied.

On January 21, 2009, Debtors Marty E. Box and Tammy J. Box executed a promissory note in
the original principal amount of $164,836, for the purchase of their home. The Note was made
payable to Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. and its successors and assigns. The Note is
secured by a Deed of Trust on the home. The Deed of Trust identifies the beneficiary as
“Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (`MERS’),” and states that “MERS is a separate
corporation that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” The
“Lender” is identified as Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. The Deed of Trust was
recorded with the Hickory County Recorder of Deeds on January 28, 2009.
BAC states that Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (“Taylor Bean”) transferred the Note
and Deed of Trust to BAC on August 25, 2009, although the only evidence of any such transfer
is an affidavit by BAC’s representative, discussed more fully below.
The Debtors filed this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case on January 20, 2010, and BAC filed the instant
Motion for Relief from Stay on February 24, 2010. As stated, the Chapter 7 Trustee maintains
that there was no proper assignment of the Note and Deed of Trust to BAC and, therefore, BAC
lacks standing to seek relief from the stay.
To obtain relief from the stay, BAC must be a party in interest[ 1 ] and have standing.[ 2 ] www.4closurefraud.org
The Missouri Court of Appeals has recently discussed assignment of notes and deeds of trust in
Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.[ 3 ] In that case, the borrower executed a promissory note
in favor of lender BNC Mortgage Inc. As here, the deed of trust did not name BNC as the
beneficiary, but instead named Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) solely as
BNC’s nominee. The promissory note made no reference to MERS. The note and deed of trust
both required that payments be made to the lender, not MERS. These facts regarding the loan
documents are, for all relevant purposes, identical to those in the case at bar.
www.4closureFraud.org
Subsequently, a third party, Robert Bellistri, purchased the property at a tax sale. Bellistri sent
BNC a notice of redemption as required by Missouri statute. After the collector of revenue issued
Bellistri a collector’s deed, MERS, as nominee for BNC, assigned the deed of trust to Ocwen.
The assignment of the deed of trust contained language that the assignment was made “together
with any and all notes and obligations therein described or referred to, the debt respectively
secured thereby and all sums of money due and to become due.” Bellistri then filed a quiet title
action to eject the original borrower from the property. Bellistri moved to add Ocwen as a
necessary party because the assignment of the deed of trust to Ocwen had been recorded and
Ocwen was, therefore, the recorded grantee as to the deed of trust. Granting summary judgment
in favor of Bellistri, the circuit court found that Ocwen lacked standing in the action. Ocwen
appealed.
In affirming the circuit court’s decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals discussed the law of
mortgages in order to determine Ocwen’s interest in the property.[ 4 ] The Court explained:
Generally, a mortgage loan consists of a promissory note and security instrument, usually a
mortgage or a deed of trust, which secures payment on the note by giving the lender the ability to
foreclose on the property. Typically, the same person holds both the note and deed of trust. In the
event that the note and the deed of trust are split, the note, as a practical matter becomes
unsecured. The practical effect of splitting the deed of trust from the promissory note is to make
it impossible for the holder of the note to foreclose, unless the holder of the deed of trust is the
agent of the holder of the note. Without the agency relationship, the person holding only the note
lacks the power to foreclose in the event of default. The person holding only the deed of trust
will never experience default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment of the
underlying obligation. The mortgage loan [becomes] ineffectual when the note holder [does] not
also hold the deed of trust.[ 5 ]
Regarding assignments:
When the holder of the promissory note assigns or transfers the note, the deed of trust is also
transferred. An assignment of the deed of trust separate from the note has no “force.” Effectively,
the note and the deed of trust are inseparable, and when the promissory note is transferred, it
vests in the transferee “all the interest, rights, powers and security conferred by the deed of trust
upon the beneficiary therein and the payee in the notes.”[ 6 ]
Thus, if the note is properly assigned, the deed of trust automatically goes with it, and the note is
not split from the deed of trust. However, that is not necessarily the case when it is the deed of www.4closurefraud.org
trust which is assigned — if the note is not also assigned, the assignment of the deed of trust is,
for all practical purposes, ineffectual because the note and deed of trust have become split.
In Bellistri, when MERS purported to assign the deed of trust to Ocwen, MERS also apparently
attempted to transfer the note because the deed of trust stated that its assignment to Ocwen was
“together with any and all notes and obligations therein described.”[ 7 ] The Court of Appeals did
not comment on the issue of whether such a notation on the assignment of the deed of trust
