Jan
28

The Crisis of Fake Constraints: Greek Denouement Eupdate

Unless Greece and its creditors reach a deal in the next few days, Greece has no money to pay €15 Billion or so due to its bondholders in March.

From the start, this has been a crisis of fake legal and economic constraints masking very real political constraints. In 2010, Greece could have restructured its debt quicker than most sovereigns in modern memory -- or it might have been bailed out, had Europe chosen to go the route of fiscal transfers. Neither of these paths was taken because the European Central Bank was unwilling to countenance the sin of debt restructuring, but member states with money were unwilling to pay for the appearance of collective virtue.

Now that the restructuring is inevitable and the virtue bill unpayable, the fake constraints are back. The ECB holds about €50 of Greek debt, which must go into the restructuring to get enough debt and cashflow relief. But the central bank would not take losses, and remains allergic to triggering credit default swaps (which is more likely to happen if it sits out). Worse, its votes might be needed to (credibly threaten to) amend Greek bonds using retrofit Collective Action Clauses. (See latest from Gulati-Zettelmeyer here.)

There seems to be a simple fix: swap the Greek bonds held by the ECB for bonds of the European Financial Stability Facility at a price that does not cause ECB losses. Then have the EFSF go into the exchange and vote the bonds if it needs to. At a minimum, this captures for Greece the discount at which the ECB bought its bonds. If Europe is unwilling to see the EFSF take a loss from the ECB's purchase price, Greece could conceivably make up the difference with a special bond issue for the EFSF on terms that reflect the specialness of the vehicle and the circumstances.

Freshly downgraded, EFSF debt is not exactly in high demand. An ECB swap would not require it to raise money in the markets. Having a fiscal vehicle take the risk (if not the loss) from a Greek restructuring is more honest and institutionally sensible than leaving it with the monetary authority. At a minimum, it would stop the chatter about monetizing the debt--without the optics of a big new package for Greece.

As precedent, the operation might be healthy for all involved. An EFSF swap would signal the parameters for any future deals involving ECB-held debt: on the one hand, it is not fully preferred, on the other hand, there is a built-in limit to the haircut. There is even a whiff of harnessing the market. (I once heard a story that Latin American debt managers in pre-Brady days had made up "Capture the Discount" t-shirts.)

More broadly there is a decent argument that the EFSF is sui generis--an ad hoc crisis vehicle that can do what no one else can be expected to do. For example, it has never been encumbered by feckless claims of preferred creditor status, unlike the new treaty-based European Stability Mechanism, due out this summer. This is as close as it gets to a credible "just this once".

There is an argument that under some version of best market practice for CACs, EFSF should not be allowed to vote its Greek bonds in an exchange, because Greece is among its shareholders. I think this objection is surmountable, to the extent the EFSF is not controlled by and does not answer to Greece. Here is some analogous reasoning.

All this to say, wait for the next fake constraint to derail what could be a palatable solution to a horrible situation, followed by more suffering for all.

Jan
06

Greek VoluntaryInvolutary DealNoDealDeal: Convolution Eupdate

Will Greece reach a voluntary deal with its creditors to write down its debt by 50% in the coming weeks? Will it default? ... or will its official patrons blink, pay up, and let the creditors off the hook? I hear at least two uber-expert Euro-watchers have taken opposite sides of the bet on that one. I bet nobody wins.

This Wall Street Journal article is rather optimistic, and somewhat incoherent on the trade-offs. Apparently private creditors are willing to take a lower interest rate in exchange for a change in governing law from Greek to English (and presumably the ability to sue in London/submission to jurisdiction) in the exit instruments--which makes some sense. But the piece then proceeds to equate English law with available collateral, which comes right out of nowhere. Emerging market sovereigns routinely submit to foreign law, but virtually no one puts up collateral. As a result, all can sue, but none can levy. Just ask Argentina's creditors, who just celebrated the tenth anniversary of the sovereign asset chase under New York, English, and all manner of other foreign laws. But if all it takes is a switch to English law, we have a deal. I doubt it is that simple.

The article is also muddled on the now-notorious business of collective action clauses and their implications for Greek Credit Default Swaps. Although the vast majority of Greece's debt contracts are under Greek law and have no amendment provisions, and although Greece could try to amend these by legislative fiat (risking lawsuits at home and in Europe), the dominant scenario appears to meld contract and legislation: pass a law that allows a super majority of creditors to bind the dissenting minority. The effect of such a law would be to retrofit majority amendment clauses across the Greek debt stock. If the majority binds the minority, the deal goes forward. (The treatment of Greek debt in official hands would be crucial here).

Such a move almost certainly triggers a credit event under Greek CDS contracts: the new terms would be "binding on all" creditors, which is the litmus test under ISDA documentation. Until now, avoiding CDS triggers has been the line in the sand for key official and private players in this drama. Hence the obsession with characterizing the deal as "voluntary." But if coersion is now on the table, why mess around with the inadequate 50% and contract-legislation hybrids? (I suspect the answer is Euro politics.) 

As an aside, the article suggests that major banks are lobbying against a credit event--does this mean that they are not hedged? ... that they sold CDS? ... to whom?

One split-the-baby scenario might be to pass the law grafting collective action clauses onto Greek bonds, but then to refrain from using the clauses to coerce creditors into the deal. Plenty of debtors who had collective acion clauses in their contracts did not use them for various reasons; however, the fact that the option was available might have helped creditors make up their minds. I think this route would be too cute to be seriously considered, but you never know.

Mitu Gulati and Jeromin Zettelmeyer have the only sensible take I have seen on the voluntary/involuntary dance: creditors will take a deep haircut voluntarily if they think the alternative is worse. The alternative could be a default, or another restructuring soon, and on nastier terms. Most sovereign restructurings until now have taken place in the shadow of default. In Greece, default was formally taken off the table at the outset for political reasons. But no one can eliminate the possibility of another restructuring--whether that one is voluntary or involuntary need not be decided today. All you need to know is that the next deal would be worse than the deal now on offer. Under the circumstances, the proposition seems like a no-brainer. Can it last?

Dec
15

Mandelman Speaks at California State Bar’s Annual Discipline Hearings

Mandelman Speaks at California State Bar’s Annual Discipline Hearings Here’s what the California State Bar’s announcement said: The State Bar will hold its annual hearings this month for the public or lawyers to make proposals or offer comments about attorney disciplinary procedures, attorney competency and admissions procedures. The first hearing will begin at 10 a.m. … Read more Related posts:
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  3. Florida Schools, the State of California and the State of Navada are Screwed – The Fed Owns Credit-Default Swaps on Debt Owed by all three – The Fed WILL Profit When they Default
Dec
05

Lee Camp | Is Occupy Wall Street Having An Effect?

Some Explicit Language So Viewer Discretion Advised On today’s episode I answer the question whether OWS is having an effect? The media wants to think it’s dead, but is it? (www.LeeCamp.net) ~ 4closureFraud.org Tweet Related posts:Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Has Proven We Don’t Have Free Speech Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Is … Read more Related posts:
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  2. Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Is A Thought Revolution – And It Won’t Be Minimized
  3. Lee Camp | Kim Kardashian, Occupy Wall Street, & Credit Default Swaps
Nov
30

Mandelman’s Monthly Museletter – Version 16.0

Okay, so here’s the next installment of Mandelman’s Monthly Museletter, which I’ve decided I post whenever there are a bunch of things going on that need to be put into proper perspective, but there’s just no way I can write individual articles on each because to do so presents a serious health risk.  Capisce?  So, without further delay… here’s Version 16.0… it’s the DECEMBER EDITION, hence the festive photo above and throughout.

1. Robo-Signing KILLS…

First the facts of the matter, as reported: Tracy Lawrence was only 43 years old when it appears she took her own life after blowing the whistle on a foreclosure scheme involving “robo-signing,”  which was implemented by a company used by most banks when repossessing homes, Lender Processing Services (“LPS”), based in Jacksonville, Florida.  According to KLAS-TV in Las Vegas, Lawrence admitted that she had fraudulently notarized about 25,000 documents as part of the fraudulent foreclosure scheme.

Lawrence blew the whistle on the LPS operation in which title officers Gary Trafford, 49, of Irvine, Calif., and Geraldine Sheppard, 62, of Santa Ana, Calif. allegedly told employees to forge their names and notarize the signatures on tens of thousands of default notices from 2005 to 2008, which were used to initiate foreclosures, according to the Nevada AG.

Two weeks ago the State of Nevada charged Trafford and Sheppard with 606 counts of offering false instruments for recording, false certification on certain instruments and notarization of the signature of a person not in the presence of a notary public. You can read the indictment here: Nevada Robosigning Indicment 11-16-11

The Nevada AG’s office sent investigators to Lawrence’s home after she didn’t show up for her sentencing on Monday morning.  And here’s the fact that caused me to pause… she would have faced up to a year in jail and a possible fine up to $2,000.

Now, my views on this story: Am I being asked to believe that Tracy Lawrence took her own life because she might have been sentenced to up to a year in jail and a perhaps fined two grand?  Because if that’s what I’m supposed to believe… well, I don’t.  And yet the fact remains that she’s dead, and it certainly appears to be suicide.  I also don’t believe that she was overcome with guilt at having done what she did and that’s what caused her to take her own life.  Nope, I’m not buying either of those explanations.

The other thing I don’t like about the way the story has been reported is that LPS is mentioned sort of secondarily, as if Trafford and Sheppard were committing their crimes independently… like rogue employees… and that LPS had nothing to do with it.  And that is simply pure, unadulterated crap.  Robo-signing, as these crimes are euphemistically called, went on all over the country… all the major banks were involved, as were LPS and other vendors used in the foreclosure process.  It’s obviously anything but an isolated incident… plainly, as practices go, it is ubiquitous.  (And you know what they say about ubiquity… it’s everywhere.)

Did LPS know about the rampant robo-signing?  Of course they did.  Someone had to produce the documents for her to sign them, right?  Did the banks know it was going on?   Of course they did.  Did the CEOs of the banks know what was going on?  Of course they did.

Look, I spent twenty years working as a consultant for large corporations at the C-Suite and senior management levels, including several of the TBTF banks, and I’m very familiar with their corporate cultures and operations.  No mid-level manager at JPMorgan, for example, made a call to start committing fraud and forgery.  Why?  Because there’s be no reason to do so, that’s why.  Faced with the problems that robo-signing addresses, any mid-level manager at a Fortune 500 company could and would simply kick it upstairs for a decision.  There just wouldn’t be any upside to trying to handle it alone.

A First Vice President at Bank of America once told me the following story about the path to advancement at the bank.  He said that when you take over a department, as long as you don’t change anything, you’ll move up regardless of how your department performs.  But, if you so much as changed the brand of pencils ordered by that department, and then the department performs poorly… you’re fired.  Now, I understand that the story is an exaggeration, but it’s an exaggeration to make a point.

The people that work in giant organizations like JPMorgan are not entrepreneurs, if they were they’d be starting their own businesses.  Consequently, they are not the type to go around attempting to solve problems not of their own making, and for which they would receive no reward, especially when you realize how easily the issue can be kicked upstairs.

Lastly, robo-signing is not a solution that exists on a list that contains other solutions.  In other words, if you’re a giant financial institution, and you chose robo-signing as your solution, it’s because you didn’t have anywhere else to go.  For example, you didn’t say to the others at the conference table, “Well, we could solve the problem by doing XYZ.  But, no… lets go with the fraud and forgery idea instead.”

Now, as to why robo-signing only seems to be a serious prosecutable crime in the State of Nevada?  Why, hat’s a darn fine question with which few in positions of power seem to be concerned.  Of course, the question of MERS assignments, or even the question of proper legal standing seem to be the same sort of thing… in some states it matters, while in others it doesn’t.

Frankly, I’d be fine with it either way.  If many of our current laws governing the transfer of property don’t matter and aren’t going to be enforced then let’s get rid of them.   Just change the existing statutes to reflect our new definition of acceptable practices as related to foreclosure.  You don’t need standing, anyone can sign off on any required document as long as their boss say it’s okay, and nothing needs to be recorded.  If you receive a foreclosure notice from your bank, the only thing to do is pack your stuff.  You see?  Problem solved.

So, why did Tracy Lawrence take her own life?  Obviously, I couldn’t know for sure… but it also seems obvious that LPS is a very large and very powerful company with employees all over the country, and Tracy blew the whistle.  I don’t believe she was so scared that she might be sentenced to under a year in jail and up to a $2,000 fine, especially because as the whistle blower, she may have been sentenced to neither.  Nor do I believe that she was overcome by guilt at having fraudulently signed and notarized documents used to foreclose on people’s homes because it wasn’t her idea… she was told by her employer to do it.

But I do believe that she was scared of the repercussions for her having blown the whistle on LPS … in fact, I believe she was scared to death as to what the rest of her life would be like having turned on LPS and the largest financial institutions in the world.  And I also believe the Nevada AG should indict LPS or do whatever is necessary to put them on the stand, answering questions under oath.  Because there is no doubt in my mind that Tracy Lawrence’s death is on their collective hands.

2. OCC proposes credit rating duties go to banks – A real conversation with a banker-friend of mine.

Okay, so I might as well admit it… I do happen to have a few friends that are bankers.  They’re evil, of course, but it doesn’t make them bad people.  Well, actually it might… but they’re friends anyway.  I’ve also got a number of regular readers that are bankers, although I’d never give away their identities… if anyone knew they were reading me, they’d likely be killed.  One such senior executive at a major bank told me in an email that reading my column is her guilty pleasure… LOL.

So, you probably saw that yesterday Standard & Poors reviewed 37 banks, downgrading 15 of them, including the six largest U.S. banks each by one notch.  JP Morgan Chase went from A+ to A; Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup were downgraded from A to A-; and Wells Fargo was cut from AA- to A+.  S&P said that it was applying some new standards to its rating methodology that “focus on how institutions manage their businesses under market and economic stress.”

Now, you might be thinking… oh, big deal, who cares?  But, to give you an idea of the impact, in a regulatory filing, Bank of America said that a downgrade of one level would mean that the bank would have to post an additional $5.1 billion as collateral.  If you remember how credit default swaps, then you already understand what that posting of additional collateral means… if you don’t, however, then perhaps you could use a refresher course at Mandelman U, where complexity we eschew… lol.

So, although I hadn’t seen the story  yet, I was on Facebook last night and a banker-friend of mine popped up in a chat window to deliver the good news.  Apparently, the bank-friendly site, HousingWire ran a story that caused his little banker heart to go all aflutter.  The headline is probably enough to make you throw up, it definitely was for me: OCC proposes moving credit rating duties to banks.
Yes, you read that right… if you don’t like being downgraded, no problem.  Just get your regulator to issue a proposal that says that you’ll be rating yourself from now on… that oughta’ fix the problem, right?  I’m thinking of doing the same thing, because frankly… the whole FICO thing often pisses me off too.  Why let Experian or Equifax rate me… surely I know me better than they do… and I’ve given myself an 850… so approve my loan, betch.

Here’s how the HousingWire story described the proposed new rule:

“The rule, when finalized, would effectively eliminate references to credit ratings agencies in OCC regulations, as required under the Dodd-Frank Act. These firms came under fire after the financial collapse in 2008 for rating many securities, particularly those backed by faulty mortgages, as high as AAA. In the years since, the credit rating agencies have been downgrading billions of RMBS deals.”

Yes, well I can see how those pesky downgrades could get annoying.  And as bankers, I suppose you are the best possible choice for rating your own crap… I mean, securities… especially if we want to completely destroy whatever is left of our global financial markets.

So, I was going to write a bunch of snarky stuff about how it’s inconceivable that we would allow such a rule to become a reality, but then… like I was just telling you… this little pop-up chat window appeared on my Facebook page and my banker friend was all excited to deliver the obviously outstanding news.  We got into a texting conversation, and when we were done, I thought to myself… why not just post the conversation as my article on the topic, and if you want more, just click the HousingWire link above and you can read it for yourself.  I’m not recommending that, by the way, it just gave me a stomach ache, but it’s your call, of course.

So… here it is in its entirety… my real life conversation with a banker on the proposed new rule and a few other things as well.  He’ll probably read my blog later today and go into cardiac arrest, but don’t worry LUCY… not his real name… no one could possibly know it was you… I’ve got over 3,000 Facebook friends and more than one or two are bankers, believe it or not.

I think you’ll like it…

BANKER: Woooo-hooooo – Now us banksters get to assign our own credit ratings!  No sense greasing rating agency palms–might as well do it ourselves!

MANDELMAN: What?  Did that happen today?

BANKER: I sent you a link to the story.

MANDELMAN: Oh, good Lord.
BANKER: OCC proposal… party-time… hey, what’s better than AAA?

MANDELMAN: And why not, you guys did such an outstanding job of risk management last time around.
BANKER: But we learned from our mistakes.  I’ve got it… A-Squared, Squared!!! That’s it, not just A-cubed.

MANDELMAN: There’s never been a banker that learned from a mistake in the history of the world… hence, we are where we are.

BANKER: Careful, my FB blood pressure app is registering an elevation…

MANDELMAN: LOL… banks should be public utilities.

BANKER: “A” to the 4th is called biquadratic – much more scientific sounding.  Public utilities have done so well, haven’t they?  Did you see LV robo-signer found dead on eve of sentencing.

MANDELMAN: Yes, I’m writing about it tonight.

BANKER: FYI – Retired OCC staff are like GS alumni infecting the executive ranks of major banks;  we have several very senior managers that retired from the OCC.

MANDELMAN: What are implications of that?

BANKER: Mostly, I’m  just saying that nothing changes… that the change agents don’t exist. New DNA/blood does not come from outside to strengthen the gene pool. They’ve seen what they’ve seen and will act according to their predispositions, experiences which were successful at regulators.

MANDELMAN: Got it.

BANKER: Not deep-thinkers; a little weak-willed — don’t like to offend others, don’t like to buck the trend – political… that sort of thing.

MANDELMAN: Gotcha… sounds encouraging… exactly the kind of people we want running the world.

BANKER: Well, the meek shall inherit the earth, remember?

MANDELMAN: Didn’t a bunch of banks get downgraded today?

BANKER: 37 of ‘em reviewed, I think 15 downgraded.

MANDELMAN: Yeah, I’m sure the rest are fine.  And so… the answer is to let them rate themselves from now on?  Brilliant!  I do love the way you guys think.  And by “love” I mean “deplore.”

BANKER: Oh, so what? We borrow from depositors for nothing, we borrow from the Fed for nothing. Since we are all downgraded and we have each other as counterparties with the Feds backing, it probably doesn’t matter much.  I haven’t read the justification for downgrades – seems counterintuitive to say our debt is riskier, when you consider the level of government support we all enjoy.

MANDELMAN: Yeah, and Europe is too far a flight to make any difference, right?

BANKER: Europe, schmeurope… makes the dollar stronger – Yay!

MANDELMAN: LMAO! Here, here! Clearly, I haven’t been looking at this correctly.

BANKER: Besides, GS can go over there and advise them on how to get out of the trouble they’re in because of them.  Just means more jobs, more bonuses… Yay again!  And European vacations might become cheap.  Mandelmanissimo can buy an Italian villa!

MANDELMAN: Another very solid point.  I definitely was not looking at it right.

BANKER: See – you need banker schooling. It isn’t about the cool-aid you drink… you need single malt scotch, cuban cigars, shiny wing-tips, an inability to feel empathy, an air of total superiority, and the belief that you can outsmart anyone else creating and harnessing the next financial weapon of mass destruction.  You gotta breathe Gordon Gekko.

MANDELMAN: Of course it probably helps to have the Federal Reserve’s checkbook and credit card.

BANKER: Hey, “you” gave it to us. You gotta’ be the parent/adult and draw the line.  You can use your forum to make the populace understand.

MANDELMAN: I’m working on that.

BANKER: I’m all for a coup d’etat.

MANDELMAN: Shall I order you a torch or are you more the pitchfork sort?

BANKER: Marginalize us… return us to the 99%… take away our social standing as the aristocracy.  Oh, you’re a legacy?   No, your gene pool no longer belongs here in positions of power and authority.  We want rational thinking, enlightenment, selfless behavior – you were elected to act on behalf of the population – 5 year no-compete clause with private industry – go back to law and write up some wills, divorces, trusts… try a Accident/Injury practice.  And no automatic pension for 1-termers.

Ya’ll (Nomi, Yves, Abigail, Max, April, et al) ought’a gather at USC, UCLA, etc. for a rally or giant speaking engagement.

MANDELMAN: I’d sure love to host that event… a Mandelman Matters conference.

BANKER: Put a simple slide presentation together, collage like an Apocalypse Now montage… boom-boom-boom… ”class war” atrocities… show scale, scope, impact… gotta’ bring the war into the living rooms of America, and show the body bags – it affects all of us.  Nothing opinion-based… just the facts, show cause and effect, make FactCheck the AAA rating. BTW, have you thought about a simple video background for your articles to post on YouTube?

MANDELMAN: Yes, I’m working on that too.  All it takes is money… why don’t you send me some?  How about a no doc, stated income re-fi at 150% of appraised value?  It’ll be just like old times, you’ll love it.  Wouldn’t want to do anything that’s not professional.

BANKER: I said YouTube not Universal Studios. Just a panorama of North Las Vegas, Phoenix, etc. to use as a background. Maybe snippets of public use video clips that aren’t too far out of context. With you narrating the video… your wife and daughter could be the audience that asks you questions.  Obama/Bush can plant journalists to lob softball questions, why can’t you can stage it too?  Any chance you could get on NPR?

MANDELMAN: I’d love to… or maybe MSNBC on Dylan Ratigan’s show.

BANKER: Hook up with Whalen and you might have a great shot at it.  I don’t think the NAR will be inviting you to their X-Mas party.

MANDELMAN: Oh gee… and I so wanted to hang out with a room full of delusional liars.

BANKER: You might be on the short list to keynote JPM’s X-mas party though.  BTW… Occupy LA Raid Happening Tonight, LAPD En Route to Begin Eviction.  Live coverage of the raid via Ustream says the raid is slow moving and strategic. Venice 311 tweeted information from an LAPD scanner, which said that 900 officers are currently en route to evict the remaining occupiers and that the LAPD has setup a processing and booking station at Dodgers Stadium.

MANDELMAN: Oh God…

BANKER: Hearing that when LAPD helicopter light is turned off that is a signal for cops to move in.  Police clad in riot gear are standing at Broadway and 1st.  CBS just stated that they are “working with law enforcement” and are not showing scenes they are “not allowed to show.”  Quote from KCAL-9, “We made an agreement with LAPD not to give away their tactics.”

MANDELMAN: Well, good then… about time we did away with that pain-in-the-neck 1st Amendment.  They’re just a bunch of whiny hippie types anyway, right?

BANKER: Hey, now you’re talking like the chairman of my bank.  Nice to have you back.

MANDELMAN: Sorry, but no thanks.  I think I’ll just go back to my work making you and yours look like the destructive, power hungry despots that you are. Besides, I took that vow of poverty when I started blogging, remember?

BANKER: Okay, well… have fun storming the castle!  I think I’ll go see which fees I can raise for no reason and without disclosure.

MANDELMAN: Sounds like a gas… I’m sending you a current copy of GAAP for Christmas… figured you’d enjoy a little nostalgia.

BANKER: Yeah… I gotta go too… and FYI — The Fed has demanded capital stress tests by Jan 4th that consider Europe/unemployment, blah, blah, blah.  And as a result, many of us bankers have had to cancel vacations for the remainder of year.  But, at least we’re getting reimbursed for lost airline/travel spending, so that’s a relief. TTYL…

MANDELMAN: You’re disgusting… text me tomorrow… are you going to make it Christmas Eve?  Chinese food on me, as usual.

