Nov
01

CHASE NOT DEALING IN GOOD FAITH WITH BORROWERS (SURPRISE)

HAMP-septemberIt will come as no surprise to anyone following the foreclosure wars to know that the lenders absolutely do not want to modify loans or work with borrowers.  One need look no further than the September Hamp Numbers for specific facts to back this up, but the bottom line is the servicers are taking  billions in taxpayer dollars (dollars that Congress now admits they are not entitled to in some cases), but they are not working with the very taxpayers that are funding their effort. That’s heaping insult on top of injury on top of obscenity…but then who really cares right?

It’s bad enough that they’re not being dealt with fairly, but below is proof positive from a lender that they are going to be actively working behind the borrowers back.

Chase Waiver Request (redacted)

chase-waiver-form

This is an absolute license to negotiate in bad faith, provide false hope while at the same time, work hard to achieve the ultimate goal (take the home).  Anyone need anymore proof that there are perverse, hidden motives here and that the lenders are not interested in keeping borrowers in their homes?

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Sep
23

Why the REST Report and NPV Analysis is what you need for HAMP Loan Modification Approval

By Lane Houk

THE REST REPORT IS a report generated by the REST software platform, which is a loan disposition analysis system that, in limited different formats, is used by major banks and mortgage servicers with borrowers and properties that are in default, to run an NPV test and to determine qualification for a HAMP Loan Modification. Financial institutions use systems like REST to analyze the various options available when a loan is not being repaid as agreed by the borrower.  The purpose of such analysis is to make sure that the bank can choose the path that offers the best financial outcome possible for the investor or owner of the loan; the servicer is simply the agent for the investor with whom most borrowers interface with on a regular basis. Usually, the investor/owner of the loan is unknown to the borrower and, in most cases, is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) more commonly known as a “Trust.”

Although almost all financial institutions and servicers use loan disposition analysis software platforms, these systems are not made available to consumers.  They are sophisticated systems only purchased and utilized by banks that have many thousands of loans that need to be analyzed so that outcomes may be determined and optimized.

When homeowners arrange to run a REST Report, the system produces an 11-page document based on the specifics of their property and their financial situation that shows, from the investor and servicer’s perspective, the various financial outcomes that would result from modifying their mortgage compared with the costs and bottom line result of foreclosure and distressed sale.  A homeowner can then use the report by submitting it to his or her lender or servicer, along with the required supporting documents, when seeking to obtain a loan modification, or approval for a short sale.

Compare the approach of using an expert financial professional who knows how to use the REST Report to that of today’s homeowners applying for a loan modification without any assistance and without any negotiating leverage whatsoever.  Some homeowners attempt to negotiate with their lender or servicer on their own and from a position of weakness, while others hire lawyers or other third parties to represent them, but in either case, all the homeowner ends up submitting to the lender or servicer is information about themselves, and nothing substantive about the possible dispositions of that loan from the bank’s perspective, or in the best interests of investors.

Law firms and other third parties, depending on the state you live in, all concentrate on helping homeowners submit the best possible application… or “proposal” to the bank.  In general, that proposal includes the borrower’s information, various documents intended to verify income, a letter describing the hardship that has caused the homeowner to apply for a modification or short sale… all the information that the homeowner or attorney/representative hopes will paint a picture that the servicer will view as qualifying for a loan modification.

But, “hope,” should only be considered a negotiating strategy, when hope is all you’ve got.

When applying for a loan modification with the REST Report, borrowers still submit their application and supporting documentation, but in addition the borrower submits a report, generated by a loan disposition analysis platform that incorporates the same decision analytics used by lenders and servicers.  The report clearly shows the servicer the investor’s financial outcome, in terms of net present value, in a range of scenarios, assuming such outcomes are possible, of course. In addition, the REST Report clearly quantifies a borrower’s eligibility for a HAMP Loan Modification and a HAFA short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure alternatives.

In March 2009, the Obama Administration published detailed program guidelines for the Making Home Affordable (MHA) Program. Mortgage servicers were authorized to begin modifications under the HAMP plan immediately. With the assistance of several government agencies, GSEs, and servicers – this effort involved the development and refinement of servicer guidelines, modification documents, and data collection and modeling tools.

The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was designed to help as many as 3 to 4 million financially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by modifying loans to a level that is affordable for borrowers now and sustainable over the long term. The program provides clear and consistent loan modification guidelines that the entire mortgage industry can use.

Borrower eligibility is based on meeting specific criteria including:

1) borrower is delinquent on their mortgage or faces imminent risk of default

2) property is occupied as borrower’s primary residence

3) mortgage was originated on or before Jan. 1, 2009 and unpaid principal balance must be no greater than $729,750 for one-unit properties.

After determining a borrower’s eligibility, a servicer will take a series of steps to adjust the monthly mortgage payment to 31% of a borrower’s total pretax monthly income:

First, reduce the interest rate to as low as 2%,

Next, if necessary, extend the loan term to 40 years,

Finally, if necessary, forbear (defer) a portion of the principal until the loan is paid off and waive interest on the deferred amount.

Note: Servicers may elect to forgive principal under HAMP on a stand-alone basis or before any modification step in order to achieve the target monthly mortgage payment.

The Home Affordable Modification Program was designed with good intentions, however, in reality, the servicers are denying thousands of homeowners who actually qualify for a HAMP Modification. There is an answer “why” but that’s another article for another time. In short, if you’re reading this, you are likely one of the tens of  thousands of homeowners who have been denied a HAMP Modification even though you really qualify. The problem is that the servicers don’t usually tell the homeowner the specific reason(s) they were denied because, in reality, they should never have been denied. Let’s just say that the real reason for denial is that it’s just not in the servicer’s best interest to modify. They’d rather foreclose because they’ll make more money going that route. It may not make sense to you right now at face value but trust me; they make more money foreclosing than they do modifying a homeowner’s loan.

The simple fact is that when a servicer receives an application for a loan modification from a borrower, that servicer should conduct its own loan disposition analysis in order to determine which outcome, foreclosure or some form of modification or disposition, is in the best interests of the investor who owns the loan.  So, when you apply with the REST Report, you provide that loan disposition analysis, causing the servicer to have to verify those numbers.  When they find that the report’s analysis is correct, we are seeing modifications granted in situations, and in timeframes, that were unexpected.

Loans and loan modifications are like snowflakes… no two are alike.  And while there are law firms or other mortgage professionals that may feel confident about their analysis, the REST Report unquestionably adds a degree of certainty that hasn’t been possible until now.

According to the latest HAMP report from the U.S. Treasury, dated April 30, 2010: Out of 1.2 million HAMP trial modifications there have been 277,640 trials cancelled… and 295,348 permanent modifications granted.

The latest Treasury HAMP Report shows the situation clearly.  The number of trial modifications that have been cancelled, is about the same as the number of permanent modifications granted, which is not good enough if you find yourself among those that have been declined by HAMP.  There are still 637,353 trial modifications awaiting an answer… thumbs up, or thumbs down. I have seen homeowners who have paid 6, 9 and even 12 trial monthly payments (which is outside the allowable guidelines) and they are still awaiting approval for their permanent modification. Still other clients have come to me having faithfully paid their 3 monthly trial period payments only to be denied a permanent modification and for no apparent or good reason.

