- JQC Complaint | Florida Judges SELL OUT a View from the Bench. Oct 28th Ft. Lauderdale Protest Judicial Bias
- Road Trip | A View from the Bench Oct 28th Ft. Lauderdale Protest of Judicial Bias
- Victor Tobin of Marshall C. Watson along with the Akerman Senterfitt firm to Moderate a View From the Bench: Bankruptcy & Foreclosures – October 28
A View from the Bench (Foreclosure Mills) | Lawyers, Judges Debate Florida’s Foreclosure Backlog
Road Trip | A View from the Bench Oct 28th Ft. Lauderdale Protest of Judicial Bias
- JQC Complaint | Florida Judges SELL OUT a View from the Bench. Oct 28th Ft. Lauderdale Protest Judicial Bias
- Victor Tobin of Marshall C. Watson along with the Akerman Senterfitt firm to Moderate a View From the Bench: Bankruptcy & Foreclosures – October 28
- DOES THE CORRUPTION EVER STOP!!! Broward Chief Judge Victor Tobin Gets Promotion, Leaves Bench For New Position At Marshall C. Watson
Two worlds and in between
A discussion about why nation-by-nation bankruptcy fails when dealing with global enterprises, here.
Video: Another Democratic Congressman who, er, hates Congress
Bankruptcy -- financial, political, and otherwise.
Remember when Democrats in Congress and out used to screech about the dictatorship of the “unitary executive” during the Bush administration? Good times, good times. For the second time this month, Nicholas Ballasly of the Daily Caller finds a Democratic Representative that cheerleads for the idea of a President bypassing Congress, evading limitations on power, [...]
JQC Complaint | Florida Judges SELL OUT a View from the Bench. Oct 28th Ft. Lauderdale Protest Judicial Bias
- Victor Tobin of Marshall C. Watson along with the Akerman Senterfitt firm to Moderate a View From the Bench: Bankruptcy & Foreclosures – October 28
- KABOOM | Freddie Mac Takes Foreclosure Files from Fort Lauderdale-based Marshall C. Watson Law Firm
- Opinion Piece on Florida Rocket Dockets and Robo Judges by J. Thomas McGrady – Judges Fulfill Proper Role in State’s Foreclosure Crisis
Surprise: Head of Energy Department’s loan program steps down amid Solyndra probe
Hmmm.
Is one sacrificial lamb enough or will Steven Chu be next to decide that he wants to spend more time with his family? Jonathan Silver, who was named executive director of DOE’s Loan Programs Office in November 2009, has come under fire from congressional Republicans since the solar manufacturer Solyndra declared bankruptcy Aug. 31 after [...]
Research: Despite Solyndra, American people believe green energy is a sound investment
Not dinner table conversation.
Recent survey and focus group research conducted in Ohio and California by Public Opinion Strategies and Fairbank, Maslin, Maulin, Metz & Associates reveals that “Solyndra” is a scandal known mainly to news junkies — and that many Americans remain committed to clean energy investments. Just 11 percent of 650 Ohio voters surveyed after Solyndra declared bankruptcy [...]
Missouri stimulus beneficiary hosting a $25,000-a-head fundraiser for Obama
Another Obama crony.
Against the backdrop of the Solyndra bankruptcy, what might have seemed innocuous a few months ago seems more than a little sketchy now. Tom Carnahan is at the helm of Wind Capital Group, an investment firm that received a $107 million federal tax credit to develop a wind power facility in his home state of [...]
Victor Tobin of Marshall C. Watson along with the Akerman Senterfitt firm to Moderate a View From the Bench: Bankruptcy & Foreclosures – October 28
Pending bankruptcy didn’t keep Solyndra from sending cash to lobbyists
Investments.
The collapse of Solyndra looks inevitable in retrospect — and for auditors who reviewed their loan application that the Obama White House expedited and to the employees who worked there, it looked inevitable before it happened, too. This has many wondering just what business model Solyndra used to keep the company going as long as [...]
Pending bankruptcy didn’t keep Solyndra from sending cash to lobbyists
Investments.
The collapse of Solyndra looks inevitable in retrospect — and for auditors who reviewed their loan application that the Obama White House expedited and to the employees who worked there, it looked inevitable before it happened, too. This has many wondering just what business model Solyndra used to keep the company going as long as [...]
We’re Simply Not Going to Win this Battle in Courts Alone…
We’re Simply Not Going to Win this Battle in Courts Alone…
As I sit here today, I’ve written and posted over 500 articles covering the financial and foreclosure crises… posted a few podcasts as well… and traveled around the country meeting with many of those involved in the fight against the servicers on behalf of homeowners. And I’ve come to the conclusion that we will not win this very important fight in the courts alone… at least not in my lifetime.
I realize that we continue to see encouraging decisions come from various courts around the country… a helpful bankruptcy decision shows up in Arizona or California… courts in Massachusetts, New Jersey or New York deliver another positive outcome… the courts in Nevada or Vermont have made other positive changes related to foreclosures… and the State of Hawaii passes a new law that offers the promise of mandatory mediation… all positive news in various pockets of the country… but no substantive improvements for homeowners in broader terms.
But it’s not enough. The truth is that I simply do not see the reality of this crisis changing as a result of continuing the status quo. After all, the definition of insanity is doing the same thing and expecting a different result, right?
So, here are the facts…
- At least half of the people in this country still don’t know anything about the foreclosure crisis… many don’t even recognize it as a “crisis” at all. To them it’s just irresponsible borrowers who bought homes they can’t afford.
- This is true about American homeowners and about many in state legislatures and in the media.
- Writing articles is one thing… seeing the crisis as told through the real people who face it every day is another thing altogether. We need to tell the story in documentary style film.
- “Inside Job” told the story of what the bankers have done, but it’s only a part of the story… a part of the tragedy.
- The banksters get away with what they do every day because not enough people know about their behavior. We need to show the country what’s really going on.
- I want to bring to the big screen the real story of the foreclosure crisis… the story no one has told before… but I need your help… your willingness to be filmed… and your financial support.
During my professional career I’ve produced and won numerous awards for documentary style video productions made on behalf of large corporations. I’ve also told the story in written form at least as much, if not more, than anyone in the country.
Help me bring the story to the big screen by donating to the production. It cannot be done without your help. It’s that simple.
We plan to release the final film by the end of this calendar year. This is an election year. We can’t afford to wait. Please help me change how this country views the tragedy that is the foreclosure crisis. And by the way… Mandelman Matters is a California Nonprofit Corporation.
Mandelman out.
CDS News
I've got a Dealbook post up about an interesting dispute that has cropped up with regard to the definition of "Bankruptcy Credit Event" as used in the ISDA CDS definitions.
Keeping Up With
For those Slips readers who are not regular Bloomberg people, I highly recommend today's bit from Bill Rochelle about the 5th Circuit's recent bankruptcy decisions, and the role of Chief Judge Jones.
Stern Consequences
The folks at the Weil bankruptcy blog do a great service in summarizing some of the initial consequences of the US Supreme Court's Stern v. Marshall decision. Suffice it to say, Mr. Chief Justice Robert's optomisim may have fallen. At the first hurdle.
"Homeowners Need Help"
That's the headline of the lead editorial today in The New York Times. The Gray Lady urges the Obama Administration to adopt solutions that reduce principal to restore homeowner equity as an essential step to economic recovery. Principal pay down in bankruptcy gets a mention.
Surprise! California high-speed rail cost explodes
The Bankruptcy Express.
Do I hate to say, “I told you so“? Er … not really: Building tracks for the first section of California’s proposed high-speed rail line will cost $2.9 billion to $6.8 billion more than originally estimated, raising questions about the affordability of the nation’s most ambitious rail project at a time when its planning and [...]
Ain’t That the Truth
"[L]et us stress being a professor specializing in bankruptcy is not a power position, even at Harvard Law School."
That high truth-value statement is from Yves Smith's post over at Naked Capitalism pondering whether Elizabeth Warren should run for president, a post that comes across as more of a thought experiment on what Obama's failure to appoint Warren to the CFPB post means for the political left. But, I like the idea of blogging for Credit Slips as a step toward the presidency.
Strategic Defaults Don’t Really Exist… Who would have thought that? Oh, that’s right… ME.
Hey, it’s about time! Finally someone who might be listened to has realized that there’s actually NOT a group of homeowners in this country that can afford their mortgage payments no problem, but have just decided not to pay them because they’re underwater. You know, the type with plenty of cash on hand, that hasn’t lost a job or had a real hardship, but just doesn’t like the fact that his or her house is worth less than they owe and so decides renting would be better.
Blogger Rortybomb has published a piece on Seeking Alpha that should set the record straight… finally. It’s titled: Strategic Default: Watch as Elites Freak Out About a Trend That Isn’t Happening.
