Feb
09

The Servicing Settlement: Banks 1, Public 0

What are we to make of the servicing settlement announced today with much hoopla?  The short answer is not much.  The settlement is the large consumer fraud settlement ever, but it accomplishes remarkably little in terms of either alleviating the foreclosure crisis of holding to account those responsible for the housing bubble and subsequent foreclosure abuses.  As my Texas relatives say, it's “All sizzle, no steak.” 

Instead, I think the settlement needs be seen as the conclusion to round one of an on-going struggle for accountability and reparations for the enormous damage the housing bubble did to the United States.  Whether we will ultimately see meaningful accountability and reparations in the end is very much in question.  Round two, featuring the Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Fraud taskforce, could well be stillborn; the taskforce combines more motivated and more capable agencies, but it isn't clear of the motivated can leverage the more capable or will be bogged down by them. But as for this settlement, if this is all that we get, it’s a big nothing. 

There are two big issues to parse in the settlement:  what does it cover and what sort of relief does it provide.  Not surprisingly, both are quite limited; the banks wouldn’t pay big dollars for a small release. 

The settlement covers mortgage servicing abuses, as well as a $1 billion settlement of claims that Countrywide (BoA) was cheating the FHA.  It also includes settlements of litigation by the Arizona and Nevada AGs for BoA’s violations of an earlier settlement.  It also covers some origination claims on which the statutes of limitations have run or will shortly expire.  The settlement apparently (and here the precise language is crucial) excludes securitization-related claims, fair lending claims, false claims acts violations, MERS issues, and criminal claims.  It also doesn’t prevent homeowners or investors from bringing their own suits.  So it’s really covering robosigning and overbilling in foreclosures. 

Given the relatively narrow scope of this settlement, it’s not surprising that the dollars involved are quite small compared to the overall harms created by the housing bubble and aftermath.  The formal price tag for the settlement is $25 billion, although it is projected to accomplish up to $40 billion in relief. Only $5 billion of that is hard cash contributed by the banks.  Let me repeat that.  The five banks involved in the settlement, which have a combined market capitalization of over $500 billion, are putting in only $5 billion.  That’s less than 1% of their net worth.  And they are admitting no wrongdoing.  To call that accountability is laughable. 

That $5 billion in hard cash is going to the state and federal government, only some of which will be given to borrowers.  What about the other $20 billion?  That’s to come in the form of $3 billion in refinancings and $17 billion in principal reductions, deeds in lieu, short sales, anti-blight measures, etc.  The banks receive variable credit for these actions, depending on whether these measures are taken for loans owned by the banks or owned by others and serviced by the banks.  Basically, it’s full credit if the bank owns the loan, and half credit if the bank merely services the loan.  Because of this formulation, the $17 billion in principal reductions, DILs, short sales is anticipated to result in $32 billion in actual relief.  In other words, it is expected that the banks will modify the loans owned by others rather than the loans they themselves own.  And when a second lien loan owned by the bank is involved, it only has to be written down pari passu (at the same percentage) as the first lien loan.  So from absolute to relative priority, which is a major handout to the big banks, which have large underwater second lien positions. 

Or put differently, $32 billion of the settlement is being financed on the dime of MBS investors such as pension funds, 401(k) plans, insurance companies, and the like—parties that did not themselves engage in any of the wrong-doing covered by the settlement.  This shouldn’t be a surprise—the state Attorneys General previously cut a similar deal with Bank of America, which promised to make up for its wrongdoing by modifying loans own by other parties. 

But let’s get to the bigger problem.  Whether this is a $25 billion or $40 billion settlement is really beside the point.  It’s a drop in the bucket relative to the scale of the problem.  There is approximately $700 billion in negative equity nationwide weighing down the housing market and the economy.  Add to that legions of homeowners dealing with unemployment or underemployment and we’ve got a problem that absolutely dwarfs the settlement numbers.  It’s Pollyannism to think that this settlement will have any impact on the national housing market.  At best it makes some incremental improvements and helps a small number of homeowners.  But at worst, it lets the banks off the hook for the largest financial crime in history. 

