Bill Black has an interesting new take on the role of Fannie and Freddie in the housing bubble. He sees their investment in non-prime mortgages as being driven by executive compensation, rather than a fight for market share against investment bank securitization conduits or govt affordable housing policy. The government affordable housing policy point has been repeatedly debunked (and Susan Wachter and I have a new paper that adds to this debunking via an examination of the commercial real estate bubble, where there was no government involvement whatsoever). Black is not, however, able to disprove the market share theory. What he does point to is that the GSE's involvement with nonprime mortgages was as whole loans kept in portfolio, rather than securitized (and also via purchases of MBS), which he says was a move to increase the short-term yield for the GSEs and thus maximize short-term executive compensation.

I think this is an interesting theory, but there are a few data points necessary to make it work, and I'm skeptical that they all support Black. 

Black argues that this boxed in the GSEs in terms of how their could up their returns. In order to increase the returns from their portfolio, they shifted it to non-prime products, and moved more of the prime products into MBS. He further argues that the only thing that kept the GSEs from getting into really poorly underwriting non-prime products was that their risk managers and underwriters had a superior culture of responsibility and fought harder to maintain standards.

I don't doubt that executive compensation could (and probably did) play a role in the GSEs' purchases of nonprime mortgages. But Black hasn't presented a convincing story. His story relies on three pieces of evidence that he has not produced: first, that the GSEs' kept the nonprime in portfolio and securitized only prime; second, that this execution was more profitable in the short term than securitizing the nonprime mortgages; and third, that the GSEs' had a superior culture of underwriting and risk-management that kept things in check.

The first point should be reasonably easy to verify. But I'm less sure about the second, and the third, is entirely speculative. Regarding the second point, remember that the GSEs' bear the credit risk on mortgages regardless of whether they are in portfolio or securitized (via a guarantee). The only difference is whether the GSEs bear the interest rate risk, which they do for portfolio, but not for securitized loans. Unless there was a real difference in yield based on interest rate risk (which is possible) between a securitized and a portfolio nonprime loan, there'd be no reason to securitize the prime and keep the non-prime in portfolio because of higher yields. That matters because Black's argument that the GSE involvement in non-prime was because of higher yields which boosted executive compensation, and if the form of their involvement didn't track with yields, this story falls apart. Certainly the investment banks decided that securitization rather than portfolio was the better execution, and it's hard to believe that the economics would have been different for the GSEs. 

Again, an executive compensation angle is quite possible, but I think there's a lot to be said for the market share theory. Executive compensation (and tenure) depended on GSE share price, and GSE share price was dependent upon market share, which was falling. What happened, then was an insurance rate war. The GSEs are best understood as mono-insurance companies, like MBIA (or AIG): like insurance companies they have an investment portfolio (MBS or whole loans) and they issue bond insurance, in the form of the guarantees on their MBS. The only difference is that the GSEs securitize the products that they insure.

A major insurance regulation concern is preventing rate wars for market share, as a rate war will leave all competitors undercapitalized for paying out future claims. The GSEs got into a rate war with private-label MBS. They did this not by lowering the G-fee that they charge for their guarantee, but by holding the G-fee constant and lowering underwriting standards. The rate that the GSEs charge needs to be understood as a risk-adjusted rate, and while the stated rate stayed constant, the risk-adjustment did not, resulting in a lower risk-adjusted rate.

Bottom line here is that we don't have definitive evidence supporting for any of the theories of the GSEs' involvement in the housing bubble. There's strong evidence against some theories, but little affirmative evidence. The GSEs are themselves sitting on the best evidence; it would be really nice to see FHFA (or the FHFA IG) put out a definitive report on the role of the GSEs in the housing bubble.  

What would you do if you were running an insolvent company? The smart thing is to bet big:  go with a high-risk/high-return strategy.  If the gamble pays off, you're solvent, and if not, well, you're already insolvent.  You're playing with the creditors' money. (And without a tort of deepening insolvency, there really isn't a clear downside for management.)  This is gambling on resurrection.  

We've seen the disastrous results of banks gambling on resurrection.  That was the S&L crisis. Rising interest rates in the late '70s decapitalized the S&Ls as the S&Ls' assets were long-term, fixed rate mortgages that paid lower rates than the S&Ls had to pay depositors.  The S&Ls, however, got a pliant Congress to agree to massive deregulation that allowed them to expand into all sorts of new business lines, like commercial real estate and race horses and junk bonds. Insolvent S&Ls went chasing high risk/high return projects.  The result was that the tab for taxpayers to fix the S&L mess was significantly greater.

Today, it looks like Bank of America is repeating the S&Ls' gamble on resurrection and using this gamble to hold the US government hostage.  

The smart move for BoA, then, would be to gamble on resurrection. And it seems that is exactly what BoA is doing. What's the most obvious high risk/high rewards strategy available presently? Writing CDS on European sovereign debt. Going long on Greece (or all the PIIGS). This is exactly what BoA (and other US banks) have been doing. 

Here's what's really scarry.  BoA just moved its derivatives business (where it does its CDS) from Merrill into its insured depository. BoA's immediate motivation might have been to reduce collateral requirements following itsSeptember ratings downgrade. But there's also a huge political benefit to the move.  Remember that CDS are qualified financial contracts that will come before FDIC claims. So it looks like BoA is gambling on resurrection at the expense of the US taxpayer. If things work out in Europe, BoA makes a bundle. And if not, the US taxpayer picks up the tab. 

This means that BoA has the US government over a barrell. BoA can basically tell Treasury that it had better make everything good in Europe or it will be paying the bill. By strapping a financial bomb to itself, BoA is in a position to dictate terms to the US government regarding international financial policy. The difficulty for BoA, however, is that the Administration understands that intervening to help the Europeans will probably cost them the election (never mind that we already did this when we bailed out AIG and protected its regulatory capital arbitrage swap counterparties).  

But here we are, a year after Dodd-Frank and three years after the financial crisis, and a too-big-to-fail bank is in a position to hold the US government hostage. If this doesn't underscore that too-big-to-fail is a threat not just to the US economy, but to the US political system, I'm not sure what does. 

Elizabeth Warren is the only person I’ve seen in Washington D.C. that is both aware of what consumers are facing today, and I believe truly cares about homeowners in this country. She gets it in ways that no one else in government does, and she appeared just a few days ago on PBS to talk about the new agency and the foreclosure crisis. And I found it breathtaking to watch, and hear what she she had to say.

She says…

“It’s about respect. I believe that the American people ought to be part of the conversation about what’s happening in our economy, and what’s happening in Washington D.C. and what’s happening on Wall Street. I truly believe that if the insiders get together and rewrite all the rules, those will be rules that will benefit the insiders and the rest of America will just be left out of it.”

She was asked whether she believes that Tim Geithner is right about the way he’s handling the commercial real estate meltdown that’s around the corner.  She responded by saying:

“We have not seen a strong response from Treasury. I hope he’s right, but I would feel better if I saw more action, if we saw some plans in place. It is our job in oversight not to say ‘Oh good, let’s relax!’ Our job in oversight is push and say these are problems, and show us what you’re doing here, and we do this on behalf of the American people.”

She described it as a downward spiral. (Sound familiar?) She knows what’s ahead and she knows it doesn’t look good. People… she is our one true real hope. We need her now, and if we can’t make her the President of the United States, we must make sure she is allowed to establish and lead the consumer protection agency of which she conceived. It is only because of her that the agency will exist, and to pretend that there is anyone else to lead it, would be a travesty and a tragedy on an historic scale.

I pray… literally pray… that all of you reading me take the time to write to the White House and to  your elected representative telling both that her appointment is the single most important thing to you… and to all of us.