I swear, I’m thinking of just re-posting my articles from last year, this year… maybe they’ll make more sense to more people the second time around.
Here’s what Rortybomb has to say:
Strategic default is not a phenomenon in any empirical data, but it is a boogeyman that needs to be ruthlessly pounded on before people realize that bankruptcy is something they pay for in their mortgages, and it is their ultimate safeguard against abusive practices. It’s telling to watch financial elites freak out about the prospect of strategic defaults waves, even as they don’t happen. It shows what really worries them about the state of the economy, about where they may not have control.
Talk about a dog that didn’t bark in 2010. The funny part about this rhetorical crackdown is that there’s been no wave of strategic default people can point to. Homeowners really value their promises and are doing anything they can to try and do right by them, and the industry is using that leverage over them anyway they can.
You’ll sometimes hear the number that a third of defaults are strategic. That number comes a survey conducted by Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. They asked random people if they’d strategically default if their home was X% underwater, took their answers, and projected them onto the actual defaults and how underwater they were. There was no actual look at household budgets in creating this number. I’m a fan of Zingales’ writings, but this is simply not useful for the debate. There’s nothing here.
REALLY? WHO WOULD HAVE THUNK IT? BESIDES ME, THAT IS.
I don’t like to do this, but I’ve been trying to point this nonsense out for so many months now, I can’t even keep track. I didn’t need a study to know this, I come up with my conclusions the old fashioned way… by taking the time to actually talk with thousands of America’s homeowners, hundreds every month since 2008. I know… there are plenty that didn’t believe me at the time, but they come around six months later when some study finally points out what I’ve been saying all along.
Here’s what I wrote some months back in reference to Howie Hubler’s idiotic new business venture and it’s new product that was designed to help stop strategic defaults. Here’s a link, in case you missed it, or weren’t able to read far enough into it to get the point. Howie Hubler’s Loan Value Group… Proof That Wall Street Has No Idea What’s Happening on Main Street…
And here’s an excerpt from that article:
Here’s what Loan Value Group’s Website says about why people default on their mortgages:
Once home equity becomes hopelessly negative, it is no longer in the borrower’s interest to continue paying, even if he or she can afford the payments. Some of these borrowers then default.
Today, 29% of all US mortgages, 15 million homes, have negative equity.
Analysis suggests that over 10 million mortgages are at significant risk of strategic default.
Boy, I’d love to take a look at that “analysis” that “suggests that over 10 million mortgages are at significant risk of strategic default,” mostly because that analysis would also have to simultaneously suggest that far fewer people are at risk of foreclosure because they can’t afford their mortgages, which is what President Obama has said is stopping him from offering more help to stabilizing the housing market.
Now, as many of my readers I’m sure know, I’ve spent the last 18 months talking with literally thousands of homeowners from just about all 50 states, and I’m talking seven days a week, with days so long they’ve too often seen me going to bed as the sun comes up. Suffice it to say, I’ve heard and read just about every take on the foreclosure crisis that could be taken. There’s only one thing I have never heard a homeowner say about their primary residence:
Yes, we can afford the payment no problem, but we decided to bail out anyway just because of our negative equity position. Yep, that was it… we just couldn’t sleep at night knowing that we’re underwater.
In fact, to the contrary… I’ve heard from countless homeowners willing to stay in their homes indefinitely if they could just get some sort of modification that will allow them to do so… regardless of how far underwater they are today.
Yet, in stark contrast to my real life experiences talking with homeowners, there is a fast growing story that tells a tale of homeowners simply walking out of their homes and refusing to pay their mortgages… even though they can afford the payments… ostensibly because they’ve pulled out their trusty HP financial calculators and determined, I suppose using some sort of time value of money-net present value calculation as compared with close substitutes and detailed alternative cost analyses, that their financial interests would be better served strategically defaulting. So ultimately, as the story goes, they are moving out, leaving their otherwise affordable mortgage debt behind them, either because they reside in a state that doesn’t allow for deficiency judgments, or via filing for bankruptcy.
NONSENSE. Not a chance. It’s simply not happening… yet, anyway. It may happen en masse at some point in the future, and perhaps it should be happening in larger number today, but to-date… sorry, no… it’s not true.
I said a lot more along those lines in that article, but if you can’t bring yourself to read the whole thing, at least you get the idea…
Next, here’s an excerpt from my article tearing apart of Donald Bisenius, Executive Vice President in charge of Freddie Mac’s Single Family Credit Guarantee Business, Freddie Mac Has a Message for Strategic Defaulters? Yeah, Well I Have a Message for Freddie Mac.
“…a new and growing concern has emerged: strategic defaults. In other words, borrowers who have the financial means to make monthly mortgage payments, but choose not to do so and, instead, purposely default on their loans.”
Yep, that’s exactly what’s happening in this country today. In fact, the entire foreclosure crisis is nothing more than a bunch of aging boomers deciding that it’s so much hipper to rent.
I’ve personally spoken with several thousand homeowners from all over the country, hundreds that have considered walking away from their mortgages, or are now in the process of doing so, and let me assure you, Don-O, your description bears no resemblance to anything that’s actually happening. And a strategic default isn’t a new, growing investment strategy, DB, it’s still someone losing their home.
Not one of the homeowners that I’ve heard from describes their situation in such happy-Sunday-in-the-suburbs type terms. The homeowners I know are undergoing the worst turmoil of their lives, and having exhausted every other avenue (supposedly) available to them, have come to the inescapable conclusion that walking away is their best… no, their only option. Don-Don makes it sound like they reached the decision over highballs at the 19th hole after wrapping up an afternoon on the links. Did I already call him a jackass? Rats.
And then, in my tearing apart of the Fannie Mae, in my article, Well, Would You Look At That… Homeowners Scared the Heck Out of Fannie Mae, I said the following:
No one is walking away from their home because they weren’t willing to make a good faith effort to find an alternative resolution by working with their servicer. Never happens, or happened. And if it has started to happen, which I still don’t believe, it’s only in response to the treatment of homeowners by their servicers. And true to form, the Wall Street Journal writes a story about homeowners happy about their decision to strategically default, some other news program interviews someone going to Hawaii as a result of not having to pay a mortgage payment, and you… you don’t bother to find out what’s really going on… you start with the threats.
I’m quite sure, if I took the time to find them, I could point to a dozen or more article I’ve written that said the same thing, but why bother?
Here’s my real point… up until now there hasn’t been any serious number of so-called “strategic defaulters,” but there will be soon if we don’t do something to stop the foreclosure crisis. In the words of James Earl Jones in the movie, “Field of Dreams”…
They will come, Ray, they will most definitely come.
I’m not guessing, folks, I’m telling you as sure as I’m typing this that there are feelings among homeowners of anger and frustration that are fast becoming utter hopelessness and when that takes hold, strategic default won’t just be the boogey-man, it’ll be very real and very much unstoppable.
It’s funny to me… in a very sad sort of way that last year when I was writing about HAMP not working and loans not getting modified, almost everyone else in the media was saying the opposite. Then the numbers finally came out towards the end of 2009, and all of a sudden the press started saying, “Gee, maybe HAMP isn’t working.”
The problem is that now HAMP and loan modifications are working better than they ever have before, and now the press is convinced that it’s next to impossible to get your loan modified. In point of fact, I can’t remember the last time I saw someone with a REST Report showing they’re qualified for a loan modification, lose a home. But I see what’s happening… people read what the press is saying and are hesitant to even try to get their loan modified. Great… well, isn’t that just friggin’ great.
I don’t know what else I can do… except to say… don’t listen to the press about loan modifications, or anything related to loan modifications. By the time they figure out what’s really going on, it’ll be over or the reverse will be true.
Stay tuned… I’m going to turn things up a notch with an article on The State of Loan Modifications and the REST Report… later this week. Don’t miss it.
Mandelman out.
Excellent National Article That is an Indictment of The Florida Foreclosure Process
It is critical to note that the court process that has developed in Florida is being maligned and properly criticized by national observers…read on:
The facts are that about 95% of the Florida foreclosure cases get slam dunked without so much as a whimper from anyone. The foreclosure mills don’t even come into court to get their summary judgments, they just call them in. Actually, they get the judges to call them. You see these mill lawyers are very busy beavers and court and due process and proper evidence are just nuisances that should be avoided at all cost. So the most time a “mill” lawyer has to spend on a foreclosure case is about 90 seconds on a call in to the judge’s chambers…yup, not even in open court. Today, in America, a consumer can lose a home over the phone. This reminds me of the old TV show called “Dialing for Dollars” but this time in reverse. Now the mills are still dialing in for dollars but also securing an order of foreclosure at the same time. And, by the way, I could possibly agree to own a foreclosure or bankruptcy mill if the firm made $2,500.00 for 90 seconds of “real lawyer” work. It is not bad money if you can get away with and still sleep at night. I have trouble sleeping anyway so this would never work for me.