BANKER: Wouldn’t miss it.

MANDELMAN: Okay, and try not to bankrupt any sovereign nations before then, okay?

BANKER: You’re no fun… c-ya!

MANDELMAN: Mandelman out.

3. PMI Files Bankruptcy – Regulators step in and take over yet another mortgage insurer…

They’re almost dropping like flies… mortgage insurers, that is.  The latest casualty is PMI Group Inc. of Walnut Creek, California… a Delaware Corporation whose parent company is PMI Mortgage Insurance Co. whose headquarters are in Arizona.  And with all of those machinations in place to avoid paying taxes and no doubt obfuscate whatever else, they still went broke… so, nice job there… don’t you feel silly now?

Now, let me assure you that I could care less about PMI Group, or whatever other holding company is or isn’t involved.  The reason I’m writing this is because I found a few of the details involved fascinating.  The company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, filed on November 23rd, showed assets of $225 million… and debt of $736 million as of August 4, 2011.  PMI had posted losses for the last 16 consecutive quarters.

I don’t know about you, but to my way of thinking, that makes them irresponsible insurers.

Last month, Arizona Director of Insurance Christina Urias took control of the PMI unit on an interim basis, directing that claims be paid at 50 cents on the dollar. (Wait until Secretary Geithner hears about this, he’s not going to be happy… he hates haircuts, don’t you know.)

Of course, it goes without saying that this is not the first mortgage insurer to fall from grace… Triad Guaranty Inc. stopped selling mortgage insurance policies when it ran short of capital back in July of 2008.  A state regulator ordered the company to defer 40 percent of claims payments because of “uncertainty” over whether it could meet its obligations.  And Old Republic International Corp. was suspended by Fannie and Freddie as an approved guarantor of loans this past summer when it failed to meet capital requirements.

It seems that these companies do much better when they don’t have claims… so, go figure.

Here’s where I thought it got interesting…

According to data provider CMA, the credit-default swaps that are tied to PMI’s bonds went up in cost after the bankruptcy filing, and the effect may be that that contract provisions trigger amounts owed totaling more than twice the company’s debt.  They’re talking about collateral calls associated with credit default swaps again… see how devastating their impact can be, even on this relatively small scale.

So, the cost to protect the company’s debt increased by 0.7 percentage points to 75.2 percentage points upfront, which is roughly twice what it would have cost to do the same thing last June.  That means that today, investors would have to pay $7.52 million up front, and $500,000 a year to protect $10 million of the insurer’s debt obligations (read: bonds).  If we’re talking about a ten year bond, that would seem a tad pricey, don’t you think?  I mean, that means the total cost would end up around $12.5 million to insure $10 million in debt.

4. Citigroup may settle, but federal judge says not Yeti…

Remember the Bumbles, from the animated television classic, “Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer,” starring the voice of Burl Ives as Sam the snowman?  You know the one… Rudolph gets tossed out of the reindeer games because of his glowing nose, and he ends up taking off with Hermey, an elf who wants to be a dentist, and Yukon Cornelius, the gold prospector. They run into the Abominable Snowman… the Bumbles… and then they find a entire island of misfit toys.  I don’t want to say any more, because I don’t want to give away the ending.

Well, the reason I bring it up is that the Bumbles always scared the heck out of me as a kid, until of course, we learn that he’s really a nice Bumbles who just has a toothache.  That’s not the part that scared me though… the scary part was that Hermey doesn’t just want to be a dentist, he fancies himself an amateur dentist… and he actually performs dentistry on the Bumbles… like, OMG.  I tell you… it was decades before I could sit in a dentist’s chair without inhaling nitrous oxide… or at least that’s my story and I’m sticking to it.  But I digress…

The SEC today reminds me of the Bumbles.  They growl and wave their arms in the air as they file a lawsuit against one of the TBTF banks, basically alleging that the bank destroyed the national and even global economy, but then they turn into the most accommodating, if not entirely malleable regulator in the history of regulators, offering to settle the case for relative nickels and dimes, complete with no admission of guilt by the settling bankster.  It’s so distasteful to watch that I’d stopped watching.

But, a friend of mine who’s a lawyer, recently brought to my attention what just happened in the latest SEC case, which is against Citigroup… the judge said no way to the flimsy proposed $285 million settlement.  It seems that Federal Judge Jed S. Rakoff believes that what’s interest of the public must be considered, and the proposed settlement clearly failed in that regard.

Now, get this… the SEC actually ARGUED in support of the proposed settlement, and part of their argument was specifically that the public interest was not a criterion that Judge Rakoff should consider.  Rakoff rejected the SEC’s argument and, citing legal precedent, refused to approve the settlement, and set the date for the trial to commence sometime next July.

Are you digging what I’m saying here?  The SEC actually argued that the judge should approve the settlement WITHOUT any concern as to what’s in the public’s interest.  I have to tell you… that revelation is, to me, proof positive of a regulatory agency that has so lost its way that it may never be able to find its way home.  I mean, were it Citigroup arguing the irrelevancy of the public’s interest  as related to the settlement, it wouldn’t faze me a bit… Citigroup, like the other TBTF banksters obviously don’t care about the public’s interests, but what in the Sam Hill is the SEC there for if not to represent… or at least be cognizant of the public’s interests?  In fact, how dare a federally funded regulatory agency stand up in court and attempt to convince a judge that the public’s interest should not be a factor in approval of a proposed settlement.

According to the SEC’s website, in the section describing the history of the agency, the SEC was created for two fundamental purposes:

  • Companies publicly offering securities for investment dollars must tell the public the truth about their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the risks involved in investing.
  • People who sell and trade securities – brokers, dealers, and exchanges – must treat investors fairly and honestly, putting investors’ interests first.

Okay, so call me crazy, but those two statements make it sound like the SEC is supposed to be concerned with the public’s interests, do they not?  And yet the SEC went as far as publicly and proudly proclaiming a settlement that the judge later described as being “POCKET CHANGE” for an organization of Citi’s size… and whether the settlement provided any benefit for the SEC beyond “A QUICK HEADLINE.”  And in the judge’s written opinion he said of the proposed settlement: “It is neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public interest.”

Keep in mind that we’re talking about allegations that center on Citi’s broker-dealer arm, Citigroup Global Market, for “intentionally misleading investors in relation to a $1 billion collateralized debt obligation known as Class V Funding III.”  You know the drill by now… Citi lied to investors, selling them crap, while betting against it on the side.

And in point of fact, it was that very behavior… far more than any sub-prime loans defaulting, that has caused an economic meltdown in this country, and around the world, not seen for more than 70 years.  Citigroup’s acts in this regard were the proximate cause behind the destruction of investor trust that has left the U.S. government the lender of first, middle and last resort.

5. Remember that final scene in Raiders of the Lost Ark?

Remember that final scene in the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark… the first one… when the U.S. Government is about to store the Ark of the Covenant and all you see are the rows upon rows of some giant government warehouse where nothing will ever be found once stored.  Well, a reader of mine was kind enough to send me a photo of one of the floors at Bank of America’s servicer… it’s where they store borrower files.

I think the photo speaks for itself. Happy holidays everybody!

Mandelman out.

Nov
30

The Bears Explain Links between OTC Derivatives, the Financial Crisis of 2008, Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, Jon Corzine and MF Global

This video explains causal links between OTC derivatives, the financial crisis of 2008, Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, Larry Summers, Jon Corzine and MF Global. ~ 4closureFraud.org Tweet Related posts:The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis – Credit Default Swaps and the Economic Meltdown [VIDEO] Fraud Factories: Rep. Alan Grayson Explains the Foreclosure Fraud Crisis, … Read more Related posts:
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  3. Fraudclosure | Fraud Factories: Alan Grayson To Run For Office Again
Nov
14

Lee Camp | Kim Kardashian, Occupy Wall Street, & Credit Default Swaps

Some Explicit Language So Viewer Discretion Advised What the hell does Kim Kardashian have to do with credit default swaps and fractional reserve banking?!? ….Nothing. But watch the video anyway. ~ 4closureFraud.org Tweet Related posts:Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Is A Thought Revolution – And It Won’t Be Minimized Lee Camp | Occupy Wall … Read more Related posts:
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  2. Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Has Proven We Don’t Have Free Speech
  3. Lee Camp | “Wall Street Is Dirtier Than Occupy Wall Street”
Nov
14

Lee Camp | Kim Kardashian, Occupy Wall Street, & Credit Default Swaps

Some Explicit Language So Viewer Discretion Advised What the hell does Kim Kardashian have to do with credit default swaps and fractional reserve banking?!? ….Nothing. But watch the video anyway. ~ 4closureFraud.org Tweet Related posts:Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Is A Thought Revolution – And It Won’t Be Minimized Lee Camp | Occupy Wall … Read more Related posts:
  1. Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Is A Thought Revolution – And It Won’t Be Minimized
  2. Lee Camp | Occupy Wall Street Has Proven We Don’t Have Free Speech
  3. Lee Camp | “Wall Street Is Dirtier Than Occupy Wall Street”
Aug
02

George Mantor | The Golden Years – Uncovering Ponzi II

  The Golden Years—Uncovering Ponzi II If you liked what they did to the value of your real estate and American jobs, you are going to love what they did to your pension. And, it’s gone. Vanished into banksta bonuses just like the credit default swaps that paid them a hundred times the value of … Read more
Jun
08

Dear Banking & Government People Who Are Reading This…

This was originally posted on May 30th, 2010, and I plan to repost it every year in the hopes that it matters.

Okay, so there’s this online thing called Google Analytics. And it shows someone who has a blog or website from where traffic to his or her site is coming. Now, it’s not always easy to tell where someone is from because some of the domains just say “verizon.net,” or whatever.

But other times I can tell where my readers are, because their domain says “freddiemac.com,” or “wellsfargo.com,” stuff like that. So, if it was just once or twice, then I would just figure that someone bumped into my blog by accident, but just between April 28th and May 29th, for example, people at FreddieMac.com came onto my blog 172 times.

Wellsfargo.com folks showed up 170 times.  JPmchase.com 94 times. Bank of America’s 64 times. usbank.com 26 times. IndyMac Bank 26 times, fanniemae.com 20 times. wachovia 19 times. fdic.gov 17 times. ca.gov 16 times. hud.gov 14 times. va.gov 14 times. mellon.com 12 times. You get the idea.

I also know that many of you spend a whole lot of time on Mandelman Matters. Like, quite a few of you have visited hundreds of pages, give or take, on my site, so obviously you’re reading it pretty carefully.

So, banking and government people… what’s up? How are you? Are you reading me because you hate what I’m saying? Or, because you hate what you’re doing? Something in the middle?

I have heard from a few of you. How come not more? Do you feel I’m being unfair about anything? Or, am I pretty much nailing it? I’m not talking about my facts, I know my facts are right. But what about my opinions? Am I out of line? You can tell me if you think so, you know. I don’t get upset because someone has a different view than my own, but it should be a well thought out view. I don’t really do stupid.

Here’s the real question: Can I do more to help homeowners in some way that you know about, but I don’t. I mean, maybe your bank or government agency is actually trying to do good, but somehow struggling for legitimate reasons and maybe I could help in some way.

I don’t really know what I’m thinking about when I say that, but I’m certainly open to the possibilities. And I wanted you all to know that I’m very easy to reach and very easy to talk to.

If you want your identity kept secret, no problem. I won’t say a word about who you are. You can reach out to me and know that I’m only interested in helping homeowners get through this mess, and I’m only trying to do that because few others seem to be.

This crisis is complex and difficult to understand for most people and I’m kind of good at explaining complicated things in a simple way, and people say I’m funny, so I think I have to try to help. Because when the people of this country catch up with what’s gone on here, and then realize that it’s going to be going on for a long time, well… a number of them are going to be quite upset.

I know that a number of banking and government people think that the way home is through our banking system, and that the average homeowner is somehow at fault and therefore somehow undeserving of help, but it’s not true. Without addressing the needs of American citizens, something we have not done well thus far, we are all in trouble.

You guys started it when you came out blaming “irresponsible sub-prime borrowers” as being the cause of the crisis. That was pretty stupid, you must admit, and I wrote to a bunch of you back then telling you it was a mistake. Now you’re having trouble getting the political support you need to change what needs to be changed because you told everybody it was something that it wasn’t.

You guys all now know that this thing had about as much to do with sub-prime borrowers as World War II. Unless you can point out a sub-prime borrower who was selling synthetic CDOs in Iceland, I think we’re done with that conversation, don’t you?

And how comfortable are you with what Bernanke’s got going at the Fed, with the help of Treasury, of course? I mean, you do agree that we’re blatantly circumventing the legislative process in order to pump trillions into banks without that messy congressional thing, right?

Okay, so fine. I’m willing to look the other way on all of that, but we have to meet somewhere in the middle. At this point, homeowners don’t believe anyone on your side of the table cares at all. They all think you’re evil and willing to see millions thrown out of their homes without blinking an eye. And if that’s the case, then there’s no reason for us to talk.

But that can’t be right, right? I can’t believe that either political party thinks they can possibly get reelected by continuing down that path, do they? It’s a bad idea. So far, the foreclosure crisis is affecting roughly 15% of American homeowners, but that number will exceed 20% in a year, or perhaps 18 months. And then all bets are off. There’ll be no going back then.

I guess that’s it. I just wanted to let you know that I’m here and I’m open to doing whatever might be productive and helpful. You don’t have to worry about me being in this for the money because if that were the case, I’d have some.

So… feel free to get in touch of you have anything to say. My email is mandelman@mac.com and I promise to be a lot more reasonable than I probably come across in many of my articles. Truth be told, I’ve learned that subtlety does little to advance my cause.

If not, not. Feel free to continue reading me without reaching out. At least I feel better for inviting you into the discussion. And I do hope some of you will take me up on it.

Mandelman out.

May
25

If You Think the Meltdown Was the Fault of Homeowners, Think Again…

If you’re thinking that our economic crisis was in some way the fault of homeowners who couldn’t afford their mortgages, please consider the following:

At the end of 2007, there were roughly $1.4 trillion in sub-prime mortgages in this country.

If “irresponsible sub-prime borrowers,” caused the meltdown, then $1.4 trillion would have solved the problem in its entirety, right?  Because that’s all the sub-prime loans there were.

But, between the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the Treasury over $13 trillion has been pumped into financial institutions to fix the “housing correction,” which is what Hank Paulson was still calling our economic collapse as of November of 2008.

At the end of 2008, there were $11.9 trillion worth of mortgages in this country.  So, with $13 trillion, the government could have paid off every single one… and still had a little over a trillion dollars left over.

But there’s a lot more to the economic problem than that, explains Nomi Prins, my new favorite financial uber-genius and author of “It takes a Pillage.” Wall Street had been playing the leverage game… somewhat like they did in the 1920s, I suppose… but on mega-steroids.  Leverage means borrowing on assets, and Wall Street banks were leveraged by 30:1, commercial banks by 10:1, not including their “off-the-balance-sheet” holdings, which could make their leverage ratio significantly higher in many cases.

So… in “Pillage,” Nomi Prins explains in terms anyone can understand that factoring in the leverage at 11:1, we’re looking at a $140 TRILLION economic problem… yes, you read that correctly… that’s trillion, with a ‘T’.  Our Wall Street bankers, through the abuse of the securitization process and excessive amounts of leverage, created a potential tab of $140 TRILLION for the people of this country to pick up.

Securitization is the process of packaging loans into securities that are then be sold to investors, called Asset Backed Securities (or ABS).  Inside a given ABS, you might find 10% real loans and 90% bonds backed by those real loans.  Or there could be only 5% real loans.  The mortgage payments we all make are used to make payments that flow through the securities and to the investors who then invest by buying pieces of the ABSs.

“It takes a Pillage” is a book that’s absolutely jam packed with “Aha!” and “OMG!” moments, but one shines above the rest… What caused the financial crisis were the securities, or the “bonds”… not the loans.

We’re talking about a system that took on $140 trillion in debt on the backs of just $1.4 trillion in real loans.  And it may be much more than $140 trillion, we don’t really know because we’ve allowed the market to remain unregulated.  The $1.4 trillion is based on leverage at 11:1.  It could very well be some multiple of that amount.

Issuers of ABSs, who were Wall Street’s investment banks earned about $300 billion for packaging and selling these “assets,” packaging the CDOs we’ve all heard about paid the best.  Who bought ABSs?  European and the global banks, insurance companies, and pension plans bought a whole lot of them.  And they bought them with borrowed money.

They bought them because Wall Street told them they were safe… triple A rated… and even better they could be insured with Credit Default Swaps, too!  What was not to love?

Hundreds of trillions in “structured assets”, ABSs, MBSs, CDOs, CDOs Squared, and of course synthetic CDOs, which are entirely, made up of credit default swaps, all deriving their value based on $1.4 trillion in mortgages.  All of those structured investments, once demand for them abruptly dried up, are what we came to know as “TOXIC ASSETS.”

Prins makes it very clear that toxic assets are not the same as defaulted sub-prime loans.  The fact is, Nomi says, that every single sub-prime loan in the country could have defaulted and all of the homes attached to those loans devalued to zero… neither of which happened… and the banks in this country would not have become insolvent… not even close.

The toxic assets lost their value starting in the summer of 2007, not because sub-prime loans defaulted, but because no one wanted to buy them anymore.  After Standard & Poors and Moody’s lowered their ratings on just 1% of the MBSs outstanding on July 10, 2007, investors no longer trusted the triple A ratings.  If some bonds were improperly rated, the thinking went, what about all the others?

I’ve read just about every book on the meltdown that’s been published in the last two years.  From “Too Big to Fail,” to more recently, “Crash of the Titans,” which is about Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch, and “It takes a Pillage” filled in so many blanks for me I couldn’t possibly count them all.  Nomi is a very down to earth person too, and it makes reading her easy like Sunday morning.  She’s snarky at certain moments, but she delivers it straight most of the time so you won’t get distracted.

I read her book and was on the phone the following morning with my friend in New York, Danny Schechter, who produced the movie, “Plunder – The Crime of Our Time,” which is all about the housing meltdown and foreclosure crisis and if you haven’t see it yet, you really should order a copy on Amazon right away.  Nomi appeared in Danny’s film a, so I knew he could put me in touch with her, and she responded to my email right away.  (She’s even agreed to an interview, so look for a podcast coming soon, I hope.)

Nomi is smart… I mean scary smart.  Like, I’ve always been considered smart too… near the top of my various classes, 1380 SAT scores about a hundred years ago, if that means anything, but Nomi is so far off the charts that I can’t even believe it.  I don’t remember anyone like her in college or graduate school.  Talking to her is like talking to a walking encyclopedia of the financial history of the United States… but one that speaks English like the rest of us.

By the summer of 2006, the housing bubble had popped.  Greenspan had raised interest rates 17 times in a row by then.  But, starting on that July day during the summer of 2007, before most people had any idea what was happening, the bond/credit markets froze solid as money stopped moving… banks started hoarding cash and soon no one would be able to get a mortgage or refinance one… and housing prices started to fall fast.

After that, anyone that had bought a home during the preceding years found himself or herself increasingly underwater.  One couple I know, with an 850 credit score by the way, lost a home to foreclosure and filed for bankruptcy.  He was a very successful dentist and she a hospital administrator.  Their crime?  They got caught buying a home… and selling one at the worst moment in US history.

So, our government pumped $13 trillion into banks, financial institutions and others in this country since the fall of 2008.  We allowed just about any business that wanted to become a “Bank Holding Company,” so they could qualify for the federal bailout programs.  (As an example, did you know that American Express Travel Services became a BHC in order to receive $4 billion in taxpayer dollars?  Why? What do they do?  Arrange vacations for rich people?  Were “they too big to fail,” too?  Nomi covers it in “Pillage.”)

And today, the only mortgage lending in this country comes from the federal government… Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHA.  So, we’ve already nationalized mortgage lending in this country.  We had no choice but to do that because if we didn’t, there would be no mortgage lending in this country.  Citibank and Bank of America have been nationalized too… I know we don’t call them “nationalized,” but they ARE both nationalized.

(Citibank, for example, has been given over $400 billion in government loans and loan guarantees.  BofA has been received over $200 billion. We still guarantee Goldman Sachs bonds… meaning we are co-signing for their debt.  Want to see the numbers in detail, visit the “Reports” tab on NomiPrins.com… you won’t believe it.)

General Motors had to come to congress for a loan at the end of 2008… why?  Well, for one thing, in 2008, they missed their forecasts by 2.4 million cars… we couldn’t finance one so we couldn’t buy one.  And the bond market was broken, so they couldn’t issue bonds as they normal would.  We lost tens of thousands of jobs when they filed bankruptcy.

Unemployment started rising as we stopped spending.  And we entered a deflationary spiral… the same one we’re in today.  There’s no double dip, it’s the same “dip.  The reason they can say that the recession ended was because of the trillions we were pumping into the system.  Among other programs, the fed bought $1.5 trillion in mortgage-backed securities between 2009 and 2010, but that’s over now, and the downturn is back in the game.

We’re just about at the end of QE2 now, and we don’t have any more stimulus money to artificially stimulate our economic situation… so things are already returning to their downward slide.  Home values nationally have fallen 57 months in a row… and they’ve fallen faster and further than during the Great Depression.

The sooner we face the reality of the situation, the sooner we can start to rebuild our economy.  All we’ve done so far is pump money into insolvent financial institutions, while we’ve let the American middle class sink into an abyss from which we will not recover in my lifetime… and I’m turning 50 on Friday of this week.

You see… all that government spending, as we like to call it… is really US… we ARE the government… it’s OUR money the government is spending.  All those trillions are coming out of OUR pockets, and the pockets of our children and their children.  And a few hundred billion has gone into the pockets of our bankers in the form of bonuses… and no one even seems to care.

And still, all that many people want to talk about is how some homeowner must have been living beyond their means and deserves to lose their home.  Don’t bail out irresponsible sub-prime homeowners, right?

Ridiculous.  We’ve been lied to.  This isn’t a question of wanting the government to take care of everything… they are ready taking care of everything, except the people, America’s middle class.  And we didn’t even ask for much… just a modified loan in order to remain in our homes.  Because millions losing homes benefits no one.

You’re already paying for bonuses at Citibank, Goldman Sachs, and American Express Travel Related Services… and if you can stomach doing that, you can find it in your heart to be in favor of your neighbor getting his loan modified, if for no other reason, so that you don’t lose your own ass in the next few years.  Because don’t kid yourself… none of us is getting out of this one unscathed.

The water is going down in the harbor, are we’re all going down with it.  And as long as we have housing prices falling and no middle class spending going on in this country, we’ll have no recovery… except maybe the recovery that they talk about on T.V. but no one can feel.  And how long do you think people are going to buy into that fairy tale being told by our politicians?

Arizona’s state senate passed a bill 28-2 that would have slowed the foreclosure and given people a chance to remain in their homes by forcing banks to follow the existing laws.  Then the banking lobby made it disappear over weekend.  Another similar amendment was to be proposed, but the banking lobby got that one too.  And last week lobbyist at a meeting of the Arizona Mortgage Lending Association bragged about his success killing the bills I refer to.  Bragged.

“It Takes a Pillage” makes it clear that we need to stop blaming our neighbors because he or she is struggling to keep the family home.  Borrowers didn’t cause this crisis, bankers caused it… but the borrowers are losing their homes while bankers get bigger and bigger bonuses?

Since when is an outcome like that what this country is all about?

There are a lot of great books I wish everyone in this country would read.  But, if you’ve already read other books about the meltdown, or even if you haven’t… whether it’s a starting place or one in a series, I can’t recommend reading “It Takes a Pillage” strongly enough.