At the end of her interview, and I hope you’ll watch every single second of it as it appears below… she admits that she doesn’t know whether it’s possible to push back against Wall Street’s power, and she admits that many have told her that it is not. But, I’ve never felt more in-sync with anyone as when she utters her last words, saying: “I don’t know. I just refuse to give up.”

I was told by someone inside the beltway, as they say, that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is still working hard to oppose her appointment to lead the new consumer protection agency. I’ve also been told that Larry Summers will also oppose her appointment.

These are the two guys who have bailed out the banks at every turn, and don’t want to see anyone question those banks, or limit what they’re allowed to do to us, in order to become solvent again.

The banks, however, are no more solvent today than they were a year ago. The toxic assets… remember the “toxic assets”… are right where they were in October of 2008. Geithner has not dealt with that problem. It is abundantly clear that his plan is to allow the banks to continue crippling our economy until they can make enough money to return to solvency.

But, and please listen when I say this, and go check it out for yourself if you don’t believe what I’m about to say… Japan took that approach and it took their banks over a DECADE. It could take our banks even longer.

My daughter is 14. How old are those that you love? We are literally staring down the barrel of a DECADE LONG GUN RIGHT NOW. Geithner cannot be allowed to continue doing what he’s doing to this country.

Last year, we spent more than $4 trillion propping up the banks, and we are no better off today than we were then. In fact, as everyone will know in a matter of months, if they don’t know it already, we are much worse off than we were a year ago.

It’s not just about the TARP for $700 billion, by the way. The TARP was just the beginning. The rest is not covered by the media, but you can look it up for yourself. Try Googling the following, because these are all programs Geithner and Summers and the Obama Administration have established and approved… quietly.

TLGP (Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program) This was set up by Geithner and Bair. It guarantees certain types of debt issued by financial institutions, and deposits in certain accounts. Thousands of banks are participating in this program. ALLOCATED: $1.5 TRILLION

GSEP (Government Sponsored Entity Purchases) This was set up by Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke. It allows the Federal Reserve to being purchasing the toxic debt issued by Fannie and Freddie. ALLOCATED: $1.4 TRILLION

CPFF (Commercial Paper Funding Facility) This program was established by Geithner to fund the commercial paper market after Lehman’s demise. Commercial paper can be thought of as short term loans that many large companies use to cover payrolls. It was funded by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York… Geithner was the President of the Federal reserve Bank of New York before becoming Treasury Secretary, by the way. They say this program is closed, but how do we really know? ALLOCATED: $1.4 TRILLION

TALF (Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility) Geithner and Bernanke set this up last year to loan money to banks that offer bundled loans to small businesses and consumers. The hope was that it would make it easier for people to get car loans, student loans, and other forms of credit. Did it work? Maybe a little, but it sure didn’t fix anything. ALLOCATED: $200 BILLION

TAF (Term Auction Facility) A program whereby the Federal Reserve auctioned funds to depository institutions. Bids are submitted by phone through local Federal Reserve banks, and all advances must be collateralized, but how do we know what’s passing for collateral these days. ALLOCATED: $600 BILLION

AMLF (Asset Backed Commercial Paper Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility) This program provides loans to banks so they can buy certain types of commercial paper from money market mutual funds. The goal of this program was to make it easier for the funds to pay the investors that wanted to cash out. ALLOCATED: $1.6 TRILLION

FEDS (Foreign Exchange Dollar Swaps) This is a program whereby the Federal Reserve goes around the world offering dollars to the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of England and other central banks. These banks can print Euros, Francs, Pounds, etc. but not dollars. The european banks give the Fed their own currencies to hold, and then lend the dollars to other banks in an attempt to ease the strain in those banks. ALLOCATED: UNREPORTED AMOUNT SPENT AS OF A YEAR AGO: $420.26 BILLION

PDCF (Primary Dealer Credit Facility) This is an overnight loan facility that provides funding to primary dealers in exchange for any tri-party-eligible collateral. The purpose is to keep the markets functioning. Loans are taken out for one day, but new loans can be taken out each day. ALLOCATED: UNREPORTED SPENT: UNREPORTED

Still think it’s all about the TARP funds?

People have called me and said… “But the banks paid back the TARP funds, doesn’t that mean they’re doing better?” And I’ve replied: No, I’m afraid not. It just means they wanted to have the restrictions on executive pay lifted, and only the TARP funds place such restrictions on the banks. The rest of the programs above don’t place any restrictions on anyone.

Tim Geithner and Larry Summers are directly responsible for the situation we are in today. It’s worsening and worsening faster than ever. Don’t wait until you actually feel the pain to take action, because by then it will be too late, if it isn’t already.

Oh, and stop listening to the double dip nonsense. It’s not true. We won’t have a double dip, because we never had a recovery. We’re in the same downward spiral we went into in 2007. Elizabeth Warren knows this, but she also knows that government cannot continue to abandon the American people as it pumps trillions into the banks who caused and are continuing to cause such monumental and intense pain. We need her now… we need balance, as much as we can get.

And just like I’ve said many times over the last two years… she won’t give up. Write to the White House, and to your elected representative today. Demand that Elizabeth Warren head up the new consumer protection agency… please.

Here’s she is being interviewed just three days ago on PBS. Please watch the whole thing. Thank you… Mandelman

Watch the full episode. See more Need To Know.

Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors

This article is by Edmund L. Andrews, Eric Dash and Graham Bowley.

WASHINGTON — The Treasury Department is expected to unveil early next week its long-delayed plan to buy as much as $1 trillion in troubled mortgages and related assets from financial institutions, according to people close to the talks.

The plan is likely to offer generous subsidies, in the form of low-interest loans, to coax investors to form partnerships with the government to buy toxic assets from banks.

To help protect taxpayers, who would pay for the bulk of the purchases, the plan calls for auctioning assets to the highest bidders.

The uproar over the American International Group’s bonuses has not stopped the Obama administration from plowing ahead. The plan is not expected to impose restrictions on the executive pay of private investors or fund managers who participate.

The three-pronged approach is perhaps the most central component of President Obama’s plan to rescue the nation’s banking system from the money-losing assets weighing down bank balance sheets, crippling their ability to make new loans and deepening the recession.

Industry analysts estimate that the nation’s banks are holding at least $2 trillion in troubled assets, mostly residential and commercial mortgages.

The plan to be announced next week involves three separate approaches. In one, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will set up special-purpose investment partnerships and lend about 85 percent of the money that those partnerships will need to buy up troubled assets that banks want to sell.

In the second, the Treasury will hire four or five investment management firms, matching the private money that each of the firms puts up on a dollar-for-dollar basis with government money.

In the third piece, the Treasury plans to expand lending through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, a joint venture with the Federal Reserve.

The goal of the plan is to leverage the dwindling resources of the Treasury Department’s bailout program with money from private investors to buy up as many of those toxic assets as possible and free the banks to resume more normal lending.

But the details have been treacherously difficult, politically and financially, and some of the big decisions are the same as those that bedeviled the Treasury Department under President George W. Bush last year.

Timothy F. Geithner, the Treasury secretary, provoked scathing criticism from investors in February by announcing the broad outlines of the plan without addressing the tough questions, like how the government planned to share the risk with investors or arrive at a fair price for the assets that would neither cheat taxpayers nor harm the banks.

Although the details of the F.D.I.C. part were still being completed on Friday, it is expected that the government will provide the overwhelming bulk of the money — possibly more than 95 percent — through loans or direct investments of taxpayer money.

The hope is that such a generous taxpayer subsidy will attract private investors into the market and accelerate the recovery of the country’s banks.