I don’t like that our courts have become a national joke in the midst of this foreclosure catastrophe. The phenomena of a nameless voice on the other end of a phone dialing in for hearings really disturbs me. I really wish more press and advocates were watching and documenting just how absurd the process is. I find it especially disturbing that mill attorneys from across town don’t find it compelling enough to attend these hearings in person and that our judges and their staff spend their day juggling phones in favor of these mills.
Really insulting was a recent phone in hearing where the foreclosure mill attorney asked to have the argument repeated because he had just returned from the bathroom and had missed the argument….yes, this occurs in an American courtroom.
Read the full article here.
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Student Loans Non-Dischargeable? — NOT SO FAST
If the government guarantee was waived in whole or in part, which I am sure is the case, then the rationale for non-dischargeability disappears. So I am suggesting that the assumption that the student loan is non-dischargeable should be challenged based upon the individual facts of your student loan. If it was securitized and it most likely was, then the party seeking to enforce the debt must prove that the government guarantee still applies. Otherwise it should be treated like any other unsecured debt.
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Editor’s comment: Fact: Nearly all finance was securitized and still is. Ron Lieber talks below about efforts to change the law so student loans could be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Good idea. But I’m not so sure it is necessary to change the law.
The entire student loan structure, as President Obama has pointed out, is just plain wrong. Somehow loans that were provided by government anyway became guaranteed by government and then actually “funded” by banks. The banks could charge whatever interest they wanted, which frequently rose to usurious levels and if the student didn’t pay, then the government did, which is the way it was before they let private banks into the mix.
The effect was to burden students with loans that were impossible to pay off given the economic context of unemployment, underemployment and stagnant median income. So the prospective students frequently put off the education or avoided it entirely because the economics did not make sense. Those that did take the plunge are “underwater” just like U.S. Homeowners all because of financial chicanery.
To top things off they made student loans —- private student loans — non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. The theory was that since the government was doing students the favor of providing a guarantee of the loans, the loans would be more available, thus increasing liquidity in the student loan market. Since the net effect was a gusher of money pouring into private banks from the pockets of students, marketing efforts (including payoffs in student adviser facilities on campus) did in fact lure students into these ridiculous arrangements.
Enter securitization: Since the private bank was guaranteed against loss, this provided the rationale for this lock-up system enslaving students before their careers even begin. But virtually ALL private banks were simply paid a fee for fronting the marketing of the loan which was funded with investor money because the loans were securitized before they were ever granted and thus the money and the risk was already resolved before the “underwriting” of the loan.
Like the mortgage loans, underwriting standards were dropped completely in favor of parameters set by Wall Street. The appearance of underwriting was preserved, but like mortgages, not very well. Like the mortgages, credit enhancements were added to the mix adding co-obligors right in the pooling and servicing agreements and assignments and assumption agreements, including insurance, credit default swaps etc.
Thus the “lender” that originating the Loan was what? A pretender lender whoa advanced no funds or capital of their own. Since the originating lender made the election of laying off the risk into slices and pieces and credit enhancements, they, in my opinion, waived the government guarantee.
If the government guarantee was waived in whole or in part, which I am sure is the case, then the rationale for non-dischargeability disappears. So I am suggesting that the assumption that the student loan is non-dischargeable should be challenged based upon the individual facts of your student loan. If it was securitized and it most likely was, then the party seeking to enforce the debt must prove that the government guarantee still applies. Otherwise it should be treated like any other unsecured debt.
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June 4, 2010Student Debt and a Push for Fairness
By RON LIEBER
If you run up big credit card bills buying a new home theater system and can’t pay it off after a few years, bankruptcy judges can get rid of the debt. They may even erase loans from a casino.
But if you borrow money to get an education and can’t afford the loan payments after a few years of underemployment, that’s another matter entirely. It’s nearly impossible to get rid of the debt in bankruptcy court, even if it’s a private loan from for-profit lenders like Citibank or the student loan specialist Sallie Mae.
This part of the bankruptcy law is little known outside education circles, but ever since it went into effect in 2005, it’s inspired shock and often rage among young adults who got in over their heads. Today, they find themselves in the same category as people who can’t discharge child support payments or criminal fines.
Now, even Sallie Mae, tired of being a punching bag for consumer advocates and hoping to avoid changes that would hurt its business too severely, has agreed that the law needs alteration. Bills in the Senate and House of Representatives would make the rules for private loans less strict, now that Congress has finished the job of getting banks out of the business of originating federal student loans.
With this latest initiative, however, lawmakers face a question that’s less about banking than it is about social policy or political calculation. At a time when voters are furious at their neighbors for getting themselves into mortgage trouble, do legislators really want to change the bankruptcy laws so that even more people can walk away from their debts?
There are two main types of student loans. Under the proposed changes, borrowers would remain on the hook for federal loans, like Stafford and Perkins loans, as they have been for many years. To most people, this seems fair because the federal government (and ultimately taxpayers) stand behind these loans. There are also many payment plans and even forgiveness programs for some borrowers.
In 2005, however, Congress made the bankruptcy rules the same for the second kind of debt, private loans underwritten by profit-making banks. These have no government guarantees and come with fewer repayment options. Undergraduates can also borrow much more than they can with federal loans, making trouble more likely.
Destitute borrowers can still discharge student loan debt if they experience “undue hardship.” But that condition is nearly impossible to prove, absent a severe disability.
Meanwhile, the volume of private loans, which are most popular among students attending profit-making schools, has grown rapidly in the last two decades as students have tried to close the gap between the rising price of tuition and what they can afford. In the 2007-8 school year, the latest period for which good data is available, about one third of all recipients of bachelor’s degrees had used a private loan at some point before they graduated, according to College Board research.
Tightening credit caused total private loan volume to fall by about half to roughly $11 billion in the 2008-9 school year, according to the College Board. Tim Ranzetta, founder of Student Lending Analytics, figures it fell an additional 24 percent this last academic year, though his estimate doesn’t include some state-based nonprofit lenders.
There is no strong evidence that young adults would line up at bankruptcy court in the event of a change. That gives Democrats and university groups hope that Congress could succeed in making the laws less strict.
In Congressional hearings on the efforts to change the rule, last year and then in April, no lender was present to make the case for the status quo. Instead, it fell to lawyers and financiers who work for them. They made the following points.
BANKRUPTCIES WOULD RISE At the April hearing, John Hupalo, managing director for student loans at Samuel A. Ramirez and Company, made the most obvious case against any change. “With no assets to lose, an education in hand, why not discharge the loan without ever making a payment to the lender?” he said.
Once you set aside this questionable presumption of mendacity among the young, there are actually plenty of practical reasons why not. “People don’t like to go through bankruptcy,” said Representative Steve Cohen, Democrat of Tennessee, who introduced the House bill that would change the rules. “It’s not like going to get a milkshake.”
Andy Winchell, a bankruptcy lawyer in Summit, N.J., likens student loan debt to tattoos: They’re easy to get, people tend to get them when they’re young, and they’re awfully hard to get rid of.
And he would remind clients of a couple of things. First, you generally can’t make another bankruptcy filing and discharge more debt for many years. So if you, in essence, cry wolf with a filing to erase your student loans, you’ll be in a real bind if you then face crushing medical debt two years later.
Then there’s the damage to your credit report. While it doesn’t remain there forever, the blemish can have an enormous impact on young people trying to establish themselves with an employer or buy a home.
Finally, you’re going to have to persuade a lawyer to take your case. And if it seems that you’re simply shirking your obligations, many lawyers will kick you out of their offices. “It’s not easy to find a dishonest bankruptcy attorney who is going to risk their license to practice law on a case they don’t believe in,” Mr. Winchell said.
Sallie Mae can live with a change, so long as there’s a waiting period before anyone can try to discharge the debts. “Sallie Mae continues to support reform that would allow federal and private student loans to be dischargeable in bankruptcy for those who have made a good-faith effort to repay their student loans over a five-to-seven-year period and still experience financial difficulty,” the company said in a prepared statement.
While there is no waiting period in either of the current bills, Mr. Cohen said he could live with one if that’s what it took to get a bill through Congress. “Philosophy and policy can get you on the Rachel Maddow show, but what you want to do is pass legislation and affect people’s lives,” he said, referring to the host of an MSNBC news program.
BANKS WOULDN’T LEND ANYMORE Private student loans are an unusual line of business, given that lenders hand over money to students who might not finish their studies and have uncertain earning prospects even if they do get a degree. “Borrowers are not creditworthy to begin with, almost by definition,” Mr. Hupalo said in an interview this week.