I can’t say I’m surprised, however.  There was no investigation was done prior to this settlement.  That had been the sticking point for a number of attorneys general who eventually signed on to the settlement, but only once it was narrowed.  But that doesn’t take away the problem that there was no investigation.  If you go bear hunting without any ammo, you aren’t going to bag a bear.

To illustrate how little the settlement does for the housing market, let’s take the settlement’s most optimistic projections and assume that it really results in $40 billion of mortgage relief of various sorts.  How much does that translate into per distressed homeowner?  Let’s assume that the universe of distressed homeowners is limited to those underwater—roughly 11 million.  So we’re talking $3,636 per homeowner.  That doesn’t help a whit in terms of preventing foreclosure. 

Now to be sure, the relief will be more concentrated on a subset of these homeowners.  The settlement is estimated to help about 2 million homeowners, hopefully to the tune of about $22,000 each.  That's certainly a lot better than $3,636, but consider that the average negative equity is about $50,000.  At a very generous best, then the settlement only gets rid of less than half of the negative equity for 18% of underwater homeowners.  So we're talking about a solution that has less than a 10% impact.  Best case scenario is less than 1 in 10 are helped.  In any case, those luck few, will be chosen not by where the relief will help the most or by who is most deserving, but by what will be most advantageous to the banks.  So some lucky group of homeowners will have “won the lottery” and in some cases might avoid foreclosure.  For most distressed homeowners, it’s “no soup for you!” And because fixing the housing sector is about volume, this means that there's no soup for all of us--the housing sector will remain severely depressed. 

What about the argument that the settlement will help the housing market by enabling foreclosures to start up again and for banks to clear through the shadow inventory?  Well, what’s causing the shadow inventory?  Is it the possibility of state and federal prosecutions for robosigning?  Is it lack of uniform servicing standards?  Nope, and nope.  The shadow inventory problem is at core the result of two problems.  First, the foreclosure system only has limited bandwidth—there are only so many foreclosures that can be processed at a time.  Second, the banks have their own staffing issues.  And third, the bigger problem is that the banks don’t have their paperwork in order to foreclose. This servicing settlement doesn’t affect any of these problems (maybe it will encourage better staffing on behalf of the banks, but if that hasn’t happened by year 5 of the crisis, I can’t imagine it will any time soon).  National servicing standards as part of a settlement in no way replace existing state and local requirements, and to the extent they supplement them, it may make things harder for the banks. The fact that a bank is in compliance with the servicing standards in the settlement doesn't mean that the bank can in fact foreclose, and litigation of foreclosure actions is private litigation, not governed by this deal. (And this leaves aside the question of bank compliance with this settlement.) 

The settlement also creates really awful incentives.  It has zero deterrent effect against future wrong-doing.  This settlement set a price-tag for mortgage servicing abuses.  If the abuses are more profitable than the cost of settlement, what rational bank wouldn’t engage in them?  The early CFPB-settlement analysis that was leaked months ago envisioned $25 billion as being simply the disgorgement component, not the remedial component.  Here we have a settlement with $ 5 billion in actual disgorgement and very little that’s remedial, let alone punitive (which is necessary to have deterrence). 

Also announced in conjunction with the big settlement were the fines the OCC is imposing as part of its consent orders.  They total $394 million, but they are payable either in cash or in kind via relief given to homeowners as part of the OCC Potemkin foreclosure review process.  Please Hammer, Don't Hurt 'Em! (Hmm, maybe the banks' theme song should be "U Can't Touch This".) 

Is this really the best our government can do?  I hope not.  This settlement might or might not be the end of the attempt to rectify the financial crisis, but as things stand, we have a settlement in which the banks commit to follow the law and pay out some pocket change.  The settlement doesn’t fix the housing market.  It doesn’t create accountability for the financial crisis.  It doesn’t even create incentives against future wrong-doing.  But it provides the Obama Administration (and those attorney generals who just jumped in for the settlement at the last minute) with a fig leaf of political cover.  It galls me is that the Obama Administration is going to trumpet this settlement as evidence that it is serious about prosecuting the crimes behind the financial crisis and helping homeowners.  It was heartening to hear Obama talk about protecting the middle class in his State of the Union address.  It was the right message, but the President is simply not a credible messenger.  If Obama wants to run as the champion of Main Street against Romney, the Captain of Wall Street, he’s going to need to do something a lot more credible than this settlement.