What Nomi Prins has to tells us, needs to be heard.

I’ll go ahead and admit something.  I’ve read it once all the way through, and dozens of times in sections… then I bought it on iTunes and I listen to it most nights as I fall asleep… I know… I’m weird… but it’s that good.

(There’s a link below to NOMI’S SITE and then you can get to Amazon from there… and it’s now available in paperback, so it’s only $11.53!  For $11.53 you’ll be so much smarter about the meltdown, you’ll thank me.)

Mandelman out.

~~~

CLICK HERE TO VISIT: NomiPrins.com

AND THEN CLICK ON THE BOOK COVER TO GO TO AMAZON

AND ORDER YOUR COPY OF “IT TAKES A PILLAGE.”

~~~

IT TAKES A PILLAGE: AN EPIC TALE OF POWER, DECEIT AND UNTOLD TRILLIONS.

“No one takes Wall Street to task like Nomi Prins. But this book is far more than a pointed attack on how greed and bad regulation created a global economic meltdown-it also offers concrete prescriptions for how to prevent the next crisis. Let’s hope Washington is listening.”

James Ledbetter, Editor, The Big Money

“Nomi Prins has applied her unmatched expertise in Wall Street’s arcane methods of turning your money into their bonuses to mapping the recent crisis. In compelling, scathing prose, she shows how the key players escaped being brought to account, and kept their pet officials in power.”

John Dizard, The Financial Times

~~~

Some of Nomi’s Bio…

Before becoming a journalist, Nomi worked on Wall Street as a managing director at Goldman Sachs, and running the international analytics group at Bear Stearns in London.

Her writing has appeared in The New York Times, Fortune, Newsday, Mother Jones, The Daily Beast, Newsweek, Slate.com, The Guardian UK, The Nation, The American Prospect, Alternet, LaVanguardia,  and other publications.

Nomi has appeared on numerous TV programs; internationally on BBC World, BBC and Russian TV,  and nationally on CNN, CNBC, MSNBC, ABC, CSPAN, Democracy Now, Fox and PBS. She has been featured on hundreds of radio shows globally including for CNNRadio, Marketplace, Air America, NPR, regional Pacifica stations, New Zealand, BBC, and Canadian Programming.

Mar
12

Mandelman U. Presents – Securitization & Mortgage Backed Securities

Originally posted on May 4, 2010.  Re-posted now at the Request of a Reader…

Complexity We Eschew at Good Old…

Mandelman U.

Sit, Sulte, Simplex

As I’ve been telling you for over a year, the banks did it, not the borrowers.  And, now I’m going to arm you like no other so when the topic of the economic meltdown and financial crisis comes up at the dinner table, you can sit calmly prepared to take on all comers.  Let them sweat.  You just say… would anyone like some tea… as you deftly explain to them the ins and outs of the financial crisis that they’ve never understood because the article they read in Newsweek didn’t really cover them.

I’ve heard more than enough idiocy being spouted by people that couldn’t tell a Synthetic CDO from a Synthetic pair off trousers.  Well, I think we’ve all heard about enough from them, don’t you?

Ready for Mandelman University?

Come back to 6th Grade where I’ll be teaching real 6th graders all about what the banks did to break the world.  We’re going to cover the Bond Market and Securitization, CDOs and CDSs… and even Synthetics and CDOs squared.  No derivative is too complex for me to tear apart and make simple enough for a 5th or 6th grader to understand.

Now, shhhh…. It’s time for class to begin… Mandelman’s in the house… Let’s do this, Dawg…

CHAPTER ONE -

Securitization, the Bond Market & the Mortgage Backed Security

Picture a bureau in a bedroom.  A stand up dresser of drawers.  To keep things simple, let’s just say there are three drawers.

Now let’s say we have one thousand, $120,000 mortgages, so the total amount of the debt is $120 million, which is simply $120,000 x 1,000.  And each of those mortgages was taken out by someone with a low credit score, say something under 600…. or 500, if you’d prefer.

Now, there are lots of reasons for having a low credit score, divorce, medical bills, a business that fails because of a partner’s actions, alcoholism or drug addiction, thousands of reasons.  Just because you have a low credit score doesn’t necessarily mean that you won’t pay your mortgage payment in the future, right?  In fact, one might argue that depending on the circumstances that led to someone having a low credit score, he or she might be less likely to default in the future than someone with a high credit score.

For example, someone who has had their car repossessed may never want to endure the pain and shame of losing their car again and therefore will do everything possible to never miss another car payment again.

So, we have $120,000,000 (or $120 million) mortgages that are all held by people with low credit scores for a garden variety of reasons, credit scores that would be classified as “C” credit.

But, how to find investors that want to lend money to those people, that’s been the question for Wall Street?  It was easy to find investors to lend money to people with perfect credit, but what about those with a low credit score?

So, Wall Street takes those “C” credit loans and dumps the cash flows or payments from those loans into the bureau… the dresser with the three drawers that I mentioned at the beginning of this article… They dump the payment streams into the bureau until it’s filled to the top with payments owed by people who, for all sorts of reasons, have low credit scores.

Now each of the three drawers contains 1/3rd of the payments or cash flows (or in other words the payments on $40 million in mortgages, which is 1/3rd of $120 million total) but the Wall Street bank that is putting together this bureau or dresser creates a contract that dictates how the payments will flow into the bureau or dresser, and that contract says that the payments shall flow in from the top.

That means that the payments will fill up the top drawer first, then the middle drawer, and then the bottom drawer last.

Now, we know that not all of the 1,000 homeowners that owe these mortgage payments are going to make their payments as agreed. Some will default and the company that we hire to service these mortgages will have to foreclose on the house and resell it.

We also know that some of the 1,000 mortgages will pay off early, either because the homeowner refinances the loan, in which case the payments will end up in someone else’s bureau or dresser drawers, or perhaps because the homeowner inherits money from a relative and decides to pay off the mortgage early.

But regardless, because we have 1,000 loans, we figure (using a bunch of complicated mathematical formulas) that no matter what… no matter how many homeowners default on their payments, and no matter how many refinance or otherwise pay off the loans early, BECAUSE the contract says that the payment streams shall come in from the top and be used to fill the top drawer first, and then the middle drawer, and only after filling the middle and top drawers will the bottom drawer be filled… we know because of that structure the top drawer will always have enough payments to fill it up all the way.

And that means that the top drawer, because of how we’ve structured the payments to come in… and NOT because of the credit scores of the people who took out the mortgages… will always be able to pay the people that invest in it.

In other words, no matter how many homeowners out of the 1,000 don’t end up paying as agreed, either because they default or because they refinance, the top drawer will still always receive enough of the payment stream to fill it all the way up.

The middle drawer only gets filled after the top drawer, so the risk of it not receiving enough payments to fill it all the way up is greater than the top drawer. And because the bottom drawer only gets payments after the top and middle have been filled, the risk that it won’t receive enough payments to fill it all the way is the greatest.  To get people to invest in the bottom drawer, we’re going to offer then the highest rate of interest to accept the risk of not getting paid at all.

So, each drawer has $40 million in mortgages, but not many investors want to invest $40 million, because that’s a lot of money for our clients.  So, we’ll slice the top drawer into 40 slices of $1 million each.  (We could slice the top drawer into 400 slices of $100,000 each, or even 4,000 slices of $10,000 each.  It just depends on what type of investors we know and can sell to.)

Regardless of how we decide to slice the top drawer, whether we choose to slice it into 40, 400, or 4,000 slices, each slice will be called a “bond” or a “mortgage backed security”… same thing.  And each slice will be rated AAA, because there will always be enough money to fill the top drawer, because of the way we’ve structured our mortgage backed security.

A bond and a mortgage backed security are one in the same.  It’s a security, in this case a bond, and it’s a security backed by mortgages on real property, such as houses.  So, it’s a mortgage backed security, or MBS, as opposed to a corporate bond issued by a company like GE or IBM, or a Municipal Bond, issued by a city or municipality, which are only backed by the company’s or the city’s credit rating at the time the bond was issued.

So you see, although both are securities, bonds are debt, while stocks are equity.

We buy shares of stock in a company because we want to be an owner of the company, because we believe the story that we’ve been told about the company’s future being bright.  And because we believe the company will succeed in the future, it will be worth more and someone will want to pay us more for our shares of stock in the future than we paid when we bought them.

The bond market, however, which is much, much larger than the stock market by the way, is a market for debt. Bonds are a way for a company to raise the capital needed for growth without selling shares of stock, which would dilute the ownership of the other shareholders, thus pissing them off because by diluting the company by selling more shares, the original shareholders own less than they did before you diluted it.

Bonds are like IOUs.  You agree to loan the company, or municipality some amount of money for a specified period of time and the issuer of the bond promises to pay you back the amount you loaned, plus some rate of interest. And just like loaning money to anyone at anytime, there’s always a certain amount of risk that whomever you’re loaning the money to, he or she won’t be able to pay you back as agreed.

When the United States government sells bonds to raise money, investors consider there to be essentially no risk, because the government has the power to tax its citizens in order to come up with the money it needs to repay its debts, so since there’s no risk of not being re-paid, Treasury bonds offer to pay the lowest interest rate of all bonds.

GE’s bonds, while not as safe as Uncle Sam’s, are still considered pretty gosh darn safe because of GE’s credit rating, so GE’s corporate bonds will offer to pay you a little more interest than bonds issued by the US Treasury.

If they didn’t offer a little more than Treasury bonds, well then no one would buy them, right?    Because if GE bonds were offering to pay the same interest rate as the US government bonds, well, you might as well buy the government’s bonds, right?  I mean, as safe as GE might be, as high as its credit score might be, it can’t be considered as safe as the government of the United States of America. Why, of course not.

Companies like Sears might issue bonds as well, but since Sears isn’t considered to be as safe as say GE, Sears bonds have to offer a higher rate of interest than GE’s bonds in order to get investors to buy them, or in other words in order to get investors to lend money to Sears.

Some companies with low credit ratings may choose to float a bond offering to raise the capital they need to grow, because bond holders are not owners of the company, they’re more like creditors of the company, so if the company goes belly up, bond holders will be paid back before the holders of common stock.  For this reason, investors may feel safer investing in a company’s bonds than its stock.

When cable television first appeared on the scene, the companies needed a huge amount of money to lay the millions of miles of fiber optic cable that would one day carry television programming into our homes, but no one knew for sure how many of us would agree to pay for television brought in via cable. Back then, television was broadcast over the airwaves and as such we were used to getting it for free.

So, the companies that were forging the cable television industry offered bonds in order to raise the billions they needed, and because there was a risk that cable television wouldn’t take off, the bonds had to offer a much higher rate of interest than Sears, GE, or the US government.

These bonds, and others like them, became known during the 1980s as “junk bonds,” but the point is that as the credit rating of the bond issuer (or borrower) went down, the amount of interest offered to the investor who purchased the bond went up. The greater the amount of risk… the greater the potential return.

(Michael Milken, as you might remember, was the king of junk bond financing in the late 1970s and 1980s.  He financed such things as cable television giant, Liberty Media, Ted Turner’s CNN, and Steve Wynn’s Casino Empire.)

Individuals, like you and me, are pretty simple for investors to judge as far as credit worthiness goes. We have loans that we make payments on, and the degree to which we make our payments on time and as agreed, along with a bunch of other factors I realize, the higher our credit score. But large corporations or municipalities are much harder to assess as to their credit worthiness, so in order to make our bond market function, the US government depends on credit rating agencies to tell investors how risky various bonds are, all relative to the bonds issued by the US Treasury.

These are not the same credit rating agencies that we’re familiar with as consumers. These ratings agencies are named Standard & Poors, Moody’s, and Fitch, and among other things, these agencies place ratings on bonds, like AAA, AA, A, or BBB, C, or possibly even “Unrated,” which signifies the highest risk of nonpayment.

Bonds are bought and sold based on their ratings simply because it would be impossible for them to be traded any other way.  An investor, for example, could hardly fly to GE’s headquarters and ask to examine the giant corporation’s books before deciding whether to buy a GE bond. Or, ask to review the books of the City of Atlanta before deciding to buy its tax-free municipal bonds, perhaps being used to raise the money needed by the city to build a new highway, or sewer system.

(Politicians hate to have to raise taxes when money is needed, so state and local governments often offer bonds to raise the funds needed for various projects at repayment terms that stretch out over 10, 15, or 20 years.)

Now, back to our $40 million top dresser drawer bond that, just for the sake of our discussion, we’ve decided to divide into 40 slices of $1 million each because we figure that we’ve got plenty of investors as clients that are looking to invest sums of $1 million and up.  Another investment bank may buy one of our $1 million slices, or bonds, which remember are also called mortgage backed securities, and then decide to divide it up into 100, $10,000 slices because that firm serves clients that are looking to invest $10,000 at a time.

Now, it’s important to remember that people with low credit scores have taken all of the mortgages that are generating the cash flows, or payment streams, that flow into our bureau or dresser drawers.

So, you might think that the bonds we create when we slice up the drawers in our $120 million dresser would have to be rated with low credit scores, but you’d be wrong because you’d be confusing the credit scores that people have, with the credit ratings placed on bonds by the ratings agencies, S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, which are intended to reflect how much risk exists that you won’t be repaid by the bonds issuer.

You see, because the contract we’ve created for our mortgage backed security states that the top drawer, which in bond lingo is called a ” tranche,” will receive the first payments received, and only after it’s full will payments flow into the middle drawer in our dresser, the top tranche’s $40 million in cash flows or payments will be rated AAA, the highest rating, and therefore all of the $1 million bonds, or MBSs, for mortgage backed securities, will likewise carry a triple A rating.

These bonds will also offer the lowest interest rate of the entire dresser, but also convey the lowest risk of default, and because of their AAA rating, they can be sold to pension plans, insurance companies, university endowments, and even state and local governments… investors with lots of money to invest for long periods of time.

The mortgages that are generating the cash flows that are being used to pay the investors were all issued to people with low credit scores, but because of how we’ve structured the bond, or MBS, with the top tranche receiving its required payments before any of the lower tranches, the bonds that are cut from the top tranche will be rated AAA.  If you think about it carefully, and Wall Street certainly did, any loans could end up being sold in AAA rated bonds, as long as you had enough of them, and this type of structure was used to build the bond.

Because the investors that provided the capital for the 1,000 mortgages did so through the purchase of a “security,” a bond called a mortgage backed security, we say that the mortgages in our example have been “securitized,” and we refer to the process of using our dresser drawers, called tranches, as “Securitization”.

Everyone still with me so far?

If not, go back and read through it again. If you think you’ve got it down, let’s move on to what our Wall Street banksters did next.

Remember when it was hard to get credit? Unless you’re in your late 40s or older, you probably don’t.

It wasn’t always so easy to get a mortgage, a car loan, or even a credit card, for that matter.  Until “securitization” was discovered and became widespread during the 1980s, loans of any kind were much harder to qualify for because whoever was providing the capital to fund your loan had to be concerned that you might not pay the loan back, often leaving that investor with a substantial loss and no way to recoup his or her money.  That’s why it used to be common to hear the phrase: “In order to qualify for a loan at the bank, you have to prove you don’t need one,” when talking about applying for credit.

Of course, this also prevented prices from going up too much too fast.  Certainly, one of the factors that caused housing prices to rise so quickly during the bubble that ran from 2002 to 2006 or 2007, was the enormous amounts of capital that was, all of a sudden, essentially effortless to qualify for in the form of a first… or second… or even third mortgage.  As long as it could be securitized, it could be financed easily.

Had it been more difficult to obtain the mortgage needed to finance a real estate purchase, demand would have been lessened and therefore prices could not have climbed as high as they did by 2006.  Unfortunately, we still would have had a bubble in housing prices, and due to other factors that we’ll look at shortly, still would have had the financial crisis.  But still, unquestionably, had easy credit been a little less easy, we wouldn’t have had as far to fall when the bubble began losing air.

It’s interesting to note that during the 1930s, mortgages went from being five years in length, to offering 12-year repayment terms.  It’s easy to see how the advent of the 30-year mortgage made it possible for housing prices to increase, after all, if the longest fully amortized mortgage was still 12 years in length, almost no one could afford the payments on their current home.

But longer term mortgages, combined with “securitization,” and soon thereafter more exotic mortgages, such as the infamous Option ARM, all contributed to inflating housing prices, and in general, addicting Americans to increasing amounts of debt.  It made us feel much wealthier than we ever were. Sure, the value of the home we lived in was steadily rising, but so was the price of our next home.

During the last thirty years, we felt richer because we, and when I say “we,” I mean baby-boomers, for the most part, a generation that had never known hard times, were continuously willing to borrow more in order to spend more. And it was Wall Street’s bankers that were committed to making it easier and easier for us to do just that.  Never mind whether it was the right thing to do, or whether it was sustainable… it was profitable, and that’s all that mattered or matters on “The Street”.

In truth, Las Vegas casinos when still run by the mob cared more for their gambling customers than Wall Street’s bankers cared for American consumers.  As the famous economist, Joseph Stiglitz, points out in his book “Freefall,” Wall Street’s bankers could have used the abundance of cheap capital to create sustainable mortgages that would have allowed unprecedented numbers of Americans to own their own home and continue to stimulate the growing US economy, but they didn’t.

They chose instead to create mortgages with toxic terms, employed leverage that was beyond reckless, and invented uses for derivatives, called Credit Default Swaps that ultimately caused the economic, financial and social catastrophe that brought the global economy to the brink of disaster.

We’re going to cover them all, slowly… one by one… and then we’re going to put them all together so I’m hoping that it will be easy for you not only to understand the parts, but how they combined to make the toxic brew that broke the world… and may have, or may still end up causing you to lose your home to foreclosure.

Stick around… in a few days you’re going to be able to take on any of the idiots that are still running around blaming the sub-prime borrowers for the economic meltdown.

That moron on CNBC, Rick Santelli or even Diana Olick comes to mind, but you may have a neighbor or even a relative that you’d love to show others is, in reality, a first class dunce when it comes to finance and economics… you just didn’t have the firepower before.  He sounded like he knew what he was talking about, and since you didn’t really understand all of the details, you backed down, gritted your teeth, and had another glass of wine or popped another Xanax, as you listened to him go on about how irresponsible borrowers caused the crisis and deserved to be losing their homes.

Well… no more.  Tell Uncle Louie, or whatever your personal demon’s name is… his days as King Shiz are over, and he better start reading up and fast, if he wants to debate you on any of this stuff from this point forward.

Because Mandelman’s going to make this so stupid simple that my 5th and 6th graders are going to be right with you on the learning curve.

This, I so promise you… is going to be fun, assuming, of course, that when you read what I wrote just above about being able to stick it to someone who’s been an obnoxious “Mr. Responsible” superior, know-it-all for the last two years, made you all tingly.  If so, well… I’ve been waiting to take that guy out myself, so I’m happy to be able to help.

Coming soon…

Chapter 2: What’s a “CDS”?  Why it’s a Credit Default Swap, silly. Nothing difficult there… Easier than mortgage backed securities.  Don’t worry about a thing… see you in class tomorrow I hope.

Let’s review today’s key learning:

1. They call it “securitization” because the investor that provides the capital does so through the purchase of a security, such as a mortgage backed security (“MBS”), which is a type of bond.

2. Stocks are equity, while bonds are debt.  Stockholders are owners of the company, while bondholders are more like the company’s creditors.

3. Bonds are safer than stocks, because if the company goes belly up, the bondholders would be repaid from whatever monies were available from the company’s liquidation, before the stockholders got a nickel.  The bond market is much, much larger than the stock market, but they don’t make movies about it, so few people know much about it.

4. Companies issue bonds in order to raise the capital they need to grow, without having to dilute the ownership interests of current shareholders.

(Let’s say you had 100 shareholders and each owned one share of stock in your company, or one percent.  But then you went out and sold another 100 shares of stock.  Now there would be 200 shares outstanding, and the original stockholders now only own one share out of 200 instead of one share out of 100, which means they went from owning 1% to owning only .5% of your company.)

5. Securitization helps to spread the risk of any individual loan defaulting.

6. In the securitization process, when building a mortgage backed security, you can think of it as a bureau or dresser with drawers in it.  You create a contract that states that the cash flows generated by the mortgages will flow in from the top, and there the top drawer will fill up before the middle drawer or lower drawer do.

7. Therefore the chances of the top drawer not receiving enough of the payments to become full is very low, and for that reason the slices of that top drawer, which are bonds, will be rated AAA by Moody’s, Standard & Poors, or Fitch, which are the names of the ratings agencies that place credit ratings on bonds.

8. It doesn’t matter what the credit scores of the people who took out the mortgages are, because as long as you have enough mortgages to create sufficient cash flows to fill the top drawer, well, then you’ve got some triple A rated bonds to sell.

9. In a Mortgage Backed Security or MBS, the dresser drawers are called “tranches,” and just so you know, this word is often misspelled as “traunches”.

10. The lower the credit rating on a bond, the higher the promised interest rate.  Bonds are bought and sold based on their ratings, because it would be impossible to review the books at a large corporation or a city or municipality, in order to determine whether you wanted to purchase a given bond.  Junk bonds had low ratings, but they can also be called “high yield bonds,” when they end up working out.  Michael Milken was the junk bond king, but he also provided the bond financing for cable television and Wynn casinos.

~~~

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Dec
19

Mandelman Commenting on ProPublica Article…

I rarely do this sort of thing…

But, ProPublica posted an article about real life foreclosures not fitting the conventional wisdom of what most people think they are… they’re not a bunch of low income minorities who should never have been able to buy their homes in the first place, for example.  I posted a comment in response to the article they posted, and then someone who reads Mandelman Matters showed up and responded and I responded again… and I wanted my readers to be able to see what we talked about…

ProPublica seems to be posting quite a bit about the foreclosure crisis of late, and some of it seems pretty good, although I haven;t had enough experience with the site really.  I remember last year thinking that they didn’t get it… so who knows.

Their article follows… then my comments…

Tale of Three Cities: Foreclosures Don’t Always Follow the Script

As a symbol of the national foreclosure crisis, Jaymie Jones isn’t what you might expect.

The 52-year-old Seattle-area woman worked her way up in the financial-services industry over three decades from bank teller to mortgage executive.

In spring 2007, she bought her dream home in Kirkland, signing a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage.

Then, as Jones celebrated New Year’s Eve on a beach in Mexico, the call came: Her division was shutting down. Jones tapped her savings over the next year and tried for a loan modification, but in the end, the bank filed to foreclose. The dream was over.

In the conventional narrative of the foreclosure crisis, rapacious lenders hooked up with irresponsible buyers in a tale of “Lending Gone Wild.”

There was certainly much of that. But a Seattle Times-ProPublica analysis of foreclosures from three areas hit hard by the housing crash tempers that image — and punctures some other popular notions about the mortgage meltdown.

Most of those in foreclosure were young people, right? Not true. Like Jones, half of them were over age 40.

Predatory lending caused foreclosures, correct? In fact, nearly three out of four loans did not have any of these three key predatory loan features — balloon payments, prepayment penalties and high interest rates.

And as for the common assumption that most people in foreclosure lost their homes? Surprisingly, not so. More than half of them were able to keep their homes, with some selling them for more than they owed.

The Times-ProPublica analysis provides new insights into the foreclosure crisis and helps fill an acknowledged gap: Much of the data on home loans is insufficient, hidden or hard to obtain.

Although politicians and regulators have moved to gather more information about lending practices and foreclosures, consumer advocates say progress is too slow. And it’s unclear how much will be made public.