effectively also assigned the note. However, the Court of Appeals said, BNC was the holder of
the promissory note, and since there was no evidence that MERS ever held the promissory note
or that BNC gave MERS the authority to transfer the promissory note, MERS did not have such
authority to transfer the promissory note.[ 8 ] Thus, the language in the assignment of the deed of
trust purporting to transfer the promissory note was ineffective.[ 9 ] In other words, “MERS never
held the promissory note, thus its assignment of the deed of trust to Ocwen separate from the
note had no force.”[ 10 ]
Here, as in Bellistri, the Note is made payable only to Taylor Bean; MERS is mentioned nowhere
in the Note. And, as in Bellistri, MERS is identified in the Deed of Trust as the beneficiary,
solely as Taylor Bean’s nominee.
With regard to the purported assignment of the loan documents to BAC, the evidence in the case
at bar is both scant and suspect. Specifically, at an April 21, 2010, hearing on BAC’s Motion for
Relief from Stay, counsel for BAC submitted a notarized Affidavit dated April 19, 2010,
partially in fill-in-the-blank form, which states, in its entirety:
CAMETRICE JACKSON, first being duly sworn, on his/her oath states that he/she is the LOAN
SVC SPECIALIST of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing, LP and is authorized by said entity to sign this Affidavit. This is to certify that BAC
Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP is the holder of the
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust dated January 21, 2009, executed by Marty E. Box and
Tammy J. Box, in the original principal amount of $164,836.00. The Promissory Note and Deed
of Trust were transferred from TAYLOR BEAN & WHITAKER MORTGAGE CORP to BAC
Home Loans Servicing, LP f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP on 8/25/2009. The
only document attached to the Affidavit was an Assignment of Deed of Trust, dated February
18, 2010, in which “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., solely as nominee for
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp.” purports to assign the Deed of Trust to “BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP F/K/A Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP.” The February 18
Assignment states that it is “[t]ogether with any and all notes and obligations therein described or
referred to, the debt respectively secured thereby and all sums of money due thereon, with
interest thereon, and attorneys’ fees and all other charges.” No documents evidencing an August
25, 2009 assignment were attached, nor were any of the loan documents themselves.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were granted time in which to submit briefs on the
issue. BAC did submit a brief, and attached a copy of the Note, the Deed of Trust, and another
copy of the Affidavit quoted above. Notably, BAC attached no documents whatsoever to support
the Affidavit’s representation that the Note and Deed of Trust were assigned at all, much less on
August 25, 2009, as represented in the Affidavit. Moreover, the Affidavit does not state with any www.4closurefraud.org
specificity how BAC purportedly became the “holder” of the Note and Deed of Trust or how the
documents were “transferred” to BAC. Although I overruled the Trustee’s objection to the
admission of the Affidavit and admitted it into evidence at the hearing,[ 11 ] the Affidavit, in and
of itself, is self-serving, lacks credibility, and is entirely unpersuasive on the question of whether
the Note and Deed of Trust were properly assigned to BAC. Indeed, in In re Wilhelm, the court
held that a statement identical to the one in BAC’s Affidavit, namely that BAC is the “holder of
the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust,” is a legal conclusion, not a fact, and inappropriate for
such an affidavit.[ 12 ] Moreover, the court said, it did not answer the critical question of fact,
which is: Who has possession of the original note?[ 13 ]
The only actual evidence of any assignment at all in this case is the February 18, 2010
Assignment which was attached to the Affidavit submitted at the hearing. The fact that the
February 18, 2010 Assignment was made after the bankruptcy case was filed does not render it
per se invalid in that there is no rule prohibiting a creditor from assigning its claim postpetition.
However, the February 18 “assignment” contradicts the date stated in the Affidavit and,
particularly since no August 25 documents were attached, makes the Affidavit even more
suspect.[ 14 ]
That said, even looking to the February 18 Assignment, that document has the same fatal flaw
that the one in Bellistri did: Even assuming that the holder of a note and deed of trust can
effectively assign the note by including such language only on the deed of trust assignment (an
issue not decided by Bellistri), there is no evidence in this case that MERS has ever held the
Note, or that MERS was Taylor Bean’s agent for purposes of assigning the Note. Perhaps MERS
had the authority to assign the Deed of Trust because it was named as a nominee beneficiary, a
question I do not decide here.[ 15 ] However, as stated, MERS was not named in any capacity in
the Note, and there was no evidence that it otherwise had the authority to assign the Note.
Consequently, because MERS has not demonstrated that it had the authority to assign the Note,
its statement on the Deed of Trust Assignment purporting to do so could not be effective.[ 16 ]
This case does present one fact that was not addressed in Bellistri. Here, the Note contains a