But banks that have stayed in the business (and others, like credit unions, that have entered recently) have made adjustments that will probably protect them far more than any alteration in the bankruptcy laws will hurt. For instance, it’s become much harder to get many private loans without a co-signer. That means lenders have two adults on the hook for repayment instead of just one.
BORROWING COSTS WOULD RISE They probably would rise a bit, at least at first as lenders assume the worst (especially if Congress applies any change to outstanding loans instead of limiting it to future ones). But this might not be such a bad thing.
Private loans exist because the cost of college is often so much higher than what undergraduates can borrow through federal loans, which have annual limits. Some lenders may be predatory and many borrowers are irresponsible, but this debate would be much less loud if tuition were not rising so quickly.
So if loans cost more and lenders underwrite fewer of them, people will have less money to spend on their education. Some fly-by-night profit-making schools might cease to exist, and all but the most popular private nonprofit universities might finally be forced to reckon with their costs and course offerings.
Prices might come down. And young adults just getting started in life might be less likely to face a nasty choice between decades of oppressive debt payments and visiting a bankruptcy judge before starting an entry-level job.
Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, expert witness, GTC | Honor, HERS, interest rates, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, Student Loans Tagged: Andy Winchell, bankruptcy, Citibank, Democrat, discharge, John Hupalo, Ny Times, Ron Lieber, Sallie MAe, Samuel ramirez and Company, Steve Cohen, student debt, student loans, tennessee
BlackRock Shifts: Principal Reduction OK in Bankruptcy
Fighting Foreclosures
From the start, the central concern about President Obama’s antiforeclosure effort has been that it would postpone foreclosures but ultimately not prevent enough to ease the economic strain from mass defaults. That concern seems increasingly justified.
In the first quarter of 2010, there were 930,000 foreclosure filings — an increase of 7 percent from the previous quarter and 16 percent from the first three months of 2009, according to recent data from RealtyTrac, an online marketer of foreclosed properties. The surge seems to indicate that homes that were in the foreclosure pipeline are now being lost for good.
The administration’s figures are not encouraging either. The Treasury reported recently that as of March, nearly 228,000 troubled loans qualified under the Obama plan for long-term payment reductions; another 108,000 long-term modifications were pending. That’s up from February, but still far behind the need. Currently, some six million borrowers are more than 60 days delinquent.
Three oversight groups have issued reports in the past month criticizing the administration’s effort and predicting that it would fall far short of its goal of helping four million borrowers by the end of 2012.
And on Tuesday, officials from JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo told a Congressional panel that they were not inclined to fully embrace the administration’s latest foreclosure-prevention plan. Announced in late March, it calls for lenders to modify troubled mortgages by cutting the loan principal, which restores some equity to borrowers while lowering the payment. The bankers were unpersuasive. They generally objected to large-scale principal reductions, even though the administration’s plan applies relatively narrowly to borrowers who are deeply indebted and meet various other criteria.
The testimony was more proof that relying on lenders to voluntarily rework troubled loans is not working.
The hearing investigated a specific obstacle to widespread modifications: Investors, including pension funds and mutual funds, often hold the first mortgages. Banks often hold home-equity loans and other second mortgages. Investors reasonably believe that second liens should be reduced before the primary mortgage is modified, but banks balk at that because it would prompt write-offs they don’t want.
Some investors, notably the powerhouse group BlackRock, have called for a special bankruptcy process to resolve the standoff. The court would seek to reduce bankrupt borrowers’ total debt to affordable levels, starting with unsecured debt like credit cards, then undersecured debt, like second mortgages, and then, if necessary, the primary mortgage debt.
We have long called for using bankruptcy court to help resolve the foreclosure crisis. A big advantage of bankruptcy over government-subsidized modifications is that bankruptcy is a difficult process that does not entice anyone to purposely default in order to get better repayment terms.
Banks have argued for the status quo, in which bankruptcy judges are not allowed to modify the terms of primary mortgages, and they have prevailed in Congress and, apparently, within the administration. The result is an ongoing foreclosure crisis. It is time to revive the fight to open the courthouse door to bankrupt homeowners.
Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, foreclosure, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: BlackRock, JPMorgan Chase, RealtyTrac, Wells Fargo
Lehman dissection provides clues for discovery and motion practice
Lehman Channeled Risks Through ‘Alter Ego’ Firm
By LOUISE STORY and ERIC DASH
It was like a hidden passage on Wall Street, a secret channel that enabled billions of dollars to flow through Lehman Brothers.
In the years before its collapse, Lehman used a small company — its “alter ego,” in the words of a former Lehman trader — to shift investments off its books.
The firm, called Hudson Castle, played a crucial, behind-the-scenes role at Lehman, according to an internal Lehman document and interviews with former employees. The relationship raises new questions about the extent to which Lehman obscured its financial condition before it plunged into bankruptcy.
While Hudson Castle appeared to be an independent business, it was deeply entwined with Lehman. For years, its board was controlled by Lehman, which owned a quarter of the firm. It was also stocked with former Lehman employees.
None of this was disclosed by Lehman, however.
Entities like Hudson Castle are part of a vast financial system that operates in the shadows of Wall Street, largely beyond the reach of banking regulators. These entities enable banks to exchange investments for cash to finance their operations and, at times, make their finances look stronger than they are.
Critics say that such deals helped Lehman and other banks temporarily transfer their exposure to the risky investments tied to subprime mortgages and commercial real estate. Even now, a year and a half after Lehman’s collapse, major banks still undertake such transactions with businesses whose names, like Hudson Castle’s, are rarely mentioned outside of footnotes in financial statements, if at all.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is examining various creative borrowing tactics used by some 20 financial companies. A Congressional panel investigating the financial crisis also plans to examine such deals at a hearing in May to focus on Lehman and Bear Stearns, according to two people knowledgeable about the panel’s plans.
Most of these deals are legal. But certain Lehman transactions crossed the line, according to the account of the bank’s demise prepared by an examiner of the bank. Hudson Castle was not mentioned in that report, released last month, which concluded that some of Lehman’s bookkeeping was “materially misleading.” The report did not say that Hudson was involved in the misleading accounting.
At several points, Lehman did transactions greater than $1 billion with Hudson vehicles, but it is unclear how much money was involved since 2001.
Still, accounting experts say the shadow financial system needs some sunlight.
“How can anyone — regulators, investors or anyone — understand what’s in these financial statements if they have to dig 15 layers deep to find these kinds of interlocking relationships and these kinds of transactions?” said Francine McKenna, an accounting consultant who has examined the financial crisis on her blog, re: The Auditors. “Everybody’s talking about preventing the next crisis, but they can’t prevent the next crisis if they don’t understand all these incestuous relationships.”
The story of Lehman and Hudson Castle begins in 2001, when the housing bubble was just starting to inflate. That year, Lehman spent $7 million to buy into a small financial company, IBEX Capital Markets, which later became Hudson Castle.
From the start, Hudson Castle lived in Lehman’s shadow. According to a 2001 memorandum given to The New York Times, as well as interviews with seven former employees at Lehman and Hudson Castle, Lehman exerted an unusual level of control over the firm. Lehman, the memorandum said, would serve “as the internal and external ‘gatekeeper’ for all business activities conducted by the firm.”
The deal was proposed by Kyle Miller, who worked at Lehman. In the memorandum, Mr. Miller wrote that Lehman’s investment in Hudson Castle would give the bank and its clients access to financing while preventing “headline risk” if any of its deals went south. It would also reduce Lehman’s “moral obligation” to support its off-balance sheet vehicles, he wrote. The arrangement would maximize Lehman’s control over Hudson Castle “without jeopardizing the off-balance sheet accounting treatment.”
Mr. Miller became president of Hudson Castle and brought several Lehman employees with him. Through a Hudson Castle spokesman, Mr. Miller declined a request for an interview.
The spokesman did not dispute the 2001 memorandum but said the relationship with Lehman had evolved. After 2004, “all funding decisions at Hudson Castle were solely made by the management team and neither the board of directors nor Lehman Brothers participated in or influenced those decisions in any way,” he said, adding that Lehman was only a tenth of Hudson’s revenue.
Still, Lehman never told its shareholders about the arrangement. Nor did Moody’s choose to mention it in its credit ratings reports on Hudson Castle’s vehicles. Former Lehman workers, who spoke on the condition that they not be named because of confidentiality agreements with the bank, offered conflicting accounts of the bank’s relationship with Hudson Castle.
One said Lehman bought into Hudson Castle to compete with the big commercial banks like Citigroup, which had a greater ability to lend to corporate clients. “There were no bad intentions around any of this stuff,” this person said.
But another former employee said he was leery of the arrangement from the start. “Lehman wanted to have a company it controlled, but to the outside world be able to act like it was arm’s length,” this person said.