The key protection for taxpayers, according to people briefed on the plan, is that the private investors will bid in auctions against each other for the assets. As a result, administration officials contend, the government will be buying the troubled loans of the banks at a deep discount to their original face value.

Because the government can hold those mortgages as long as it wants, officials are betting the government will be repaid and that taxpayers may even earn a profit if the market value of the loans climbs in the years to come.

To entice private investors like hedge funds and private equity firms to take part, the F.D.I.C. will provide nonrecourse loans — that is, loans that are secured only by the value of the mortgage assets being bought — worth up to 85 percent of the value of a portfolio of troubled assets.

The remaining 15 percent will come from the government and the private investors. The Treasury would put up as much as 80 percent of that, while private investors would put up as little as 20 percent of the money, according to industry officials. Private investors, then, would be contributing as little as 3 percent of the equity, and the government as much as 97 percent.

The government would receive interest payments on the money it lent to a partnership and it would share profits and losses on the equity portion of the investment with the private investors.

Ever since last fall, industry analysts and policy makers in Washington have argued that the banking system’s biggest problem was the huge pile of troubled mortgages and other loans on bank balance sheets.

Risk-taking institutional investors, like hedge funds and private equity funds, have refused to pay more than about 30 cents on the dollar for many bundles of mortgages, even if most of the borrowers are still current. But banks holding those mortgages, not wanting to book huge losses on their holdings, have often refused to sell for less than 60 cents on the dollar.

The result has been a paralyzing impasse. Banks, unwilling to sell their loans at fire-sale prices, have had less capital available to make new loans. Mortgage investors, unable to leverage their investments with borrowed money, have been unwilling to pay more than fire-sale prices.

To break that impasse, the government’s crucial subsidy is meant to provide investors with the kind of low-cost financing that has been utterly unavailable in today’s credit markets.

Administration officials refused to comment on the details of the plan, and refused to say what kind of interest rates the government would be charging investors. But government officials have long maintained that they could charge slightly more than the Treasury’s own cost of money and still offer rates far less than the private markets would demand.

To start the program, Treasury will ask banks, like Citigroup or JPMorgan Chase, to identify pools of residential and commercial real estate loans that they will be willing to sell through an auction. Private investors will bid against each other, setting a market price. No bank will be required to participate.

Analysts worry whether the prices investors offer will be high enough to induce the banks to sell assets. The hope is that high valuations at the auctions will increase the price of assets that remain on the books of banks, bolstering confidence in the sector.

Still, the Treasury Department’s biggest obstacle may be the current political environment in Washington, where Democratic lawmakers are furious about the pay packages and bonuses received by executives at companies being rescued by taxpayers.

Many investment executives said they were worried that participating in any bailout program would expose them to political wrath and potentially steep new restrictions on their own pay.

Treasury and Fed officials have remained firmly against imposing any restrictions on pay for companies investing money in the rescue effort rather than receiving money from it.

The plan comes as financial institutions continue to fail. Federal regulators Friday seized control of the two largest wholesale credit unions — U.S. Central Federal Credit Union and Western Corporate Federal Credit Union — which together had $57 billion in assets. They provide financing, check-clearing and other tasks for retail credit unions.

The government is absolute in its intent to sell the American people on the pitch that we must spend our way out of this, bailout industries and generally stick their nose into every facet of our lives. Now they want to spend some circa 1.8 – 3.5 TRILLION on Health Care. And we’re supposed to believe that they can do this better and more profitable than the private industry can.

I always maintain that the truth is what you see in front of you, not the illusion you hear on TV and especially what you hear from the Obama Administration or the liberals on Capitol Hill.

What I see happening all over this country is businesses boarding up, more people looking for jobs, more people hoping that unemployment benefits get extended and more people working harder than they ever have before for way less than they’ve made since they entered the work force full-time.

Businesses are not getting their receivables paid by other businesses and the essence of Trickle-Down Economics ensues.

Obama’s Economic Policy is: Shove it Down Economics vs. Trickle Down

Enter the Greatest Depression in U.S. History…

Article by Andrew Gavin Marshall

Introduction

While there is much talk of a recovery on the horizon, commentators are forgetting some crucial aspects of the financial crisis. The crisis is not simply composed of one bubble, the housing real estate bubble, which has already burst. The crisis has many bubbles, all of which dwarf the housing bubble burst of 2008. Indicators show that the next possible burst is the commercial real estate bubble. However, the main event on the horizon is the “bailout bubble” and the general world debt bubble, which will plunge the world into a Great Depression the likes of which have never before been seen.

Housing Crash Still Not Over

The housing real estate market, despite numbers indicating an upward trend, is still in trouble, as, “Houses are taking months to sell. Many buyers are having trouble getting financing as lenders and appraisers struggle to figure out what houses are really worth in the wake of the collapse.” Further, “the overall market remains very soft [...] aside from speculators and first-time buyers.” Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington said, “It would be wrong to imagine that we have hit a turning point in the market,” as “There is still an enormous oversupply of housing, which means that the direction of house prices will almost certainly continue to be downward.” Foreclosures are still rising in many states “such as Nevada, Georgia and Utah, and economists say rising unemployment may push foreclosures higher into next year.” Clearly, the housing crisis is still not at an end.[1]

The Commercial Real Estate Bubble

In May, Bloomberg quoted Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackermann as saying, “It’s either the beginning of the end or the end of the beginning.” Bloomberg further pointed out that, “A piece of the puzzle that must be calculated into any determination of the depth of our economic doldrums is the condition of commercial real estate – the shopping malls, hotels, and office buildings that tend to go along with real-estate expansions.” Residential investment went down 28.9 % from 2006 to 2007, and at the same time, nonresidential investment grew 24.9%, thus, commercial real estate was “serving as a buffer against the declining housing market.”

Commercial real estate lags behind housing trends, and so too, will the crisis, as “commercial construction projects are losing their appeal.” Further, “there are lots of reasons to suspect that commercial real estate was subject to some of the loose lending practices that afflicted the residential market. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices found that whereas in 2003 just 2 percent of banks were easing their underwriting standards on commercial construction loans, by 2006 almost a third of them were relaxing.” In May it was reported that, “Almost 80 percent of domestic banks are tightening their lending standards for commercial real-estate loans,” and that, “we may face double-bubble trouble for real estate and the economy.”[2]

In late July of 2009, it was reported that, “Commercial real estate’s decline is a significant issue facing the economy because it may result in more losses for the financial industry than residential real estate. This category includes apartment buildings, hotels, office towers, and shopping malls.” Worth noting is that, “As the economy has struggled, developers and landlords have had to rely on a helping hand from the US Federal Reserve in order to try to get credit flowing so that they can refinance existing buildings or even to complete partially constructed projects.” So again, the Fed is delaying the inevitable by providing more liquidity to an already inflated bubble. As the Financial Post pointed out, “From Vancouver to Manhattan, we are seeing rising office vacancies and declines in office rents.”[3]

In April of 2009, it was reported that, “Office vacancies in U.S. downtowns increased to 12.5 percent in the first quarter, the highest in three years, as companies cut jobs and new buildings came onto the market,” and, “Downtown office vacancies nationwide could come close to 15 percent by the end of this year, approaching the 10-year high of 15.5 percent in 2003.”[4]