blank endorsement by Taylor Bean.[ 17 ] Hence, BAC asserts that Taylor Bean transferred the
Note to it, and that the Deed of Trust follows the assigned Note.[ 18 ]
As relevant here, § 400.3-301 of the Missouri Statutes provides that a party may enforce a
promissory note if it is either (1) the holder of the promissory note, or (2) a nonholder in
possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder.[ 19 ] “`Holder’ with respect to a
negotiable instrument, means the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in
the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in
possession.”[ 20 ] “`Negotiation’ means a transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary,
of an instrument by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder.”[
21 ] “An instrument is transferred when it is delivered by a person other than its issuer for the
purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.”[ 22 ]
“Except for negotiation by a remitter, if an instrument is payable to an identified person,
negotiation requires transfer of possession of the instrument and its endorsement by the holder. If
an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone.”[ 23 ] www.4closurefraud.org
Therefore, because the Note is made payable to Taylor Bean, in order to transfer the Note to
BAC, Taylor Bean had to both transfer possession of the Note to BAC, and endorse it.
Because the Note here contains a blank endorsement, § 400.3.-205(b) applies. That section
provides:
If an endorsement is made by the holder of an instrument and it is not a special endorsement, it is
a “blank” endorsement. When endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and
may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially endorsed.[ 24 ]
“`Bearer’ means the person in possession of an instrument, document of title, or certificated
security payable to bearer or endorsed in blank.”[ 25 ] As the Trustee suggests, as to bearer paper,
an entity is only entitled to enforce the obligation if it proves that it holds the original or
complies with the lost not requirements discussed later.[ 26 ] This requirement serves an important
purpose. As stated, under Missouri law, the transfer of a note serves to also transfer the
transferor’s rights under a deed of trust, regardless of whether that transfer is recorded.
Possession of the note insures that this creditor, and not an unknown one, is the one entitled to
exercise rights under the deed of trust, and that the debtor will not be obligated to pay twice.[ 27 ]
BAC has not produced the original Note, nor has it even produced a witness stating that BAC is
in possession of the original Note. Indeed, even the Affidavit, for what it is worth, fails to make
such a statement.[ 28 ] Since BAC has failed to demonstrate that the loan was properly assigned to
it by Taylor Bean, it lacks standing to seek relief from the stay.
Perhaps BAC can correct the problem it currently faces with standing, as well as the Trustee’s
likely attack on the validity of the lien BAC asserts. The most obvious way would be for BAC to
produce the original Note, either endorsed to it or endorsed in blank. If BAC can do that, such
that the evidence sufficiently establishes proper assignment of the Note to BAC, then, as stated
above, the Deed of Trust followed, and the February 18 Assignment would be, in effect, a
nullity. BAC would, in that event, be the holder of both the Note and Deed of Trust.
On the other hand, if BAC cannot produce the original Note (or satisfy the requirements for a
lost note under §400.3-309), then assuming that the February 18 Assignment of the Deed of
Trust is valid (i.e., assuming MERS had authority as nominee beneficiary to make such an
assignment of the Deed of Trust), the Note and Deed of Trust may have become split, in that
Taylor Bean still holds the Note, but BAC holds the Deed of Trust. In that case, the Trustee
might prevail in challenging the lien. However, the court in Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler has
suggested that MERS may not have had the authority to assignment of the Deed of Trust, either.
If that is correct, then Taylor Bean may still hold both the Note and the Deed of Trust. And, as
stated, there is no rule prohibiting a postpetition assignment of a claim to another party such as
BAC.
This Order does not go further than necessary, and specifically does not decide whether the
structure of MERS is fatally flawed under Missouri law because, e.g., it splits the note and deed
of trust between different entities. I am well aware that there would be far-reaching
consequences from such a determination on creditors holding what they believed were mortgage www.4closurefraud.org
loans, and also on debtors, who may or may not be able to obtain new financing in order to
purchase their homes from the estate at current value. Therefore, I would hope to decide those
issues in a proceeding in which the promissory note is produced, and in which evidence is
offered as to the relationship between MERS and lenders for whom it purports to act, as well as
the powers granted to it by them. Such evidence might include, for example, an agency
agreement if one exists.
All I find here is that BAC has not proven that it holds the Note. Thus, it has not established that
it is a party in interest or that it has standing to seek relief from the stay.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Relief from Stay filed by BAC Home Loans Servicing LP
f/k/a Countrywide Home Loans Servicing is DENIED.
4closureFraud
www.4closureFraud.org www.4closurefraud.org