The latest Treasury data did show some very encouraging trends as well.  For example, as of June 1, 2010, borrowers will have to document their income before beginning a trial modification, and many servicers started implementing this policy in April, so there is data, and it is very encouraging in that it shows roughly twice as many homeowners being approved for a permanent modification after successfully completing the trial period.

Well, when it comes to loan modifications under HAMP, the REST Report runs NPV analytics that should fall within HAMP guidelines.  So, when the report says you qualify for HAMP, there’s no one else, besides your servicer of course, that can be as sure you do, as the REST Report.

But, what if you don’t qualify for HAMP?

However, for homeowners that don’t qualify for HAMP, the REST Report can be every bit as helpful to the loan modification or short sale process as it is for those applying under HAMP.  Perhaps the principal balance on your loan exceeds HAMP’s $729,000 limit.  Or, perhaps you’ve been turned down for HAMP and don’t know why.  Or, maybe it’s a mortgage on a second home that you’re trying to modify.

Whatever the reason for falling outside of HAMP guidelines, the loan disposition analysis report produced by the REST platform is proving itself invaluable in the negotiations between a homeowner and their lender or servicer.

Mortgage servicers are companies that are hired by investors to “service” mortgages they own.  The servicers all work under a contract called a “Pooling and Servicing Agreement,” or PSA.  And all PSAs require servicers to make decisions related to the loans they are servicing in the best interests of the investors for whom they work.

So, when you submit a REST Report to your lender or servicer, they don’t just receive information about you, they also receive an analysis of the financial impact to investors of the alternatives to foreclosure compared with the cost of foreclosing on your property.

If the net present value analysis shows that investors would be better off modifying than foreclosing, we’re seeing servicers responding to the report, and offering to modify loans in more cases than we expected.

It’s not that we believe that a servicer would accept the analysis shown in the REST Report at face value, they most certainly would not.  But we do know that when they verify the report’s conclusions using their own internal systems, they will find the REST Report’s financial analysis to be accurate.

Does that mean that submitting an application for a loan modification or short sale along with the REST Report guarantees anything?  No, no one can guarantee anyone that a lender or servicer will modify a loan, at the end of the day, both participation in HAMP, and their willingness to modify a mortgage internally, is strictly voluntary.  And as anyone in the banking industry will readily tell you… banks only modify loans when it’s in their own best financial interest to do so.

And that, folks is precisely the point. When you can quantify and document that the modification (or short sale) is in the best interest of the investor, the servicer will be put in a very precarious position if they then still choose to ignore those findings.

Most importantly, when it comes to a HAMP Modification, the core component of a HAMP approval boils down to the NPV Analysis or NPV Test. NPV stands for “Net Present Value.”

The base NPV model provides consistency in NPV calculations for the Home Affordable Modification Program and was designed to help the mortgage industry move toward a more standard process for evaluating the NPV of mortgages for purposes of making modifications.

A participating servicer in the Home Affordable Modification Program must modify any loan that meets the program’s eligibility criteria if the modification tests “positive” for NPV. I hope you noted that point above. That word is “must.”

When mortgage modifications have a positive NPV, it is in the best interests of lenders, servicers, investors, and borrowers to modify mortgages to reduce the risk of foreclosure. The Home Affordable Modification Program increases the potential number of mortgage modifications that will have a positive NPV, resulting in more servicers modifying mortgages, and keeping more Americans in their homes. The Home Affordable Modification Program specifies a precise method for determining NPV and provides a base NPV model that any servicer can use or customize into a proprietary NPV model that satisfies all of the program’s methodological requirements.

Almost all servicers in the US have by now elected to participate in the Making Home Affordable program and have signed what is called a “Servicer Participation Agreement” (SPA) with the US Department of Treasury, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as compliance agent.

The SPA obligates the servicer to follow the HAMP guidelines. If the NPV Test comes back positive and the servicer still refuses to modify, it is likely that a claim for breach of contract could be brought against the servicer; and, there are already about a dozen lawsuits currently pending claiming just that… that the servicer breached their contract with Treasury by wrongfully denying homeowners for a HAMP Modification.

Now, if you are a homeowner who is frustrated beyond belief and looking for relief, I encourage you to pick up the phone and call us. We are one of the few firms around the country authorized to run REST Reports and help homeowners with the process of getting their ducks in a row and putting their best foot forward.

Call the National Institute of Consumer Advocacy at 800-985-4685 or by email at info[at]nioca.org

Sep
19

WATCH OUT~ Keep your eyes out for this interesting development!

WatchOut-foreclosure

It’s been some time since I talked about Capacity, so I want to do a new post here on the subject.  The bottom line is this, hundreds of thousands of foreclosure judgments are being entered based on complaints that lack one of the most basic elements of EVERY SINGLE OTHER LAWSUIT FILED IN THIS COUNTRY. The critical piece of information I’m speaking about is the identification of the parties to the lawsuit.  Now in most cases, the borrower defendants are known and identified.  They’re easy because the live in the home.  The second lienholders are never properly identified and they are almost always only served through MERS, so it is questionable whether the real owner of the debt obligation secured by the second mortgage is notified, but that’s a subject for another blog.

Today I’m talking about the failure to specifically and accurately identify who or what the plaintiff corporation is, where they are located and under what authority they assert the capacity to sue.  Now in this Twilight Zone world of mortgage foreclosures, our judges have no idea what the answers to those questions are so all across this state our judges are busy transferring millions of dollars in judgments and property to entities with long, confusing, abbreviated, obfuscated, mutilated, desecrated (whatever) names.  Just last week a client came in with a JP Morgan as trustee for 123 trust in its capacity as receiver for XYZ bank, trustee or some such nonsense.  Problem with that is no one could even pretend to know who or what was responsible for trying to throw a neighbor onto the street, but left unchallenged a judge somewhere will just grant that shadow entity a judgment.

Look carefully at the names that are listed on the attached documents that are registered with the Secretary of State.  You think you recognize those names don’t you….Well Look Very Carefully at the owner’s name.  Now I want to know what legitimate purpose a person would have for registering the names that are indicated there.  I can certainly think of several improper reasons for having such names, but I cannot think of a single legitimate purpose.  Look carefully at the names there people, then consider how that could come into play in our courtrooms across the state and in the current state of this mortgage environment.

Fictitiousnames-1

occ

cuomosupreme1

wattersNBA1

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Aug
19

Debating Yield Spread Premiums: RU Talking to ME?

From Gregg Christoff, who apparently doesn’t like what I have to say and thinks I don’t know what I’m talking about —-

Ok, no offense but this Garfield has no clue what he is talking about in this article. Let me tell you how YSP actually work. Typically banks send mortgage originators (lender) rates every day. The lender then chooses which rate he is going to offer the client. Frankly the higher the rate above the raw rate the higher the yield spread premium. (Which translates to higher commission paid to the lender.) Obviously, the lender cannot offer the raw rate to the client because no profit will be reckonized unless the lender can charge for numerous fees. Normally, charging additional fees is challenging due to the competitive nature of mortgage lending. Therefore, most lenders make thier income from YSP.

When it comes to charging YSP frankly it depends on how much time is spent preparing the loan. If it is a quick and easy loan a minimum YSP can be “charged”. Therefore the loan rate should be close to the raw rate for that loan product. On the other hand, some loans can take months even up to a year to close. So obviously the YSP has to be higher to offset the time and overhead needed to prepare that loan.

The bottom line is no one can stay in business without collecting some type of profitibility. Do you know of any business that can survive without any income?