In the same month it was reported that, “Strip malls, neighborhood centers and regional malls are losing stores at the fastest pace in at least a decade, as a spending slump forces retailers to trim down to stay afloat.” In the first quarter of 2009, retail tenants “have vacated 8.7 million square feet of commercial space,” which “exceeds the 8.6 million square feet of retail space that was vacated in all of 2008.” Further, as CNN reported, “vacancy rates at malls rose 9.5% in the first quarter, outpacing the 8.9% vacancy rate registered in all of 2008.” Of significance for those that think and claim the crisis will be over by 2010, “mall vacancies [are expected] to exceed historical levels through 2011,” as for retailers, “it’s only going to get worse.”[5] Two days after the previous report, “General Growth Properties Inc, the second-largest U.S. mall owner, declared bankruptcy on [April 16] in the biggest real estate failure in U.S. history.”[6]

In April, the Financial Times reported that, “Property prices in China are likely to halve over the next two years, a top government researcher has predicted in a powerful signal that the country’s economic downturn faces further challenges despite recent positive data.” This is of enormous significance, as “The property market, along with exports, were leading drivers of the booming Chinese economy over the past decade.” Further, “an apparent rebound in the property market was unsustainable over the medium term and being driven by a flood of liquidity and fraudulent activity rather than real demand.” A researcher at a leading Chinese government think tank reported that, “he expected average urban residential property prices to fall by 40 to 50 per cent over the next two years from their levels at the end of 2008.”[7]

In April, it was reported that, “The Federal Reserve is considering offering longer loans to investors in commercial mortgage-backed securities as part of a plan to help jump-start the market for commercial real estate debt.” Since February the Fed “has been analyzing appropriate terms and conditions for accepting commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and other mortgage assets as collateral for its Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF).”[8]

In late July, the Financial Times reported that, “Two of America’s biggest banks, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo … threw into sharp relief the mounting woes of the US commercial property market when they reported large losses and surging bad loan,” as “The disappointing second-quarter results for two of the largest lenders and investors in office, retail and industrial property across the US confirmed investors’ fears that commercial real estate would be the next front in the financial crisis after the collapse of the housing market.” The commercial property market, worth $6.7 trillion, “which accounts for more than 10 per cent of US gross domestic product, could be a significant hurdle on the road to recovery.”[9]

The Bailout Bubble

While the bailout, or the “stimulus package” as it is often referred to, is getting good coverage in terms of being portrayed as having revived the economy and is leading the way to the light at the end of the tunnel, key factors are again misrepresented in this situation.

At the end of March of 2009, Bloomberg reported that, “The U.S. government and the Federal Reserve have spent, lent or committed $12.8 trillion, an amount that approaches the value of everything produced in the country last year.” This amount “works out to $42,105 for every man, woman and child in the U.S. and 14 times the $899.8 billion of currency in circulation. The nation’s gross domestic product was $14.2 trillion in 2008.”[10]

Gerald Celente, the head of the Trends Research Institute, the major trend-forecasting agency in the world, wrote in May of 2009 of the “bailout bubble.” Celente’s forecasts are not to be taken lightly, as he accurately predicted the 1987 stock market crash, the fall of the Soviet Union, the 1998 Russian economic collapse, the 1997 East Asian economic crisis, the 2000 Dot-Com bubble burst, the 2001 recession, the start of a recession in 2007 and the housing market collapse of 2008, among other things.

On May 13, 2009, Celente released a Trend Alert, reporting that, “The biggest financial bubble in history is being inflated in plain sight,” and that, “This is the Mother of All Bubbles, and when it explodes [...] it will signal the end to the boom/bust cycle that has characterized economic activity throughout the developed world.” Further, “This is much bigger than the Dot-com and Real Estate bubbles which hit speculators, investors and financiers the hardest. However destructive the effects of these busts on employment, savings and productivity, the Free Market Capitalist framework was left intact. But when the ‘Bailout Bubble’ explodes, the system goes with it.”

Celente further explained that, “Phantom dollars, printed out of thin air, backed by nothing … and producing next to nothing … defines the ‘Bailout Bubble.’ Just as with the other bubbles, so too will this one burst. But unlike Dot-com and Real Estate, when the “Bailout Bubble” pops, neither the President nor the Federal Reserve will have the fiscal fixes or monetary policies available to inflate another.” Celente elaborated, “Given the pattern of governments to parlay egregious failures into mega-failures, the classic trend they follow, when all else fails, is to take their nation to war,” and that, “While we cannot pinpoint precisely when the ‘Bailout Bubble’ will burst, we are certain it will. When it does, it should be understood that a major war could follow.”[11]

However, this “bailout bubble” that Celente was referring to at the time was the $12.8 trillion reported by Bloomberg. As of July, estimates put this bubble at nearly double the previous estimate.

As the Financial Times reported in late July of 2009, while the Fed and Treasury hail the efforts and impact of the bailouts, “Neil Barofsky, special inspector-general for the troubled asset relief programme, [TARP] said that the various US schemes to shore up banks and restart lending exposed federal agencies to a risk of $23,700bn [$23.7 trillion] – a vast estimate that was immediately dismissed by the Treasury.” The inspector-general of the TARP program stated that there were “fundamental vulnerabilities . . . relating to conflicts of interest and collusion, transparency, performance measures, and anti-money laundering.”

Barofsky also reports on the “considerable stress” in commercial real estate, as “The Fed has begun to open up Talf to commercial mortgage-backed securities to try to influence credit conditions in the commercial real estate market. The report draws attention to a new potential credit crunch when $500bn worth of real estate mortgages need to be refinanced by the end of the year.” Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Fed, and Timothy Geithner, the Treasury Secretary and former President of the New York Fed, are seriously discussing extending TALF (Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility) into “CMBS [Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities] and other assets such as small business loans and whether to increase the size of the programme.” It is the “expansion of the various programmes into new and riskier asset classes is one of the main bones of contention between the Treasury and Mr Barofsky.”[12]

Testifying before Congress, Barofsky said, “From programs involving large capital infusions into hundreds of banks and other financial institutions, to a mortgage modification program designed to modify millions of mortgages, to public-private partnerships using tens of billions of taxpayer dollars to purchase ‘toxic’ assets from banks, TARP has evolved into a program of unprecedented scope, scale, and complexity.” He explained that, “The total potential federal government support could reach up to 23.7 trillion dollars.”[13]

Is a Future Bailout Possible?

In early July of 2009, billionaire investor Warren Buffet said that, “unemployment could hit 11 percent and a second stimulus package might be needed as the economy struggles to recover from recession,” and he further stated that, “we’re not in a recovery.”[14] Also in early July, an economic adviser to President Obama stated that, “The United States should be planning for a possible second round of fiscal stimulus to further prop up the economy.”[15]

In August of 2009, it was reported that, “THE Obama administration will consider dishing out more money to rein in unemployment despite signs the recession is ending,” and that, “Treasury secretary Tim Geithner also conceded tax hikes could be on the agenda as the government worked to bring its huge recovery-related deficits under control.” Geithner said, “we will do what it takes,” and that, “more federal cash could be tipped into the recovery as unemployment benefits amid projections the benefits extended to 1.5 million jobless Americans will expire without Congress’ intervention.” However, any future injection of money could be viewed as “a second stimulus package.”[16]

The Washington Post reported in early July of a Treasury Department initiative known as “Plan C.” The Plan C team was assembled “to examine what could yet bring [the economy] down and has identified several trouble spots that could threaten the still-fragile lending industry,” and “the internal project is focused on vexing problems such as the distressed commercial real estate markets, the high rate of delinquencies among homeowners, and the struggles of community and regional banks.”