Filed under: foreclosure
May
06

WEISBAND Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH. BKR Tucson Judge HOLLOWELL Denies MLS for Lack of Standing

GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved.

IN RE WEISBAND

In re: BARRY WEISBAND, Chapter 13, Debtor.

Case No. 4:09-bk-05175-EWH.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Arizona.

March 29, 2010.

Barry Weisband, Tucson, AZ, Ronald Ryan, Ronald Ryan, P.C., Tucson, AZ, Attorney for Debtor.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

EILEEN W. HOLLOWELL, Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The debtor, Barry Weisband (“Debtor”), has challenged the standing of creditor, GMAC Mortgage, LLC (“GMAC”), to seek stay relief on his residence. After reviewing the documents provided by GMAC and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court concludes that GMAC, the alleged servicer of the Debtor’s home loan, lacks standing to seek stay relief. The reasons for this conclusion are explained in the balance of this decision.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Creation of Debtor’s Note And Asserted Subsequent Transfers

On or about October 6, 2006, the Debtor executed and delivered to GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GreenPoint”) an adjustable rate promissory note in the principal sum of $540,000 (“Note”) secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) on real property located at 5424 East Placita Apan, Tucson, Arizona 85718 (“Property”).

On a separate piece of paper, GreenPoint endorsed the Note to GMAC (“Endorsement”). The Endorsement is undated. The DOT was signed by the Debtor on October 9, 2006, and recorded on October 13, 2006. The DOT lists GreenPoint as the lender, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficiary of the DOT “solely as nominee for [GreenPoint], its successors and assigns.”

Approximately five months before the creation of the Note and DOT, on April 10, 2006, GreenPoint entered into a Flow Interim Servicing Agreement (“FISA”) (Exhibit D)[ 1 ] with Lehman Capital, a division of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Lehman”), pursuant to which Lehman agreed to purchase conventional, residential, fixed and adjustable rate first and second lien mortgage loans from GreenPoint. Under the FISA, GreenPoint agreed to service the mortgage loans it sold to Lehman. According to GMAC, GreenPoint transferred the Note and DOT to Lehman under the FISA.

On November 1, 2006, Lehman entered into a Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement (“MLSAA”) with Structured Asset Securities Corporation (“SASC”) (Exhibit E). Under that agreement, Lehman transferred a number of the mortgage loans it acquired under the FISA to SASC. GMAC claims that the Note was one of the mortgage loans transferred to SASC. SASC created a trust to hold the transferred mortgages — GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust (“Trust”). The MLSAA also transferred the right to receive principal and interest payments under the transferred mortgage loans from Lehman to the Trust.

Also, on November 1, 2006, SASC entered into a Trust Agreement (Exhibit F) with Aurora Loan Services (“Aurora”) as the master servicer, and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) as the trustee. A Reconstituted Servicing Agreement (Exhibit G) was executed the same day, which provided that GreenPoint would continue to service the mortgages transferred to the Trust under the MLSAA, but that the Trust could change servicers at any time. Also, according to GMAC, on November 1, 2006, GMAC, Lehman, and Aurora entered into a Securitization Servicing Agreement (“SSA”) (Exhibit H), pursuant to which GMAC would service the loans transferred to the Trust. GMAC claims that under the SSA it is the current servicer of the Note and DOT.