 The score:  Banks 1, Public 0. 

 

Feb
03

Foreclosure Politics Here and Across the Pond – Professor David Coates on a Mandelman Matters Podcast

 

Since 1999, Professor David Coates has been the Worrell Chair of Anglo-American Studies at Wake Forest University.  Prior to joining the faculty at Wake Forest he directed the International Centre for Labour Studies, and was Professor of Government at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom.  He also writes a blog at www.davidcoates.com, and it’s absolutely a fantastic read in all cases.

I found Professor Coates’ blog last year on my birthday as I was searching the Web for like voices and when I came across his, I felt like I had been given a birthday present.  And I wrote to him at the time and told him exactly that.

David’s latest article, for example, is titled: Republican Truth and the Real Truth: GSEs and the Housing Bubble.

David and I have been communicating over the last year and I invited him to join me on a podcast because he offers points of view that are as fascinating as they are erudite and well-considered.  They are also not the same thing you’ve heard before, as they cover the foreclosure crisis both here in the U.S and in the UK.  He also talks about the global financial crisis and the political ramifications that are manifesting themselves in this country and frankly, what he says is important at every turn.

David has also written two books, both of which you can find on his blog.  One is, “Answering Back,” which offers “liberal responses to conservative arguments,” and the other, “Making the Progressive Case.”  Both are worth reading.

I’ve learned a lot from Professor Coates and I’m confident you will too.  So, turn up your speakers… click below… sit back and relax… and listen to an uninterrupted hour with Professor David Coates as he talks about the foreclosure crisis here and in the UK, why democracy and progressive politics are more important today than perhaps ever before…  and whole lot more… on A Mandelman Matters Podcast.

(Plus… I don’t know about you, but somehow the foreclosure crisis sounds better in a British accent… go figure.)

CLICK BELOW

Mandelman Out.

 

 

Jan
20

Holder, Breuer connected to players in foreclosure fraud?

"I think it's difficult to find a fraud of this size on the U.S. court system in U.S. history."


For years, the Left has asked why the Obama administration hasn’t pursued prosecutions against lenders who arguably engaged in fraud when foreclosing on mortgages in the wake of the housing-bubble collapse.  It turns out that these lenders had friends in high places in the Department of Justice.  Reuters reports that both Attorney General Eric Holder [...]

Read this post »

Jan
04

Fedspeak White Paper | The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations

The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations The ongoing problems in the U.S. housing market continue to impede the economic recovery. House prices have fallen an average of about 33 percent from their 2006 peak, resulting in about $7 trillion in household wealth losses and an associated ratcheting down of aggregate consumption. At … Read more Related posts:
  1. $50 – $100 Billion | White Paper – Is FHA the Next Housing Bailout?
  2. Adam Levitin and Tara Twomey White Paper on Mortgage Servicing
  3. Explaining the Housing Bubble – A Georgetown University Law Center Paper
Dec
31

A New Theory of the Role of the GSEs in the Housing Bubble

Bill Black has an interesting new take on the role of Fannie and Freddie in the housing bubble. He sees their investment in non-prime mortgages as being driven by executive compensation, rather than a fight for market share against investment bank securitization conduits or govt affordable housing policy. The government affordable housing policy point has been repeatedly debunked (and Susan Wachter and I have a new paper that adds to this debunking via an examination of the commercial real estate bubble, where there was no government involvement whatsoever). Black is not, however, able to disprove the market share theory. What he does point to is that the GSE's involvement with nonprime mortgages was as whole loans kept in portfolio, rather than securitized (and also via purchases of MBS), which he says was a move to increase the short-term yield for the GSEs and thus maximize short-term executive compensation.

I think this is an interesting theory, but there are a few data points necessary to make it work, and I'm skeptical that they all support Black. 