Typically, companies are required to disclose only material investments or purchases of public companies. Hudson Castle was neither.
Nonetheless, Hudson Castle was central to some Lehman deals up until the bank collapsed.
“This should have been disclosed, given how critical this relationship was,” said Elizabeth Nowicki, a professor at Boston University and a former lawyer at the S.E.C. “Part of the problems with all these bank failures is there were a lot of secondary actors — there were lawyers, accountants, and here you have a secondary company that was helping conceal the true state of Lehman.”
Until 2004, Hudson had an agreement with Lehman that blocked it from working with the investment bank’s competitors, but in 2004, that deal ended, and Lehman reduced its number of board seats to one, from five, according to two people with direct knowledge of the situation and an internal Hudson Castle document. Lehman remained Hudson’s largest shareholder, and its management remained close to important Lehman officials.
Hudson Castle created at least four separate legal entities to borrow money in the markets by issuing short-term i.o.u.’s to investors. It then used that money to make loans to Lehman and other financial companies, often via repurchase agreements, or repos. In repos, banks typically sell assets and promise to buy them back at a set price in the future.
One of the vehicles that Hudson Castle created was called Fenway, which was often used to lend to Lehman, including in the summer of 2008, as the investment bank foundered. Because of that relationship, Hudson Castle is now the second-largest creditor in the Lehman Estate, after JPMorgan Chase. Hudson Castle, which is still in business, doing similar work for other banks, bought out Lehman’s stake last year. The firm’s spokesman said Hudson operated independently in the Fenway deal in the summer of 2008.
Hudson Castle might have walked away earlier if not for Fenway’s ties to Lehman. Lehman itself bought $3 billion of Fenway notes just before its bankruptcy that, in turn, were used to back a loan from Fenway to a Lehman subsidiary. The loan was secured by part of Lehman’s investment in a California property developer, SunCal, which also collapsed. At the time, other lenders were already growing uneasy about dealing with Lehman.
Further complicating the arrangement, Lehman later pledged those Fenway notes to JPMorgan as collateral for still other loans as Lehman began to founder. When JPMorgan realized the circular relationship, “JPMorgan concluded that Fenway was worth practically nothing,” according the report prepared by the court examiner of Lehman.
Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: accounting, creditor, DEBTOR, discovery, enforcement of obligation, Lehman, motino practice, Obligation, unsecured obligationunsecured note
MERS Cover-Up of REAL INVESTOR
More and more authorities are holding that in order for a claimant to prove itself to be the real party in interest to support a proof of claim or motion for relief from stay in bankruptcy, as well as to prove itself to be a holder in due course, they have to prove the entire chain of “ownership” and “holdership” of the Note complete with proof of “value paid to purchase the note ownership.” – Lane Houk
Thanks to Ron Ryan
Editor’s note: If you really think about it there is no reason for MERS to exist EXCEPT to hide transactions under a veil of a “private” association of members, sidestepping the recording statues of every state and fooling Judges, Lawyers and homeowners around the state. Ron came up with the suspicion that Wells Fargo, HSBC and others were posting false entries on ownership of the note so as to dissuade homeowners from a “real party in interest” challenge.
He’s right and the information is starting to pop up showing this pattern of deceit, as you can see from the exchange below and MERS report below. Finding the creditor is this vast array of players is a task that must not be overlooked.
It’s just another example of why “auditors” and “analysts” need to include a complete review and research of the chain before they come to any conclusions about the TILA Report. These factors have a deep impact on APR, undisclosed fees and parties, and a host of other issues that are missed by most TILA Audits.
Brad Keiser’s Forensic Analysis Workshop will show you how to perform this analysis and research. If you are not already well versed in the securitization process and its impact on the mortgage, note, obligation and closing documents, you need to attend this workshop before you send out any more reports without referencing these factors.
——————————————————————–
Ronald Ryan: [It is highly probable] that HSBC, Wells Fargo and some others have come up with an extra creative way to hide the fact that a Note has been pooled into a MBS Pool. As many know, if one is able to obtain the MERS Milestone History and MERS Min Summary there is a great wealth of useful information. These documents are available online, but not to the public. It is not always easy to obtain these. Also, the information that is even on this is not perfect. The information that is shown depends on the information provided by the MERS Membership. I think that HSBC, Wells and others routinely list loans in which they are the Servicer as showing they are both Servicer and Current Investor. In other words, they publish on these secret data bases that they actually own and hold the Note in their own right, when they are really only the Servicer and the Note is pooled just like in every other instance of a Note executed between 2001-early 2008. The idea is that they know that attorneys for borrowers may obtain these documents, and this may dissuade an attack on their “real party in interest” status.
RONALD RYAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
RONALD RYAN PC
1413 E HEDRICK DRIVE
TUCSON AZ 85719
(520)298‐3333
(520)743‐1020 fax
ronryanlaw@cox.net
http://www.ronryanlaw.com
MILESTONES for 1000302-0055800082-2
Description Date Initiating
Organization / User Milestone Information
Foreclosure Status
Update
11/27/2007 1000115 CitiMortgage, Inc. MIN Status: Active (Registered)
Foreclosure Status: Foreclosure
Pending (option 2), retained on
MERS
Quality Review: Y
Batch
Transfer of Flow
TOS/TOB
Servicing Rights
10/17/2005 1000302 Cherry Creek Mortgage Company,
Inc.
MIN Status: Active (Registered)
New Investor: 1000115
CitiMortgage, Inc.
Old Investor: 1000302 Cherry
Creek Mortgage Company, Inc.
Batch Number: 2785251
Transfer Date: 10/14/2005
Christy Martin
Transfer of Flow
TOS/TOB
Servicing Rights
10/17/2005 1000302 Cherry Creek Mortgage Company,
Inc.
MIN Status: Active (Registered)
New Servicer: 1000115
CitiMortgage, Inc.
Old Servicer: 1000302 Cherry
Creek Mortgage Company, Inc.
Batch Number: 2785251
Sale Date: 10/14/2005
Transfer Date: 10/14/2005
Christy Martin
Release Interim
Funder Interests
10/14/2005 1000108 GMAC Bank (1) MIN Status: Active (Registered)
Old Interim Funder: 1000108
Batch GMAC Bank (1)
Registration 10/03/2005 1000302 Cherry Creek Mortgage Company,
Inc.
MIN Status: Active (Registered)
Servicer: 1000302 Cherry Creek
Batch Mortgage Company, Inc.
Page 1 of 1
https://www.mersonline.org/mers/mininfo/minviewmiles.jsp?aux=A968006867765676A
RONALD RYAN
From: RONALD RYAN [ronryanlaw@cox.net]
Sent: Sunday, March 07, 2010 7:02 AM
To: ‘Lane Houk’
Subject: MERS RE: QUESTION AND REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK
Attachments: image001.png; image002.gif
Thank you. That is very helpful. As to discovery on MERS, do you mean a subpoena or a request for production? I have
had them ignore subpoenas. Do you have a ruling on enforcement of a request for production against them, if they are not named? Also, see below. If you would like a copy of my latest briefing on the relevant issues, I would be happy to provide it to you for the assistance you provided. Thanks again.
RONALD RYAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
RONALD RYAN PC
1413 E HEDRICK DRIVE
TUCSON AZ 85719
(520)298‐3333
(520)743‐1020 fax
ronryanlaw@cox.net
http://www.ronryanlaw.com
From: Lane Houk [mailto:Lane@thePatriotsWar.com]
Sent: Sunday, March 07, 2010 6:19 AM
To: ‘RONALD RYAN’
Subject: RE: QUESTION AND REQUEST FOR FEEDBACK
Ron,
Your suspicions are correct. See attached milestone report… Citimortgage is listing itself as Servicer and Investor.
Citimortgage does not invest in the loans. At the very least, the owner is Citibank but more likely a private trust or public trust since the loan is a jumbo.
Also, another thing to note on this report is the 10/14/2005 milestone… “Release Interim Funder Interests” naming GMAC Bank as the Interim Funder. On this transaction, GMAC Bank was never named in any document, no disclosure,
nothing. Cherry Creek Mortgage Company was supposedly the “Lender” in this transaction and is listed on HUD‐1 as lender, was the entity which disclosed under the TILA.
The “Lender” on the Note and DOT is never the actual source of funds. Is it your position that TILA requires that the actual source of funding be disclosed?
When we got this milestone report, it prompted specific discovery for all bailee agreements subject to this transaction; still waiting on that. There will also be a break in chain of title since the only assignment they’ve ever produced/recorded is from MERS to Citimortgage.