Further, “The team is also responsible for considering potential government responses, but top officials within the Obama administration are wary of rolling out initiatives that would commit massive amounts of federal resources.” The article elaborated in saying that, “The creation of Plan C is a sign that the government has moved into a new phase of its response, acting preemptively rather than reacting to emerging crises.” In particular, the near-term challenge they are facing is commercial real estate lending, as “Banks and other firms that provided such loans in the past have sharply curtailed lending,” leaving “many developers and construction companies out in the cold.” Within the next couple years, “these groups face a tidal wave of commercial real estate debt – some estimates peg the total at more than $3 trillion – that they will need to refinance. These loans were issued during this decade’s construction boom with the mistaken expectation that they would be refinanced on the same generous terms after a few years.”

However, as a result of the credit crisis, “few developers can find anyone to refinance their debt, endangering healthy and distressed properties.” Kim Diamond, a managing director at Standard & Poor’s, stated that, “It’s not a degree to which people are willing to lend,” but rather, “The question is whether a loan can be made at all.” Important to note is that, “Financial analysts said losses on commercial real estate loans are now the single largest cause of bank failures,” and that none of the bailout efforts enacted “is big enough to address the size of the problem.”[17]

So the question must be asked: what is Plan C contemplating in terms of a possible government “solution”? Another bailout? The effect that this would have would be to further inflate the already monumental bailout bubble.

The Great European Bubble

In October of 2008, Germany and France led a European Union bailout of 1 trillion Euros, and “World markets initially soared as European governments pumped billions into crippled banks. Central banks in Europe also mounted a new offensive to restart lending by supplying unlimited amounts of dollars to commercial banks in a joint operation.”[18]

The American bailouts even went to European banks, as it was reported in March of 2009 that, “European banks declined to discuss a report that they were beneficiaries of the $173 billion bail-out of insurer AIG,” as “Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and a host of other U.S. and European banks had been paid roughly $50 billion since the Federal Reserve first extended aid to AIG.” Among the European banks, “French banks Societe Generale and Calyon on Sunday declined to comment on the story, as did Deutsche Bank, Britain’s Barclays and unlisted Dutch group Rabobank.” Other banks that got money from the US bailout include HSBC, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch, Banco Santander and Royal Bank of Scotland. Because AIG was essentially insolvent, “the bailout enabled AIG to pay its counterparty banks for extra collateral,” with “Goldman Sachs and Deutsche bank each receiving $6 billion in payments between mid-September and December.”[19]

In April of 2009, it was reported that, “EU governments have committed 3 trillion Euros [or $4 trillion dollars] to bail out banks with guarantees or cash injections in the wake of the global financial crisis, the European Commission.”[20]

In early February of 2009, the Telegraph published a story with a startling headline, “European banks may need 16.3 trillion pound bail-out, EC document warns.” Type this headline into google, and the link to the Telegraph appears. However, click on the link, and the title has changed to “European bank bail-out could push EU into crisis.” Further, they removed any mention of the amount of money that may be required for a bank bailout. The amount in dollars, however, nears $25 trillion. The amount is the cumulative total of the troubled assets on bank balance sheets, a staggering number derived from the derivatives trade.

The Telegraph reported that, “National leaders and EU officials share fears that a second bank bail-out in Europe will raise government borrowing at a time when investors – particularly those who lend money to European governments – have growing doubts over the ability of countries such as Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Britain to pay it back.”[21]

When Eastern European countries were in desperate need of financial aid, and discussion was heated on the possibility of an EU bailout of Eastern Europe, the EU, at the behest of Angela Merkel of Germany, denied the East European bailout. However, this was more a public relations stunt than an actual policy position.

While the EU refused money to Eastern Europe in the form of a bailout, in late March European leaders “doubled the emergency funding for the fragile economies of central and eastern Europe and pledged to deliver another doubling of International Monetary Fund lending facilities by putting up 75bn Euros (70bn pounds).” EU leaders “agreed to increase funding for balance of payments support available for mainly eastern European member states from 25bn Euros to 50bn Euros.”[22]

As explained in a Times article in June of 2009, Germany has been deceitful in its public stance versus its actual policy decisions. The article, worth quoting in large part, first explained that:

Europe is now in the middle of a perfect storm – a confluence of three separate, but interconnected economic crises which threaten far greater devastation than Britain or America have suffered from the credit crunch: the collapse of German industry and employment, the impending bankruptcy of Central European homeowners and businesses; and the threat of government debt defaults from loss of monetary control by the Irish Republic, Greece and Portugal, for instance on the eurozone periphery.

Taking the case of Latvia, the author asks, “If the crisis expands, other EU governments – and especially Germany’s – will face an existential question. Do they commit hundreds of billions of euros to guarantee the debts of fellow EU countries? Or do they allow government defaults and devaluations that may ultimately break up the single currency and further cripple German industry, as well as the country’s domestic banks?” While addressing that, “Publicly, German politicians have insisted that any bailouts or guarantees are out of the question,” however, “the pass has been quietly sold in Brussels, while politicians loudly protested their unshakeable commitment to defend it.”

The author addressed how in October of 2008:

[...] a previously unused regulation was discovered, allowing the creation of a 25 billion Euros “balance of payments facility” and authorising the EU to borrow substantial sums under its own “legal personality” for the first time. This facility was doubled again to 50 billion Euros in March. If Latvia’s financial problems turn into a full-scale crisis, these guarantees and cross-subsidies between EU governments will increase to hundreds of billions in the months ahead and will certainly mutate into large-scale centralised EU borrowing, jointly guaranteed by all the taxpayers of the EU.

[...] The new EU borrowing, for example, is legally an ‘off-budget’ and ‘back-to-back’ arrangement, which allows Germany to maintain the legal fiction that it is not guaranteeing the debts of Latvia et al. The EU’s bond prospectus to investors, however, makes quite clear where the financial burden truly lies: “From an investor’s point of view the bond is fully guaranteed by the EU budget and, ultimately, by the EU Member States.”[23]

So Eastern Europe is getting, or presumably will get bailed out. Whether this is in the form of EU federalism, providing loans of its own accord, paid for by European taxpayers, or through the IMF, which will attach any loans with its stringent Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) conditionalities, or both. It turned out that the joint partnership of the IMF and EU is what provided the loans and continues to provide such loans.

As the Financial Times pointed out in August of 2009, “Bank failures or plunging currencies in the three Baltic nations – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – could threaten the fragile prospect of recovery in the rest of Europe. These countries also sit on one of the world’s most sensitive political fault-lines. They are the European Union’s frontier states, bordering Russia.” In July, Latvia “agreed its second loan in eight months from the IMF and the EU,” following the first one in December. Lithuania is reported to be following suit. However, as the Financial Times noted, the loans came with the IMF conditionalities: “The injection of cash is the good news. The bad news is that, in return for shoring up state finances, the new IMF deal will require the Latvian government to impose yet more pain on its suffering population. Public-sector wages have already been cut by about a third this year. Pensions have been sliced. Now the IMF requires Latvia to cut another 10 per cent from the state budget this autumn.”[24]

If we are to believe the brief Telegraph report pertaining to nearly $25 trillion in bad bank assets, which was removed from the original article for undisclosed reasons, not citing a factual retraction, the question is, does this potential bailout still stand? These banks haven’t been rescued financially from the EU, so, presumably, these bad assets are still sitting on the bank balance sheets. This bubble has yet to blow. Combine this with the $23.7 trillion US bailout bubble, and there is nearly $50 trillion between the EU and the US waiting to burst.

An Oil Bubble

In early July of 2009, the New York Times reported that, “The extreme volatility that has gripped oil markets for the last 18 months has shown no signs of slowing down, with oil prices more than doubling since the beginning of the year despite an exceptionally weak economy.” Instability in the oil and gas prices has led many to “fear it could jeopardize a global recovery.” Further, “It is also hobbling businesses and consumers,” as “A wild run on the oil markets has occurred in the last 12 months.” Oil prices reached a record high last summer at $145/barrel, and with the economic crisis they fell to $33/barrel in December. However, since the start of 2009, oil has risen 55% to $70/barrel.