Like any business, there are always ones that act responsible and with integrity and those that don’t. There are a number of cases where people abused the mortgage industry as it was originally intended. These people have created a black eye for the industry.

But to say that YSP is used to lie to clients claimed by Garfield is utterly ridiculous. If it wasn’t for YSP, how was a mortgage company to stay in business?? Answer that Garfield………..[OK see below]

ANSWER: NO OFFENSE TAKEN, BUT I ALWAYS KNOW WHEN SOMEONE SAYS “NO OFFENSE” WHAT THEY REALLY MEAN IS THAT THEY DON’T WANT TO HEAR AN ANSWER THAT MAKES THEM LOOK FOOLISH.

  • YIELD: The rate received by the lender on a loan adjusted for the effects of amortization, points and other factors. That is why the APR is different than the nominal rate quoted to the borrower. The actual yield is considered to be the percentage return that goes to the lender, taking into consideration the amount of money the lender advanced and measured against the amount of money the lender actually receives on an annual basis.
  • If there was ONE YIELD there would be no YIELD SPREAD. And if there was no YIELD SPREAD there would be no YIELD SPREAD PREMIUM.
  • A Yield SPREAD arises when there are two different possible yields for the same loan. One is better for the borrower and one is better for the lender.
  • If the spread favors the lender, then a PREMIUM is paid to the one responsible for creating it — i.e., the mortgage broker or mortgage originator.
  • YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS for 2001-2008 ran 3-4 times higher than the figures you quote. In some cases, they were much higher than that because all the premiums and commissions were raised to keep mouths shut who knew that the appraisal would never stand the test of time — even one day worth of time.
  • While it is possible that an argument could have been made for the old yield spread premium of 1-1/2%, it still amounted to a commission that paid for asymmetric information — i.e., the lender/broker knew more than the borrower or the borrower would not have paid it.
  • In order to “earn” a yield spread premium, the broker or originator must convince the borrower to accept a loan which gives the lender a higher yield than the borrower could otherwise pay. If the borrower takes the bait (you come to the table with less money, you reduce the the monthly payments at first anyway, etc.) then the yield spread occurs and the premium is paid.
  • In order to convince the the borrower to take the loan terms that give the lender a higher yield, the broker must downplay the negative aspects of making the switch and play up the apparent advantages of the terms that give more to the lender.
  • To seal the deal, the broker pretends to be acting in the best interests of the borrower when in fact he is acting in the best interests of himself and the “lender.”
  • Pretending means the broker is lying to the customer about who to trust.  And the substance of the lie is that the loan that gives the higher yield to the lender is better for the borrower. This lie can only be accomplished in complex transactions like real estate purchases with one or more loans. Otherwise the borrower would see right through it.
  • Thus I stand by my rendition of yield spread premiums and assert that you are counting the pits in the orange while someone is driving off with the grove — with your help.

Filed under: foreclosure
Aug
10

FLA State probes whether three law firms falsified foreclosure documents

Editor’s Note: The REAL BOTTOM LINE POINT is not some technicality wherein the paperwork wasn’t done right, which frankly is reason enough to deny the foreclosure, it is that this “technical” deficiency is “derived” from the fact that there is no note or mortgage or deed of trust that can be enforced. There might not even be any obligation at all if the creditor received payment in full.

LAWYERS TAKE NOTE: Go back to the law books. There are essential differences between the obligation that arises as a matter of law, the note that is offered as proof of the obligation, and the mortgage or deed of trust which is incident to the note.

Don’t dispute the obligation. It DID arise by operation of law. And by operation of law it may still exist, be partially extinguished or entirely extinguished. The documents signed at closing were only PART of the deal in a securitized residential loan. The borrower signs a note and the lender (investor) gets a bond (or evidence of a bond). [THE NOTE AND BOND HAVE DIFFERENT TERMS AND PARTIES BUT THE BOND REFERS TO SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS THAT IN TURN DESCRIBE LOANS OF WHICH THE BORROWER'S LOAN IS ONE CLAIMED TO BE IN A POOL FORMING THE SOURCE OF REVENUE].

WITHOUT REAL DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY REAL PEOPLE WITH REAL AUTHORITY WITH REAL EFFECTIVE DATES, THE CHAIN IS BROKEN.

The borrower signs the note to a party whom the investor never heard of nor could the investor have uncovered the payee on the note because the information was withheld. The investor receives a bond which is an assignment of all right, title and interest to the receivables, but the security instrument is left where it always was — with the mortgage originator (the only one in county records with an interest). The lender (investor) doesn’t know the borrower and the borrower doesn’t know the lender, while each of them receives different terms and [promises from different parties.

But by operation of law, the originator’s interest is extinguished the moment it arises because it is in most cases a table funded loan in which the originator acted as a broker not a lender, and performed no underwriting tasks. So the legal obligation is extinguished at the same time that the legal obligation arises.

BUT that is not the end of the story.

The equitable powers of the court come into play to prevent unjust enrichment. So the next time a Judge says he doesn’t want the borrower to get a house for free, your answer should be you don’t want anyone to get the house for free. And if the Court wishes to exercise its equitable powers to allocate any equity in the home, after due consideration for the obligations of the borrowers and many others who promised to pay the bond holder then the party seeking affirmative relief must make a short plain statement of ultimate facts upon which relief could be granted and then prove their case.

What these law firms and fabrication mills are doing is fabricating and forging documents to create the illusion that those complexities don’t exist — a conclusion that every Judge would like to reach.

Ultimately, the die is cast — the Courts are required to consider the complexity and force the real party in interest, the party with standing to say they lost money on the deal and to show exactly how they did lose money — not merely point to the borrower’s non-payment.

The non-payment by borrower ONLY comes into play if the payment is due and the “creditor” can prove their standing and prove the obligation, complete with an accounting from beginning to end. The fact that the note SAYS the payment is due does not make the payment due — not if the payment was made or the obligation has been changed or satisfied.The note is evidence that must be proffered though the rules of evidence with authentication from competent witnesses or admission from the borrower. Don’t be so quick to admit that they have the note. Even if it is right in front of you, close examination may well reveal that it came off a color printer that morning.

The reason the die is cast is that ultimately this comes down to property law. The breaks in the chain of title render every title in whichever a securitized loan was involved susceptible to being identified as unmarketable or defective title. This threatens the entire marketplace. It is this issue that these firms and the large banks are continuing to finesse with their freshly color-printed “original” documents, indorsements, assignments and powers of attorney.

NEWS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

August 10, 2010

Contact: Sandi Copes

Phone: 850.245.0150

Sandi.Copes@myfloridalegal.com

FLORIDA LAW FIRMS SUBPOENAED OVER FORECLOSURE FILING PRACTICES
——————————————————————

TALLAHASSEE, FL – Attorney General Bill McCollum today announced his office has launched three new investigations into allegations of unfair and deceptive actions by Florida law firms handling foreclosure cases.

The Attorney General’s Economic Crimes Division is investigating whether improper documentation may have been created and filed with Florida courts to speed up foreclosure processes, potentially without the knowledge or consent of the homeowners involved.

The new investigations name The Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A.; Shapiro & Fishman, LLP; and the Law Offices of David J. Stern, P.A. The law firms were hired by loan servicers to begin foreclosure proceedings when consumers were in arrears on their mortgages.