When you say break in the chain of title, you mean break in the chain of ownership of the Note? More and more authorities are holding that in order for a claimant to prove itself to be the real party in interest to support a proof of claim or motion for relief from stay in bankruptcy, as well as to prove itself to be a holder in due course, they have to prove the entire chain of “ownership” and “holdership” of the Note complete with proof of “value paid to purchase the note ownership.”
2
Lastly, you can get these milestone reports through discovery served on MERS regardless if they are named.
Hope this helps,
Lane Houk, CLA
National Institute of Consumer Advocacy, LLC
Consumer Debt Analyst & Investigator
Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: brad keiser, chain of ownership, creditor, forensic analysis, Lane Houk, MERS, MIN report, real investor, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, Ron Ryan
Guess What Got Lost in the Loan Pool?
By Gretchen Morgenson
New York Times – March 1, 2009
WE are all learning, to our deep distress, how the perpetual pursuit of profits drove so many of the bad decisions that financial institutions made during the mortgage mania.
But while investors tally the losses that were generated by loose lending so far, the impact of another lax practice is only beginning to be seen. That is the big banks’ minimalist approach to meeting legal requirements – bookkeeping matters, really – when pooling thousands of loans into securitization trusts.
Stated simply, the notes that underlie mortgages placed in securitization trusts must be assigned to those trusts soon after the firms create them. And any transfers of these notes must also be recorded.
But this seems not to have been a priority with many big banks. The result is that bankruptcy judges are finding that institutions claiming to hold the notes that back specific mortgages often cannot prove it.
On Feb. 11, a circuit court judge in Miami-Dade County in Florida set aside a judgment against Ana L. Fernandez, a borrower whose home had been foreclosed and repurchased on Jan. 21 by Chevy Chase Bank, the institution claiming to hold the note. But the bank had been unable to produce evidence that the original lender had assigned the note, which was in the amount of $225,000, to Chevy Chase.
With the sale set aside, Ms. Fernandez remains in the home. “We believe this loan was never assigned,” said Ray Garcia, the lawyer in Miami who represented the borrower. Now, he said, it is up to whoever can produce the underlying note to litigate the case. The statute of limitations on such a matter runs for five years, he said.
A spokeswoman for Capital One, which is in the process of acquiring Chevy Chase, did not return a phone call on Friday seeking comment.
Mr. Garcia has another case in which a borrower tried to sell his home but could not because the note underlying a $60,000 second mortgage cannot be found. The statute of limitations on the matter will expire in October, he said, and if the note holder has not come forward by then, the borrower will be free of his obligation on the second mortgage.
No one knows how many loans went into securitization trusts with defective documentation. But as messes go, this one has, ahem, potential. According to Inside Mortgage Finance, some eight million nonprime mortgages were put into securities pools in 2005 and 2006 and sold to investors. The value of these loans was $797 billion in 2005 and $815 billion in 2006.
If notes underlying even some of these mortgages were improperly assigned or lost, that will surely complicate pending legislation intended to allow bankruptcy judges to modify mortgage terms for troubled borrowers. A so-called cram-down provision in the law would let judges reduce the size of a loan, forcing whoever holds the security interest in it to take a loss.
But if the holder of the note is in doubt, how can these loans be modified?
Bookkeeping is such a bore, especially when there are billions to be made shoveling loans into trusts like coal into the Titanic’s boilers. You can imagine the thought process: Assigning notes takes time and costs money, why bother? Who’s going to ask for proof of ownership of these notes anyhow?
But as the Fernandez case and others indicate, bankruptcy judges across the country are increasingly asking these pesky questions. Two judges in California – one in state court, another in federal court – issued temporary restraining orders last month stopping foreclosures because proper documentation was not produced by lenders or their representatives. And in another California case, a borrower’s lawyer was awarded $8,800 in attorney’s fees relating to costs spent litigating against a lender that could not prove it had the right to foreclose.
California cases are especially interesting because foreclosures in that state can be conducted without the oversight of a judge. Borrowers who do not have a lawyer representing them can be turned out of their homes in four months.
Samuel L. Bufford, a federal bankruptcy judge in Los Angeles since 1985, has overseen some 100,000 bankruptcy cases. He said that in previous years, he rarely asked for documentation in a foreclosure case but that problems encountered in mortgage securitizations have made him become more demanding.
In a recent case, Judge Bufford said, he asked a lender to produce the original of the note and it turned out to be different from the copy that had been previously submitted to the court. The original had been assigned to a bank that had then transferred it to Freddie Mac, the judge explained. “They had no clue what happened after that,” he said. “Now somebody’s got to go find that note.”
“My guess is it’s because in the secondary mortgage market they have been sloppy,” Judge Bufford added. “The people who put the deals together get paid for the deals, but they don’t get paid for the paperwork.”
A small but spirited group of consumer lawyers has argued for years that the process of pooling residential mortgages into securities was so haphazard that proper documentation of the loans was never made in many cases. Leading the brigade is April Charney, a foreclosure lawyer at Jacksonville Legal Aid in Florida; she now trains consumer lawyers around the country to litigate these cases.
Depending on the documentation defect, lawyers say, investors in the trust could try to force the institution that sold the loan to the trust to buy it back. Many of these institutions would be unable to do so, however, because they are defunct. In the meantime, when judges are not persuaded that the documentation is proper, troubled borrowers can remain in their homes even if they are delinquent.
THE woes brought on by sloppy bookkeeping in securitizations will be on the agenda at the American Bankruptcy Institute’s annual spring meeting on April 3. An article titled “Where’s the Note, Who’s the Holder,” co-written by Judge Bufford and R. Glen Ayers, a former federal bankruptcy judge in Texas, will be the basis of a discussion at the meeting.
Mr. Ayers, who is a lawyer at Langley & Banack in San Antonio, said he expects that these documentation problems will halt a lot of foreclosures. That will mean pain for investors who hold the securities. The problem for those who expect to receive the benefit of the note, Mr. Ayers said, is that they “may not be able to show to the judge they have a right to foreclose.”
“It’s a huge problem,” he added. “It’s going to be expensive, I don’t know how expensive, ultimately to the bondholders.”
Where’s the Note and Who’s the Holder
This post is taken from an article written by the Hon. Samuel Bufford (CA Bankruptcy Judge) and R. Glen Ayers in coordination with the American Bankruptcy Institute.
You can view the FULL REPORT HERE.
WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER: ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY REAL ESTATE
HON. SAMUEL L. BUFFORD
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(FORMERLY HON.) R. GLEN AYERS
LANGLEY & BANACK
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
APRIL 3, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER
INTRODUCTION
In an era where a very large portion of mortgage obligations have been securitized, by assignment to a trust indenture trustee, with the resulting pool of assets being then sold as mortgage backed securities, foreclosure becomes an interesting exercise, particularly where judicial process is involved. We are all familiar with the securitization process. The steps, if not the process, is simple. A borrower goes to a mortgage lender. The lender finances the purchase of real estate. The borrower signs a note and mortgage or deed of trust. The original lender sells the note and assigns the mortgage to an entity that securitizes the note by combining the note with hundreds or thousands of similar obligation to create a package of mortgage backed securities, which are then sold to investors.
Unfortunately, unless you represent borrowers, the vast flow of notes into the maw of the securitization industry meant that a lot of mistakes were made. When the borrower defaults, the party seeking to enforce the obligation and foreclose on the underlying collateral sometimes cannot find the note. A lawyer sophisticated in this area has speculated to one of the authors that perhaps a third of the notes “securitized” have been lost or destroyed. The cases we are going to look at reflect the stark fact that the unnamed source’s speculation may be well-founded.
UCC SECTION 3-309
If the issue were as simple as a missing note, UCC §3-309 would provide a simple solution. A person entitled to enforce an instrument which has been lost, destroyed or stolen may enforce the instrument. If the court is concerned that some third party may show up and attempt to enforce the instrument against the payee, it may order adequate protection. But, and however, a person seeking to enforce a missing instrument must be a person entitled to enforce the instrument, and that person must prove the instrument’s terms and that person’s right to enforce the instrument. §3-309 (a)(1) & (b).
WHO’S THE HOLDER
Enforcement of a note always requires that the person seeking to collect show that it is the holder. A holder is an entity that has acquired the note either as the original payor or transfer by endorsement of order paper or physical possession of bearer paper. These requirements are set out in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in every state, including Louisiana, and in the District of Columbia. Even in bankruptcy proceedings, State substantive law controls the rights of note and lien holders, as the Supreme Court pointed out almost forty (40) years ago in United States v. Butner, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
However, as Judge Bufford has recently illustrated, in one of the cases discussed below, in the bankruptcy and other federal courts, procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure. And, procedure may just have an impact on the issue of “who,” because, if the holder is unknown, pleading and standing issues arise.