As the Times article points out, “the recent rise in oil prices is reprising the debate from last year over the role of investors – or speculators – in the commodity markets.” Energy officials from the EU and OPEC met in June and concluded that, “the speculation issue had not been resolved yet and that the 2008 bubble could be repeated.”[25]

In June of 2009, Hedge Fund manager Michael Masters told the US Senate that, “Congress has not done enough to curb excessive speculation in the oil markets, leaving the country vulnerable to another price run-up in 2009.” He explained that, “oil prices are largely not determined by supply and demand but the trading desks of large Wall Street firms.” Because “Nothing was actually done by Congress to put an end to the problem of excessive speculation” in 2008, Masters explained, “there is nothing to prevent another bubble in oil prices in 2009. In fact, signs of another possible bubble are already beginning to appear.”[26]

In May of 2008, Goldman Sachs warned that oil could reach as much as $200/barrel within the next 12-24 months [up to May 2010]. Interestingly, “Goldman Sachs is one of the largest Wall Street investment banks trading oil and it could profit from an increase in prices.”[27] However, this is missing the key point. Not only would Goldman Sachs profit, but Goldman Sachs plays a major role in sending oil prices up in the first place.

As Ed Wallace pointed out in an article in Business Week in May of 2008, Goldman Sachs’ report placed the blame for such price hikes on “soaring demand” from China and the Middle East, combined with the contention that the Middle East has or would soon peak in its oil reserves. Wallace pointed out that:

Goldman Sachs was one of the founding partners of online commodities and futures marketplace Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). And ICE has been a primary focus of recent congressional investigations; it was named both in the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’ June 27, 2006, Staff Report and in the House Committee on Energy & Commerce’s hearing last December. Those investigations looked into the unregulated trading in energy futures, and both concluded that energy prices’ climb to stratospheric heights has been driven by the billions of dollars’ worth of oil and natural gas futures contracts being placed on the ICE – which is not regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.[28]

Essentially, Goldman Sachs is one of the key speculators in the oil market, and thus, plays a major role in driving oil prices up on speculation. This must be reconsidered in light of the resurgent rise in oil prices in 2009. In July of 2009, “Goldman Sachs Group Inc. posted record earnings as revenue from trading and stock underwriting reached all-time highs less than a year after the firm took $10 billion in U.S. rescue funds.”[29] Could one be related to the other?

Bailouts Used in Speculation

In November of 2008, the Chinese government injected an “$849 billion stimulus package aimed at keeping the emerging economic superpower growing.”[30] China then recorded a rebound in the growth rate of the economy, and underwent a stock market boom. However, as the Wall Street Journal pointed out in July of 2009, “Its growth is now fuelled by cheap debt rather than corporate profits and retained earnings, and this shift in the medium term threatens to undermine China’s economic decoupling from the global slump.” Further, “overseas money has been piling into China, inflating foreign exchange reserves and domestic liquidity. So perhaps it is not surprising that outstanding bank loans have doubled in the last few years, or that there is much talk of a shadow banking system. Then there is China’s reputation for building overcapacity in its industrial sector, a notoriety it won even before the crash in global demand. This showed a disregard for returns that is always a tell-tale sign of cheap money.”

China’s economy primarily relies upon the United States as a consumption market for its cheap products. However, “The slowdown in U.S. consumption amid a credit crunch has exposed the weaknesses in this export-led financing model. So now China is turning instead to cheap debt for funding, a shift suggested by this year’s 35% or so rise in bank loans.”[31]

In August of 2009, it was reported that China is experiencing a “stimulus-fueled stock market boom.” However, this has caused many leaders to “worry that too much of the $1-trillion lending binge by state banks that paid for China’s nascent revival was diverted into stocks and real estate, raising the danger of a boom and bust cycle and higher inflation less than two years after an earlier stock market bubble burst.”[32]

The same reasoning needs to be applied to the US stock market surge. Something is inherently and structurally wrong with a financial system in which nothing is being produced, 600,000 jobs are lost monthly, and yet, the stock market goes up. Why is the stock market going up?

The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which provided $700 billion in bank bailouts, started under Bush and expanded under Obama, entails that the US Treasury purchases $700 billion worth of “troubled assets” from banks, and in turn, “that banks cannot be asked to account for their use of taxpayer money.”[33]

So if banks don’t have to account for where the money goes, where did it go? They claim it went back into lending. However, bank lending continues to go down.[34] Stock market speculation is the likely answer. Why else would stocks go up, lending continue downwards, and the bailout money be unaccounted for?

What Does the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Have to Say?

In late June, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the central bank of the world’s central banks, the most prestigious and powerful financial organization in the world, delivered an important warning. It stated that, “fiscal stimulus packages may provide no more than a temporary boost to growth, and be followed by an extended period of economic stagnation.”

The BIS, “The only international body to correctly predict the financial crisis … has warned the biggest risk is that governments might be forced by world bond investors to abandon their stimulus packages, and instead slash spending while lifting taxes and interest rates,” as the annual report of the BIS “has for the past three years been warning of the dangers of a repeat of the depression.” Further, “Its latest annual report warned that countries such as Australia faced the possibility of a run on the currency, which would force interest rates to rise.” The BIS warned that, “a temporary respite may make it more difficult for authorities to take the actions that are necessary, if unpopular, to restore the health of the financial system, and may thus ultimately prolong the period of slow growth.”

Of immense import is the BIS warning that, “At the same time, government guarantees and asset insurance have exposed taxpayers to potentially large losses,” and explaining how fiscal packages posed significant risks, it said that, “There is a danger that fiscal policy-makers will exhaust their debt capacity before finishing the costly job of repairing the financial system,” and that, “There is the definite possibility that stimulus programs will drive up real interest rates and inflation expectations.” Inflation “would intensify as the downturn abated,” and the BIS “expressed doubt about the bank rescue package adopted in the US.”[35]

The BIS further warned of inflation, saying that, “The big and justifiable worry is that, before it can be reversed, the dramatic easing in monetary policy will translate into growth in the broader monetary and credit aggregates,” the BIS said. That will “lead to inflation that feeds inflation expectations or it may fuel yet another asset-price bubble, sowing the seeds of the next financial boom-bust cycle.”[36]

Major investors have also been warning about the dangers of inflation. Legendary investor Jim Rogers has warned of “a massive inflation holocaust.”[37] Investor Marc Faber has warned that, “The U.S. economy will enter ‘hyperinflation’ approaching the levels in Zimbabwe,” and he stated that he is “100 percent sure that the U.S. will go into hyperinflation.” Further, “The problem with government debt growing so much is that when the time will come and the Fed should increase interest rates, they will be very reluctant to do so and so inflation will start to accelerate.”[38]

Are We Entering A New Great Depression?

In 2007, it was reported that, “The Bank for International Settlements, the world’s most prestigious financial body, has warned that years of loose monetary policy has fuelled a dangerous credit bubble, leaving the global economy more vulnerable to another 1930s-style slump than generally understood.” Further:

The BIS, the ultimate bank of central bankers, pointed to a confluence a worrying signs, citing mass issuance of new-fangled credit instruments, soaring levels of household debt, extreme appetite for risk shown by investors, and entrenched imbalances in the world currency system.