Thus, according to GMAC, as of November 1, 2006, the Note and DOT had been transferred to the Trust, with SASC as the Trustor, U.S. Bank as the Trustee, Aurora as the master servicer, and GMAC as the sub-servicer. GreenPoint went out of business in 2007. According to GMAC, it remains the sub-servicer of the Note, and that is its only financial interest in the Note and DOT. (Transcript Nov. 10, 2009, pp. 44, 47, 75.)

B. Bankruptcy Events

As of March 1, 2009, the Debtor was in default of his obligations under the Note. Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 19, 2009. On May 16, 2009, GMAC filed a proof of claim (“POC”), which attached the Note and DOT. The Endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was not attached to GMAC’s proof of claim. On May 12, 2009, MERS, as nominee for GreenPoint, assigned its interest in the DOT to GMAC (“MERS Assignment”). The MERS Assignment was recorded on July 16, 2009.

GMAC filed a Motion for Relief from Stay (“Motion”) on May 29, 2009, on the grounds that the Debtor had no equity in the Property and the Property was not necessary for an effective reorganization. The Motion also requested adequate protection payments to protect GMAC’s alleged interest in the Property. GMAC attached the Note with the Endorsement and DOT as exhibits to the Motion.

The Debtor filed a response challenging GMAC’s standing to seek relief from stay. After various discovery disputes, GMAC sent a letter dated September 17, 2009, to the Debtor which purported to explain the various transfers of the Note and the DOT. (Docket #90). The letter explained that GreenPoint transferred the “subject loan” to Lehman under the FISA, that Lehman sold the “subject loan” to SASC under the MLSAA, that SASC, Aurora Loan Services, and U.S. National Bank entered into a trust agreement, which created the Trust and made Aurora the master servicer for the “subject loan,” and, that GMAC was the servicer of the “subject loan” under the SSA. According to GMAC, its status as servicer, along with the Endorsement of the Note to GMAC and the assignment of the DOT from MERS to GMAC, demonstrated that it had standing to bring the Motion.

On November 10, 2009, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. GMAC offered the original Note at the hearing and admitted into evidence a copy of the Note, DOT, copies of the FISA, MLSAA, Trust Agreement, the Reconstituted Servicing Agreement and the SSA. However, GMAC did not offer any documents demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed by GreenPoint to the FISA. No document was offered demonstrating how the Note and DOT were conveyed from the FISA to the MLSAA or from the MLSAA into the Trust. Schedule A-1 of the MLSAA, where the transferred mortgages presumably would have been listed, only has the words “Intentionally Omitted” on it, and Schedule A-2 has the word “None.” (Exhibit F, pp. 19-20). Similarly, there is no evidence that the Note and DOT are subject to the SSA. Exhibit A to the SSA, titled “Mortgage Loan Schedule,” is blank. At the conclusion of the hearing, this Court ordered the Debtor to begin making adequate protection payments commencing on December 1, 2009 to the Chapter 13 Trustee. The Court further ordered GMAC and the Debtor to negotiate the amount of the adequate protection payments. When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the Court set the amount of the monthly payments at $1,000.

III. ISSUE

Does GMAC have standing to bring the Motion?

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(b)(2)(G).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of collection and enforcement actions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The purpose of the automatic stay is to provide debtors with “protection against hungry creditors” and to assure creditors that the debtor’s other creditors are not “racing to various courthouses to pursue independent remedies to drain the debtor’s assets.” In re Tippett,Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 754, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also In re Johnston, 321 B.R. 262, 2737-4 (D. Ariz. 2005). Despite the broad protection the stay affords, it is not without limits. 542 F.3d 684, 689-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Section 362(d) allows the court, upon request of a “party in interest,” to grant relief from the stay, “such as terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The court may grant relief “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection.” Id. The court may also grant relief from the stay with respect to specific property of the estate if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

Any party affected by the stay should be entitled to seek relief. 3 COLLIER’S ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[2] (Henry Somers & Alan Resnick, eds. 15th ed., rev. 2009); Matter of Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc., 118 B.R. 889, 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990); In re Vieland, 41 B.R. 134, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)). Relief from stay hearings are limited in scope — the validity of underlying claims is not litigated. In re Johnson, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985). As one court has noted, “[s]tay relief hearings do not involve a full adjudication on the merits of claims, defenses or counterclaims, but simply a determination as to whether a creditor has a colorable claim.” In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).