“For those of us who want to understand how the foreclosure crisis has affected borrowers and communities, it is frustrating to not have access to publicly available data that can really help us to understand what happened and why,” said Carolina Reid, a research manager for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

Even a basic number — borrowers in default or foreclosure — is hard to pinpoint, said Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance, a leading trade publication. That’s because those who track the data have no way to weed out homes that are counted multiple times because they’ve gone into and out of the foreclosure process more than once.

Cecala’s best guess, based on industry surveys: 4.8 million homes are in serious delinquency or foreclosure.

But, “even the best foreclosure numbers don’t give us the reason for the foreclosure,” Cecala said. “It’s hard to address a problem when you don’t know all the causes of it.”

Debate about root causes of the crisis has re-emerged in recent days with a partisan split on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission about whether failed government housing policies or private-sector lending abuses deserve the most blame.

To address the lack of information about foreclosures, The Seattle Times and ProPublica decided to create a database that could provide some answers. Reporters pulled a random sample of more than 1,200 foreclosure filings from 2005 through 2008. That entailed around 400 filings for each one of the central counties encompassing the Seattle, Phoenix and Baltimore areas.

Overall, the data underscore how the housing bubble and lower lending standards of the era reinforced each other, seducing many homeowners to get in over their heads. Comparing the three counties also reveals regional differences in the profiles of those who got into trouble.

In the Phoenix area, one of the biggest housing bubbles in the nation suddenly burst, unleashing an equally sudden wave of foreclosure filings.

In the Baltimore area, job losses in an aging city threatened home purchases and neighborhood revitalization.

And in the Seattle area, longtime homeowners responded to lenders’ aggressive pitches by tapping into rising equity, taking on more debt, and refinancing into adjustable-rate mortgages.

Click to read more: Seattle: Waves of Refinancing , article continues…

NOW HERE’S MY RESPONSE, AND MY SECOND RESPONSE FOLLOWS:

There are two primary misconceptions why Americans are allowing the foreclosure crisis to continue:

1. People believe that the “banks” are foreclosing because it’s in their best financial interests. And it makes sense that they think this way, as that’s what “banks” have always done in the past.

2. Banks are foreclosing on homes bought by irresponsible and often low income people that should never been allowed to buy their homes in the first place and can’t possibly afford them. And virtually all of the imagery of the foreclosure crisis features poor minorities in run down homes with trash piled everywhere.

If either of these thoughts were true, then the people would be right to ignore the foreclosures as they would be the natural order of things.  Unpleasant to watch, but unavoidable, so wake me when its over.

So, it’s not illogical that most of the country seems to be uninterested in stopping the foreclosure crisis, even though they themselves are losing enormous amounts of accumulated wealth in their homes as a result of the crisis continuing.  If you believe points one and two above, then there’s nothing to be done… so wake me when it’s over.

BUT NEITHER POINT IS TRUE.

While low income minorities certainly have suffered as a result of the crisis, they are by no means the lion’s share of the affected population.  It’s just that the “The Anderson Family” rarely stops for a photo-op in front of their Volvo wagon before driving away from their home for the last time.

And “banks” are not the ones foreclosing… “servicers” are foreclosing.  And “servicers” ALWAYS make the most money by servicing a delinquent loan for as long as possible and then foreclosing.

Servicers aren’t acting in the best interests of investors or borrowers, or even our society as a whole.  They are acting in their own best interests, which are to keep your loan delinquent for a while before foreclosing.

The unsolvable part of the crisis is that in many cases there are no fiduciaries to the loans… the investors are holders of “certificates” entitled to a share of the cash flows produced by a pool of loans, but they don’t consider themselves landlords, by any means.

And if not servicers, then who will be involved in negotiating loan modifications?  Servicers can’t be relied upon to do it, their incentives are not aligned with any others, and the government would have to take over the loans to modify them.

The country needs to come to understand that the cause of the crisis was not a housing bubble popping, it was not caused by irresponsible people buying homes they can’t afford.

It should be obvious by now that none of us will be getting out of this unscathed. The water is rising and, while the crisis may only be causing flooding in 15% of homeowners with a mortgage, it is already at least lapping at the rest of America’s toes.

The only real question is whether the people will come to understand what’s happened and is being allowed to continue  to happen before we all learn the truth of the matter the hard way.

Already 42 million Americans are receiving food stamps, up from 11 million in 2005.  Million dollar mortgages are defaulting at twice the national average.  More than half of all foreclosures are prime loans, and there are few states today unaffected by the foreclosure crisis.

Because foreclosures breed foreclosures… they lead to lower property values, which lessens  consumer spending, which reduces corporate profits, resulting in higher unemployment, which ends in more foreclosures.

It’s a feedback loop that won’t stop until it has wiped out America’s consumer economy and destroyed the accumulated wealth of America’s middle class.

THEN, HERE’S MY SECOND COMMENT:

For the record… home prices fell for different reasons at two different times.

1. The Bubble Begins to Deflate… By summer 2006, the Fed had raised rates 17 times in a row in its attempt to keep inflation in check.

As rates rose, fewer qualified for loans, homes stayed on the market longer… prices fell.  Those who had put no money down, had adjustable or teaser rate loans, or who had counted on low rates or higher values in the future so they could refinance… fell into foreclosure.

But that’s what was supposed to happen…

Who knows what would have happened from there, had the housing bubble continued to lose air.  We never got to find out…

2. The Banks Break the Bond Market… On July 10th, 2007… something happened that never happened before.

Standard & Poors and Moody’s, announced they were downgrading ratings on 1,032 bond issues, fewer than 1% of all bonds backed by sub-prime loans, but it didn’t matter…

Investors panicked, many dumped holdings at fire sale prices.  Many had been sold to pension plans, whose bylaws prevented them from holding anything but triple A rated securities.

Investors worried that if S&P and Moody’s were wrong about these bonds, what about the trillions in bonds backed by Alt-A and other mortgages.

The bond market froze.  Within two weeks, banks wouldn’t loan money to each other, and the Fed had to reverse its position from two weeks prior, and started pumping cash into the system to keep liquidity from drying up.

All of a sudden no one trusted ratings on bonds, so no one would buy or hold bonds backed by mortgages. And the secondary market, which is where banks sell loans they’ve originated, was no longer buying mortgages, since they couldn’t sell bonds backed by such mortgages.

Lending stopped… banks started hoarding cash. Over a couple of weeks, we went from lending… to no loans.  You couldn’t get a first mortgage or a second.

With no loans available, housing prices started falling… fast.

But this was no housing bubble slowly deflating, this was a free fall situation that would soon take down Wall Street, spawn a global financial crisis, and wipe out the accumulated wealth of America’s middle class.

Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, and Fed Chair Ben Bernanke didn’t see what was happening until it was far too late.  In Paulson’s book, On the Brink,” he admits: “We were just wrong.”

Bear Stearns went first.  Then September 17th, 2008, Lehman Bros. announced that it was filing for bankruptcy, and AIG… well, that’s another story.

THE KEY PROBLEM…

Somewhere along the way, we started blaming “irresponsible sub-prime borrowers” who were said to have bought homes they couldn’t afford.

Many people had seen new McMansions going up during the bubble, and had started to get just a little jealous or concerned that perhaps they were falling behind their peers… and now they said to themselves:

“Ah ha! I knew it wasn’t me… they were irresponsible borrowers… I knew it!”

No one saw the bond market break, but everyone heard of houses in foreclosure.  And I suppose that its easier to blame neighbors for being irresponsible than Goldman Sachs, or others on Wall Street whose greed and abuses of the system weren’t widely understood, or explained by the media.

Today, the only lender in this country is the federal government, through Fannie, Freddie or FHA.  There are no “securitizations” to speak of, which is the process through which mortgages are transformed into debt securities sold to investors.

Our banks were holding hundreds of billions in mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) on their balance sheets and in off-balance sheet SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles). There was no longer a market, so marking them down to market value meant they were worthless… they were “toxic assets.”

Banks had also borrowed against their now worthless assets by up to 30:1,  and the entire U.S. banking system was about to implode.

Enter: TARP

Paulson said he’d need $700 billion to stop our ship from sinking, and we know what happened from there.  To-date we’ve pumped $12.2 trillion into our banking system, but only 1/1000th of that amount into stopping the foreclosure crisis.

Why?  Because there is no widespread political support for bailing out what too many still think of as “irresponsible sub-prime borrowers who bought homes they couldn’t afford, and who therefore should be punished by losing their homes.”

And so, housing prices remain in a free fall, unemployment is still rising, and homeowners have lost $9 trillion in equity since 2006.

The housing bubble’s demise might have caused the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, but it didn’t… it never got the chance.

Those at risk of foreclosure today didn’t do anything wrong.  They just did whatever they did at the wrong time.

It’s not the borrowers… it’s the banks.

AND… there’s more on the ProPublica site if you;re interested…

Mandelman out.

Nov
23

Mandelman U. Presents: There’s Credit Default Swaps & then there’s Credit Default Swaps

Complexity We Eschew at Good Old…

Mandelman U.

Sit, Sulte, Simplex

In 1998, there were so few Credit Default Swaps in play that they were hardly worth counting. Not only were there a relatively small number of these credit derivatives being issued, but they essentially never paid off.   That’s right.  Issuing credit default swaps, at least as they were originally conceived and utilized, was risky like issuing flight insurance was risky.

So, what the heck happened to elevate credit default swaps to the status of global economy killer as they might rightfully be described today?  Well, there are credit default swaps… and then there are credit default swaps.

The Set-Up…

Let’s start with this fact: banks are required to hold funds in reserve for future losses, and the amounts they reserve can not be invested to maximize return, so they want to hold as little in reserve as is permitted by what are called Basel II regulations.  How much a bank is required to hold in reserve depends on what type of assets… read: loans… are on its balance sheets.  The riskier the loans a bank owns, the more capital the bank must keep in reserve.  But, additionally, riskier loans pay better.

If a bank has invested in a bunch of sub-prime mortgages, they have to reserve for some percentage of homeowners who default on their payments and/or pre-pay their mortgages, but if those mortgages are inside a triple A rated security, and if that security is “insured” by a credit default swap, then they don’t have to reserve anything for a future loss, because it doesn’t appear that there will be a future loss.  Oh, and if the whole transaction can be handled off the bank’s balance sheet in the first place, such as inside an SIV or Special Investment Vehicle, that’s held off-shore… then so much the better.

How it all began…

Sometime in 1994, JPMorgan created the first credit default swap.

It seems that JPMorgan had provided Exxon with a $4.8 billion credit line, but Exxon was now facing $5 billion in punitive damages as a result of the Valdez catastrophe, so JPMorgan was required to reserve the funds for such a credit risk.  To clean up their balance sheet, JPMorgan sold the credit risk involved in the Exxon credit line to a large European banking concern, and thereby reduced the amounts it was required to hold in reserve.  It swapped the risk of $4.8 billion in extended credit defaulting.

It worked so well that, in 1997, JPMorgan created BISTRO, which stood for “Broad Index Securitized Trust Offering.”  BISTRO was a proprietary product for JPMorgan that used CDSs to clean up a bank’s balance sheet, just like the bank had done for itself in the case of Exxon a few years back.

But, BISTRO actually used the securitization process to break up the credit risk into smaller pieces, which allowed smaller investors to get in the game… not everyone can take on a $4.8 billion risk… and in that sense BISTRO was the first “synthetic collateralized debt obligation” or synthetic CDO.

Don’t be discouraged if you’re not getting all that at the moment, hopefully I’ll straighten it all out in a minute or two.

Then, in 2003, best I can tell, Goldman Sachs convinced AIG to offer a credit default swap on a CDO… a collateralized debt obligation.  You can think of a CDO as being a derivative of a mortgage-backed security.

Remember how we create mortgage-backed securities?  We take a bunch of mortgages and put them into a pool and then we create a contract that prioritizes the payment streams into slices called tranches.  The top is the safest tranche, it pays the lowest interest rate and is always rated triple A because it receives its payments before any other tranche.  The middle tranche, called the mezzanine or “the mez,” if you’re that Wall-Street-cool, gets its payments after the top tranche has been filled, and it is rated BBB.  The bottom tranche doesn’t get a nickel until the top two have been filled as expected, and it is often unrated, or in other words is like a junk bond.  It offers the highest rate of interest, but also carries the greatest amount of risk.

Okay… still with me, right?  If that last paragraph was confusing, you should probably go back and read another Mandelman U. article: Securitization and Mortgage-Backed Securities, which explains the securitization process and mortgage-backed securities thoroughly and in simple terms.

So, let’s say that we’ve sold all the triple A rated tranches and we’ve got a bunch of BBB rated stuff laying around.  Well, if we… let’s call it… re-securitize all of the BBB tranches, we’ll end up with another top tranche that will again be rated triple A, another “mez” rated BBB, and another unrated bottom tranche.  But notice that the first time we securitized the mortgages the payment streams that went into the tranches came directly from the mortgages in the pool.  But this time, we re-securitized the BBB tranches from other securitizations, so we’re one step removed as compared with the first time around.

This time, for our triple A rated tranche to get a nickel, the top tranches in the first securitizations have to have been filled up with payment streams as expected.  So, a CDO’s income isn’t based on payment streams from mortgages, rather it’s income is based on payment streams from securities whose incomes are based on mortgages.

So, Goldman Sachs convinces AIG to offer credit default swaps on triple A rated tranches of CDOs.  I mean, why not?  After all, the historical loss rates on American mortgages were damn near zero.  And, thus was reborn the credit default swap… now tailor made for the mortgage boom that was fast bringing the U.S. economy out of the recession created by the bursting of the dot-com bubble a few years before.

Now, investors buy CDOs, which look great, because they are based on BBB rated tranches, so they pay higher interest than were it based on the triple A rated tranche, BUT… it’s re-securitized, if you will, so it has a new triple A rated tranche itself.  And you can get a CDS so there’s no risk at all… load ‘em up.  They look as safe as U.S. Treasury bonds, but they pay much higher interest rates, and have no risk of default as a result of the inexpensive CDS you added on top.

Oh, and these CDOs are hard to construct and value, so Wall Street investment bankers can make a bundle putting the deals together and selling them all over the world.  In fact, almost no one on the planet can truly understand what they’re made up of, and what they’re worth… absolute heaven for Wall Street types.

(You see, it’s important to understand that the harder it is to value something, the more a Wall Street investment bank can charge to put the deal together and make a market for whatever it is.  Just think of it as being the opposite of gold.  Gold is a commodity that trades all over the world, so all you need to do is look up the price of gold today and there it is for all to see.  So, Wall Street firms aren’t much interested in selling gold… too easy to price, get it?)

The most simplified example of a credit default swap would be issued as related to highly rated corporate bonds.  Let’s say your Aunt passed away and left you $100,000.  And you decided to put that $100,000 into a triple A rated Exxon-Mobil corporate bond, perhaps instead of a Treasury bill of some sort, because Exxon-Mobil was offering a slightly higher interest rate and since Exxon-Mobil is one of the world’s largest and most stable corporations, you saw the investment as being just about as safe as bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury.

But, just in case… because you didn’t want any risk whatsoever, you decided to buy a credit default swap, which in essence insured the investment you made in the Exxon-Mobil bond.  If Exxon-Mobil defaulted on their obligation to pay you as promised, the company who issued the credit default swap would pay you what you were owed under the terms of the bond.

Of course, triple A rated corporate bonds, like those that might be issued by Exxon-Mobil, very rarely default… and by very rarely, I mean like never, so you probably wouldn’t need to insure against such an event, but that’s also why doing so wouldn’t be very expensive… very much like the flight insurance that you can buy before boarding a given flight.

The odds of that individual flight crashing and you being killed as a result are remote… very remote1.  So, if you’ll pay something like $50, some insurance company will pay $1,000,000 if your flight crashes and you die as a result.  A credit default swap issued on a triple A rated Exxon-Mobil corporate bond might be considered about that risky, and therefore it wouldn’t cost very much to buy.

For example, Michael Lewis, in his book “The Big Short,” quotes the cost of a credit default swap on a $100 million mortgage-backed security as being $200,000 a year for ten years.  So, if you paid the annual premium for the entire ten years, you would have paid 2% of the insured amount.  Two million to get you One hundred million… that’s 50:1… better than the odds when playing roulette.

Of course, you might not have paid for ten years before your bond or mortgage-backed security defaulted, so in that case your return would have been much greater.  Like if you owned the credit default swap for one year, and as a result had only paid one $200,000 premium payment, then your return would be 500:1, right?  Not too shabby, if you can get in on something like that, I’m sure you’d agree.

I’m not saying that’s exactly how today’s credit default swaps work because for one thing, they are only offered to institutional investors, and not on the bond you bought with money your Aunt bequeathed to you.  But, as descriptions go, it’s not that far away either, so hopefully you’re getting the general idea.

You see, that’s what I mean when I say there were credit default swaps and then there were credit default swaps.

In my Exxon-Mobile example, the credit default swap was insuring against a single corporation defaulting, and in the “CDSs” of our current financial crisis and resulting mortgage meltdown, it was individual homeowners paying mortgages that could cause your bond or CDO (considered to be another derivative) to default.  Also, in our Exxon-Mobile example, you owned the bond and in the recent fiasco, you didn’t need to own anything to buy the credit default swap “insurance,” and thereby place a bet against the bond paying off as agreed.

Bond insurance… sort of…

And that’s what a credit default swap is, really… bond insurance.  But no one ever wanted to refer to it that way because they were afraid that the State Insurance Commissioners would want to regulate CDSs like they regulate all other forms of insurance, requiring the companies that sold CDSs to hold money in reserve against potential future claims.

Besides, it was argued, CDSs weren’t actually insurance, they just played insurance on T.V.

For example, the buyer of a CDS doesn’t have to own the underlying security that in a sense is being insured against default.  In fact, the buyer doesn’t even have to suffer a loss as a result of the defaulting security in order to cash in on the CDS.  That’s not very insurance like.  And insurance companies manage risk using actuarial data and the law of large numbers to determine appropriate loss reserves, while the sellers of CDSs price them using financial models and attempt to hedge risk using other securities dealers and a variety of transactions in underlying bond markets.

So, since none of the companies that issued credit default swaps ever thought that they’d have to pay a claim related to the insurance they were selling, they didn’t tie up their cash in a reserve account when it could be invested elsewhere, and therefore earning returns.  By referring to them as “swaps,” they were completely unregulated, falling under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”), which was a statute passed in 2000, that removed swaps transactions from any and in fact essentially all substantive federal oversight.

The CFMA legislation was, it’s interesting to note, pretty much rushed through Congress during a lame duck session.  It was a rider to an 11,000-page omnibus appropriations bill.  So, I think one would have to say, very well done there.

And the end result is that credit default swaps remain entirely unregulated… even after this latest financial disaster, we’ve done nothing to change that, which is sort of like finding out the day after 9-11 happened that we are still allowing passengers to carry box cutters on commercial flights.

What the bankers did…

Okay, so you’re a European bank and you’ve got too many deposits because in your country people still save money, actually.. You’re looking for something to invest in that will help you increase the spread between the interest rates you pay people for their deposits, and the interest rates you’re able to earn by lending.

You need the safest thing you can find, at the highest possible rate of interest… a difficult balancing act for all of us, to be sure.

You could, of course, buy a bunch of triple A rated mortgage-backed securities based on sub-prime loans, but that would increase your reserve requirements, which would reduce the amount of cash you can invest and hence the amount of leverage (read: borrowing) you can employ.

But wait… maybe not.  AIG is offering a way for you to have your cake and eat it too.  Isn’t financial innovation wonderful?

With the AIG answer, you can forget the Basel II rules by using the unregulated insurance contract called a “credit default swap.”   For let’s say 2% of face value, AIG agrees to guarantee the subprime mortgage-backed security you want to buy against default for five years.

As long as it maintained a triple-A credit rating, AIG didn’t have to put up any capital as collateral on its swaps.  There was no real capital cost to selling them; there was no limit to the number that could be sold.  Of course, as AIG’s credit rating fell, the company was required by its own contracts to post collateral… money… to ensure that it could pay off the claim in the event of a default.  And that’s what buried AIG… collateral calls from the likes of Goldman Sachs and many others around the world.

And thanks to “mark-to-market” accounting, as described in FAS 157 and FAS 159, AIG could book the profits from a five-year credit default swap as soon as the contract was sold, based solely on the expected default rate.  What the computer said AIG was likely to make on the deal, the accountants would write down as actual profit. The broker who sold the swap would be paid a bonus at the end of the first year – long before the actual profit on the contract was made.

The European bank was now able to assure its regulators that it was holding only triple-A credit securities, and certainly not a bunch of subprime loans given to people without jobs, income or assets. The bank could employ the maximum amount of leverage allowable under Basel II, and AIG could book hundreds of millions in “profit” each year, without having to pony up billions in collateral, or really even invest a dime of its capital.

They even started selling “synthetic CDOs,” which were collateralized debt obligations, but with only credit default swaps inside… no mortgage-backed securities at all… just the credit default swaps that were to pay off in the event of a CDO’s default.

And the bankers who sold these securities and swaps to others around the globe knew they were selling crap in a CDS crapper.  They knew the ratings agencies models weren’t tracking the important variables inherent to the loans used in creating the CDOs they were selling.  They knew because they were betting against them at the same time they were selling them.

So, what’s not to love?

Well, the fraud part isn’t that attractive, I suppose, but don’t be such a doom and gloomer.

So, our Wall Street bankers sold this scheme all over the planet taking in trillions of dollars and ultimately bankrupting the global financial system and costing hundreds of millions of working class citizens their savings, their livelihoods and their homes.  And the profits AIG and the others on Wall Street booked never came true, although the bonuses that got paid out were very real.

On July 10, 2007, Moody’s and S&P downgraded the ratings on 1,032 bond issues, which was less than one percent of the bonds backed by sub-prime mortgages, but the percentage didn’t matter… investors panicked and ran for the exit door.  If the ratings on these bonds were wrong, what about the rest… the ALT-A… the Option ARMS… the prime loans… everything was all of a sudden questionable, and within two weeks the credit markets froze solid… banks wouldn’t lend to each other.  And the giant write downs began in earnest.

In residential mortgage land, all of a sudden no one could get a mortgage or refinance one.  Housing prices, which had already started to cool off as a result of Greenspan having raised interest rates 17 times in a row as of the summer of 2006, now fell off a cliff and kept falling.

Our government just didn’t see what was happening.  Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, in his recently published book, writing about this moment in history, explains it this way:

“We were just wrong.”

And it may just be that no truer words have ever been spoken, because there’s no question that Mr. Paulson, Mr. Bernanke, Ms. Bair… and all who surrounded them were all monumentally and catastrophically wrong.

The dominoes were falling faster and faster and yet our government did almost nothing to prevent them from falling or even slow them down. As a result, the default rates on mortgage-back securities underwritten in 2005, 2006, and 2007 turned out to be many multiples higher than expected.  There are instances in which the securities the bankers claimed to be rated triple A ended worth less than 15¢ on the dollar.

By the end of the calendar year, 2007, AIG reported an $11 billion charge to earnings and managed to raise the capital to cover it.  But the writing was all over the walls, the floors, the ceilings, and even the windows.  The credit markets were now broken, the days of being able to get a mortgage were over for tens of millions of Americans and as prices fell, defaults increased and the foreclosure crisis would soon be in full swing.

When AIG lost its triple A rating, it had to come up with tens of billions in collateral overnight, in addition to the amounts it owed its trading partners… and there was no way… AIG… the world’s largest insurance company… was bankrupt.  Lehman fell the same day… Merrill Lynch was sold in a shotgun wedding to Bank of America.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were forced to become commercial banks, able to borrow from the Federal Reserve’s discount window, among other things.