Because many mortgages have been bought and sold by different institutions multiple times, key paperwork involved in the process to obtain foreclosure judgments is often missing. On numerous occasions, allegedly fabricated documents have been presented to the courts in foreclosure actions to obtain final judgments against homeowners.

Thousands of final judgments of foreclosure against Florida homeowners may have been the result of the allegedly improper actions of the law firms under investigation.

The Attorney General’s Office is also investigating whether the law firms have created affiliated companies outside the United States where the allegedly false documents are being prepared and then submitted to the law firms for use.

Subpoenas have been served on each of the law firms listed above, and the investigations are ongoing.

For an official, downloadable photograph, please visit http://www.myfloridalegal.com/picture.html. Also, follow the Attorney General’s Office on Twitter! http://www.twitter.com/myfloridalegal

Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
Posted: 11:48 a.m. Tuesday, Aug. 10, 2010
The Florida Attorney General’s office announced this morning investigations into the state’s three largest foreclosure law firms for allegations of unfair and deceptive actions.
The firms, sometimes called “foreclosure mills,” are the Fort Lauderdale Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, Tampa-based Shapiro & Fishman, and the Law Offices of David J. Stern, based in Plantation.
Last month, a lawsuit seeking class action status was filed by a Fort Lauderdale attorney against Stern claiming the firm generated fraudulent mortgage assignments when pursuing foreclosures.
An assignment is held by the entity that has the right to receive mortgage payments.
Stern’s practice, which the lawsuit claims filed up to 7,000 foreclosure cases in Florida every month last year, also is alleged in the suit to have pursued foreclosures for lenders that didn’t own the debt on the homes.
Miami attorney Jeffrey Tew is representing Stern. Last week, he said Stern and his company have done nothing wrong.
“This foreclosure crisis was not created by David Stern, but it is so huge and a lot of people are in very bad shape, so some of the finger-pointing goes to him,” Tew said.
Tew called portions of the lawsuit that claim Stern conspired to confuse ownership of homes “fantastical.”
A press release from Attorney General Bill McCollum’s office says because many mortgages have been bought and sold by financial institutions multiple times, key paperwork involved in the process to obtain foreclosure judgments is often missing.
“On numerous occasions, allegedly fabricated documents have been presented to the courts in foreclosure actions to obtain final judgments against homeowners,” the press release states. “Thousands of final judgments of foreclosure against Florida homeowners may have been the result of the allegedly improper actions of the law firms under investigation.”

Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, trustee
Aug
04

New HAMP NPV Analysis Service – Prove the Servicer Wrong!

For over a year I’ve known that the crux of the issue for homeowners trying to get a Loan Modification under the federal government’s HAMP program has been the shrouded mystery of the NPV Analysis. The Net Present Value (NPV) calculation is the KEY component of determining whether or not the homeowner gets a trial, and ultimately, a permanent loan modification under the HAMP program. That mystery is now GONE!!

The problem has been that the NPV calculation is a closely guarded secret of the major financial institutions and servicers. If they can keep this calculation a secret, then they can tell homeowners (and even judges) that the homeowner did not qualify for the HAMP modification and no one is the wiser or can prove them wrong; AND that is exactly what they have done for over a year. Here’s the bottom line: Servicers do NOT want to modify because it is simply not as profitable for them as default servicing is. Period. It has NOTHING to do with the homeowner qualifying or not qualifying for HAMP. The problem is enforcement of the HAMP rules and regulations and unless you can prove them wrong with documentation, you’re basically screwed by the secret information (NPV test) that only they possess… until now.

The Department of Treasury is the government entity responsible for determining the formula and the dataset for calculating the NPV on any given mortgage loan asset. The NPV Model formula has been revised several times since the initial launch of the HAMP program and all participants are now currently using NPV Model 3.1 (version) in their calculations.

Here’s a direct quote from the HAMP website from the Treasury, ” A participating servicer in the Home Affordable Modification Program must modify any loan that meets the program’s eligibility criteria if the modification tests “positive” for NPV.” – notice the word “MUST” in that sentence. Here’s a link to that entire report on the HAMP site.

Folks, this is an absolute requirement if a mortgage loan meets the eligibility requirements and the NPV analysis results in a “POSITIVE” then the loan MUST be modified under HAMP. If the Servicer fails to approve the modification under this scenario, they are in BREACH of their Servicer Participation Agreement and this is actionable on the part of the homeowner; meaning you can go on the offense once you have proof that you do qualify and the Servicer has wrongfully and willfully denied you of the HAMP modification.

MBS Analytics HAS ACCESS TO AN NPV MODEL PORTALTO RUN AN ACTUAL NPV LOAN DISPOSITION ANALYSIS FOR ANY HOMEOWNER. Basically they reproduce exactly what the servicer is supposed to do and then hit ‘em between the eyes with, well, let’s just call it a very compelling package and argument to “modify this loan under HAMP or face the consequences.”

Yes, you read that right. So here’s what MBS Analytics does…

  1. collect ALL of the required information and documentation to ascertain the data and information that needs to be inputted
  2. calculate the borrower’s actual monthly income and expenses
  3. calculate the proper monthly amounts for taxes and insurance
  4. run an AVM (short for automated appraisal) just like the servicer does to determine a FMV (Fair Market Value) for the property
  5. run a COMPLETE NPV ANALYSIS which tests for HAMP eligibility, NPV Positive or Negative, New Monthly Payment under HAMP and eligibility for Foreclosure Alternatives such as Short Sale, Deed in Lieu and non-HAMP modification alternatives
  6. compile the complete package in a very specific order and format
  7. draft a cover letter with a summary of the NPV findings and the Loan Disposition Analysis and which also states their legal position on the Homeowner’s qualification for a HAMP modification
  8. attach documenation to support the position and documentation which details the Servicer’s OBLIGATION to comply
  9. cover letter makes a demand to comply and to modify according to the HAMP program and in line with the calculations for the new monthly payment under HAMP
  10. send all of this certified mail to the servicer

Call MBS Analytics today if you are interested or have any questions or want to get started.

MBS Analytics at 1-800-985-4685

Jul
29

Mass Extinction of Pools Becomes Clearer

Our good friend “Anonymous” has piped up with more vital information and expressed it more succinctly than I did.

“The senior tranches have largely already been paid and closed. Since the junior tranches are paid only if there is left over current payment – after the senior tranches have been paid. Thus, junior tranches are paid nothing (this is evident in investor lawsuits – damages do not deduct foreclosure recovery). If anything remains today from the toxic mortgage loan securitizations, it is the residual tranche – which has likely been resecuritized into a separate Trust – that is not a current pass-through security – but, rather, synthetically derived from a dismantled original Trust structure. “

Editor’s Note: In other words, if you have a high quality loan wherein you have a high credit score and received relatively good terms, it was in the “senior tranches.” The senior tranches were paid and closed. They were paid from the meager proceeds of the junior tranches, from insurance, credit default swaps etc. Bottom Line: If you got one of those mortgages, it has almost certainly been paid in full. So why are they still collecting your payments? Because they can.

Your obligation has most likely been satisfied long ago without any rights of subrogation. If you are in foreclosure now with one of these loans, the “Trustee” is in actuality out of the picture because the “Trust” was closed out (IF IT EVER LEGALLY EXISTED). All of this leads to the politically incorrect conclusion that people gt their houses for “nothing.” But that is not true.

ALL THE MONEY THAT WAS OWED ON THAT LOAN HAS BEEN PAID. WHY SHOULD ANYONE COLLECT ANYTHING FURTHER?