Nevertheless, in order to establish a colorable claim, a movant for relief from stay bears the burden of proof that it has standing to bring the motion. In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009). The issue of standing involves both “constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Constitutional standing concerns whether the plaintiff’s personal stake in the lawsuit is sufficient to have a “case or controversy” to which the federal judicial power may extend under Article III. Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000).

Additionally, the “prudential doctrine of standing has come to encompass several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’” Pershing Park Villas, 219 F.3d at 899. Such limits are the prohibition on third-party standing and the requirement that suits be maintained by the real party in interest. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498-99; Gilmartin v. City of Tucson, 2006 WL 5917165, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2006). Thus, prudential standing requires the plaintiff to assert its own claims rather than the claims of another. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, made applicable in stay relief motions by Rule 9014, “generally falls within the prudential standing doctrine.” In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. at 398.

B. GMAC’s Standing

GMAC advances three different arguments in support of its claim to be a “party in interest” with standing to seek relief from stay. First, GMAC asserts it has standing because the Note was endorsed to GMAC and GMAC has physical possession of the Note. Second, GMAC asserts that by virtue of the MERS Assignment, it is a beneficiary of the DOT and entitled to enforce and foreclose the DOT under Arizona law. Third, GMAC asserts it has standing because it is the servicer of the Note. The court addresses each of GMAC’s claims in turn.

1. GMAC Has Not Demonstrated That It Is A Holder Of The Note

If GMAC is the holder of the Note, GMAC would be a party injured by the Debtor’s failure to pay it, thereby satisfying the constitutional standing requirement. GMAC would also be the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 because under ARIZ. REV. STAT. (“A.R.S.’) § 47-3301, the holder of a note has the right to enforce it.[ 2 ] However, as discussed below, GMAC did not prove it is the holder of the Note.

Under Arizona law, a holder is defined as “the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.” A.R.S. § 47-1201(B)(21)(a).[ 3 ] GMAC has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note because, while it was in possession of the Note at the evidentiary hearing, it failed to demonstrate that the Note is properly payable to GMAC. A special endorsement to GMAC was admitted into evidence with the Note. However, for the Endorsement to constitute part of the Note, it must be on “a paper affixed to the instrument.” A.R.S. § 47-3204; see also In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254, 261 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). Here, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Endorsement was affixed to the Note. The Endorsement is on a separate sheet of paper; there was no evidence that it was stapled or otherwise attached to the rest of the Note. Furthermore, when GMAC filed its proof of claim, the Endorsement was not included, which is a further indication that the allonge containing the Endorsement was not affixed to the Note.[ 4 ]

In Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs executed promissory notes which, after a series of transfers, came into the defendant’s possession. At issue was whether the defendant was the rightful owner of the notes. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to holder in due course status because the endorsements failed to meet the UCC’s fixation requirement. Id. at 168-69. The court relied on UCC section 3-202(2) [A.R.S. § 47-3204]: “An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Id. at 165. Since the endorsement page, indicating that the defendant was the holder of the note, was not attached to the note, the court found that the note had not been properly negotiated. Id. at 166-67. Thus, ownership of the note never transferred to the defendant. Applying that principle to the facts here, GMAC did not become a holder of the Note due to the improperly affixed special endorsement.

While the bankruptcy court in In re Nash, 49 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) found that holder in due course status existed even though an allonge was not properly affixed to an instrument, the court based its determination on the clear intention that the note assignment be physically attached because: (1) the assignment was signed and notarized the same day as the trust deed; (2) the assignment specifically referenced the escrow number; (3) the assignment identified the original note holder; and (4) the assignment recited that the note was to be attached to the assignment. Id. at 261.

In this case, however, there is no proof that the allonge containing the special endorsement from GreenPoint to GMAC was executed at or near the time the Note was executed. Furthermore, the Endorsement does not have any identifying numbers on it, such as an account number or an escrow number, nor does it reference the Note in any way. There is simply no indication that the allonge was appropriately affixed to the Note, in contradiction with the mandates of A.R.S. § 47-3204. Thus, there is no basis in this case to depart from the general rule that an endorsement on an allonge must be affixed to the instrument to be valid.

GMAC cannot overcome the problems with the unaffixed Endorsement by its physical possession of the Note because the Note was not endorsed in blank and, even if it was, the problem of the unaffixed endorsement would remain.[ 5 ] As a result, because GMAC failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Endorsement was proper, it has failed to demonstrate that it is the holder of the Note.