BRIEF REVIEW OF UCC PROVISIONS
Article 3 governs negotiable instruments – it defines what a negotiable instrument is and defines how ownership of those pieces of paper is transferred. For the precise definition, see § 3-104(a) (“an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest . . . .”) The instrument may be either payable to order or bearer and payable on demand or at a definite time, with or without interest.
Ordinary negotiable instruments include notes and drafts (a check is a draft drawn on a bank). See § 3-104(e).
Negotiable paper is transferred from the original payor by negotiation. §3-301. “Order paper” must be endorsed; bearer paper need only be delivered. §3-305. However, in either case, for the note to be enforced, the person who asserts the status of the holder must be in possession of the instrument. See UCC § 1-201 (20) and comments.
The original and subsequent transferees are referred to as holders. Holders who take with no notice of defect or default are called “holders in due course,” and take free of many defenses. See §§ 3-305(b).
The UCC says that a payment to a party “entitled to enforce the instrument” is sufficient to extinguish the obligation of the person obligated on the instrument. Clearly, then, only a holder – a person in possession of a note endorsed to it or a holder of bearer paper – may seek satisfaction or enforce rights in collateral such as real estate.
NOTE: Those of us who went through the bank and savings and loan collapse of the 1980′s are familiar with these problems. The FDIC/FSLIC/RTC sold millions of notes secured and unsecured, in bulk transactions. Some notes could not be found and enforcement sometimes became a problem. Of course, sometimes we are forced to repeat history. For a recent FDIC case, see Liberty Savings Bank v. Redus, 2009 WL 41857 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.), January 8, 2009.
THE RULES
Judge Bufford addressed the rules issue this past year. See In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2008). First, there are the pleading problems that arise when the holder of the note is unknown. Typically, the issue will arise in a motion for relief from stay in a bankruptcy proceeding.
According F.R.Civ. Pro. 17, “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” This rule is incorporated into the rules governing bankruptcy procedure in several ways. As Judge Bufford has pointed out, for example, in a motion for relief from stay, filed under F.R.Bankr.Pro. 4001 is a contested matter, governed by F. R. Bankr. P. 9014, which makes F.R. Bankr. Pro. 7017 applicable to such motions. F.R. Bankr. P. 7017 is, of course, a restatement of F. R. Civ. P. 17. In re Hwang, 396 B.R. at 766. The real party in interest in a federal action to enforce a note, whether in bankruptcy court or federal district court, is the owner of a note. (In securitization transactions, this would be the trustee for the “certificate holders.”) When the actual holder of the note is unknown, it is impossible – not difficult but impossible – to plead a cause of action in a federal court (unless the movant simply lies about the ownership of the note). Unless the name of the actual note holder can be stated, the very pleadings are defective.
STANDING
Often, the servicing agent for the loan will appear to enforce the note. Assume that the servicing agent states that it is the authorized agent of the note holder, which is “Trust Number 99.” The servicing agent is certainly a party in interest, since a party in interest in a bankruptcy court is a very broad term or concept. See, e.g., Greer v. O’Dell, 305 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2002). However, the servicing agent may not have standing: “Federal Courts have only the power authorized by Article III of the Constitutions and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. … [A] plaintiff must have Constitutional standing in order for a federal court to have jurisdiction.” In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp. 3d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio, 2007) (citations omitted).
But, the servicing agent does not have standing, for only a person who is the holder of the note has standing to enforce the note. See, e.g., In re Hwang, 2008 WL 4899273 at 8.
The servicing agent may have standing if acting as an agent for the holder, assuming that the agent can both show agency status and that the principle is the holder. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) at 520.
A BRIEF ASIDE: WHO IS MERS?
For those of you who are not familiar with the entity known as MERS, a frequent participant in these foreclosure proceedings:
MERS is the “Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. “MERS is a mortgage banking ‘utility’ that registers mortgage loans in a book entry system so that … real estate loans can be bought, sold and securitized, just like Wall Street’s book entry utility for stocks and bonds is the Depository Trust and Clearinghouse.” Bastian, “Foreclosure Forms”, State. Bar of Texas 17th Annual Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course, March 9-10, 2007, Dallas, Texas. MERS is enormous. It originates thousands of loans daily and is the mortgagee of record for at least 40 million mortgages and other security documents. Id.
MERS acts as agent for the owner of the note. Its authority to act should be shown by an agency agreement. Of course, if the owner is unknown, MERS cannot show that it is an authorized agent of the owner.
RULES OF EVIDENCE – A PRACTICAL PROBLEM
This structure also possesses practical evidentiary problems where the party asserting a right to foreclose must be able to show a default. Once again, Judge Bufford has addressed this issue. At In re Vargas, 396 B.R. at 517-19. Judge Bufford made a finding that the witness called to testify as to debt and default was incompetent. All the witness could testify was that he had looked at the MERS computerized records. The witness was unable to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 803, as applied to computerized records in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 517-20. The low level employee could really only testify that the MERS screen shot he reviewed reflected a default. That really is not much in the way of evidence, and not nearly enough to get around the hearsay rule.
FORECLOSURE OR RELIEF FROM STAY
In a foreclosure proceeding in a judicial foreclosure state, or a request for injunctive relief in a non-judicial foreclosure state, or in a motion for relief proceeding in a bankruptcy court, the courts are dealing with and writing about the problems very frequently.
In many if not almost all cases, the party seeking to exercise the rights of the creditor will be a servicing company. Servicing companies will be asserting the rights of their alleged principal, the note holder, which is, again, often going to be a trustee for a securitization package. The mortgage holder or beneficiary under the deed of trust will, again, very often be MERS.
Even before reaching the practical problem of debt and default, mentioned above, the moving party must show that it holds the note or (1) that it is an agent of the holder and that (2) the holder remains the holder. In addition, the owner of the note, if different from the holder, must join in the motion.
Some states, like Texas, have passed statutes that allow servicing companies to act in foreclosure proceedings as a statutorily recognized agent of the noteholder. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code §51.0001. However, that statute refers to the servicer as the last entity to whom the debtor has been instructed to make payments. This status is certainly open to challenge. The statute certainly provides nothing more than prima facie evidence of the ability of the servicer to act. If challenged, the servicing agent must show that the last entity to communicate instructions to the debtor is still the holder of the note. See, e.g., HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Valentin, 2l N.Y. Misc. 3d 1123(A), 2008 WL 4764816 (Table) (N.Y. Sup.), Nov. 3, 2008. In addition, such a statute does not control in federal court where Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and 19 (and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7017 and 7019) apply.
SOME RECENT CASE LAW
These cases are arranged by state, for no particular reason.
Massachusetts
In re Schwartz, 366 B.R.265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007)
Schwartz concerns a Motion for Relief to pursue an eviction. Movant asserted that the property had been foreclosed upon prior to the date of the bankruptcy petition. The pro se debtor asserted that the Movant was required to show that it had authority to conduct the sale. Movant, and “the party which appears to be the current mortgagee…” provided documents for the court to review, but did not ask for an evidentiary hearing. Judge Rosenthal sifted through the documents and found that the Movant and the current mortgagee had failed to prove that the foreclosure was properly conducted.
Specifically, Judge Rosenthal found that there was no evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage prior to foreclosure. However, at footnote 5, Id. at 268, the Court also finds that there is no evidence that the note itself was assigned and no evidence as to who the current holder might be.
Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company (In re Nosek), 286 Br. 374 (Bankr D Mass. 2008).
Almost a year to the day after Schwartz was signed, Judge Rosenthal issued a second opinion. This is an opinion on an order to show cause. Judge Rosenthal specifically found that, although the note and mortgage involved in the case had been transferred from the originator to another party within five days of closing, during the five years in which the chapter 13 proceeding was pending, the note and mortgage and associated claims had been prosecuted by Ameriquest which has represented itself to be the holder of the note and the mortgage. Not until September of 2007 did Ameriquest notify the Court that it was merely the servicer. In fact, only after the chapter 13 bankruptcy had been pending for about three years was there even an assignment of the servicing rights. Id. at 378.
Because these misrepresentations were not simple mistakes: as the Court has noted on more than one occasion, those parties who do not hold the note of mortgage do not service the mortgage do not have standing to pursue motions for leave or other actions arising form the mortgage obligation. Id at 380.
As a result, the Court sanctioned the local law firm that had been prosecuting the claim $25,000. It sanctioned a partner at that firm an additional $25,000. Then the Court sanctioned the national law firm involved $100,000 and ultimately sanctioned Wells Fargo $250,000. Id. at 382-386.
In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008).
Like Judge Rosenthal, Judge Feeney has attacked the problem of standing and authority head on. She has also held that standing must be established before either a claim can be allowed or a motion for relief be granted.
Ohio
In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp. 2d (S.D. Ohio 2007).