More comments from “Anonymous”

This is a very important post. I have been aware of cases where the defendant is sent to mediation without first identifying the real creditor. Some here have stated that the real party issue is not relevant because eventually the plaintiff will get his “ducks in a row” and proceed with the foreclosure under the real party name.

Not identifying the real party in court is not only fraud but also deprives the defendant of direct and timely negotiation with the real party true creditor. Thus, damages accrue to the defendant.

Although real party, in my opinion, is the single most important issue, I am not seeing courts enforce discovery to ascertain the real party. Once it can be established that the real party is not before the court, all the produced documents are also subject to question. I have seen cases where the real party is at issue – but most of the cases simply state that the plaintiff does not have standing – without attempting to demonstrate why the plaintiff is not the real party.

Since foreclosure cases most often are indicative of securitization, knowing the chain of sale/assignment in a securitization is crucial. Also, knowing what the “investors” are entitled to is important. Again, while I think this post is very important – i disagree with “there is nothing left to pay the investors who advanced money into a pool from which some mortgages were funded” 1) any investors who indirectly funded a “pool” – did not directly fund mortgages and 2) tranche “investors” – for which there a limited number of tranches – were only entitled to current income pass-through – not foreclosure recovery (which is not current and not passed on to pass-through security investors. (However, the residual tranche is not a pass-through – and is usually held by the servicer – who may -or may not be the current creditor). 3) the Trust is likely dissolved.

The fact that mediation is being conducted without identification of the current creditor – in whose name any modification must be contracted – is simply additional fraud upon the borrower defendant. This fraud is akin to “loan modification” scams that are being currently investigated by some state Department of Justices.

How and why the courts are allowing this to happen – and actually promoting it – is beyond me.

Editor’s Note: Legally this puts us at the horns of a dilemma. If we want to travel the path of “PAID IN FULL” then we are treading on the thin ice of accepting or admitting that the loan was actually legally and correctly assigned and indorsed into the pool, in addition to the usual “free house” talk.  If we travel the path of UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTED ASSIGNMENT then we get to the conclusion that the loan is still owned by the originating lender, who was PAID IN FULL at the time of the loan closing, but still is the owner of record. If we travel both paths, we are presenting a highly complex argument that most judges won’t understand. This is why the winners out there are not making big splashes with exotic legal arguments (even though they would be right), the winners are getting down to the details that any Judge would understand — SHOW ME THE TRUST DOCUMENT, SHOW ME THE NOTE, SHOW ME THE ASSIGNMENT, SHOW ME THE INDORSEMENT, SHOW ME THE ACCOUNTING, SHOW ME THE CREDITOR ETC.

MANY THANKS, ANONYMOUS!!!


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: creditor, fraud, mediation, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Jul
21

JPMorgan Chase Blows Away Analysts’ Estimates, Lies Beyond Expectations

Last Thursday, I woke up extra early to hear Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase lie through his teeth about his mega-bank’s quarterly earnings.  Analysts were expecting a lie of around 70 cents a share, but Mr. Dimon exceeded all expectations for lying, reporting earnings of $1.09 a share.  Now, to be fair, some of that was made up of one-time items, and some of it was just plain made up.  But even so, taking away the one-time events, JPMorgan Chase would have reported earnings of 87 cents a share.  Fabulous, isn’t he?  And handsome too.

To be entirely honest about the whole thing, it made me queasy for half an hour or so, and I had to get up and walk around.  I didn’t need a part time job last week, I had more than enough on my plate as it was.  And here was Dimon telling me I would soon have to spend a good six hours trying to figure out how to separate the wheat from the bank’s chaff.

I know what you’re thinking… “Oh, goodie… an accounting article… I just love these.”  Yeah, well don’t worry, their not exactly my favorite kind to write either, but this one’s important.

JPMorgan Chase’s earnings report was all sunshine and flowers, the bank reported a drop in net revenue of 8%, which was in line with what Wall Street was expecting.  But the bank’s investment banking and fixed income securities trading, both fell in Q2, as compared with Q1.  So, where did all that money come from that allowed JPMorgan Chase to report such astonishing quarterly results?

It’s really quite simple… Dimon took $1.5 billion out of the bank’s account that’s labeled “reserves for future losses,” which is obviously supposed to be there in anticipation of future losses on bad loans, and called it “profits,” by taking it to the bottom line.  Nice, huh?  Losses… hmmm… now why on earth would anyone worry about losses at JPMorgan Chase at a time like this?

Actually, the whole thing was confusing because Dimon also cautioned analysts that the bank’s “losses from bad loans remain elevated.”

But, I suppose as long as Geithner doesn’t make the mega-bank write down any losses in the future, everything will work out just fine and dandy.  What, me worry?  No chance of that.  Besides, I don’t know why anyone would have a hard time believing anything a bank said these days.  I mean, these guys wouldn’t lie, right?  Flourish the thought.

I’m not the only one that was skeptical about JP’s earnings.  MoneyWeek’s David Stevenson also found the numbers hard to believe.  You can see his analysis in his article: US banking recovery is a sham.

Mike “Mish” Shedlock didn’t buy it either.  He points out that JPMorgan Chase’s earnings hese have now climbed right back to 2007’s high point, which he describes as being “nothing short of amazing.”  He also points out that “it’s more than enough to get bank bulls quite excited again.”

Mish also explains JPMorgan Chase’s figures “aren’t as good as they first seem”.  He explains:

“… the bank only turned in such a ‘good’ result because it slashed its “provision for credit losses” by two thirds, from $9.7bn to $3.4bn. In other words, all (and more) of JP Morgan’s latest profit was due to the bank making a much lower allowance for bad debts – loans that could go sour because the debtors can’t repay to the bank the money they’ve borrowed.”

Of course, that’s not all the bank has going for it in fantasy earnings land.  Compliance with various accounting rules has been a thing of the past as far as our banks are concerned for some time now, and perhaps long enough for investors to have forgotten.  Commercial real estate values have fallen by more than 40 percent, but Geithner and Bair are still not requiring the assets to be written down to market value, and FASB 157 still allows certain residential mortgages the same sort of treatment, so the actual value of a good portion of any bank’s assets is at least questionable in my mind.

Mish also explained another aspect of how FASB 157 is artificially inflating earnings related to how banks value and account for bonds sold by banks, and this one I did not know.  Apparently, FASB 157 allows banks to “pretend” they’ll be buying back bonds they issued at current market rates, regardless of their true intentions.  If the market value of the bank’s bonds falls, banks are now permitted to assume that they owe less to their creditors, booking the difference between the previous market price and the new lower price as a profit, even though such changes in the value of the bonds don’t affect how much the bank actually owes.

Mish, along with others that cover the banking industry, say to expect more of this sort of accounting witchcraft, with Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citibank all expected to take billions to their bottom lines as a result of what FASB 157 now allows.

Lastly, Housing Wire reported just yesterday that JPMorgan Chase’s REO (Real Estate Owned) assets, at least those insured by government agencies… have come close to tripling in value on their balance sheet since the second quarter of 2009, mostly because the bank had to buyback mortgage backed securities from Ginnie Mae.  No further details as to why were offered by Dimon or Chase, but I think its safe to assume that most of what was bought back, was at least 60 days delinquent, and quite possibly longer.