The Federal Government stepped in with an $85 billion loan for AIG in exchange for almost all of the equity in the company.  AIG’s largest trading partner was Goldman Sachs, and so $20 billion in taxpayer dollars went directly from the people of this country to Goldman’s balance sheet… most of which to be paid out in bonuses over the next year or two.  Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who was then heading up the New York Federal Reserve Bank, forced AIG to sign away their right to sue any of the major banks for most of what’s happened.

Because we can keep pointing fingers in all directions if it makes us feel better, but the Wall Street bankers who perpetrated this fraud on our world knew what they were doing as they did it.  They did it because they became incredibly wealthy by doing it, simple as that.

The collapse of the market for credit default swaps also meant that the giants of the investment banking world – every last one of them, by the way – with no one to insure their debts, could no longer borrow.  Without the CDS market, banks can’t report the real value of the assets (read: CDOs, CDSs, et al).  To do so would render them all insolvent and in default with Basel II regulations.  Absent AIG’s credit default swaps to provide fraudulent cover, all we can do is play accounting games and pretend that their assets are worth far more than they are actually worth.

The era of the Wall Street investment banker was over.  Bankers had leveraged their organizations beyond all reason, meaning that they had borrowed 30:1 or 40:1… or as in the cases of Fannie and Freddie, a mind boggling 110:1 and 174:1, respectively.  That means for every dollar the bank carried on it books as an asset, the banks had borrowed thirty or forty dollars. Accounting regulations had to be suspended lest the banks all be seen as insolvent.

Just to fund their operations, our TBTF banks are totally dependent on the Federal Reserve.  In fact, things got so bad that the Fed had to change the long-standing rules so that Goldman, Morgan and Merrill could use equities as collateral for trillions in loans.

Additionally, a little known and almost never discussed provision of the TARP bailout bill says that the Fed can pay interest on the collateral it’s holding… a simple, but very effective and yet covert way to pump untold billions in taxpayer dollars directly into the banks without the need for congressional approval.

Without the government having taken these steps, however inadequate and transient, AIG’s failure would have likely led to the failure of every major bank in the world.

But there should be no question… the enabler of the global credit bubble of the last eight years was AIG unregulated selling of credit default swaps without collateralizing the risk.  In 1998, there were so few Credit Default Swaps in play that they were hardly worth counting.  By late 2009, between newly instituted processes allowing CDSs, which offset each other to be cancelled, combined with the termination of recently paid out contracts, the face value of the CDS market was reduced to an estimated $30 trillion.

And the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill that was signed into law last summer does nothing to address regulation of this volatile and dangerous market.

Seventy percent of the U.S. economy is driven by consumer spending, which has been driven by borrowing over the last ten years.  Even if we wanted to do so, we can’t borrow our way back to prosperity this time around, however, because the credit markets are broken for good this time… because they were a fraud in the first place.  Our economy has entered a downturn that, before it reverses itself, will force most of us to reduce our standard of living for many if not most of our remaining years. Some believe that foreign spending and spending by the very rich can bring us back, but the numbers just don’t prove out.

Meanwhile, our helpless, hapless, and perhaps hopeless government continues to treat this financial crisis like it’s a liquidity crisis… lowering interest rates and pumping cash into a failed and fraudulent system being run by the same men that brought us here.

Or maybe I’m wrong about all of this… maybe it was all simply the fault of irresponsible sub-prime borrowers who all went out and bought homes they couldn’t afford.  Yeah, that must be right.  Lower the rates again… extend the tax cuts… print some more dough and pump it into Wall Street’s banks… that’ll probably fix everything.

Mandelman out.

*1 According to the FAA’s Aviation Safety Statistical Fact Book, there are 16 fatalities per one million hours of general aviation, and according to the National Transportation Safety Board, of the airplane accidents that occurred between 1983-2000, 51,207 of the 53,487 of the affected passengers survived.  Even if you only consider the 26 most serious airplane accidents during that period, 1,525 of the 2,739 passengers survived… that’s a 56% survival rate.  And take out the Lockerbie crash, which wasn’t an accident, but rather a bomb planted by a terrorist, and the survival rate goes up to 61%.  So, all told, you being killed in a plane crash is very unlikely.

Nov
23

Mandelman U. Presents: There’s Credit Default Swaps & then there’s Credit Default Swaps

Complexity We Eschew at Good Old…

Mandelman U.

Sit, Sulte, Simplex

In 1998, there were so few Credit Default Swaps in play that they were hardly worth counting. Not only were there a relatively small number of these credit derivatives being issued, but they essentially never paid off.   That’s right.  Issuing credit default swaps, at least as they were originally conceived and utilized, was risky like issuing flight insurance was risky.

So, what the heck happened to elevate credit default swaps to the status of global economy killer as they might rightfully be described today?  Well, there are credit default swaps… and then there are credit default swaps.

The Set-Up…

Let’s start with this fact: banks are required to hold funds in reserve for future losses, and the amounts they reserve can not be invested to maximize return, so they want to hold as little in reserve as is permitted by what are called Basel II regulations.  How much a bank is required to hold in reserve depends on what type of assets… read: loans… are on its balance sheets.  The riskier the loans a bank owns, the more capital the bank must keep in reserve.  But, additionally, riskier loans pay better.

If a bank has invested in a bunch of sub-prime mortgages, they have to reserve for some percentage of homeowners who default on their payments and/or pre-pay their mortgages, but if those mortgages are inside a triple A rated security, and if that security is “insured” by a credit default swap, then they don’t have to reserve anything for a future loss, because it doesn’t appear that there will be a future loss.  Oh, and if the whole transaction can be handled off the bank’s balance sheet in the first place, such as inside an SIV or Special Investment Vehicle, that’s held off-shore… then so much the better.

How it all began…

Sometime in 1994, JPMorgan created the first credit default swap.

It seems that JPMorgan had provided Exxon with a $4.8 billion credit line, but Exxon was now facing $5 billion in punitive damages as a result of the Valdez catastrophe, so JPMorgan was required to reserve the funds for such a credit risk.  To clean up their balance sheet, JPMorgan sold the credit risk involved in the Exxon credit line to a large European banking concern, and thereby reduced the amounts it was required to hold in reserve.  It swapped the risk of $4.8 billion in extended credit defaulting.

It worked so well that, in 1997, JPMorgan created BISTRO, which stood for “Broad Index Securitized Trust Offering.”  BISTRO was a proprietary product for JPMorgan that used CDSs to clean up a bank’s balance sheet, just like the bank had done for itself in the case of Exxon a few years back.

But, BISTRO actually used the securitization process to break up the credit risk into smaller pieces, which allowed smaller investors to get in the game… not everyone can take on a $4.8 billion risk… and in that sense BISTRO was the first “synthetic collateralized debt obligation” or synthetic CDO.

Don’t be discouraged if you’re not getting all that at the moment, hopefully I’ll straighten it all out in a minute or two.

Then, in 2003, best I can tell, Goldman Sachs convinced AIG to offer a credit default swap on a CDO… a collateralized debt obligation.  You can think of a CDO as being a derivative of a mortgage-backed security.

Remember how we create mortgage-backed securities?  We take a bunch of mortgages and put them into a pool and then we create a contract that prioritizes the payment streams into slices called tranches.  The top is the safest tranche, it pays the lowest interest rate and is always rated triple A because it receives its payments before any other tranche.  The middle tranche, called the mezzanine or “the mez,” if you’re that Wall-Street-cool, gets its payments after the top tranche has been filled, and it is rated BBB.  The bottom tranche doesn’t get a nickel until the top two have been filled as expected, and it is often unrated, or in other words is like a junk bond.  It offers the highest rate of interest, but also carries the greatest amount of risk.

Okay… still with me, right?  If that last paragraph was confusing, you should probably go back and read another Mandelman U. article: Securitization and Mortgage-Backed Securities, which explains the securitization process and mortgage-backed securities thoroughly and in simple terms.

So, let’s say that we’ve sold all the triple A rated tranches and we’ve got a bunch of BBB rated stuff laying around.  Well, if we… let’s call it… re-securitize all of the BBB tranches, we’ll end up with another top tranche that will again be rated triple A, another “mez” rated BBB, and another unrated bottom tranche.  But notice that the first time we securitized the mortgages the payment streams that went into the tranches came directly from the mortgages in the pool.  But this time, we re-securitized the BBB tranches from other securitizations, so we’re one step removed as compared with the first time around.

This time, for our triple A rated tranche to get a nickel, the top tranches in the first securitizations have to have been filled up with payment streams as expected.  So, a CDO’s income isn’t based on payment streams from mortgages, rather it’s income is based on payment streams from securities whose incomes are based on mortgages.

So, Goldman Sachs convinces AIG to offer credit default swaps on triple A rated tranches of CDOs.  I mean, why not?  After all, the historical loss rates on American mortgages were damn near zero.  And, thus was reborn the credit default swap… now tailor made for the mortgage boom that was fast bringing the U.S. economy out of the recession created by the bursting of the dot-com bubble a few years before.

Now, investors buy CDOs, which look great, because they are based on BBB rated tranches, so they pay higher interest than were it based on the triple A rated tranche, BUT… it’s re-securitized, if you will, so it has a new triple A rated tranche itself.  And you can get a CDS so there’s no risk at all… load ‘em up.  They look as safe as U.S. Treasury bonds, but they pay much higher interest rates, and have no risk of default as a result of the inexpensive CDS you added on top.

Oh, and these CDOs are hard to construct and value, so Wall Street investment bankers can make a bundle putting the deals together and selling them all over the world.  In fact, almost no one on the planet can truly understand what they’re made up of, and what they’re worth… absolute heaven for Wall Street types.

(You see, it’s important to understand that the harder it is to value something, the more a Wall Street investment bank can charge to put the deal together and make a market for whatever it is.  Just think of it as being the opposite of gold.  Gold is a commodity that trades all over the world, so all you need to do is look up the price of gold today and there it is for all to see.  So, Wall Street firms aren’t much interested in selling gold… too easy to price, get it?)

The most simplified example of a credit default swap would be issued as related to highly rated corporate bonds.  Let’s say your Aunt passed away and left you $100,000.  And you decided to put that $100,000 into a triple A rated Exxon-Mobil corporate bond, perhaps instead of a Treasury bill of some sort, because Exxon-Mobil was offering a slightly higher interest rate and since Exxon-Mobil is one of the world’s largest and most stable corporations, you saw the investment as being just about as safe as bonds issued by the U.S. Treasury.

But, just in case… because you didn’t want any risk whatsoever, you decided to buy a credit default swap, which in essence insured the investment you made in the Exxon-Mobil bond.  If Exxon-Mobil defaulted on their obligation to pay you as promised, the company who issued the credit default swap would pay you what you were owed under the terms of the bond.

Of course, triple A rated corporate bonds, like those that might be issued by Exxon-Mobil, very rarely default… and by very rarely, I mean like never, so you probably wouldn’t need to insure against such an event, but that’s also why doing so wouldn’t be very expensive… very much like the flight insurance that you can buy before boarding a given flight.

The odds of that individual flight crashing and you being killed as a result are remote… very remote1.  So, if you’ll pay something like $50, some insurance company will pay $1,000,000 if your flight crashes and you die as a result.  A credit default swap issued on a triple A rated Exxon-Mobil corporate bond might be considered about that risky, and therefore it wouldn’t cost very much to buy.

For example, Michael Lewis, in his book “The Big Short,” quotes the cost of a credit default swap on a $100 million mortgage-backed security as being $200,000 a year for ten years.  So, if you paid the annual premium for the entire ten years, you would have paid 2% of the insured amount.  Two million to get you One hundred million… that’s 50:1… better than the odds when playing roulette.

Of course, you might not have paid for ten years before your bond or mortgage-backed security defaulted, so in that case your return would have been much greater.  Like if you owned the credit default swap for one year, and as a result had only paid one $200,000 premium payment, then your return would be 500:1, right?  Not too shabby, if you can get in on something like that, I’m sure you’d agree.

I’m not saying that’s exactly how today’s credit default swaps work because for one thing, they are only offered to institutional investors, and not on the bond you bought with money your Aunt bequeathed to you.  But, as descriptions go, it’s not that far away either, so hopefully you’re getting the general idea.

You see, that’s what I mean when I say there were credit default swaps and then there were credit default swaps.

In my Exxon-Mobile example, the credit default swap was insuring against a single corporation defaulting, and in the “CDSs” of our current financial crisis and resulting mortgage meltdown, it was individual homeowners paying mortgages that could cause your bond or CDO (considered to be another derivative) to default.  Also, in our Exxon-Mobile example, you owned the bond and in the recent fiasco, you didn’t need to own anything to buy the credit default swap “insurance,” and thereby place a bet against the bond paying off as agreed.

Bond insurance… sort of…

And that’s what a credit default swap is, really… bond insurance.  But no one ever wanted to refer to it that way because they were afraid that the State Insurance Commissioners would want to regulate CDSs like they regulate all other forms of insurance, requiring the companies that sold CDSs to hold money in reserve against potential future claims.

Besides, it was argued, CDSs weren’t actually insurance, they just played insurance on T.V.

For example, the buyer of a CDS doesn’t have to own the underlying security that in a sense is being insured against default.  In fact, the buyer doesn’t even have to suffer a loss as a result of the defaulting security in order to cash in on the CDS.  That’s not very insurance like.  And insurance companies manage risk using actuarial data and the law of large numbers to determine appropriate loss reserves, while the sellers of CDSs price them using financial models and attempt to hedge risk using other securities dealers and a variety of transactions in underlying bond markets.

So, since none of the companies that issued credit default swaps ever thought that they’d have to pay a claim related to the insurance they were selling, they didn’t tie up their cash in a reserve account when it could be invested elsewhere, and therefore earning returns.  By referring to them as “swaps,” they were completely unregulated, falling under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”), which was a statute passed in 2000, that removed swaps transactions from any and in fact essentially all substantive federal oversight.

The CFMA legislation was, it’s interesting to note, pretty much rushed through Congress during a lame duck session.  It was a rider to an 11,000-page omnibus appropriations bill.  So, I think one would have to say, very well done there.

And the end result is that credit default swaps remain entirely unregulated… even after this latest financial disaster, we’ve done nothing to change that, which is sort of like finding out the day after 9-11 happened that we are still allowing passengers to carry box cutters on commercial flights.

What the bankers did…

Okay, so you’re a European bank and you’ve got too many deposits because in your country people still save money, actually.. You’re looking for something to invest in that will help you increase the spread between the interest rates you pay people for their deposits, and the interest rates you’re able to earn by lending.

You need the safest thing you can find, at the highest possible rate of interest… a difficult balancing act for all of us, to be sure.

You could, of course, but a bunch of triple A rated mortgage-backed securities based on sub-prime loans, but that would increase your reserve requirements, which would reduce the amount of cash you can invest and hence the amount of leverage (read: borrowing) you can employ.

But wait… maybe not.  AIG is offering a way for you to have your cake and eat it too.  Isn’t financial innovation wonderful?

With the AIG answer, you can forget the Basel II rules by using the unregulated insurance contract called a “credit default swap.”   For let’s say 2% of face value, AIG agrees to guarantee the subprime mortgage-backed security you want to buy against default for five years.

As long as it maintained a triple-A credit rating, AIG didn’t have to put up any capital as collateral on its swaps.  There was no real capital cost to selling then; there was no limit to the number that could be sold.  Of course, as AIG’s credit rating fell, the company was required by its own contracts to post collateral… money… to ensure that it could pay off the claim in the event of a default.  And that’s what buried AIG… collateral calls from the likes of Goldman Sachs and many others around the world.

And thanks to “mark-to-market” accounting, as described in FAS 157 and FAS 159, AIG could book the profits from a five-year credit default swap as soon as the contract was sold, based solely on the expected default rate.  What the computer said AIG was likely to make on the deal, the accountants would write down as actual profit. The broker who sold the swap would be paid a bonus at the end of the first year – long before the actual profit on the contract was made.

The European bank was now able to assure its regulators that it was holding only triple-A credit securities, and certainly not a bunch of subprime loans given to people without jobs, income or assets. The bank could employ the maximum amount of leverage allowable under Basel II, and AIG could book hundreds of millions in “profit” each year, without having to pony up billions in collateral, or really even invest a dime of its capital.

They even started selling “synthetic CDOs,” which were collateralized debt obligations, but with only credit default swaps inside… no mortgage-backed securities at all… just the credit default swaps that were to pay off in the event of a CDO’s default.

And the bankers who sold these securities and swaps to others around the globe knew they were selling crap in a CDS crapper.  They knew the ratings agencies models weren’t tracking the important variables inherent to the loans used in creating the CDOs they were selling.  They knew because they were betting against them at the same time they were selling them.

So, what’s not to love?

Well, the fraud part isn’t that attractive, I suppose, but don’t be such a doom and gloomer.

So, our Wall Street bankers sold this scheme all over the planet taking in trillions of dollars and ultimately bankrupting the global financial system and costing hundreds of millions of working class citizens their savings, their livelihoods and their homes.  And the profits AIG and the others on Wall Street booked never came true, although the bonuses that got paid out were very real.

On July 10, 2007, Moody’s and S&P downgraded the ratings on 1,032 bond issues, which was less than one percent of the bonds backed by sub-prime mortgages, but the percentage didn’t matter… investors panicked and ran for the exit door.  If the ratings on these bonds were wrong, what about the rest… the ALT-A… the Option ARMS… the prime loans… everything was all of a sudden questionable, and within two weeks the credit markets froze solid… banks wouldn’t lend to each other.  And the giant write downs began in earnest.

In residential mortgage land, all of a sudden no one could get a mortgage or refinance one.  Housing prices, which had already started to cool off as a result of Greenspan having raised interest rates 17 times in a row as of the summer of 2006, now fell off a cliff and kept falling.

Our government just didn’t see what was happening.  Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, in his recently published book, writing about this moment in history, explains it this way:

“We were just wrong.”

And it may just be that no truer words have ever been spoken, because there’s no question that Mr. Paulson, Mr. Bernanke, Ms. Bair… and all who surrounded them were all monumentally and catastrophically wrong.

The dominoes were falling faster and faster and yet our government did almost nothing to prevent them from falling or even slow them down. As a result, the default rates on mortgage-back securities underwritten in 2005, 2006, and 2007 turned out to be many multiples higher than expected.  There are instances in which the securities the bankers claimed to be rated triple A ended worth less than 15¢ on the dollar.

By the end of the calendar year, 2007, AIG reported an $11 billion charge to earnings and managed to raise the capital to cover it.  But the writing was all over the walls, the floors, the ceilings, and even the windows.  The credit markets were now broken, the days of being able to get a mortgage were over for tens of millions of Americans and as prices fell, defaults increased and the foreclosure crisis would soon be in full swing.

When AIG lost its triple A rating, it had to come up with tens of billions in collateral overnight, in addition to the amounts it owed its trading partners… and there was no way… AIG… the world’s largest insurance company… was bankrupt.  Lehman fell the same day… Merrill Lynch was sold in a shotgun wedding to Bank of America.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were forced to become commercial banks, able to borrow from the Federal Reserve’s discount window, among other things.

The Federal Government stepped in with an $85 billion loan for AIG in exchange for almost all of the equity in the company.  AIG’s largest trading partner was Goldman Sachs, and so $20 billion in taxpayer dollars went directly from the people of this country to Goldman’s balance sheet… most of which to be paid out in bonuses over the next year or two.  Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who was then heading up the New York Federal Reserve Bank, forced AIG to sign away their right to sue any of the major banks for most of what’s happened.

Because we can keep pointing fingers in all directions if it makes us feel better, but the Wall Street bankers who perpetrated this fraud on our world knew what they were doing as they did it.  They did it because they became incredibly wealthy by doing it, simple as that.

The collapse of the market for credit default swaps also meant that the giants of the investment banking world – every last one of them, by the way – with no one to insure their debts, could no longer borrow.  Without the CDS market, banks can’t report the real value of the assets (read: CDOs, CDSs, et al).  To do so would render them all insolvent and in default with Basel II regulations.  Absent AIG’s credit default swaps to provide fraudulent cover, all we can do is play accounting games and pretend that their assets are worth far more than they are actually worth.

The era of the Wall Street investment banker was over.  Bankers had leveraged their organizations beyond all reason, meaning that they had borrowed 30:1 or 40:1… or as in the cases of Fannie and Freddie, a mind boggling 110:1 and 174:1, respectively.  That means for every dollar the bank carried on it books as an asset, the banks had borrowed thirty or forty dollars. Accounting regulations had to be suspended lest the banks all be seen as insolvent.

Just to fund their operations, our TBTF banks are totally dependent on the Federal Reserve.  In fact, things got so bad that the Fed had to change the long-standing rules so that Goldman, Morgan and Merrill could use equities as collateral for trillions in loans.

Additionally, a little known and almost never discussed provision of the TARP bailout bill says that the Fed can pay interest on the collateral it’s holding… a simple, but very effective and yet covert way to pump untold billions in taxpayer dollars directly into the banks without the need for congressional approval.

Without the government having taken these steps, however inadequate and transient, AIG’s failure would have likely led to the failure of every major bank in the world.

But there should be no question… the enabler of the global credit bubble of the last eight years was AIG unregulated selling of credit default swaps without collateralizing the risk.  In 1998, there were so few Credit Default Swaps in play that they were hardly worth counting.  By late 2009, between newly instituted processes allowing CDSs, which offset each other to be cancelled, combined with the termination of recently paid out contracts, the face value of the CDS market was reduced to an estimated $30 trillion.

And the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill that was signed into law last summer does nothing to address regulation of this volatile and dangerous market.

Seventy percent of the U.S. economy is driven by consumer spending, which has been driven by borrowing over the last ten years.  Even if we wanted to do so, we can’t borrow our way back to prosperity this time around, however, because the credit markets are broken for good this time… because they were a fraud in the first place.  Our economy has entered a downturn that, before it reverses itself, will force most of us to reduce our standard of living for many of not most of our remaining years. Some believe that foreign spending and spending by the very rich can bring us back, but the numbers just don’t prove out.

Meanwhile, our helpless, hapless, and perhaps hopeless government continues to treat this financial crisis like it’s a liquidity crisis… lowering interest rates and pumping cash into a failed and fraudulent system being run by the same men that brought us here.

Or maybe I’m wrong about all of this… maybe it was all simply the fault of irresponsible sub-prime borrowers who all went out and bought homes they couldn’t afford.  Yeah, that must be right.  Lower the rates again… extend the tax cuts… print some more dough and pump it into Wall Street’s banks… that’ll probably fix everything.

Mandelman out.

*1 According to the FAA’s Aviation Safety Statistical Fact Book, there are 16 fatalities per one million hours of general aviation, and according to the National Transportation Safety Board, of the airplane accidents that occurred between 1983-2000, 51,207 of the 53,487 of the affected passengers survived.  Even if you only consider the 26 most serious airplane accidents during that period, 1,525 of the 2,739 passengers survived… that’s a 56% survival rate.  And take out the Lockerbie crash, which wasn’t an accident, but rather a bomb planted by a terrorist, and the survival rate goes up to 61%.  So, all told, you being killed in a plane crash is very unlikely.

Aug
16

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors – Shell Game Continues

EDITOR’S NOTE: The shell game continues. While the media picks up stories about “settlements” giving rise to the presumption that Countrywide Home Loans and Bank of America and the rest of the securitization players committed various violations of statutes, duties, rules and regulations, the main point gets lost. Where is this money going and WHY? What is the tacit or express admission in paying that money and what effect does it have on the average homeowner sitting with a loan whose obligation is being paid in these settlements?