2. The MERS Assignment Of The DOT Did Not Provide GMAC With Standing

GMAC argues that it has standing to bring the Motion as the assignee of MERS.[ 6 ] In this case, MERS is named in the DOT as a beneficiary, solely as the “nominee” of GreenPoint, holding only “legal title” to the interests granted to GreenPoint under the DOT. A number of cases have held that such language confers no economic benefit on MERS. See, e.g., In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355, *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009); In re Mitchell, 2009 WL 1044368, *3-4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359, 367 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). As noted by the Sheridan court, MERS “collect[s] no money from [d]ebtors under the [n]ote, nor will it realize the value of the [p]roperty through foreclosure of the [d]eed of [t]rust in the event the [n]ote is not paid.” 2009 WL 631355 at *4.

Because MERS has no financial interest in the Note, it will suffer no injury if the Note is not paid and will realize no benefit if the DOT is foreclosed. Accordingly, MERS cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. GMAC, as MERS’ assignee of the DOT, “stands in the shoes” of the assignor, taking only those rights and remedies the assignor would have had. Hunnicutt Constr., Inc. v. Stewart Title & Trust of Tucson, Trust No. 3496, 187 Ariz. 301, 304 (Ct. App. 1996) citing Van Waters & Rogers v. Interchange Res., Inc., 14 Ariz. App. 414, 417 (1971); In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Because GMAC is MERS’ assignee, it cannot satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing either.[ 7 ]

3. GMAC Does Not Have Standing As The Servicer Of The Note

(a) Servicer’s Right To Collect Fees For Securitized Mortgages

Securitization of residential mortgages is “the process of aggregating a large number of notes secured by deeds of trust in what is called a mortgage pool, and then selling security interests in that pool of mortgages.” Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 536 (2002). The process begins with a borrower negotiating with a mortgage broker for the terms of the loan. Then, the mortgage broker either originates the loan in its own name or in the name of another entity, which presumably provides the money for the loan. Almost immediately, the broker transfers the loan to the funding entity. “This lender quickly sells the loan to a different financial entity, which pools the loan together with a host of other loans in a mortgage pool.” Id. at 538.

The assignee then transfers the mortgages in the pool to another entity, which in turn transfers the loans to a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”,) whose sole role is to hold the pool of mortgages. Id. at 539. “The transfer to the special purpose trust must constitute a true sale, so that the party transferring the assets reduces its potential liability on the loans and exchanges the fairly illiquid loans for much more liquid cash.” Id. at 542. Next, the SPV issues securities which the assignee sells to investors. Id. at 539.

Once the securities have been sold, the SPV is not actively involved. It “does not directly collect payments from the homeowners whose notes and deeds of trust are held by the SPV.” Id. at 544. Rather, servicers collect the principal and interest payments on behalf of the SPV. Id. Fees are associated with the servicing of loans in the pool. Therefore, GMAC would have constitutional standing if it is the servicer for the Note and DOT because it would suffer concrete injury by not being able to collect its servicing fees.[ 8 ]In re O’Kelley, 420 B.R. 18, 23 (D. Haw. 2009) . In this case, however, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Note and DOT were transferred to the Trust, and, without that evidence, there is no demonstration that GMAC is the servicer of the Note.

(b) There Is Insufficient Evidence That The Note Was Sold To Lehman And Became Part Of The Trust

When the Debtor executed the Note and DOT, GreenPoint was the original holder of the Note and the economic beneficiary of the DOT. GreenPoint, allegedly, transferred the Note to Lehman pursuant to the FISA. However, the term “mortgage loans” is not defined in the FISA and GMAC’s documents regarding the securitization of the Note and DOT provide no evidence of actual transfers of the Note and DOT to either the FISA or the Trust. Because such transfers must be “true sales,” they must be properly documented to be effective. Thus, to use an overused term, GMAC has failed “to connect the dots” to demonstrate that the Note and DOT were securitized. Accordingly, it is immaterial that GMAC is the servicer for the Trust.