I don’t know if its occurred to anyone else at this point, but none of this sounds like “banking.”  Does it to you?  All I see are accounting tricks and some bad federal policy.  And in response to that sort of thing, it looked to me as if the market was just about ready to kiss Dimon’s ring, as he reported the good news last Thursday.

Well, as you might imagine, I am nowhere near ready to do any ring kissing.  Dimon and his bankster pals are all expected to continue this emergent accounting slight of hand for a while … anything to keep the optics up and Wall Street feeling groovy.

I wish Jamie cared about his bank’s optics related to HAMP loan modifications.  According to Treasury’s latest HAMP report, JPMorgan Chase has offered 880,000 loan modifications to homeowners, with roughly 245,000 having been approved… but, wait… get this… the banks says that just over 54,000 permanent HAMP modifications have been granted through the end of June.  54,000 vs. 880,000?

I just don’t understand it… how can they be so adept at accounting, and yet, when it comes to a modifying a loan, they lose paperwork, struggle to calculate income properly, data enter the wrong numbers, and find it impossible to explain to anyone why they’ve failed an NPV test?

Never mind… I don’t know why I even bother asking such questions anymore.

And all this is after Dimon essentially was given WaMu for $1.9 billion.  Branches totaling 5400 in California, Washington and Florida, among other states, a sizable credit card operation, about $900 billion in deposits, the most of any U.S. bank, and roughly $90 billion in mortgages, and $60 billion give or take in servicing rights, if memory serves.  All that for $1.9 billion?  That’s less than two billion dollars for the whole package.  Oh, and Bear Stearns wasn’t exactly over priced either.  It’s impossible to tell from looking at the bank’s financials, but it seems to me that Jamie would have to have written some of these assets up, as opposed to down.

All I can say is this… our banking system is no longer a banking system… the toxic assets are right where they were in October of 2008…  none make loans… none follows accounting rules…  in fact, almost 100 percent of all of the major banks earnings last year came from their trading desks.  And this year it looks like they’re pulling them out of their…

Mandelman out.

Jul
14

Bank of America Says $10.7 Billion of Trades Wrongly Classified

The bank transferred mortgage-backed securities to a trading partner with the idea of receiving different securities later and classifying the deals as sales, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday. The securities the bank received were similar to those it got rid of, meaning the transactions can’t be considered sales, the newspaper said.

Bank of America had disclosed in a March 31 financial filing that “certain sales of agency mortgage-backed securities should have been recorded as secured borrowings rather than sales,” bank spokesman Jerry Dubrowski said. “The handful of transactions did not have a material impact on the company’s balance sheet or earnings. They need to be viewed in the context of our $2.3 trillion balance sheet.”

It sounds so benign, doesn’t it? What this means is that BofA was, as we all have been saying for years now, trading interests in mortgage backed securities (i.e., indirect or derived interests in the actual loans) for other mortgage backed securities. The real intent was to distance themselves from the original transactions. Who were they trading with? In all probability one of the other banks that wanted to do the same thing. Bottom Line: You can ONLY state with certainty that a pool exists that CLAIMS ownership of the loan and that the owners were at that point in time the investors who created the pool of money that was used to fund mortgages, along with enormous profits and fees that were both unearned and unreported. The current owners of the actual receivables from the loan payments, the receivables from insurance, credit defaults swaps etc., cannot be known without discovery or compliance with the QWR. These trades are not on any exchange where you can go look them up. They are secret.

And that is why the note, assignment and indorsements don’t show up until moments before a hearing. It is because they never existed up until that moment. And often the note is a color printout rather than the original. Look at the other side of the paper to see if there are any indentations. In plain language they said they were transferring the loan but never did. So if you have a performing loan, you’ll wait forever to see an assignment because they don’t want to create it, until some final resting place is required. They are keeping their options open until they MUST show the chain of ownership.

Bank of America Says $10.7 Billion of Trades Wrongly Classified

By David Mildenberg and Dakin Campbell – Jul 10, 2010

Bank of America Corp., the largest U.S. bank by assets, said it wrongly classified as much as $10.7 billion of short-term repurchase and lending transactions as sales from 2007 to 2009 to reduce its end-of-quarter assets.

Bank of America said the inaccuracies aren’t material and “don’t stem from any intentional misstatement of the Corporation’s financial statements and was not related to any fraud or deliberate error,” according to a May 13 letter released yesterday from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

“A $10.7 billion accounting error would be a material event for about 99.9 percent” of U.S. banks, said Cornelius Hurley, director of the Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law at Boston University School of Law. “It’s hard to see how the SEC can accept BofA’s rejoinder as being sufficient.”

SEC spokesman John Nester declined to comment.

The SEC sent letters to finance chiefs at about two dozen firms in March asking whether they employed accounting strategies like those at Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. The bankrupt securities firm was accused of using repurchase agreements called Repo 105s to move assets off its balance sheet to hide leverage, thereby improving its capital ratios.

$2.3 Trillion

Bank of America had disclosed in a March 31 financial filing that “certain sales of agency mortgage-backed securities should have been recorded as secured borrowings rather than sales,” bank spokesman Jerry Dubrowski said. “The handful of transactions did not have a material impact on the company’s balance sheet or earnings. They need to be viewed in the context of our $2.3 trillion balance sheet.”

In April, the SEC asked Bank of America to disclose whether its transactions were intentionally mislabeled, and to prove that the trades were immaterial. The Charlotte, North Carolina- based bank said in an April 13 letter that it stopped the transactions after the first quarter of 2009, the SEC said.

The Bank of America transactions involved six so-called dollar-roll trades completed during 2007, 2008 and 2009. The amount of the trades represented 0.1 percent of total assets in the December 2008 quarter and improved the company’s Tier 1 capital leverage ratio by one basis point, or one-hundredth of a percentage point, during the September 2008 quarter, the bank said.

Bank Review

The bank said in its May 13 letter it did an “extensive review” of repurchase agreements and similar transactions and didn’t find more errors. The mistakes didn’t affect credit ratings or management compensation, hide any failure to meet analysts’ consensus estimates, “mask” other trends or put the bank out of compliance with loan and capital requirements, the bank said.

Bank of America was led by Chief Executive Officer Kenneth D. Lewis from 2001 through the end of 2009, when he retired and was succeeded by Brian Moynihan. In January, Moynihan moved Joe Price, the chief financial officer since January 2007, to run the company’s consumer banking unit. In May, the bank hired former Northrup Grumman Corp. executive Charles Noski as CFO.

The bank transferred mortgage-backed securities to a trading partner with the idea of receiving different securities later and classifying the deals as sales, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday. The securities the bank received were similar to those it got rid of, meaning the transactions can’t be considered sales, the newspaper said.

To contact the reporters on this story: Dakin Campbell in San Francisco at dcampbell27@bloomberg.net David Mildenberg in Charlotte at dmildenberg@bloomberg.net


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
28

WITHOUT RECOURSE: Hangman’s Noose

By Collete McDonald

Editor’s Note: Ms. McDonald hits the nail on the head with this article. You should incorporate it word for word in any relevant memoranda. Why is this important?

Because most of the “notes” (assuming they were the real notes and were timely indorsed and not back-dated) are presented as having been indorsed “without recourse.” Your opposition is counting on the fact that you don’t know the UCC, and you don’t know anything about indorsements.