[...] In a thinly-veiled rebuke to the US Federal Reserve, the BIS said central banks were starting to doubt the wisdom of letting asset bubbles build up on the assumption that they could safely be “cleaned up” afterwards – which was more or less the strategy pursued by former Fed chief Alan Greenspan after the dotcom bust.[39]

In 2008, the BIS again warned of the potential of another Great Depression, as “complex credit instruments, a strong appetite for risk, rising levels of household debt and long-term imbalances in the world currency system, all form part of the loose monetarist policy that could result in another Great Depression.”[40]

In 2008, the BIS also said that, “The current market turmoil is without precedent in the postwar period. With a significant risk of recession in the US, compounded by sharply rising inflation in many countries, fears are building that the global economy might be at some kind of tipping point,” and that all central banks have done “has been to put off the day of reckoning.”[41]

In late June of 2009, the BIS reported that as a result of stimulus packages, it has only seen “limited progress” and that, “the prospects for growth are at risk,” and further “stimulus measures won’t be able to gain traction, and may only lead to a temporary pickup in growth.” Ultimately, “A fleeting recovery could well make matters worse.”[42]

The BIS has said, in softened language, that the stimulus packages are ultimately going to cause more damage than they prevented, simply delaying the inevitable and making the inevitable that much worse. Given the previous BIS warnings of a Great Depression, the stimulus packages around the world have simply delayed the coming depression, and by adding significant numbers to the massive debt bubbles of the world’s nations, will ultimately make the depression worse than had governments not injected massive amounts of money into the economy.

After the last Great Depression, Keynesian economists emerged victorious in proposing that a nation must spend its way out of crisis. This time around, they will be proven wrong. The world is a very different place now. Loose credit, easy spending and massive debt is what has led the world to the current economic crisis, spending is not the way out. The world has been functioning on a debt based global economy. This debt based monetary system, controlled and operated by the global central banking system, of which the apex is the Bank for International Settlements, is unsustainable. This is the real bubble, the debt bubble. When it bursts, and it will burst, the world will enter into the Greatest Depression in world history.

Notes

[1] Barrie McKenna, End of housing slump? Try telling that to buyers, sellers and the unemployed. The Globe and Mail: August 6, 2009:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/end-of-housing-slump-try-telling-that-to-buyers-sellers-and-the-unemployed/article1240418/

[2] Gene Sperling, Double-Bubble Trouble in Commercial Real Estate: Gene Sperling. Bloomberg: May 9, 2009:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=a.X91SkgOd8g

[3] AL Sull, Commercial Real Estate – The Other Real Estate Bubble. Financial Post: July 23, 2009:
http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fpmagazinedaily/archive/2009/07/23/commercial-real-estate-the-other-real-estate-bubble.aspx

[4] Hui-yong Yu, U.S. Office Vacancies Rise to Three-Year High, Cushman Says. Bloomberg: April 16, 2009:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aegH6dXG8H8U

[5] Parija B. Kavilanz, Malls shedding stores at record pace. CNN Money: April 14, 2009:
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/10/news/economy/retail_malls/index.htm

[6] Ilaina Jonas and Emily Chasan, General Growth files largest U.S. real estate bankruptcy. Reuters: April 16, 2009:
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE53F68P20090417

[7] Jamil Anderlini, China property prices ‘likely to halve’. The Financial Times: April 13, 2009:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9a36b342-280e-11de-8dbf-00144feabdc0.html

[8] Reuters, Fed Might Extend TALF Support to Five Years. Money News: April 17, 2009:
http://moneynews.newsmax.com/financenews/talf/2009/04/17/204120.html?utm_medium=RSS

[9] Francesco Guerrera and Greg Farrell, US banks warn on commercial property. The Financial Times: July 22, 2009:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a1e9d86-76eb-11de-b23c-00144feabdc0.html

[10] Mark Pittman and Bob Ivry, Financial Rescue Nears GDP as Pledges Top $12.8 Trillion. Bloomberg: March 31, 2009:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=armOzfkwtCA4

[11] Gerald Celente, The “Bailout Bubble” – The Bubble to End All Bubbles. Trends Research Institute: May 13, 2009:
http://geraldcelentechannel.blogspot.com/2009/05/gerald-celente-bubble-to-end-all.html

[12] Tom Braithwaite, Treasury clashes with Tarp watchdog on data. The Financial Times: July 20, 2009:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab533a38-757a-11de-9ed5-00144feabdc0.html

[13] AFP, US could spend 23.7 trillion dollars on crisis: report. Agence-France Presse: July 20, 2009:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuL1HParBuO4WyHJIxw6rlOKdz-A

[14] John Whitesides, Warren Buffett says second stimulus might be needed. Reuters: July 9, 2009:
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressReleasesMolt/idUSTRE5683MZ20090709

[15] Vidya Ranganathan, U.S. should plan 2nd fiscal stimulus: economic adviser. Reuters: July 7, 2009:
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE56611D20090707

[16] Carly Crawford, US may increase stimulus payments to rein in unemployment. The Herald Sun: August 3, 2009:
http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,25873672-664,00.html

[17] David Cho and Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury Works on ‘Plan C’ To Fend Off Lingering Threats. The Washington Post: July 8, 2009:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/07/AR2009070702631.html?hpid=topnews

[18] Charles Bremner and David Charter, Germany and France lead €1 trillion European bailout. Times Online: October 13, 2009:
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article4937516.ece

[19] Douwe Miedema, Europe banks silent on reported AIG bailout gains. Reuters: March 8, 2009:
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE5270YD20090308

[20] Elitsa Vucheva, European Bank Bailout Total: $4 Trillion. Business Week: April 10, 2009:
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/apr2009/gb20090410_254738.htm?chan=globalbiz_europe+index+page_top+stories

[21] Bruno Waterfield, European bank bail-out could push EU into crisis. The Telegraph: February 11, 2009:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/4590512/European-banks-may-need-16.3-trillion-bail-out-EC-dcoument-warns.html

[22] Ian Traynor, EU doubles funding for fragile eastern European economies. The Guardian: March 20, 2009:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/20/eu-imf-emergency-funding

[23] Anatole Kaletsky, The great bailout – Europe’s best-kept secret. The Times Online: June 4, 2009:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/anatole_kaletsky/article6426565.ece

[24] Gideon Rachman, Europe prepares for a Baltic blast. The Financial Times: August 3, 2009:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b497f5b6-8060-11de-bf04-00144feabdc0.html

[25] JAD MOUAWAD, Swings in Price of Oil Hobble Forecasting. The New York Times: July 5, 2009:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/business/06oil.html

[26] Christopher Doering, Masters says signs of oil bubble starting to appear. Reuters: June 4, 2009:
http://www.reuters.com/article/Inspiration/idUSTRE55355620090604

[27] Javier Blas and Chris Flood, Analyst warns of oil at $200 a barrel. The Financial Times: May 6, 2008:
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto050620081414392593

[28] Ed Wallace, The Reason for High Oil Prices. Business Week: May 13, 2009:
http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/may2008/bw20080513_720178.htm

[29] Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Posts Record Profit, Beating Estimates. Bloomberg: July 14, 2009:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2jo3RK2_Aps

[30] Peter Martin and John Garnaut, The great China bailout. The Age: November 11, 2008:
http://business.theage.com.au/business/the-great-china-bailout-20081110-5lpe.html

[31] Paul Cavey, Now China Has a Credit Boom. The Wall Street Journal: July 30, 2009:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204619004574319261337617196.html

[32] Joe McDonald, China’s stimulus-fueled stock boom alarms Beijing. The Globe and Mail: August 2, 2009:
http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090802.wchina02/GIStory/

[33] Matt Jaffe, Watchdog Refutes Treasury Claim Banks Cannot Be Asked to Account for Bailout Cash. ABC News: July 19, 2009:
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Politics/story?id=8121045&page=1