Perhaps the District Court’s orders in the foreclosure cases in Ohio have received the most press of any of these opinions. Relying almost exclusively on standing, the Judge Rose has determined that a foreclosing party must show standing. “[I]n a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time that the complaint was filed.” Id. at 653.
Judge Rose instructed the parties involved that the willful failure of the movants to comply with the general orders of the Court would in the future result in immediate dismissal of foreclosure actions.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227 (S.D. Ohio) January 8, 2008.
In Steele, Judge Abel followed the lead of Judge Rose and found that Deutsche Bank had filed evidence in support of its motion for default judgment indicating that MERS was the mortgage holder. There was not sufficient evidence to support the claim that Deutsche Bank was the owner and holder of the note as of that date. Following In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 456586, the Court held that summary judgment would be denied “until such time as Deutsche Bank was able to offer evidence showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed.” 2008 WL 111227 at 2. Deutsche Bank was given twenty-one days to comply. Id.
Illinois
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Cook, 2009 WL 35286 (N.D. Ill. January 6, 2009).
Not all federal district judges are as concerned with the issues surrounding the transfer of notes and mortgages. Cook is a very pro lender case and, in an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the Court found that Cook had shown no “countervailing evidence to create a genuine issue of facts.” Id. at 3. In fact, a review of the evidence submitted by U.S. Bank showed only that it was the alleged trustee of the securitization pool. U.S. Bank relied exclusively on the “pooling and serving agreement” to show that it was the holder of the note. Id.
Under UCC Article 3, the evidence presented in Cook was clearly insufficient.
New York
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin, 21 Misc. 3D 1124(A), 2008 WL 4764816 (Table) (N.Y. Sup.) November 3, 2008. In Valentin, the New York court found that, even though given an opportunity to, HSBC did not show the ownership of debt and mortgage. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the “notice of pendency” against the property was canceled.
Note that the Valentin case does not involve some sort of ambush. The Court gave every HSBC every opportunity to cure the defects the Court perceived in the pleadings.
California
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)
and
In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)
These two opinions by Judge Bufford have been discussed above. Judge Bufford carefully explores the related issues of standing and ownership under both federal and California law.
Texas
In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
and
In re Gilbreath, 395 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
These two recent opinions by Judge Jeff Bohm are not really on point, but illustrate another thread of cases running through the issues of motions for relief from stay in bankruptcy court and the sloppiness of loan servicing agencies. Both of these cases involve motions for relief that were not based upon fact but upon mistakes by servicing agencies. Both opinions deal with the issue of sanctions and, put simply, both cases illustrate that Judge Bohm (and perhaps other members of the bankruptcy bench in the Southern District of Texas) are going to be very strict about motions for relief in consumer cases.
SUMMARY
The cases cited illustrate enormous problems in the loan servicing industry. These problems arise in the context of securitization and illustrate the difficulty of determining the name of the holder, the assignee of the mortgage, and the parties with both the legal right under Article 3 and the standing under the Constitution to enforce notes, whether in state court or federal court.
Interestingly, with the exception of Judge Bufford and a few other judges, there has been less than adequate focus upon the UCC title issues. The next round of cases may and should focus upon the title to debt instrument. The person seeking to enforce the note must show that:
(1) It is the holder of this note original by transfer, with all necessary rounds;
(2) It had possession of the note before it was lost;
(3) If it can show that title to the note runs to it, but the original is lost or destroyed, the holder must be prepared to post a bond;
(4) If the person seeking to enforce is an agent, it must show its agency status and that its principal is the holder of the note (and meets the above requirements).
Then, and only then, do the issues of evidence of debt and default and assignment of mortgage rights become relevant.
Your best chance at a real Loan Modification – TILA Rescission
I wrote a post similar to this yesterday. It was a post on TILA rescission that referred to a married couple who rescinded their loan AFTER foreclosure was filed. They subsequently filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy as well. The lender (Option One Mortgage Corp. – division of Wells Fargo) balked and refused to honor the rescission. The borrowers filed an Adversary Proceeding in bankruptcy court and won. CLICK HERE to read the full post.
This post is focused on alerting America’s homeowners who want to stay in their homes (but cannot afford the payment anymore) of the BEST REMEDY you may have. This is not for the proverbial “deadbeat” who just wants to cheat the system and live for free. However, there are much fewer of those kinds of people than those that can afford the payment might think. Millions of Americans are losing their jobs, being laid off, having their salary and overtime cut back while the costs of living have increased. The cost of living has been increasing (ie. inflation) for quite a while. From insurance costs to groceries to the costs of labor. Because of this cost of living increase, many fixed income families were forced to start living partly on credit cards. By the way, had this “credit” not been available in the first place, I don’t think we’d be where we are today. Supply and demand will keep the economy in check unless you can artificially fuel demand with borrowed money that someone can’t really afford to pay back.
Because of these extra credit payments and loss of income or a job, millions of families are on the verge of foreclosure or already there. If this is where you (or a friend/family member) is at, you MAY have one very powerful remedy to force the lender/servicer to work with you.
This remedy is called “TILA Rescission.” TILA stands for the “Truth in Lending Act.” It is the major piece of federal legislation that regulates lending practices of financial institutions. A borrower may have the “extended right to rescind” a loan for UP TO THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF CLOSING.
It is important to note that a loan can ONLY be rescinded when:
- The loan is a refinance transaction;
- Funded in the last three years
- On the borrower’s primary residence;
- When a “material disclosure violation” is found
The term “material disclosure violation” is a very important component. Many people (including self-proclaimed experts in loan auditing) think that “any” violation of the Truth in Lending Act gives someone the right to rescind. That is patently wrong. The four conditions above must be true in order for the borrower to have the possible “extended right to rescind” the loan transaction. There are only 4 potential “material disclosure violations.”
Many homeowners don’t want to just “walk away.” They want to stay in their home. The bad news is that these lenders are run by criminals. Literally. They’re getting billions in bailout money. They’re getting millions to billions more in insurance payouts on defaulted debt. Homeowners who are trying to save their homes are running into the brick wall of GREED. Loss mitigation departments are being run by a bunch bungling fools who don’t even know how to answer a phone much less deal with a homeowner with dignity and respect. The corporate bottom-line is driving our country to the bottom.
So, if you’re like me, when you’re backed into a corner, you take the gloves off and you come out swinging. I think that Congress and corporate America really does underestimate the average American patriot. That’s their first and biggest mistake.
If you want to fight the battle to save your home… if you want to go on the offense, then TILA Rescission is one great weapon to fight with. You need to have an audit of your loan file done by someone who really knows what they’re doing. Most of the businesses and people out there claiming to know what they’re doing, don’t. Beware. If someone is trying to charge you over $750 for an audit, don’t just beware, don’t do it.
With a professional audit of your loan closing file, the auditor is investigating for material disclosure violations. If one is found, you have the right to rescind the loan – if the loan has been closed in the last three years and it was funded on your primary residence.
The loan is rescinded by sending a “rescission letter” to the servicer, the originator of the loan and any special servicer(s) that may need to be notified as well.
This puts the screws to the lender immediately and they end up in a real quagmire. TILA is meant to be a “self-enforcing” statute. This means that the lenders are supposed to enforce it on themselves. They are not allowed to sue a homeowner to get around the self-enforcing nature of the statute. Doing so is another violation. The only thing a lender can do is to “seek judicial guidance” in a TILA rescission claim.
In practice, when a homeowner rescinds the loan and IF they have a competent attorney well-versed in TILA, they are going to be asked by the lender or opposing counsel to submit a “proposal.” Folks, this is legal-speak for we’re willing to modify your loan, send us a proposal.
If you truly want a loan modification, a workout of your existing loan, a payment reduction plan, this is THE best and most powerful remedy one can have. Not all homeowners qualify and not all loans will have a material disclosure violation. I can tell you that I find material disclosure violations in greater than 50% of all loan packages I audit.
You have to be very careful to ensure that the “chain of custody” of your loan documents is protected. This is one main area a lender’s attorney will try to attack in an attempt to discredit the claim by saying that the documents could have been lost or altered because the homeowner, auditor and/or attorney for the homeowner were careless in preserving the integrity of the original loan copy package they received from the closing agent. A good attorney and auditor should have procedures and systems in place to combat this potential attack and preserve integrity of the documents.
If you have any questions about the loan audit process or would like to inquire about a professional mortgage loan audit, contact me by email at Lane@LaneHouk.com
DISCLOSURE: I am not an attorney and nothing in this post should be construed as legal advice. Seek out an attorney for any questions pertaining to legal matters. I audit loan files for violations and have education and training in this area of practice. I work with competent consumer-based attorneys who handle legal matters for clients and provide audit report services for consumers and a select group of attorneys.






