According to Black, the GSEs' involvement in nonprime mortgages grew out of their earlier accounting scandals. Black sees these scandals as the result of efforts to increase executive compensation. He argues that Fannie and Freddie first tried to goose their returns by increasing the size of their whole loan portfolios and thus taking on massive interest rate risk. Fannie bet the wrong direction on interest rates and this resulted in the Fannie accounting scandal as it tried to cover up its losses. Freddie got the bet right, but then tried to set up a "cookie jar" to cover future losses in order to inflate future earnings. The SEC was having none of it, and forced out the CEOs and mandated accounting restatements. In the wake of these scandals, OFHEO (the GSE's regulator) made the GSEs limit their hedging activities and reduce the size of their portfolios.  

Black argues that this boxed in the GSEs in terms of how their could up their returns. In order to increase the returns from their portfolio, they shifted it to non-prime products, and moved more of the prime products into MBS. He further argues that the only thing that kept the GSEs from getting into really poorly underwriting non-prime products was that their risk managers and underwriters had a superior culture of responsibility and fought harder to maintain standards.

I don't doubt that executive compensation could (and probably did) play a role in the GSEs' purchases of nonprime mortgages. But Black hasn't presented a convincing story. His story relies on three pieces of evidence that he has not produced: first, that the GSEs' kept the nonprime in portfolio and securitized only prime; second, that this execution was more profitable in the short term than securitizing the nonprime mortgages; and third, that the GSEs' had a superior culture of underwriting and risk-management that kept things in check.

The first point should be reasonably easy to verify. But I'm less sure about the second, and the third, is entirely speculative. Regarding the second point, remember that the GSEs' bear the credit risk on mortgages regardless of whether they are in portfolio or securitized (via a guarantee). The only difference is whether the GSEs bear the interest rate risk, which they do for portfolio, but not for securitized loans. Unless there was a real difference in yield based on interest rate risk (which is possible) between a securitized and a portfolio nonprime loan, there'd be no reason to securitize the prime and keep the non-prime in portfolio because of higher yields. That matters because Black's argument that the GSE involvement in non-prime was because of higher yields which boosted executive compensation, and if the form of their involvement didn't track with yields, this story falls apart. Certainly the investment banks decided that securitization rather than portfolio was the better execution, and it's hard to believe that the economics would have been different for the GSEs. 

Again, an executive compensation angle is quite possible, but I think there's a lot to be said for the market share theory. Executive compensation (and tenure) depended on GSE share price, and GSE share price was dependent upon market share, which was falling. What happened, then was an insurance rate war. The GSEs are best understood as mono-insurance companies, like MBIA (or AIG): like insurance companies they have an investment portfolio (MBS or whole loans) and they issue bond insurance, in the form of the guarantees on their MBS. The only difference is that the GSEs securitize the products that they insure.

A major insurance regulation concern is preventing rate wars for market share, as a rate war will leave all competitors undercapitalized for paying out future claims. The GSEs got into a rate war with private-label MBS. They did this not by lowering the G-fee that they charge for their guarantee, but by holding the G-fee constant and lowering underwriting standards. The rate that the GSEs charge needs to be understood as a risk-adjusted rate, and while the stated rate stayed constant, the risk-adjustment did not, resulting in a lower risk-adjusted rate.

Bottom line here is that we don't have definitive evidence supporting for any of the theories of the GSEs' involvement in the housing bubble. There's strong evidence against some theories, but little affirmative evidence. The GSEs are themselves sitting on the best evidence; it would be really nice to see FHFA (or the FHFA IG) put out a definitive report on the role of the GSEs in the housing bubble.  