[34] The China Post, Bank lending slows down in U.S.: report. The China Post: July 28, 2009:
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/americas/2009/07/28/218141/Bank-lending.htm

[35] David Uren. Bank for International Settlements warning over stimulus benefits. The Australian: June 30, 2009:
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,25710566-601,00.html

[36] Simone Meier, BIS Sees Risk Central Banks Will Raise Interest Rates Too Late. Bloomberg: June 29, 2009:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068&sid=aOnSy9jXFKaY

[37] CNBC.com, We Are Facing an ‘Inflation Holocaust’: Jim Rogers. CNBC: October 10, 2008:
http://www.cnbc.com/id/27097823

[38] Chen Shiyin and Bernard Lo, U.S. Inflation to Approach Zimbabwe Level, Faber Says. Bloomberg: May 27, 2009:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=avgZDYM6mTFA

[39] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, BIS warns of Great Depression dangers from credit spree. The Telegraph: June 27, 2009:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/2811081/BIS-warns-of-Great-Depression-dangers-from-credit-spree.html

[40] Gill Montia, Central bank body warns of Great Depression. Banking Times: June 9, 2008:
http://www.bankingtimes.co.uk/09062008-central-bank-body-warns-of-great-depression/

[41] Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, BIS slams central banks, warns of worse crunch to come. The Telegraph: June 30, 2008:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2792450/BIS-slams-central-banks-warns-of-worse-crunch-to-come.html

[42] HEATHER SCOFFIELD, Financial repairs must continue: central banks. The Globe and Mail: June 29, 2009:
http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090629.wcentralbanks0629/BNStory/HEATHER+SCOFFIELD/

This originally appeared on Global Research.

Andrew Gavin Marshall is a Research Associate with the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). He is currently studying Political Economy and History at Simon Fraser University.

I’ve been digging through research papers trying to find accurate measures of household balance sheets during the Great Depression to try to develop a reference point for our current bubble.  The trouble of course is that much of our new toxic instruments like Alt-A mortgages and massive amounts of commercial real estate debt really didn’t have a big impact during the Great Depression.  At the time, it is estimated that some 1 million Americans were invested in the stock market.  The homeownership rate was rather stable during the early half of the century:

This goes in stark contrast to our bubble peak when homeownership neared 70 percent while the majority of Americans are now involved in the stock market either directly or through a pension fund.  Yet looking at research conducted on the American balance sheet during the Great Depression, we find that this current bust has caused more wealth destruction.

This is part XXVII in our Lessons from the Great Depression series:

21.  The Big Change

22.  The Infection of Consumerism and Living Fake Lives.

23.  The Worst Housing Crash in American History.

24.  Economic Crises Around the World in Synchronization.

25. Reconstruction Finance Corporation II

26. Pecora Commission Where Art Thou?

It is hard to grasp such a large drop in net worth.  Let us chart this out:

*Click for sharper image

The growth in American household assets has been rather unrelenting since the 1950s.  We had a hiccup earlier in the decade with the tech bust but we were back on track in a very short time.  However, since the peak the asset side of the equation has imploded.  We also see on the chart above the increase in liabilities.  As in most busts including the Great Depression, assets adjusted quicker than liabilities.  While asset prices have come down $13.8 trillion the liability side of the equation has only decreased by $420 billion.  How is this disconnect remedied?  By massive amounts of defaults and foreclosures since the instrument that caused the bubble was real estate and the debt tied to it.

Now I know that during the Great Depression, the safety net was largely non-existent.  There was no FDIC.  No Social Security.  No large pension funds.  So for the most part, people were on their own.  It is no surprise then that the unemployment rate peaked at 25 percent with 14 million unemployed Americans.

It is hard to believe that we now have 14.7 million unemployed Americans with another 11.2 million either working part-time for economic reasons or some who have given up looking for work.  Yet the pain isn’t as visible as soup lines or men standing outside of manufacturing plants looking for work.  Unemployment benefits are done electronically through the internet and in some states, funds are disbursed through debit cards.  Yet on a percent basis, Americans have lost more household wealth in this crisis than in the Great Depression.  Let us look at the balance sheet from the Great Depression American household:

*Source:  Frederic Mishkin – The Journal of Economic History (Dec., 1978)

I struggled to find this data and even the author in the above work had difficulty constructing the data set.  Much of this is largely due to the poor record keeping done prior to the Great Depression.  As we can see from the above chart, the household net worth peaked in 1929 and didn’t hit a bottom until 1934.  From peak to trough, the amount loss was 11 percent.  Now why the lag?  For the most part, much of the wealth of the American household wasn’t in stocks contrary to popular belief.  Of course, the stock market rocked the economy and led to job losses which in turn hurt the balance sheet but many Americans did not have their money linked up in stocks.  The lag and hits came with many of the bank failures and subsequent foreclosures.  The most visible historical memory is the stock market crash with photos of anxious crowds gathering outside of Wall Street.

It is interesting to note that the patterns of bubbles are rather similar.  That is, liabilities keep on increasing even after the peak.  Let us look at the liability side of things:

Mortgages were not a gigantic part of the balance sheet.  Much of this had to do with mortgages being constructed with a 5 to 10 year term and a balloon payment at the end.  Let us take the peak year of 1929 for example.  While household net worth (in 1958 dollars – we are focused more on percent changes) was $844 billion mortgage debt was $29.6 billion, or 3.5 percent of net worth.  Let us look at our peak data.  Net worth peaked at $64.2 trillion and mortgage debt was $10.5 trillion, or 16.3 percent.  Now this would make sense since homeownership is much higher than during the Great Depression but it also shows how dependent we were to the housing industry.  In fact, that is why the government and Wall Street are so concerned about maintaining high home prices even though in many parts of the country they are still unaffordable.  We are approaching the bust in differing ways.  Take a look at a paper written in 1933 during the Great Depression addressing various government programs:

It is strange to see a government initiative during the bust seeking affordable housing.  How things have changed.  Most of the current legislation and programs seek to maintain high home prices (i.e., loan modifications, bailouts, etc).  Since much of the American balance sheet is tied to real estate when the housing industry busted, much of the bubble wealth also came crashing down.  At the peak real estate made up $24 trillion of the $64 trillion in household net worth.  That is a large portion.  It’ll be fascinating to look at the Q2 data since housing prices have been coming down but the stock market has rebounded.  Real Estate is still a larger segment so I would expect the net worth figure to decrease for the quarter.

What becomes clear is that even though there is more overall prosperity in 2009 than in 1929, there has never been a time in history when so much wealth has been lost.  Even the Great Depression did not see such large wealth destruction.  We have more humane safety nets in 2009 but these are being strained.  Many unemployment insurance benefits are reaching their end even with extended dates.  What then for these people?  Even though the freefall in unemployment may have stopped, companies are still not hiring.  So what then?  Trade is still hurting:

The American household balance sheet will only begin to feel some relief when companies begin hiring again.  The balance sheet will only be helped when the liabilities side of the equation begins to reflect the real world value of the assets.  There are many lessons to learn from the Great Depression.  What those in Wall Street forget is that you have to create jobs to have a healthy economy.  Without that, this is going to be a long and drawn out recession.  Even Ben Bernanke had this to say:

“A lot of things happened, a lot came together, [and] created probably the worst financial crisis, certainly since the Great Depression and possibly even including the Great Depression,” Bernanke said at the start of a town-hall meeting in Kansas City.” – July 26, 2009

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The American Household Balance Sheet. Lessons from the Great Depression Part XXVII: Household Net Worth Drop in Great Depression 11 Percent. Current Net Worth Drop of $13.8 Trillion Equivalent to 21 Percent Drop.

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