Think about it. If Bank of America, which now owns Countrywide, is paying “fractions” to investors who purchased mortgage bonds then who is it that owns the underlying mortgages and loans? Did Bank of America pay the investors do it under a reservation of rights (subrogation) to enforce the underlying loans? If not, then why are they foreclosing? All evidence is to the contrary. There is no subrogation under these purchases, insurance, credit default swaps or any other contract — not that I ever saw and not that my sources in the industry tell me was ever even contemplated much less executed. The same holds true for all those bonds the Federal Reserve is holding.

If Bank of America is paying “fractions” to investors who purchased mortgage bonds, why was it a fraction? Is it because the value of the bond was much lower than the price paid by the investor? Is it just a convenient settlement? Or is it because the investors have also received funds from other sources?

This is what I am referring to when I address “factual constipation.” How are these payments being allocated? Did the owners of the bonds actually have any definable interest in the underlying mortgage loans? If they did, why are these payments not being allocated to the obligations or payments due under those underlying mortgage loans? If they didn’t, why did they get paid anything? How will we ever know without getting a full accounting from all the parties that claim some stake or ownership interest or receivable interest in me is underlying mortgage loans?

It is black letter law as well as common law dating back centuries that nobody can collect the same debt more than once. If they do collect more than once there is a clear right of action by the borrower to collect the excess payment through a lawsuit for unjust enrichment, breach of contract and other causes of action. Here we have an intentional act designed to collect the same debt multiple times. In my opinion this does not merely indicate the presence of an action for fraud, it clearly shows an interstate pattern of racketeering that at one time in our history had the Department of Justice and the FBI busy putting people in jail.

Only in America where the news has turned into an entertainment blitz used by those with the most power and the most money to get their message across, even if it is a total lie. Somehow many if not most people have the impression that the borrowers and the securitized mortgages executed between 2001 and 2009 are not entitled to the relief that any other debtor is entitled to receive––that is the obligation has been reduced for any reason, the borrowers should get credit and if any party receives money in excess of the net amount due after credits, the creditor becomes the debtor owing money to the former borrower.

The bullet point that is being used to distort the perception of our citizens and policymakers is that these borrowers should not get a  “free house.” Without getting a full accounting from all parties that advanced funds to and from the original investors who purchased mortgage bonds or collateralized debt obligations and related hedge products, there is no way of knowing the amount of the credit which is due to the borrower. Yes, it is possible that the amount received by the various intermediaries in the securitization chain exceeded the original obligation due from the borrower.

In that case, the borrower owes nothing to the originating lender or the successors to that lender. But if there is still a class of investor or institution that can prove a loss resulting from the nonpayment of the obligation by the borrower (as opposed to non-payment from other parties in the securitization chain) then the law allows that party to recover the loss from those that caused it.  That probably includes the borrower, which means that we are not seeking a free house, we are seeking a truthful accounting.

BUT the fact that this obligation theoretically exists does not mean and never did mean under any legal decision in existence that the obligation should be paid to anybody who claims it. By all substantive and procedural law, the obligation is payable to one who proves the obligation and to one who proves it is owed to them and nobody else.

Yet in the view of many judges the challenge by the borrower is viewed as a delay tactic or an attempt to use technical deficiencies to a gain a free house on a lawn that the borrower sought but could not pay.  No doubt this is true in some cases. But in nearly all the cases, armies of salespeople using names like “loan expert” pounded on doors and rang the phones of people who had no thought of borrowing money on homes, in many cases, that were debt-free and had been in the family for generations. Now many of those homes are bank owned property.

The simple question that needs to be posed to anyone who looks at the borrower as anything other than a victim is which is more likely? Did the owners of 20 million homes enter into a conspiracy to defraud the financial system, half society and our taxpayers? Did these people have the sophistication, education, knowledge, experience or training to pull off such a caper? Or is it more likely that the Wall Street titans stepped over the line and instead of increasing liquidity for the benefit of consumers and small businesses, used their position to deplete the resources of unsuspecting citizens, pension funds, financial institutions and governmental units from the top federal levels down to the smallest local geographical areas?

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors

By ALAN ZIBEL (AP) – Aug 3, 2010

WASHINGTON — Former shareholders of fallen mortgage giant Countrywide Financial Corp. are in line to recoup a fraction of their investments now that a Los Angeles judge has approved a settlement worth more than $600 million settlement.

The payoff doesn’t come close to compensating for the money lost by investors. But it could prompt more lenders to settle legal disputes at the center of the housing bust.

Bank of America, which bought Countrywide two years ago, agreed to pay $600 million to end a class-action case filed against the company. KPMG, Countrywide’s accounting firm, will pay $24 million.

Several New York pension funds who served as lead plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide hid how risky its business had become during the housing market’s boom years. Calabasas, Calif.-based Countrywide was once the nation’s largest mortgage lender.

The agreement stands to return about 40 cents per share of Countrywide’s common stock, before legal fees and expenses. Consider that the stock peaked at $45 a share in February 2007, before the financial crisis. So an investor who held 100 shares could bank on receiving $40 for an investment that was once worth $4,500.

Shareholders did receive 0.1822 shares of Bank of America’s stock for each share of Countrywide they owned when Bank of America acquired Countrywide. That worked out to about one share for every 5.5 shares of Countrywide stock. Shares of Bank of America closed at $14.34 on Tuesday. So that same 100 shares of Countrywide would be worth about $261 today in Bank of America stock.

Add the $40 from the settlement and those shares are now worth little more than $300.

Lawyers for the pension funds are requesting $56 million, or 4 cents per share, for fees and other costs.

Investors “will be compensated for a significant portion of the legal damages that they suffered as a result of what we believe was a violation of the securities laws,” said Joel Bernstein, a lawyer for the pension funds. “They won’t be compensated for every penny of that.”

Bank of America has been trying to put Countrywide’s legal problems behind it. In June, the Charlotte, N.C.-based company agreed to pay $108 million to settle the Federal Trade Commission’s charges that Countrywide collected outsized fees from about 200,000 borrowers facing foreclosure.

It reached a settlement Monday primarily to keep legal fees from escalating, a bank spokeswoman said.

“Countrywide denies all allegations of wrongdoing and any liability under the federal securities laws,” said Shirley Norton, a spokeswoman for Bank of America. “We agreed to the settlement to avoid the additional expense and uncertainty associated with continued litigation.”

Plaintiffs attorneys have pursed lawsuits against numerous lenders and investment banks in the wake of the housing market’s devastating downturn, and the Countrywide settlement could encourage even more such cases, said Paul Hodgson, a senior research associate at The Corporate Library, an independent corporate governance research firm.

“There are a lot of suits out there waiting to get launched,” Hodgson said. “I think this is the opening of the floodgates.”

Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo, former President David Sambol, former CFO Eric Sieracki and former board members were named in the litigation but are not contributing to the settlement.

But it does not end their legal problems. More than a year ago the Securities and Exchange Commission brought civil fraud charges against Mozilo and the two other former executives. Mozilo, the most high-profile individual to face charges from the government in the aftermath of the financial crisis, has denied any wrongdoing.

For Countrywide, “This is only a chapter and not the end of the book,” said John Coffee, a securities law professor at Columbia University.


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, education, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, foreign relations, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Servicer, trustee Tagged: ALAN ZIBEL, AP, Bank of America, countrywide, Joel Bernstein, KPMG, New York pension funds
Aug
03

GM, GMAC & the US Government… Have You No Shame?

In 1984, General Motors and Toyota entered into a joint venture, and they called it the NUMMI plant in Fremont California. Up until May of 2010, NUMMI built an average of 6000 vehicles each week, or nearly eight million cars and trucks. GM saw the joint venture as an opportunity to learn about manufacturing from the Japanese company.

Then the financial meltdown of Wall Street came. Bankers constructed bonds that were designed to default, took advantage of holes in the ratings agencies’ systems, sold them around the world, leveraged themselves 30:1 and more, and profited immensely by betting against them with credit default swaps. It wasn’t the fault of the employees at GM’s NUMMI plant, they had nothing to do with it, but they were about to pay a steeper price than the Wall Street bankers would pay.

GM pulled out of the venture in June 2009, and several months later Toyota announced plans to pull out by March 2010. Roughly 5,000 people, many of whom had worked at the plant for twenty years would lose their jobs, their retirement plans… everything.

At 9:40am on April 1, 2010, the plant produced its last car, a red Toyota Corolla S. Production of Corollas in North America was moved to Canada. It was over.

The faces of the NUMMI plant.

Of course, it wasn’t the first time a GM plant had closed leaving thousands of workers without jobs, far from it. But this time it was different.

The NUMMI plant is in Fremont, California, near the  Central Valley of California, the part of the state with the lowest literacy rates, and a favorite of home builders and Wall Street’s bankers. Billions of dollars were poured into the Central Valley and tens of thousands of homes were built and sold there during the real estate bubble. It would become Ground Zero of the foreclosure crisis.

The workers at the NUMMI plant were quite familiar with GMAC, because the mortgage lender was the only mortgage lender given access to the plant employees to sell them on refinancing their homes. “Put your cars, your credit cards… everything into a GMAC mortgage,” they were told at the numerous seminars held at the plant, “that way you won’t be in debt.”

GMAC actually had a booth inside the NUMMI plant… you could stop by for brochures 24/7 and 365 days a year. GMAC’s salespeople were on site at least two to three times a month to sell mortgages to plant workers. “GM employees pay no fees and no points with GMAC loans,” the workers were sold… I mean told. Everyone took out GMAC loans, it was like GMAC’s own personal gold mine.

Joe Phillippi, principal of AutoTrends, a consulting firm in Short Hills, N.J. said: “The thing that brought down GMAC was its sub-prime mortgage business.” GMAC lost $16.5 billion in its mortgage business from 2007 to 2009.

According to Bloomberg… GMAC Chief Executive Officer (for a month and a half of last year), and former Citibank executive, Michael Carpenter, was paid $1.2 million plus restricted stock options. He replaced former CEO Alvaro de Molina in mid-November of 2009, who received a $3.7 million salary.

But that’s not all… not even close. GMAC paid Chief Risk Officer Sam Ramsey $7.7 million, $5.7 million to Tom Marano, CEO of mortgage unit Residential Capital LLC. $4.9 million to finance chief Robert Hull, and Chief Marketing Officer Sanjay Gupta received about $4 million.

GMAC lost money in nine of the past 10 quarters. The company hasn’t reported earning a profit since the final quarter of 2008. The company posted a record $3.9 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2009, and lost $10.3 billion for the year.

The Congressional Oversight Panel, in March of 2010 said that despite three separate bailouts of GMAC totaling $17.3 billion, GMAC Financial Services “continues to struggle with its troubled mortgage liabilities.”

The U.S. government now owns 56.3 percent of GMAC, which serves as the primary source of dealer and car buyer financing for GM and Chrysler. The Obama administration currently estimates that taxpayer losses on the GMAC bailout may be at least $6.3 billion.

The Congressional Oversight Panel said that bankruptcy, and merging GMAC back into GM, could have put GMAC on a sounder footing. Instead, the panel said, Treasury treated GMAC more like large banks such as Citigroup and Bank of America.

I just spent hours getting to know a couple that worked at the NUMMI plant for roughly twenty years. I don’t want to release their real name, so maybe we should just call them “THE DIRT FAMILY,” because that’s exactly how they’ve been treated by GMAC as they tried to apply for a loan modification.

They began their application for a loan modification in July 2009, they were current and had excellent credit… something in the FICO 750 range.

So, first they were told they had to be delinquent. Then, when they went delinquent, they were declined because the husband was told that he made enough to make the mortgage payment. They applied again… and were declined because he was told that he didn’t make enough to qualify for the loan modification.

Are we having fun yet?

They turned to Bruce Marks’ traveling tent show of an non-profit organization, NACA, for help. NACA said they’d put them at the front of the line, but months went by and nothing from NACA. A sale date was set and NACA told the DIRTS they would have to file bankruptcy to stop the sale, so they did, but within days GMAC filed for the removal of the stay, although no new sale date was scheduled.

NACA wanted to wait until MR. DIRT actually lost his job, saying that this would make obtaining the modification easier. GMAC sent a letter to the DIRT’S bankruptcy attorney saying that they couldn’t negotiate unless the lawyer signed a letter saying it was okay to speak directly with the DIRTS. Apparently GMAC was aware of California Civil Code 2923.5, which says the bank must engage in meaningful discussions with a homeowner about alternatives to foreclosure before they foreclose.

The bankruptcy lawyer signed the letter. GMAC never contacted the DIRTS to talk about anything. GMAC won’t tell them if there’s another sale date set. GMAC says they never got anything from NACA.

Next thing they hear is that their house is being auctioned in a matter of days. They hire a law firm to try to stop the sale. The DIRTS and their new law firm ask GMAC who is the owner of their loan. GMAC says its GMAC. As it turns out it’s Fannie Mae.

GMAC won’t postpone the sale. Why? Not enough time. GMAC says the DIRT’S waited until the last minute… they procrastinated… they’re procrastinators, shame on them.

He worked 21 years at the NUMMI plant. Four more years and he would have earned his retirement pension. She worked at the plant until she was injured on the job… GM’s work comp doctor said the pain was all in her head… until she needed multiple back and shoulder surgeries… didn’t sue GM because he was going to make supervisor. They raised three children. Next year will be twenty years of a loving marriage. Hard work, but his life was in that plant… until it wasn’t.

And GMAC sold their home. They couldn’t wait. Apparently the Central Valley needs another empty foreclosed home. Here’s the letter they found on their door the next day. It was from Steve Ewing of Keller Williams Realty in the Central Valley of California:

Steve Ewing
Keller Williams Realty
2291 West March Lane, Suite D-210
Stockton, CA 95207
THE NINES TEAM AT KELLER WILLIAMS, CENTRAL VALLEY

We all need a little help in difficult times…

We have been hired by the new owners of this property to bring it to market as quickly as possible. This bank owned property must be sold VACANT.

It is possible that we may be able to provide some financial help for your immediate move.

TIME IS NOT ON YOUR SIDE, PLEASE DON’T MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY!!

PLEASE CONTACT STEVE EWING
PHONE: 209-625-8231
FAX: 866-790-8285
EMAIL: STEVE@THENINESTEAM.NET

ALL OF OUR CONVERSATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL

Are they, Steve? You scavenger piece of crap. Are all of your conversations confidential? Just between us girls, is that what you were thinking would be the case? Well, surprise, Steve-O, because I hate secrets. And it’s no secret that you are an inconceivably inconsiderate and insensitive jackass who doesn’t deserve to stand within a hundred yards of anyone in this family.

Do you even know what a real day’s work is Steverino? Because the father in this family definitely does, while you… you puny pompous paper pusher in search of his next commission… obviously doesn’t. How dare you leave a letter like that on their door, and then weasel away in your Mercedes, or whatever kind of import car I’m betting you scamper around in. Did you even know there was a GM plant near by? Did you ever stop to care about the people that worked hard there… that gave their lives there?

No, Mr. Earwhig, I’m telling you that you didn’t care then, and you care even less now. These are people in your community that need your help… your empathy… your understanding… not your asinine “time is not on your side” threatening notes.

So, I have a suggestion for you and Keller Williams… leave this family alone. Don’t go knocking on their door… in fact, don’t bother them at all. They’ve already been inconceivably and undeservedly treated like DIRT by GM, GMAC and my federal government, they certainly don’t need to concern themselves with the likes of you.

Besides, they’re filing a lawsuit asap, so don’t plan on selling that house anytime soon anyway.

And GMAC… I have only just begun to uncover what unethical, incompetent, money-grubbing, greedy predatory pigs you guys are. You haven’t heard anywhere near the last of me… no you haven’t… I’m just warming up, as far as you’re concerned.

Now you want to be known as “Ally Bank?” Because you actually think that’s how we’re going to think of you? Like our “ally”? Well, bang up job so far, you ally you. With allies like you, who needs the axis?

Now… GMAC, GM, and the Obama Administration… you have a responsibility to these people whose lives you’ve so carelessly thrown by the wayside. These are people that built 8 million cars and trucks in and for this country, so the way I see it, they are responsible for creating a whole lot more jobs in this country than this or any administration has, I’ll say that for sure. So, Mr. President, its time to do the right thing.

GMAC has to act human here. Taxpayers bailed them out to the tune of $17.3 billion. And for what? Was GMAC too PIG to fail?

LIKE A ROCK, RIGHT?

Well, you’re going to just LOVE this!

Here’s GMAC Corp. contact information, which is found on their Website here:
https://www.gmacmortgage.com/About_Us/Company_Info/OperatingCenters.html

It shows the following under “About Us” and Company Info:
GMAC Mortgage Corporate Headquarters
1100 Virginia Drive
Fort Washington, PA 19034

(215) 734-8899

SEE WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU CALL THE NUMBER… COME ON… IT’S REALLY WORTH IT, I SWEAR IT IS. GRAB YOUR CELL RIGHT NOW AND CALL THE CORPORATE NUMBER FOR GMAC AFTER WE TAXPAYERS PUT $17.3 BILLION INTO IT.  IT ONLY TAKES A MINUTE…

LIKE A ROCK! SING IT WITH ME… LIKE A ROCK!

Now, here’s a song performed by one of the unemployed workers from NUMMI:

Mandelman OUT!

Jul
29

Mass Extinction of Pools Becomes Clearer

Our good friend “Anonymous” has piped up with more vital information and expressed it more succinctly than I did.

“The senior tranches have largely already been paid and closed. Since the junior tranches are paid only if there is left over current payment – after the senior tranches have been paid. Thus, junior tranches are paid nothing (this is evident in investor lawsuits – damages do not deduct foreclosure recovery). If anything remains today from the toxic mortgage loan securitizations, it is the residual tranche – which has likely been resecuritized into a separate Trust – that is not a current pass-through security – but, rather, synthetically derived from a dismantled original Trust structure. “

Editor’s Note: In other words, if you have a high quality loan wherein you have a high credit score and received relatively good terms, it was in the “senior tranches.” The senior tranches were paid and closed. They were paid from the meager proceeds of the junior tranches, from insurance, credit default swaps etc. Bottom Line: If you got one of those mortgages, it has almost certainly been paid in full. So why are they still collecting your payments? Because they can.

Your obligation has most likely been satisfied long ago without any rights of subrogation. If you are in foreclosure now with one of these loans, the “Trustee” is in actuality out of the picture because the “Trust” was closed out (IF IT EVER LEGALLY EXISTED). All of this leads to the politically incorrect conclusion that people gt their houses for “nothing.” But that is not true.

ALL THE MONEY THAT WAS OWED ON THAT LOAN HAS BEEN PAID. WHY SHOULD ANYONE COLLECT ANYTHING FURTHER?

More comments from “Anonymous”

This is a very important post. I have been aware of cases where the defendant is sent to mediation without first identifying the real creditor. Some here have stated that the real party issue is not relevant because eventually the plaintiff will get his “ducks in a row” and proceed with the foreclosure under the real party name.

Not identifying the real party in court is not only fraud but also deprives the defendant of direct and timely negotiation with the real party true creditor. Thus, damages accrue to the defendant.

Although real party, in my opinion, is the single most important issue, I am not seeing courts enforce discovery to ascertain the real party. Once it can be established that the real party is not before the court, all the produced documents are also subject to question. I have seen cases where the real party is at issue – but most of the cases simply state that the plaintiff does not have standing – without attempting to demonstrate why the plaintiff is not the real party.

Since foreclosure cases most often are indicative of securitization, knowing the chain of sale/assignment in a securitization is crucial. Also, knowing what the “investors” are entitled to is important. Again, while I think this post is very important – i disagree with “there is nothing left to pay the investors who advanced money into a pool from which some mortgages were funded” 1) any investors who indirectly funded a “pool” – did not directly fund mortgages and 2) tranche “investors” – for which there a limited number of tranches – were only entitled to current income pass-through – not foreclosure recovery (which is not current and not passed on to pass-through security investors. (However, the residual tranche is not a pass-through – and is usually held by the servicer – who may -or may not be the current creditor). 3) the Trust is likely dissolved.

The fact that mediation is being conducted without identification of the current creditor – in whose name any modification must be contracted – is simply additional fraud upon the borrower defendant. This fraud is akin to “loan modification” scams that are being currently investigated by some state Department of Justices.

How and why the courts are allowing this to happen – and actually promoting it – is beyond me.

Editor’s Note: Legally this puts us at the horns of a dilemma. If we want to travel the path of “PAID IN FULL” then we are treading on the thin ice of accepting or admitting that the loan was actually legally and correctly assigned and indorsed into the pool, in addition to the usual “free house” talk.  If we travel the path of UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTED ASSIGNMENT then we get to the conclusion that the loan is still owned by the originating lender, who was PAID IN FULL at the time of the loan closing, but still is the owner of record. If we travel both paths, we are presenting a highly complex argument that most judges won’t understand. This is why the winners out there are not making big splashes with exotic legal arguments (even though they would be right), the winners are getting down to the details that any Judge would understand — SHOW ME THE TRUST DOCUMENT, SHOW ME THE NOTE, SHOW ME THE ASSIGNMENT, SHOW ME THE INDORSEMENT, SHOW ME THE ACCOUNTING, SHOW ME THE CREDITOR ETC.

MANY THANKS, ANONYMOUS!!!


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: creditor, fraud, mediation, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Jul
20

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

Many questions are coming after yesterday’s post. The main point is that there is no paper trail because nobody wanted it. Up at the top of the “securitization chain” fabricated by the securitization documents, nobody was checking loans at the level of actually looking at the loan documents, so they never asked for the loan documents, much less any assignments, indorsements or evidence of delivery or transfer.

With nobody asking — no demand — for the paper trail, there was no reason to produce one. But there is another reason as well. In order to move the “assets” around into mortgage bonds, CDOs composed of mortgage bonds, credit default swaps (the equivalent of buying the bond if you sold a CDS) and synthetic CDOs composed of credit default swaps, total flexibility was needed to make sure that when called upon to do so, they could produce a clear chain of title.

That is why they used MERS as a cover for constant transfers, resales, and multiple sales. You must remember that MERS is neither the business record of any of the players nor public record. It is worthless as evidence since it is a virtually unsecured proprietary database that owns nothing, transfers nothing, never comes into possession of the documents, and never touches the money as a conduit or otherwise.

Thus the Achilles heal of the would-be foreclosers is that no paper trail exists on any loan. By that I mean, nobody, authorized or not, executed any assignments, endorsements, or transmittals for delivery of the loan documents. Nobody.

This is where the sleight of hand occurs. The securitization structure is established by the pooling and servicing agreement and perhaps the assignment and assumption agreement, and maybe even the prospectus to investors. As near as I can tell they never actually issued bonds except at the very beginning, circa the year 2000.

These were all book entries that were the only evidence of the lender receiving a non-certificated bond or ownership interest in the pool that was completely dependent upon the actual receipt of money arising from payments made in connection with mortgage loans. Those payments were from borrowers, insurers, etc.

So the securitization structure was established — but that is like building the outside of a house and never putting anything on the inside. Like a trust can be established, but if it is not funded — i.e., if nothing is actually put into it —- it might exist in the technical sense but the trust doesn’t own anything and therefore the Trustee has no duties to perform, and the “beneficiaries” actually exist but they don’t get anything.

What I am saying is that the mortgage mess is far simpler than what it appears.

The position of the borrower should be that he/she/they did business with XYZ Mortgage Inc. which for all times material to the life of the loan was the only record holder of an interest (as “LENDER”) in the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) and the only payee under the terms of the written evidence of the obligation (the note). That interest was never transferred in any manner, shape or form. And like one creative lender lawyer found out recently, courts will NOT recognize anything even smelling like an “equitable transfer.”