This is another case where the instrument could appear valid on its face but for the fact that it is a fake. In this case the words “without recourse” on a note (executed as evidence of an obligation on a home loan) is contradicted by the very instrument that authorizes the indorsement — the PSA (Pooling and Servicing Agreement). The PSA ALWAYS provides for conditions, terms and provisions that are exactly the opposite of “without recourse.” These conditions have a negative effect on the negotiability of the instrument. So not only do we have a case where the “assignment” or indorsement” was merely an offer that was never accepted (and could not be accepted as per the terms of the PSA) but you also have an instrument that could not be negotiated under the terms expressed on it.

WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS EFFECTING THE INDORSEMENT “WITHOUT RECOURSE?”: Well the main one is that the pooling and servicing agreement states that if the loan becomes non-performing, the assignor must replace it with either cash or another performing loan. Nothing could be more clear that the indorsement was WITH RECOURSE.

The bottom Line: Most if not all “assignments” or “indorsements” are without effect, which means that the party having legal title to the instrument is the party named on it. And THAT means that each time the opposition attempts to establish authority under the chain of securitization, they are actually making the case that they have no such authority. You can’t come to court and say I am the Trustee for asset backed Pool XYZ which has ownership of this loan” and then turnaround and say you also have authority (legal authority supporting the power of sale in non-judicial states and the standing to foreclose in judicial states) to represent the “lender.” Not if the “lender” is named on the note as payee and on the mortgage or deed of trust as the lender.

If they want to establish some equitable right to enforce the note, they MUST file a judicial action.

WITHOUT RECOURSE:

A phrase used by an endorser (a signer other than the original maker) of a negotiable instrument (for example, a check or promissory note) to mean that if payment of the instrument is refused, the endorser will not be responsible.

An individual who endorses a check or promissory note using the phrase without recourse specifically declines to accept any responsibility for payment. By using this phrase, the endorser does not assume any responsibility by virtue of the endorsement alone and, in effect, becomes merely the assignor of the title to the paper.

A without recourse endorsement is governed by the laws of commercial paper, which have been codified in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC has been adopted wholly or in part by every state, establishing uniform rights of endorsers under UCC § 3-414(1).

A without recourse endorsement is a qualified endorsement and will be honored by the courts if certain requirements are met. Any words other than “without recourse” should clearly be of similar meaning. Because the payee’s name is on the back of the note, he is presumed to be an unqualified endorser unless there are words that express a different intention. The denial of recourse against a prior endorser must be found in express words. An implied qualification, based on the circumstances surrounding the endorsement to a third party, will not be recognized by the courts. An assignment of a note is generally regarded as constituting an endorsement, and the mere fact that an instrument is assigned by express statement on the back does not make the signer a qualified endorser.

The qualification without recourse, or its equivalent, is limited to the immediate endorsement to which it applies. It may precede or follow the name of the endorser, but its proximity to the name should be such as to give a subsequent purchaser reasonable notice of the endorsement to which it applies.

A person might agree to accept a check without recourse if the person believes she could collect the money in question. Often the purchaser of such a note will acquire it at a substantial discount from the face value of the note, in recognition that the purchaser can only seek to collect the money from the original maker of note.

An example of a without recourse note is a personal check written by A, the maker, to B, the payee. B, in turn pays off a debt to C by endorsing the check and adding the without recourse phrase. If A’s bank refuses to pay C the check amount because A has insufficient funds in his checking account, C cannot demand payment from B. C will have to attempt to collect the money from A.


Filed under: CDO, evidence, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, Mortgage, Pleading, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: assignment, Collete McDonald, conditions, indorsement, legal title, negotiable instrument, PSA, UCC, UCC § 3-414(1)., without recourse
Jun
17

TBW Taylor Bean Chairman Arrested On Fraud Charges

“The fraud here is truly stunning in its scale and complexity,” said Lanny A. Breuer, assistant attorney general in the criminal division of the Department of Justice. “These charges send a strong message to corporations and corporate executives alike that financial fraud will be found, and it will be prosecuted.”

Once they determined that that approach might be difficult to conceal, they started selling mortgage pools and other assets to Colonial Bank that they knew to be worthless, officials said. Mr. Farkas and his partners relied on this technique to sell more than $1 billion of fraudulent assets over the course of several years, even covering up the fraud by recycling old fake assets for new ones, according to the complaints.

Editor’s Note: TBW has been high on my list of incompetent fraudsters. I always thought it was a stupid risk to “sell” mortgages and “sell” the servicing rights (probably to their own entity), and then take the servicing back. Stupid maybe, but they had no choice. The entire Taylor Bean operation wreaks of fraud and inconsistencies.

Bottom Line: If you have a TBW as the originating “lender” this article indicates, as we have known all along, that they were using OPM (Other People’s Money) and they were NOT the lender even though they said they were. It is highly likely that few, if any, of the loans were actually “securitized” because the loans were either nonexistent as described, never accepted by any pool (even though there might be a pool out there that claims ownership) and that none of the assignments were ever completed.

Thus your claims against TBW (including appraisal fraud, predatory loan practices, deceptive loan practices, fraud etc.) are properly directed, to wit: TBW still owns the paper, although the obligation is subject to an equitable unsecured claim from investors who funded the loan.

June 16, 2010

Executive Charged in TARP Scheme

By ERIC DASH

Federal prosecutors on Wednesday accused the former chairman of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, once one of the nation’s largest mortgage lenders, of masterminding a fraud scheme that cheated investors and the federal government out of billions of dollars and led to last year’s sudden failure of Colonial Bank.

The executive, Lee B. Farkas, was arrested late Tuesday in Ocala, Fla., after a federal grand jury in Virginia indicted him on 16 counts of conspiracy, bank fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud. Separately, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought civil fraud charges against Mr. Farkas in a lawsuit filed on Wednesday.

Prosecutors said the fraud would be one of the biggest and most complex to come out of the housing collapse and the government’s huge bailout of the banking industry. In essence, they described an elaborate shell game that involved covering up the lender’s losses by creating fake mortgages and passing them along to private investors and government agencies.

Federal officials became suspicious after Colonial BancGroup, the main source of financing for Mr. Farkas’s company, tried to obtain $553 million in bailout money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The TARP application, filed in early 2009, was contingent on the bank first raising $300 million from private investors.

According to the S.E.C. complaint, Mr. Farkas and his partners said they would contribute $150 million, two private equity firms would each contribute $50 million, and a “friends and family” investor group would contribute another $50 million. “In truth, neither of the $50 million investors were private equity investors and neither ever agreed to participate,” the complaint said.

Mr. Farkas pocketed at least $20 million from the fraud, which he used to finance a private jet and a lavish lifestyle that included five homes and a collection of vintage cars, prosecutors said.

But the case is likely to expand beyond Mr. Farkas. The complaints cite the involvement of an unnamed Colonial Bank executive and other co-conspirators in the suspected fraud, and prosecutors said they might hold others accountable down the road.

“The fraud here is truly stunning in its scale and complexity,” said Lanny A. Breuer, assistant attorney general in the criminal division of the Department of Justice. “These charges send a strong message to corporations and corporate executives alike that financial fraud will be found, and it will be prosecuted.”

Officials said the many layers of the scheme resulted in more than $1.9 billion of losses to investors; a $3 billion loss to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which guaranteed many of the loans that Mr. Farkas’s company sold; and a $3.6 billion hit to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which had to take over Colonial Bank and pay its depositors after many of the bank’s assets were found to be worthless.

The complaints also list BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank, which provided financing to Mr. Farkas’s company, as victims of the suspected fraud. Together, they lost $1.5 billion.