C. Debtor’s Other Arguments

1. Securities Investors Are Not The Only Individuals Who Can Satisfy Standing Requirements When Dealing With A 362 Motion on a “Securitized” Mortgage

The Debtor argues that, in an asset securitization scheme, only the securities investors have standing to seek stay relief because they are the only parties with a financial interest in the securitized notes. However, because the Debtor executed the Note and received consideration (which he used to purchase the house), the contract is enforceable regardless of who provided the funding. In other words, the fact that the funds for a borrower’s loan are supplied by someone other than the loan originator, does not invalidate the loan or restrict enforcement of the loan contract to the parties who funded the loan. A number of cases and treatises recognize that consideration for a contract, including a promissory note, can be provided by a third party. See, e.g., DCM Ltd. P’ship v. Wang, 555 F. Supp. 2d 808, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Buffalo County v. Richards, 212 Neb. 826, 828-29 (Neb. 1982); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:20 (Richard A. Lord, 4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (2009).

Notes are regularly assigned and the assignment does not change the nature of the contract. The assignee merely steps into the shoes of the assignor. In re Boyajian, 367 B.R. 138, 145 (9th Cir. BAP 2007); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). No additional consideration is required, as opposed to a novation which creates a new obligation. Id. at 216-17 citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280, cmt. e. Therefore, the Debtor’s argument that the Note is unenforceable because the funder of the Note was not the payee fails. The Note is still valid and can be enforced by the party who has the right to enforce it under applicable Arizona law.

2. Proof Of A Note’s Entire Chain Of Ownership Is Not Necessary For Stay Relief

A movant for stay relief need only present evidence sufficient to present a colorable claim — not every piece of evidence that would be required to prove the right to foreclose under a state law judicial foreclosure proceeding is necessary. In re Emrich, 2009 WL 3816174, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009). Accordingly, not every movant for relief from stay has to provide a complete chain of a note’s assignment to obtain relief.

Arizona’s deed of trust statute does not require a beneficiary of a deed of trust to produce the underlying note (or its chain of assignment) in order to conduct a Trustee’s Sale. Blau v. Am.’s Serv. Co., 2009 WL 3174823, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2009); Mansour v. Cal-W. Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009); Diessner v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009). It would make no sense to require a creditor to demonstrate more to obtain stay relief than it needs to demonstrate under state law to conduct a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure. Moreover, if a note is endorsed in blank, it is enforceable as a bearer instrument. See In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009). Therefore, this Court declines to impose a blanket requirement that all movants must offer proof of a note’s entire chain of assignments to have standing to seek relief although there may be circumstances where, in order to establish standing, the movant will have to do so.

3. The Movant Has Not Violated Rule 9011

The Debtor argues that GMAC “violated Rule 7011″ by presenting insufficient and misleading evidence. Given that there is no Rule 7011, the Court assumes that the Debtor was actually referring to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Rule 9011 allows a court to impose sanctions for filing a frivolous suit. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). As noted at the evidentiary hearing, the Court did not find that GMAC filed its motion for relief stay in bad faith, nor does this Court believe GMAC filed its motion thinking it did not have proper evidentiary support. There are numerous, often conflicting, decisions on the issues of “real party in interest” and constitutional standing, and what evidence must be presented by a servicer seeking stay relief. The record in this case does not support imposition of 9011 sanctions.

VI. CONCLUSION

GMAC has not demonstrated that it has constitutional or prudential standing or is the real party in interest entitled to prosecute a motion for relief from stay.

Accordingly, its motion is DENIED without prejudice.


Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: adequate protection payments, adjustable rate promissory note, allonge, ARIZONA, Aurora Loan Services ("Aurora"), case or controversy, endorsement, evidentiary hearing, FISA, Flow Interim Servicing Agreement ("FISA"), GMAC as the sub-servicer, GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Trust ("Trust"), HERS, HOLLOWELL, Inc., Inc. ("GreenPoint", Lehman Brothers Holdings, Lehman Capital, Master Servicer, MERS, Mortgage Electronic registration Systems, Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement ("MLSAA"), Motion for Relief from Stay, motion to lift stay, prohibition on third-party standing, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, Reconstituted Servicing Agreement, Ronald Ryan, SASC, standing, Structured Asset Securities Corporation ("SASC"), third-party standing, trust, Trust Agreement, Tucson, U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), WEISBAND
Feb
01

Bankruptcy Judge Invalidates Securitization Payment Structure

A
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