So where does that leave us? In the same place with a different focus than what I have been writing about up until now. The real parties are clearly identified at the closing of the loan. Different parties have flooded the room — substitute trustee, Trustee for the Pool, Servicer, Master Servicer, Trusts, Investors, etc.

Just like the era before securitization, a Bank might lend money to a person, then sell the loan to another bank. The new bank and the originating bank would both send the borrower a notice saying the loan had been assigned.

The assignment of the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) would be recorded, and the borrower would start making payments to the second Bank. In foreclosure, the second bank would have the loan documents, would have a  full accounting from both banks, and would simply instruct the trustee to sell the property in non-judicial sale or instruct its attorneys to commence the foreclosure proceedings.

If the borrower challenged a non-judicial sale the second bank would produce the proof that it paid for the loan, and a full accounting, together with all the necessary paperwork including the recorded assignment, the original note etc.

If the second bank commenced a foreclosure suit it would attach as exhibits and plead allegations that the first bank originated the loan, then it was assigned, the assignment was recorded, the borrower was notified, etc. It would all be laid out nice and pretty ready for a Judge to rubber stamp it.

What I am saying is that the would-be forecloser must meet the same standards in the so-called world of securitized mortgages. The fact that they intended to assign and indorse, and deliver does not mean they did it.

If they didn’t do it, then they can’t enforce the debt or foreclose on the property. If they did, then they must produce the documentation and recording. There’s the rub.

They can’t produce the documentation without creating it for purposes of litigation. Each non-performing loan only has a demand for the paper trail if it is claimed to be in default, is in litigation, and the lawyer for the would-be forecloser needs something to show the judge. Each such loan transaction is THEN subject to an assignment that was created, fabricated and forged long after the cutoff date and possessing the single quality (being in alleged default) that makes it ineligible for assignment into a pool or to anyone without changes in the negotiability of the instrument.

So there is no assignment, indorsement or delivery and even if there was, there are provisions in every PSA that a bad loan will be replaced by cash or a “good” loan. This is what has pissed off so many judges now. every time a judge examines the paperwork it doesn’t add up. The Judge feels tricked and sometimes, like in Massachusetts they levy $800,000 fines against both lawyer and client (Wells Fargo) was misrepresenting facts they knew to be false.

So in the end you have two things. A “lender” (at the closing and on record) who isn’t owed anything because they got paid in full and have suffered no loss and a “lender” (the investor who purchased the MBS) who actually funded the loan and suffered a loss.

Of course you also have the borrower who has suffered a major loss through appraisal fraud etc. People forget that the borrower has paid money upon moving into the house or just by going into the closing. The presumption that there are borrowers with nothing invested in the house is dead wrong unless it was a completely fabricated loan using a dead person as the borrower.

The reason the lender/investors are not suing the homeowner is that they don’t actually have the paperwork to back it up. And they can’t get it. So they are suing the investment banks for appraisal fraud, securities fraud etc. The actual lender has elected their remedies, and perhaps they will pursue the borrowers under some equitable theories. But one thing is sure: the original obligation to the lender of record has been extinguished along with the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust). None of the borrowers did this nor had any hand in the handling, creation or recording of the paperwork.

The fact that the securitization parties chose not to assign, indorse, deliver or record should not be rewarded by title to a house in which they have no investment based upon a non-existent loss. The borrower has money into the house even if there was no down payment. The securitization parties have nothing invested into the house and in fact, quite the reverse, were paid handsomely to create this mass illusion. Thus the only party seeking and getting a free house are those intermediary parties who neither funded nor bought the loan.


Filed under: foreclosure
Jul
19

Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs'] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure mill, forms, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, trustee Tagged: assignment, delivery, discovery, Edward DeMarco, FHFA, foreclosureblues, indorsement, investor-lender, Isaac Gradman, pools, table funded loan, third aprty payment
Jun
19

LINKING SECURITIZATION AND TILA

NOTE: Working on one of my expert declarations I figured I would share my computations with the readers. In order to protect privacy I am deleting any identifying information.

In this case there was a $1 billion offering of non-certificated mortgage backed securities, which is a fancy way of saying there was no certificate, just a book entry. The Master Servicer is the one with all the power to write-down the value of the pool to what the Master Servicer deems to be fair market value. You might call that a license to steal. The use of proceeds does not list any specific uses. It merely says that the money is going for general operational purposes.That is contrary to the usual standards of an offering prospectus which gives at least some specifics on use of proceeds. Thus it didn’t take much effort to see $1 billion worth of non-certificated mortgage backed securities and only use 75% of it to invest in mortgages.

So it is easy as in this case to take $747,000 from an investor, lend out $377,000, pocket the rest. Then when the guaranteed to fail loans start failing, the Master Servicer announces that the pool is no longer viable and the Master Servicer buys it at a small percentage of the nominal value of the mortgages.

Then because the pool is deemed a failure, say by Goldman Sachs (who bought credit default swaps against the pool), the Master Servicer collects on the insurance and other credit enhancements. Since the investors no longer own anything they don’t have a claim, or so the scheme says.

So even if  a particular loan does NOT fail on schedule, they can still declare the pool as failed, and still collect the third party payments that were originally promised to the investors. But none of this takes away from the fact that all these institutions were part of a single securitization chain which is to say a single transaction in which the investor was the lender and the homeowner was the borrower. If they collected money and didn’t give to the investor it still doesn’t mean that the profit should not be allocated to the debtor’s loan account.

And if, as in this case, they collected a yield spread premium (Yield spread premium #2 in prior posts) created as a result of cheating the investor, well, whether the investor wants to press that claim or not, it is a yield spread premium, it is a single loan transaction, and TILA says you must disclose it — or give it back. Since the originating “lender” is the face they put on the transaction and since the originating “lender” is the only party of record in the title records, the yield spread premium must be applied to the benefit of the borrower. In this case, the YSP is almost the same as the loan amount, and with interest, vastly exceeds it. And then there is the issue of treble damages.

What many lawyers are missing because they are intimidated by the complexity of this thing, is that there are a lot of damages that can be collected from deep pockets and there is also a recovery of attorney fees.

Let’s see what happened in this case:

$1 billion (approximate) in securities offering. No showing of actual proceeds or any limitations on issuer. Second yield spread premium may exist in this unknown spread or in the spread between the offering amount and the unknown actual amount funded.

Extrapolating from yields disclosed in the prospectus the actual yield promised to investors was approximately 7%, with the right to reduce same under a variety of circumstances wholly in control of the underwriters. The nominal yield weighted average is stated in several different ways in order to confuse the reader and make computation more challenging. Based upon computations made directly from the prospectus and comparing it with similar prospectuses involving most of the same parties, the nominal actual average interest was sold to the SPV at approximately 9.6%. Thus, rounding down, the yield spread premium was 2.5%. 2.5% is 26% of the nominal 9.6% rate. Applying 26% to the declared proceeds, the dollar yield spread, undisclosed to either the investors or the borrowers, was approximately $250,000,000. The nominal principal of the debtor’s note is approximately $377,000.

The non-weighted yield spread premium at this level of the lending chain should therefore be expressed as either $94,250 or $82,500 (25%, non-weighted, or dollar weighted without regard to actual rates and data from this particular case). Applying an average between the two methods, the estimated non-weighted yield spread premium on this loan is approximately $88,000 without weighting for the actual rate spread. Applying the customary weighting using the actual nominal rate sold on this debtor’s loan (14.1%), the estimated yield spread premium earned by participants in this lending chain from this level of the lending chain was in fact approximately $369,460 (almost equal to the loan itself). Adding customary interest ($232,759.80) and treble damages ($1,108,380) under the Federal Truth and Lending Act the net actual dollar liability for yield spread premium at said level due from the lending chain on debtor’s loan would therefore be expressed as $ $1,341,139.80 due to borrower. This amount is subject of course to a determination of all other claims and defenses each or any of the parties may have.


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
16

MERS, POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, ACCOUNTING….GREAT , NOW WHAT?

SUBMITTED BY M SOLIMAN

EDITOR’S NOTE: Soliman brings out some interesting and important issues in his dialogue with Raja.

  • The gist of what he is saying about sales accounting runs to the core of how you disprove the allegations of your opposition. In a nutshell and somewhat oversimplified: If they were the lender then their balance sheet should show it. If they are not the lender then it shows up on their income statement. Now of course companies don’t report individual loans on their financial statements, so you need to force discovery and ask for the ledger entries that were made at the time of the origination of the loan.
  • If you put it another way the accounting and bookkeeping amounts to an admission of the real facts of the case. If they refuse to give you the ledger entries, then you are entitled to a presumption that they would have shown that they were not acting as a lender, holder, or holder in due course. If they show it to you, then it will either show the admission or you should inquire about who prepared the response to your discovery request and go after them on examination at deposition.
  • Once you show that they were not a lender, holder or holder in due course because their own accounting shows they simply booked the transaction as a fee for acting as a conduit, broker or finder, you have accomplished several things: one is that they have no standing, two is that they are not a real party in interest, three is that they lied at closing and all the way up the securitization chain, and four is that you focus the court’s attention on who actually advanced the money for the loan and who stands to suffer a loss, if there is one.
  • But it doesn’t end there. Your discovery net should be thrown out over the investment banking firm that underwrote the mortgage backed security, and anyone else who might have received third party insurance payments or any other payments (credit default swaps, bailout etc.) on account of the failure of the pool in which your loan is claimed to be an “asset.”
  • Remember that it is my opinion that many of these pools don’t actually have the loans that are advertised to be in there. They never completed or perfected the transfer of the obligation and the reason they didn’t was precisely because they wanted to snatch the third party payments away from the investors.
  • But those people were agents of the investors and any payment they received on account of loss through default or write-down should be credited and paid to the investor.
  • Why should you care what the investor received? Because those are payments that should have been booked by the investors as repayment of their investment. In turn, the percentage part of the pool that your loan represents should be credited proportionately by the credit and payment to the investor.
  • Those payments, according to your note should be allocated first to payments due and outstanding (which probably eliminates any default), second to fees outstanding attributable to the borrower (not the investor) and third to the borrower which normally would be done as a credit against principal, which would reduce the amount of principal outstanding and thus reduce the number of people who think they are under water and are not.

———————————————————————–

MERS, POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, ACCOUNTING….GREAT , NOW WHAT?

I am really loving this upon closer inspection Raja! The issues of simple accounting rules violations appear narrow, yet the example you cite here could mean A DIFFERENCE AND SWAY IN ADVANTAGE.

Many more cases can potentially address broader issues of pleading sufficiency with repsect to securities and accounting rules violations prohibiting foreclosures.

Sale accounting is the alternative to debt or financing arrangements which is what the lender seeks to avoid in this economic downturn. Both approaches to accounting are clearly described and determinable by GAAP. In sales accounting there is no foreclsure. In debt for GAAP accounting your entitled to foreclose.

Its when you mix the two you r going to have problems. Big problems.

Pleading sufficiency is (by this layperson) the need for addressing a subject matter in light of the incurable defects in proper jurisdiction. The subject can be convoluted and difficult, I realize that.

Where the matter is heard should allow ample time to amend as a plaintiff. This is given to the fact the lender can move quicklly and seek dismissal.

The question is how far must a consumer plaintiff reach to allege that serverity of the claims, based on adverse event information, as in foreclosure.

This is significant in order to establish that the lender or a lender defendants’ alleged failure to disclose information. Therein will the court find the claim to be sufficently material.

In possession hearings the civil courts have granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and in actions brought against the consumer. The courts are often times granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that these complaints fail to adequately suffice or address the judicial fundamental element of materiality.

I can tell you the accounting rules omissions from the commencement of the loan origination through a foreclosure is one continual material breach. Counsel is lost to go to court without pleading this fact.

The next question is will the pleading adequately allege the significance of the vast number of consumer homeowner complaints. One would think yes considering the lower court level is so backlogged and a t a time when budget cuts require one less day of operations.

These lower courts however are hearing post foreclosure matters of possession. there is the further possibility that the higher Court in deciding matters while failing to see any scienter. Its what my law cohorts often refer to as accountability for their actions. That is what the “Fill in the Dots” letter tells me at first glance.

I believe it’s only in a rare case or two that a securities matter is heard in the Ninth Circuit. Recently however, there the conclusion was in fact that scienter allegations raised by the opposition were sufficient based on plaintiff’s allegations that the “high level executives …would know the company was being sued in a product liability action,” and in line with the many, customer complaints (I assume that were communicated to the company’s directors…)

The FASB is where the counterproductive rule changes always seem to take place and where lobbyist and other pro life and pro bank enthusiasts seem to spend their days. No need to fret however as gain on sale accounting is specific and requires the lender to have SOLD your loan in order to securitize it as part of a larger bulk pool.

The document I am reading, submitted by Raja tells me something is very concerning to the “lender parties” that they believe is downstream and headed their way. I’ll try and analyze each line item for you as to what it says and what they really are trying to do. I think for now though its value is for determining the letter as an admission of “we screwed up!”

M.Soliman


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, interest rates, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: accounting, balance sheet, discovery, failure, income statement, Investor, ledger, lenders, mortgage backed securities, mortgage lenders, pools, Raja, securitization chain, Soliman, third party payments, writedown
Jun
16

MERS, POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, ACCOUNTING….GREAT , NOW WHAT?

SUBMITTED BY M SOLIMAN

EDITOR’S NOTE: Soliman brings out some interesting and important issues in his dialogue with Raja.

  • The gist of what he is saying about sales accounting runs to the core of how you disprove the allegations of your opposition. In a nutshell and somewhat oversimplified: If they were the lender then their balance sheet should show it. If they are not the lender then it shows up on their income statement. Now of course companies don’t report individual loans on their financial statements, so you need to force discovery and ask for the ledger entries that were made at the time of the origination of the loan.
  • If you put it another way the accounting and bookkeeping amounts to an admission of the real facts of the case. If they refuse to give you the ledger entries, then you are entitled to a presumption that they would have shown that they were not acting as a lender, holder, or holder in due course. If they show it to you, then it will either show the admission or you should inquire about who prepared the response to your discovery request and go after them on examination at deposition.
  • Once you show that they were not a lender, holder or holder in due course because their own accounting shows they simply booked the transaction as a fee for acting as a conduit, broker or finder, you have accomplished several things: one is that they have no standing, two is that they are not a real party in interest, three is that they lied at closing and all the way up the securitization chain, and four is that you focus the court’s attention on who actually advanced the money for the loan and who stands to suffer a loss, if there is one.
  • But it doesn’t end there. Your discovery net should be thrown out over the investment banking firm that underwrote the mortgage backed security, and anyone else who might have received third party insurance payments or any other payments (credit default swaps, bailout etc.) on account of the failure of the pool in which your loan is claimed to be an “asset.”
  • Remember that it is my opinion that many of these pools don’t actually have the loans that are advertised to be in there. They never completed or perfected the transfer of the obligation and the reason they didn’t was precisely because they wanted to snatch the third party payments away from the investors.
  • But those people were agents of the investors and any payment they received on account of loss through default or write-down should be credited and paid to the investor.
  • Why should you care what the investor received? Because those are payments that should have been booked by the investors as repayment of their investment. In turn, the percentage part of the pool that your loan represents should be credited proportionately by the credit and payment to the investor.
  • Those payments, according to your note should be allocated first to payments due and outstanding (which probably eliminates any default), second to fees outstanding attributable to the borrower (not the investor) and third to the borrower which normally would be done as a credit against principal, which would reduce the amount of principal outstanding and thus reduce the number of people who think they are under water and are not.

———————————————————————–

MERS, POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, ACCOUNTING….GREAT , NOW WHAT?

I am really loving this upon closer inspection Raja! The issues of simple accounting rules violations appear narrow, yet the example you cite here could mean A DIFFERENCE AND SWAY IN ADVANTAGE.

Many more cases can potentially address broader issues of pleading sufficiency with repsect to securities and accounting rules violations prohibiting foreclosures.

Sale accounting is the alternative to debt or financing arrangements which is what the lender seeks to avoid in this economic downturn. Both approaches to accounting are clearly described and determinable by GAAP. In sales accounting there is no foreclsure. In debt for GAAP accounting your entitled to foreclose.

Its when you mix the two you r going to have problems. Big problems.

Pleading sufficiency is (by this layperson) the need for addressing a subject matter in light of the incurable defects in proper jurisdiction. The subject can be convoluted and difficult, I realize that.

Where the matter is heard should allow ample time to amend as a plaintiff. This is given to the fact the lender can move quicklly and seek dismissal.

The question is how far must a consumer plaintiff reach to allege that serverity of the claims, based on adverse event information, as in foreclosure.

This is significant in order to establish that the lender or a lender defendants’ alleged failure to disclose information. Therein will the court find the claim to be sufficently material.

In possession hearings the civil courts have granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and in actions brought against the consumer. The courts are often times granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that these complaints fail to adequately suffice or address the judicial fundamental element of materiality.

I can tell you the accounting rules omissions from the commencement of the loan origination through a foreclosure is one continual material breach. Counsel is lost to go to court without pleading this fact.

The next question is will the pleading adequately allege the significance of the vast number of consumer homeowner complaints. One would think yes considering the lower court level is so backlogged and a t a time when budget cuts require one less day of operations.

These lower courts however are hearing post foreclosure matters of possession. there is the further possibility that the higher Court in deciding matters while failing to see any scienter. Its what my law cohorts often refer to as accountability for their actions. That is what the “Fill in the Dots” letter tells me at first glance.

I believe it’s only in a rare case or two that a securities matter is heard in the Ninth Circuit. Recently however, there the conclusion was in fact that scienter allegations raised by the opposition were sufficient based on plaintiff’s allegations that the “high level executives …would know the company was being sued in a product liability action,” and in line with the many, customer complaints (I assume that were communicated to the company’s directors…)

The FASB is where the counterproductive rule changes always seem to take place and where lobbyist and other pro life and pro bank enthusiasts seem to spend their days. No need to fret however as gain on sale accounting is specific and requires the lender to have SOLD your loan in order to securitize it as part of a larger bulk pool.

The document I am reading, submitted by Raja tells me something is very concerning to the “lender parties” that they believe is downstream and headed their way. I’ll try and analyze each line item for you as to what it says and what they really are trying to do. I think for now though its value is for determining the letter as an admission of “we screwed up!”

M.Soliman


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, interest rates, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: accounting, balance sheet, discovery, failure, income statement, Investor, ledger, lenders, mortgage backed securities, mortgage lenders, pools, Raja, securitization chain, Soliman, third party payments, writedown
Jun
16

MERS, POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, ACCOUNTING….GREAT , NOW WHAT?

SUBMITTED BY M SOLIMAN

EDITOR’S NOTE: Soliman brings out some interesting and important issues in his dialogue with Raja.

  • The gist of what he is saying about sales accounting runs to the core of how you disprove the allegations of your opposition. In a nutshell and somewhat oversimplified: If they were the lender then their balance sheet should show it. If they are not the lender then it shows up on their income statement. Now of course companies don’t report individual loans on their financial statements, so you need to force discovery and ask for the ledger entries that were made at the time of the origination of the loan.
  • If you put it another way the accounting and bookkeeping amounts to an admission of the real facts of the case. If they refuse to give you the ledger entries, then you are entitled to a presumption that they would have shown that they were not acting as a lender, holder, or holder in due course. If they show it to you, then it will either show the admission or you should inquire about who prepared the response to your discovery request and go after them on examination at deposition.
  • Once you show that they were not a lender, holder or holder in due course because their own accounting shows they simply booked the transaction as a fee for acting as a conduit, broker or finder, you have accomplished several things: one is that they have no standing, two is that they are not a real party in interest, three is that they lied at closing and all the way up the securitization chain, and four is that you focus the court’s attention on who actually advanced the money for the loan and who stands to suffer a loss, if there is one.
  • But it doesn’t end there. Your discovery net should be thrown out over the investment banking firm that underwrote the mortgage backed security, and anyone else who might have received third party insurance payments or any other payments (credit default swaps, bailout etc.) on account of the failure of the pool in which your loan is claimed to be an “asset.”
  • Remember that it is my opinion that many of these pools don’t actually have the loans that are advertised to be in there. They never completed or perfected the transfer of the obligation and the reason they didn’t was precisely because they wanted to snatch the third party payments away from the investors.
  • But those people were agents of the investors and any payment they received on account of loss through default or write-down should be credited and paid to the investor.
  • Why should you care what the investor received? Because those are payments that should have been booked by the investors as repayment of their investment. In turn, the percentage part of the pool that your loan represents should be credited proportionately by the credit and payment to the investor.
  • Those payments, according to your note should be allocated first to payments due and outstanding (which probably eliminates any default), second to fees outstanding attributable to the borrower (not the investor) and third to the borrower which normally would be done as a credit against principal, which would reduce the amount of principal outstanding and thus reduce the number of people who think they are under water and are not.

———————————————————————–

MERS, POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, ACCOUNTING….GREAT , NOW WHAT?

I am really loving this upon closer inspection Raja! The issues of simple accounting rules violations appear narrow, yet the example you cite here could mean A DIFFERENCE AND SWAY IN ADVANTAGE.

Many more cases can potentially address broader issues of pleading sufficiency with repsect to securities and accounting rules violations prohibiting foreclosures.

Sale accounting is the alternative to debt or financing arrangements which is what the lender seeks to avoid in this economic downturn. Both approaches to accounting are clearly described and determinable by GAAP. In sales accounting there is no foreclsure. In debt for GAAP accounting your entitled to foreclose.

Its when you mix the two you r going to have problems. Big problems.

Pleading sufficiency is (by this layperson) the need for addressing a subject matter in light of the incurable defects in proper jurisdiction. The subject can be convoluted and difficult, I realize that.

Where the matter is heard should allow ample time to amend as a plaintiff. This is given to the fact the lender can move quicklly and seek dismissal.

The question is how far must a consumer plaintiff reach to allege that serverity of the claims, based on adverse event information, as in foreclosure.

This is significant in order to establish that the lender or a lender defendants’ alleged failure to disclose information. Therein will the court find the claim to be sufficently material.

In possession hearings the civil courts have granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and in actions brought against the consumer. The courts are often times granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that these complaints fail to adequately suffice or address the judicial fundamental element of materiality.

I can tell you the accounting rules omissions from the commencement of the loan origination through a foreclosure is one continual material breach. Counsel is lost to go to court without pleading this fact.

The next question is will the pleading adequately allege the significance of the vast number of consumer homeowner complaints. One would think yes considering the lower court level is so backlogged and a t a time when budget cuts require one less day of operations.

These lower courts however are hearing post foreclosure matters of possession. there is the further possibility that the higher Court in deciding matters while failing to see any scienter. Its what my law cohorts often refer to as accountability for their actions. That is what the “Fill in the Dots” letter tells me at first glance.

I believe it’s only in a rare case or two that a securities matter is heard in the Ninth Circuit. Recently however, there the conclusion was in fact that scienter allegations raised by the opposition were sufficient based on plaintiff’s allegations that the “high level executives …would know the company was being sued in a product liability action,” and in line with the many, customer complaints (I assume that were communicated to the company’s directors…)

The FASB is where the counterproductive rule changes always seem to take place and where lobbyist and other pro life and pro bank enthusiasts seem to spend their days. No need to fret however as gain on sale accounting is specific and requires the lender to have SOLD your loan in order to securitize it as part of a larger bulk pool.

The document I am reading, submitted by Raja tells me something is very concerning to the “lender parties” that they believe is downstream and headed their way. I’ll try and analyze each line item for you as to what it says and what they really are trying to do. I think for now though its value is for determining the letter as an admission of “we screwed up!”