According to the complaints, the fraud started as early as 2002 with an effort to conceal rising operating losses at Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, a mortgage lender founded by Mr. Farkas. The first stage involved an attempt to hide overdrafts on a credit line the company had with Colonial Bank. As those overdrafts grew, prosecutors contend, Mr. Farkas and his associates started selling fake mortgage assets to Colonial Bank in exchange for tens of millions of dollars.

Once they determined that that approach might be difficult to conceal, they started selling mortgage pools and other assets to Colonial Bank that they knew to be worthless, officials said. Mr. Farkas and his partners relied on this technique to sell more than $1 billion of fraudulent assets over the course of several years, even covering up the fraud by recycling old fake assets for new ones, according to the complaints.

The transactions were “designed to give the false appearance that the loans were being sold into the secondary mortgage market,” Mr. Breuer said. “In fact, they were not.”

By 2008, prosecutors contend, the scheme had entangled the federal government. Investigators in the Office of the Special Inspector General for TARP took notice of the size of Colonial Bank’s bailout application and became suspicious of the accuracy of the bank’s statements.

That led investigators to alert other federal officials and draw a connection between Colonial Bank and Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, whose offices were raided by federal agents in August 2009. Both companies would soon stop operating.

“We knew it was a longstanding and close relationship between Colonial and T.B.W., and we decided that we needed to take a much closer look,” Neil M. Barofsky, the TARP special inspector general, said at a news conference on Wednesday. Investigators also discussed the situation with Treasury officials to “make sure the money would not go out the door.”

Federal officials have conducted nearly 80 criminal and civil investigations into companies that accepted TARP money, but so far they have filed charges in only one other case. In March, the head of Park Avenue Bank in Manhattan was accused of trying to defraud the government bailout program.


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES Tagged: accounting, bank fraud, civil fraud charges, Colonial BancGroup, Colonial Bank, conspiracy, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, DOJ, ERIC DASH, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation., fraud, HERS, infrastructure, investors, Lanny A Breuer, Lee B Farkas, Ny Times, Securities and Exchange Commission, securities fraud, Taylor, Taylor Bean, TBW, wire fraud
May
11

APPRAISAL FRAUD IN DETAIL

APPRAISAL FRAUD IS THE ACT OF GIVING A RATING OR VALUE TO A HOME THAT IS WRONG — AND THE APPRAISER KNOWS IT IS WRONG. This can’t be performed in a vacuum because there are so many players who are involved. They ALL must be complicit in the deceit leading to the homeowner signing on the the bottom line and advancing his home as collateral on a loan which at the very beginning is theft of most of the value of the home. It’s like those credit cards they send to people who are financially challenged. $300 credit, no questions asked. And then you get a bill for $297 including fees and insurance. So you end up not with a credit line of $300, but a liability of $300 just for signing your name. It’s a game to the “lenders” because they are not using their own money.

And remember, the legal responsibility for the appraisal is directly with the appraiser, the appraisal company (which usually has errors and omissions insurance) and the named lender in your closing documents. The named “lender” is, according to Federal Law, required to verify the value of the property.

How many of them , if they were using their own money, would blithely accept a $300,000 appraisal on a home that was worth $200,000 last month and will be worth $200,000 next month? You are entitled to rely on the appraisal and the “verification” by the “lender” (see Truth in Lending Act and Reg Z). The whole reason the law is structured that way is because THEY know and YOU don’t. THEY have access to the information and YOU don’t. This is a complex transaction that THEY understand and YOU don’t.

A false appraisal steals money from you because you rely on it to make the deal for refinancing or for the purchase. You think the home is worth $300,000 and so you agree to buy a loan product that puts you in debt for $290,000. But the house is worth $200,000. You just lost $90,000 plus closing costs and a variety of other expenses, especially if you are moving into anew home that requires all kinds of additions like window treatments etc. But the “lender” who is really just a front for the Wall Street and the investor pool that funded the loan, made out like bandits. Yield spread premiums, extra fees, profits, rebates, kickbacks to the developer, the appraiser, the mortgage broker, the title agency, the closing agent, the real estate broker, trustee(s) the investment banking entities that were used in the securitization of your loan, amount in some cases to MORE THAN YOUR LOAN. No wonder they are so anxious to get your signature.

“Comparable” means reference to time, nearby geography, and physical attributes of the home and lot. Here are SOME of the more obvious indicators of appraisal fraud:

  1. Your home is worth 40% of the appraisal amount.
  2. The appraisal used add-ons from the developer that were marked up for the home buyer but which nobody in the secondary market will pay. That kitchen you paid an extra $10,000 for “extras” is included in your appraisal but has no value to anyone else. That’s not an appraisal and it isn’t collateral or fair market value.
  3. The homes in the immediate vicinity of your home were selling for less than your home appraisal when they had the same attributes.
  4. The homes in the immediate vicinity of your home were selling for less than your home appraisal just a few weeks or months before.
  5. The value of your home was significantly less just a  few weeks or months after the closing.
  6. You are underwater: this means you owe more on your obligation than your house is worth. Current estimates are that it might take 20 years or more for home prices to reach the level of mortgages, and that is WITH inflation.
  7. Negative amortization loans usually allow the principal to rise even above the falsely inflated appraisal amount. If that happened, then they knew at the time of the loan that even if the appraisal was not inflated, it still would not be worth the amount of the principal due on the obligation. For example, if your loan is $290,000 and the interest is $25,000 per year, but you were only required to pay $1,000 per month for the first three years, then your Principal was going up by $13,000 per year compounded. So that $300,000 appraisal doesn’t cover the $39,000+ that would be added to your principal balance. The balance at the end of 3 years will be over $330,000 on property APPRAISED at $300,000. No honest appraiser, mortgage broker, or lender, would be complicit in such an arrangement unless they were paid handsomely to do it and they had no risk because they were not using their own money for the loan.

Filed under: foreclosure Tagged: access to the information, Appraisal, appraisal company, appraisal fraud, builder, closing agent, credit cards, deceitful lending practices, developer, errors and omissions insurance, fair market value, false appraisal, fees, fraud, HERS, insurance, kickbacks, lenders, MORTGAGE BROKER, profit, rating, reabtes, Reg Z, TILA, title agency, trustee, Truth in Lending Act, value, verification, yield spread premium, YSP
Mar
13

We All Make A Difference: Homeowners, Forensic Analysts, Experts and Lawyers

Every project or cause that was ever completed had many people who made it happen other than those who were “front and center” upon it’s completion. It might be the one’s who envisioned the project, those who labored in it’s every detail, or maybe it was the one who rescued the project after the initial excitement faded. The bottom line is that all of these people are why the project succeeded. But again, they were all individually dependent upon someone else to do their part or there literally would be no place for their contribution. from www.aish.com

YOU are making a difference just by reading this. YOU make a difference every time you pass on information and messages of hope. YOU make a difference when you help someone keep their home. YOU make a difference when you save your own home. Without YOU the words on this blog, the actions and services we facilitate, would be nothing but empty words and flailing of arms. YOU make the difference when you take action.

This project won’t be over for many more years. What YOU do now will make a difference to the world of our children and grandchildren. Summon the strength, face the challenges, persist in what is right, fight what is wrong and move the mountain along with everyone else who dares to stand, think, speak on their own behalf and on behalf of others who can’t.


Filed under: foreclosure
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