M.Soliman


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, interest rates, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: accounting, balance sheet, discovery, failure, income statement, Investor, ledger, lenders, mortgage backed securities, mortgage lenders, pools, Raja, securitization chain, Soliman, third party payments, writedown
Jun
09

AFTER THE SALE: PART I

Submitted by Charles Koppa. 6/9/2010

Editor’s Note: We are starting to look at events AFTER the sale has taken place and we are discovering a number of things:

  • CREDIT BID: Only the Creditor can submit a credit bid. All others must pay actual money. If a non-creditor submitted a credit bid (essentially bidding the “amount due” which as we have seen from the FTC action against BOA is incorrectly stated) then the procedure has been violated, the sale has not legally occurred. At least that is my interpretation.
  • Also the submission of a credit bid locks in the position of the parties. So if you are suing for wrongful or fraudulent foreclosure, they no longer have the option of fabricating documents as you raise one objection after another.
  • The obligation to return money rightfully owed to the homeowner continues but it is ignored. Thus even if the property is not sold to a bonafied purchaser for value without notice of defects, the net accounting due is the same. So the receipt of third party insurance, credit default swaps, or other credit enhancement payments is still required to be allocated to this loan. Hence there is a damage claim against the participants in the foreclosure and sale.
  • More later. For now read Charles’ comments below

REO’s and OREO’s have NO MERS Identification Numbers.

1.  Loan Servicer (as a MERS member) initiates the NOD and NOTS.
2.  When the auctioneer pronounces “Back To Beneficiary”, the securitized bond trust receives the MinBid at averages of 46% below the NOTS amount posted the day before.  Bondholder “paper certificate losses”  are unconscionably assigned against the Real Estate asset. “The Paper Trust” gains an untitled transfer of the Real Estate Asset which it NEVER Wanted!
3.  The Auction extinguishes the Toxic Security on Wall Street.  Counterparties collect on their bets.  Investor lose their investments” and the monthly cash interest streams are terminated.
4.  Simultaneously, the Servicer (and MERS) are extinguished from all public records.  Servicer collects on MGIC or other mortgage insurance to cover ALL their contrived losses and costs.
5.  When the re-sale is completed, “The Bookkeeping Trust” ALSO disappears from County Property RECORDS!!!
6.  Until re-sold, the real property travels at ZERO book value into an off balance sheet private entity (mostly controlled by the BHC) which was the SIV “depositor” (as an off balance entity) in setting up the REMIC and/or the Investment Trust in the first place.


Filed under: CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, marketing, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: Auction, bookkeeping trust, credit bid, fabricating documents, foreclosure, foreclosure sale, fraudulent foreclosure, Identification Numbers, Lehman Brothers, MERS, MIN, NOD, NOTS, OREO, property records, REO, sale, servicer
May
13

What Do Those Losses at Fannie and Freddie Mean?

Editor’s Note: While the courts hear arguments and decide this way and that about standing and real party in interest, the elephant in the living room is that we have highly publicized reports of LOSSES associated with more than $5 trillion in loans bought or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. That amounts to around 25 million loans more or less. So I ask myself, “Self, if those loans were bought or guaranteed by Freddie or Fannie, what’s left?”

If they were bought, did they keep them or sell them into the secondary market for securitization?

If they own them, why are they not at least nominal plaintiffs or beneficiaries in foreclosure sales?

If they guaranteed them, and they show a loss, doesn’t that mean they paid?

If they paid, it was presumably the loss or full balance of the loan, so which is it?

If they paid, what did they get in return?

If they paid, who owns the loan now?

If they report an “inventory” of foreclosed property, who actually is named as the owner and who gets the proceeds of sale?

If property is “inventory” were Freddie and Fannie involved on any level of the foreclosure or sale?

Did Freddie or Fannie get the benefit of any credit enhancements, insurance, credit default swaps etc.?

Who makes modification decisions for Fannie and Freddie?

Do some or all of these loans fall under the category of unsecured debt, the enforcement of which is subject to pennies on the dollar debt collection?

—————————————-

May 10, 2010, 4:46 am

<!– — Updated: 11:47 am –>

Ignoring the Elephant in the Bailout

From Gretchen Morgenson’s latest Fair Game column:

If you blinked, you might have missed the ugly first-quarter report last week from Freddie Mac, the mortgage finance giant that, along with its sister Fannie Mae, soldiers on as one of the financial world’s biggest wards of the state.

Freddie — already propped up with $52 billion in taxpayer funds used to rescue the company from its own mistakes — recorded a loss of $6.7 billion and said it would require an additional $10.6 billion from taxpayers to shore up its financial position.

The news caused nary a ripple in the placid Washington scene. Perhaps that’s because many lawmakers, especially those who once assured us that Fannie and Freddie would never cost taxpayers a dime, hope that their constituents don’t notice the burgeoning money pit these mortgage monsters represent. Some $130 billion in federal money had already been larded on both companies before Freddie’s latest request.

But taxpayers should examine Freddie’s first-quarter numbers not only because the losses are our responsibility. Since they also include details on Freddie’s delinquent mortgages, the company’s sales of foreclosed properties and losses on those sales, the results provide a telling snapshot of the current state of the housing market.

That picture isn’t pretty. Serious delinquencies in Freddie’s single-family conventional loan portfolio — those more than 90 days late — came in at 4.13 percent, up from 2.41 percent for the period a year earlier. Delinquencies in the company’s Alt-A book, one step up from subprime loans, totaled 12.84 percent, while delinquencies on interest-only mortgages were 18.5 percent. Delinquencies on its small portfolio of option-adjustable rate loans totaled 19.8 percent.

The company’s inventory of foreclosed properties rose from 29,145 units at the end of March 2009 to almost 54,000 units this year. Perhaps most troubling, Freddie’s nonperforming assets almost doubled, rising to $115 billion from $62 billion.

When Freddie sells properties, either before or after foreclosure, it generates losses of 39 percent, on average.

There is a bright spot: new delinquencies were fewer in number than in the quarter ended Dec. 31.

Freddie Mac said the main reason for its disastrous quarter was an accounting change that required it to bring back onto its books $1.5 trillion in assets and liabilities that it had been keeping off of its balance sheet.

None of the grim numbers at Freddie are surprising, really, given that it and Fannie have pretty much been the only games in town of late for anyone interested in getting a mortgage. The problem for taxpayers, of course, is that the company’s future doesn’t look much different from its recent past.

Indeed, Freddie warned that its credit losses were likely to continue rising throughout 2010. Among the reasons for this dour outlook was the substantial number of borrowers in Freddie’s portfolio that currently owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth.

Even as its business suffers through a sour real estate market, Freddie must pay hefty cash dividends on the preferred stock the government holds. After it receives the additional $10.6 billion it needs from taxpayers, dividends owed to Treasury will total $6.2 billion a year. This amount, the company said, “exceeds our annual historical earnings in most periods.”

In spite of these difficulties, Freddie and Fannie are nowhere to be seen in the various financial reform efforts under discussion on Capitol Hill. Timothy F. Geithner, the Treasury secretary, offered a vague comment to Congress last March, that after some unspecified reform effort someday in the future, the companies “will not exist in the same form as they did in the past.”

Fannie and Freddie, lest you’ve forgotten, have been longstanding kingpins in the housing market, buying mortgages from banks that issue them so the banks could turn around and lend even more. After both companies overindulged in the lucrative but riskier end of home loans, they nearly collapsed, prompting the federal rescue. Since then, the government has continued to use the firms as mortgage buyers of last resort, to help stabilize a housing market that is still deeply troubled.

To some, the current silence on what to do about Freddie and Fannie is deafening — as is the lack of chatter about Freddie’s disastrous report last week.

“I don’t understand why people are not talking about it,” said Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, referring to Freddie’s losses. “It seems to me the most fundamental question is, have they on an ongoing basis been paying too much for loans even since they went into conservatorship?”

Michael L. Cosgrove, a Freddie spokesman, declined to discuss what the company pays for the mortgages it buys. “We are supporting the market by providing liquidity,” he said. “And we have longstanding relationships with all the major mortgage lenders across the country. We’re in the business of buying loans, and we are one of the few sources of liquidity available.”

But Mr. Baker’s question gets to the heart of the conflicting roles that Freddie and Fannie are being asked to play today. On the one hand, the companies are charged with supporting the mortgage market by buying loans from banks and other lenders. At the same time, they must work to minimize credit losses to make sure the billions that taxpayers have poured into the firms don’t disappear.

Freddie acknowledged these dueling goals in its quarterly report. “Certain changes to our business objectives and strategies are designed to provide support for the mortgage market in a manner that serves our public mission and other nonfinancial objectives, but may not contribute to profitability,” it noted. Freddie said that its regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, has advised it that “minimizing our credit losses is our central goal and that we will be limited to continuing our existing core business activities and taking actions necessary to advance the goals of the conservatorship.”

Mr. Baker’s concern that Freddie may be racking up losses by overpaying for mortgages derives from his suspicion that the government might be encouraging it to do so as a way to bolster the operations of mortgage lenders.

That would make Fannie’s and Freddie’s mortgage-buying yet another backdoor bailout of the nation’s banks, Mr. Baker said, and could explain the government’s reluctance to include them in the reform efforts now being so hotly debated in Washington.

“If they are deliberately paying too much for mortgages to support the banks,” Mr. Baker said, “the government wants them to be in a position to keep doing that, and that would mean not doing anything about their status until further down the road.”

It’s no surprise that the government doesn’t want to acknowledge the soaring taxpayer costs associated with these mortgage zombies. The truth about Fannie and Freddie has always been hard to come by in Washington, and huge piles of money seem to circulate silently around both firms.

Remember last Christmas Eve? That’s when the Treasury quietly decided to remove the $400 billion limit on federal borrowings available to Fannie and Freddie through 2012.

That stealth move didn’t engender much confidence in either the companies or their government guardian.

But because taxpayers own Freddie and Fannie, we should know more about their buying habits, as Mr. Baker points out. Unfortunately, if the government’s past actions are any indication of what we can expect, then don’t hold your breath waiting for the facts.

Go to Column from The New York Times »
Go to Freddie Mac Quarterly Report »


Filed under: bubble, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: bailout, Debt Collection, Fair Game, Fannie, Freddie Mac, Gretchen Morgenson’s, losses on loans, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, standing, unsecured debt
May
09

Insider Confirms Builder Complicity in Appraisal Fraud

Editor’s Comment: Appraisal fraud, ratings fraud, misrepresentation, steering investors and borrowers in the wrong direction — all of these amount to the same thing: DECEIT. And as everyone knows, when someone is bilked out of money or value through deceit, they are entitled to made whole — as close as possible, and probably entitled to punitive, exemplary or treble damages. This is no theory. This is hundreds of years of common law a statutes.

So why is the media narrative and the courtroom argument centered on whether the homeowner made payments on a loan that was sold to him under false pretenses? Why is the focus on the homeowner when the real creditor is not in the room? Why are they demanding so much money when part or all of the obligation has been paid (satisfied) through credit enhancements, credit default swaps, insurance and federal bailouts?

The reason why the narrative is on the wrong subject is because you let them take over the narrative. In our course coming up on Discovery and Motion Practice we’ll be talking about how to take control of the narrative. But for now, the message is this is an obligation in search of a creditor and the people who are collecting and enforcing the payments of principal and interest are ignoring the fact that payments were made by third parties, sending out statements that are incorrect or just plain lies, and sending out notices of default and notices of sale on mortgages that are paid off in whole or in part by third parties. STAY ON YOUR MESSAGE.

From Comment on Blog: May 8. 2010

Neidermeyer finds it hard to believe that Builders participated in the mortgage fraud because he has not seen it first hand like I have.

I have been in the real estate business since 1993 during that time I was a loan officer for various independent loan brokers. ( no I did not fund ANY preditory loans, option arms, 3 year pre-pay penalties..etc. and my clients were forced to read their paperwork because I was at the closing table with them)

The first fraud I was witness to was borrower steering. The builder would offer incentives to buyers for financing if only the borrower would use the builders in-house lender directly. The incentives on average would be around $3000.00 toward closing costs. At the beginning of the application buyers would be quoted a rate about 1/8 below market so it appeared that the Builders lender would give them a good deal. When the home was finished 6 months later, 9 times out of 10 the rate had risen and the rate at closing was actually 1/8 to 1/4 percent higher than the buyer could have gotten with their original broker.. So the incentive for closing costs was a sham to steer clients to in house banks.. aka Countrywide on many occasions..So new home buyers check the comparative rates the day you closed and you will see the builders lender saved you no money.

2. Appraisal fraud was rampant. New homes always cost more than comparable resale because the prices for upgrades are added into the loan at retail..

What has to be investigated are the first 3-4 sales in the development or nearby developments..who are those parties and what is their relation to the builder? And how was the comparable property purchased? Cash? Deed Transfer of some sort etc.. often employees or relatives of the builder would” buy”” a home and close on it to create a comp.. perhaps 2 and then the appraiser could go outside the development for 3rd comparable sale at another builders development.

Voila they now have comps and they just turned $200k houses into $300k houses!

Condo Developments/ condo conversions: the HOA and property management company will often still be owned by the developer under another LLC.. look for the same officers..the hoa will be asked to certify certain information about the development on the appraisal..such as owner occupancy ratios, number sold etc. And the HOA cert will lie about the ratios to get the appraisal approved in underwriting.

I just had a client win a settlement due to my research..The appraisal was one of the worst I had seen and ordered the Landsafe and Countrywide in house..The comps used were 5 miles away and 2 times the sq ft and bedrooms.. completely uncomparible properties to start with and the adjustments down for sq ft and bedrooms was laughably small..the HOA cert( by the developers other llc) stated 175 owner occupied when there were only 3 mailing addresses in the development in public records for owners that were not in another state! I also found that one of the signatories for the builder had her own LLC’s and one of her business addresses was the one comparable sale within the development included on my clients appraisal and “owned by an entirely different individual!

And the worst thing I found on this appraisal was the appraiser’s comments section where he admitted the unit had not yet been renovated and that the builder intended to do so after the next tenant changeover..NOT RENOVATED YET! and yet still he appraised the unit as/if it was renovated..the targeted client lived out of state and never saw the property he purchased..

I also looked at the early transfers..of course there were 2 that were sold at 160K when nothing prior had sold over 64k..interestingly after the initial inflated transfers there were several deeds recorded by the officers of the builder llc and friends for the same units at 48-68K done quietly so as not to hurt their comparable sales.

Check the upgrade sheets and what you were charged for certain upgrades… a client of mine was charged over $30,000 for paint upgrades! I am not talking murals here.. a sponged hallway and 2 tones for moldings and walls..

So yes the builders are more than responsible for the inflated values..the partnered with the banks to create this market..It is all in the research!


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, STATUTES Tagged: Appraisal, appraisal fraud, appraiser’s comments section, builders, comparable property, comparable sales, Condo, countrywide, early transfers, fraud, HERS, HOA, incentives, independent loan brokers, inflated values, Landsafe, loan officer, mortgage fraud, occupancy ratios, property management company, upgrade sheet, upgrades
May
08

NY Judges Slamming Debt Collectors

Eltman, Eltman & Cooper was one of 35 law firms sued last July by the state, which claimed that they had improperly obtained more than 100,000 judgments in consumer-debt cases. Editor’s notes: The dubious “enforcement” of mortgages, notes and “obligations (that have been paid many times over through credit enhancement) is both mirrored and amplified in the debt collection industry. Servicers are merely debt collectors since they are collecting for a third party. In an investigative report coming soon to these pages you will see that servicers are actually the “real trustee” for the investors, separate and apart from the Special Purpose Vehicle. But that is for later.

For now, before you slide into grief and shame over your financial condition, know this: the people hounding you for money are doing so in most cases illegally and Judges are reversing themselves across the country as they take a closer look at the the procedural tricks routinely employed by those who prey upon consumers with “debt” claims have that long since been extinguished, written off, repackaged into resecuritized asset backed securities, with even more credit swaps on top of the old ones.

In this article from the New York Times, the clarity of the scam is being revealed and unraveled. The ultimate conclusion of this mess will take years if not decades, to move us back to a state of equilibrium. In the meantime, the major piece of advice you will probably get from any consumer law advocate or attorney is this: don’t pay anyone unless you are sure you owe THEM the money. The question is not whether you owe money (i.e., the existence of the obligation), the question is the identity of the creditor and whether the obligation, without your knowledge was already paid in whole or in part by credit default swaps, other credit enhancement techniques, etc.

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May 7, 2010

In New York, Some Judges Are Now Skeptical About Debt Collectors’ Claims

By WILLIAM GLABERSON

As New Yorkers have tumbled into credit card debt in large numbers during the great recession, bill collectors have inundated the courts to get what they say is due. In turn, the courts have issued hundreds of thousands of orders against residents. Some consumer groups argue that by doing so, the courts have become little more than an arm of the debt collection industry.

Now, a few judges in New York State are suggesting that they agree, at least in part, with the consumer groups. They have fumed at debt collectors and their lawyers, scolding them for interest as high as 30 percent a year and berating them for false statements and abusive practices.

Some of the rulings have even been sarcastic or incredulous. In December, a Staten Island judge said debt collectors seemed to think their lawsuits were taking place in a legal Land of Oz, where everyone was supposed to follow anticonsumer rules invented by some unseen debt-collection wizard.

Last month, a Manhattan appeals court threw out a credit card case, saying a debt collection company had sued the wrong person but pursued the case anyway.

“I think these judges are outraged at the status quo, and they’re trying to change it,” said Janet Ray Kalson, a Manhattan lawyer who is the chairwoman of a City Bar Association committee that has studied the deluge of credit card cases.

Debt-buyer businesses purchase debts — along with lists of names and amounts supposedly due — for pennies on the dollar from credit card companies and sometimes have no real evidence about whom they are suing or why. They then file tens of thousands of suits, often with little to back up their claims.

A Nassau County District Court judge said recently, for example, that one of New York City’s high-volume debt collection law firms, which has close ties to a debt-buying company, did not provide “a scintilla of evidence” that there was even a debt in a case against a Long Island woman.

The suit received an unusual amount of attention. The judge, Michael A. Ciaffa, said that it “regrettably, involves a veritable ‘perfect storm’ of mistakes, errors, misdeeds and improper litigation practices.” Judge Ciaffa said the law firm, Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, ignored court orders, made a “demonstrably false” assertion and harassed the woman for payment even after its suit was dismissed.

The case before Judge Ciaffa ended with an order that is far from typical in a credit card suit. The woman who had been sued, Patricia Bohnet, a bookkeeper and single mother, did not have to pay anything. But Eltman, Eltman & Cooper had to pay $14,800 in sanctions for violating ethical rules at least 18 times. Under the judge’s order, $4,800 is to go to Ms. Bohnet and the remainder to a state fund that works to reimburse clients for dishonest conduct by lawyers.

“They don’t care if you’re sick; they don’t care if you’re poor,” Ms. Bohnet said in an interview at her job in Woodmere. “Their only job is to collect money, and they’ll do it in any way possible.”

In response to questions, the law firm said in a written statement that Judge Ciaffa had not had all the facts but that the firm would not appeal. “As with any firm or business that handles this type of volume,” it added, “there exists a potential for errors or omissions in the normal course of business.”

Eltman, Eltman & Cooper was one of 35 law firms sued last July by the state, which claimed that they had improperly obtained more than 100,000 judgments in consumer-debt cases. Separate files in Federal District Court in Brooklyn show that without admitting fault, the Eltman law firm settled a class-action suit in 2006 that claimed it used “false, misleading and deceptive means” to collect debts.

Privately, some judges say they are embarrassed that in many New York courts, debt-collection lawyers have grown so comfortable that they give the impression they are in charge of the proceedings and do not need prove their claims with strong evidence.

In the recent pro-consumer rulings, skepticism of the debt collectors’ claims has been obvious. A Civil Court judge in Brooklyn, Noach Dear, has written decisions that come close to saying that the collection cases are sometimes based on falsehoods.

In a case in August, Judge Dear observed that there was nothing to substantiate a lawyer’s claim that she somehow remembered mailing a document to the credit card holder that was the foundation of the collection suit. The document, Judge Dear noted archly, had been mailed three and a half years earlier.

Behind the legalese of the credit card suits, some judges have suggested, there is often a disorganized jumble of documentation. A Mount Vernon City Court judge noted that one case was based on little more than “a self-serving computer printout.” A Manhattan judge said one company that bought debt claims from credit card companies had filed suit against a cardholder although it did not own that particular debt.

In the Staten Island case, the judge, Philip S. Straniere, said a credit card company was claiming interest of 28 percent on the balance due, which would be illegal as usury under New York law. The company argued that the credit card issued to a New Yorker that seemed to be from a national company had actually been issued by a one-branch bank in Utah, which had no usury law.

“Like the Land of Oz, run by a Wizard who no one has ever seen,” Judge Straniere wrote, “the Land of Credit Cards permits consumers to be bound by agreements they never sign, agreements they may never have received, subject to change without notice and the laws of a state other than those existing where they reside.”

The judge ruled that the supposed agreement allowing unlimited interest charges was not enforceable in New York.

Industry officials said that tales of abusive collection cases were misleading. “There are certainly colorful stories,” said Joann Needleman, an officer of the National Association of Retail Collection Attorneys. “People think that handful is the rule, not the exception, but it’s not.”

But Ms. Bohnet, the Long Island woman who was sued by a New York law firm, said just one case could be harrowing. When she received a call last year at the charity where she keeps the books for $39,000 a year, the voice on the other end told her the debt collectors had a five-year-old court judgment against her for a $4,861 debt. She had to pay, or they would start taking money out of her salary, she said she was told.

The address of the debt-collection firm and its lawyers at Eltman, Eltman & Cooper seemed to be the same, she noticed.

Ms. Bohnet did not know she had ever been sued. She started to cry, she said, worried that with a chunk of money taken every month, she might lose the modest apartment she needed to share custody of her teenage daughter.

“I was in all-out fear,” she said, adding, “After I got off the phone, I realized I didn’t even know what the debt was for.” She might have had an old credit card debt, but she had had some years of problems with alcohol and drugs and tangled financial problems. In recovery, she said, she had worked to clean up her financial affairs.

The next time the collectors called, she said, she told them that she was willing to pay if she owed any money but that she needed to see some proof that they had the right person. Then, without a lawyer, she went to the court, in Hempstead, to check into the order the debt collectors said they had against her.

After some digging, she found the case. The debt-buyer’s lawyers had filed a sworn statement that they said was proof she had been given notice of the suit. A process server for Eltman, Eltman & Cooper claimed she had been given a copy of the suit personally on July 30, 2004.

Judge Ciaffa doubted that. Ms. Bohnet, he wrote, “hadn’t lived at that address since 1998.”


Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Motion Practice and Discovery, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: debt, Debt Collectors, Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, judges, New York, Obligation, Philip S. Straniere, usury, WILLIAM GLABERSON
May
02

A Fellow You might Want to talk With About Morgan Stanley Credit Default Swaps

Morgan Stanley’s head of European leveraged credit trading has resigned. Robert Lepone, who oversaw various teams, including high yield bonds, leveraged loans, credit default swaps and distressed debt, left Morgan Stanley’s London office for personal reasons, a spokesman said. His replacement will be announced in the coming weeks, the spokesman said, declining to comment further. Lepone’s departure comes less than two weeks after Joseph McManus, a vice president with Morgan Stanley’s investment-grade credit products group, left to join CastleOak Securities’ fixed-income sales team.


Filed under: bubble, CORRUPTION, HERS, investment banking, Investor, securities fraud Tagged: CastleOak Securities, credit products, European leveraged credit trading, HERS, investment-grade credit products group, Joseph McManus, leveraged credit trading, Morgan Stanley, Robert Lepone