Dec
28

Deutsche Bank Offers U.S. Plans for Renting Fraudclosed Homes

Deutsche Bank Offers U.S. Plans for Renting Foreclosed Homes Fortress Investment Group LLC (FIG) and Deutsche Bank AG (DB), whose executives played roles in the housing bubble, are among the hundreds of firms that responded to a U.S. government request for proposals to rent out foreclosed fraudclosed homes. The Federal Housing Finance Agency asked for … Read more Related posts:
  1. Fannie Mae Offers Bonus to Realtors to Drive Sales of its Foreclosed Homes
  2. Barry Ritholtz’s Answer to the Foreclosure Mess: Sell the Fraudclosed, Clouded Title Homes to Unsuspecting Immigrants (VIDEO)
  3. No Money? No Problem! | HUD Offers REO Homes for $100 Down in Select States Using Non Recourse Leverage
Dec
16

Matt Stoller | Treat Foreclosure as a Crime Scene

“What is behind these suits? Simple: Crime by mortgage servicers and their contractors. And this is more than just the crime of these foreclosures themselves — it’s the residual tail end of a housing bubble based on fraud. The reason these bank servicers must now routinely employ notaries using false documentation is because they never … Read more No related posts.
Dec
14

MERS: A Twenty First Century Creation Navigating An Eighteenth Century Legal System

MERS: A Twenty First Century Creation Navigating An Eighteenth Century Legal System Introduction One need not be an expert in banking or real estate to have become acutely aware of the 2008 financial crisis and the housing bubble that largely precipitated it. High unemployment, low economic growth, and record government deficits are daily reminders of … Read more Related posts:
  1. Asshat Alert | Ajay Rajadhyaksha, Managing Director of Barclays Capital – Legalizing the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) Will Streamline the Legal Process to Accurately Transfer Loans
  2. Fannie Mae SEC 10-Q Report “MERS System could pose counterparty, operational, reputational and legal risks for us.”
  3. Statement by CEO of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) “The MERS System is not fraudulent, and MERS has not committed any fraud.”
Nov
27

NY Times Editorial | Mitt Romney on Fraudclosures

Mr. Romney on Foreclosures Since the housing bubble began to burst six years ago, prices nationwide have fallen by a third. Nearly $7 trillion of home equity has been wiped out. Currently, some 14.7 million homeowners owe $700 billion more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. Going forward, prices are likely to fall … Read more Related posts:
  1. Kathleen “Blame the Victim” Passidomo Endorses Presidential Candidate Mitt “The Foreclosurer” Romney
  2. Mitt Romney Fund-raiser,T. Martin Fiorentino Jr, Lobbied for Foreclosure Firm, Lender Processing Services
  3. TH EDITORIAL BOARD | Iowa AG Tom Miller Owes Explanation to the People RE Campaign Donations from Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Companies
Nov
24

Unmistakably April Charney – A Mandelman Matters Podcast

If there was a Hall of Fame for the foreclosure crisis, and perhaps one day there will be, there is no question that attorney April Charney would be one of the first to be indoctrinated.  She’s been fighting for the rights of homeowners for decades, and training other lawyers to do the same since 1994.  Of course, the advent of securitization and the meltdown of our financial and credit markets, combined with the effects of our housing bubble, has caused an economic catastrophe not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s, changed everything, but April has been right there on the front lines of the fight to keep people in their homes.  I’d say she knows as much about securitization and what went so terribly wrong as anyone in the country, and she has a way of explaining it, so that judges… and anyone else for that matter can understand it.

April and I have gotten to be friends over the last couple of years, and I have an enormous amount of respect for her, both as a person and as a professional.  She is someone that will not keep quiet… she will not back down… and she will never give up when fighting for what she knows to be right.  She is one of the few people on the planet that I trust unconditionally.  I may not always agree with every single position she takes, but whenever she tells me something, I always give it great consideration, because I know that she does not take positions without having done the same.  In my view, April Charney is one of the lawyers in this country that reminds us that some attorneys should be revered by our society.  If the foreclosure mill attorney David Stern had a polar opposite or arch nemesis… no question it would be April.

Okay, so there no reason for me to say anything more to introduce April, she really is someone that requires no introduction.  She’s been quoted by the media countless times related to the foreclosure crisis, and anyone involved in representing homeowners at risk of foreclosure knows her name and what’s she’s accomplished for homeowners in Florida.  And by the way, she’s also a good friend of Max Gardner’s, another hero of this crisis.

So, whether you’re a homeowner fighting to keep your home… or a lawyer who represents homeowners in foreclosure, here’s an opportunity to hear what April has to say about where we’ve been, where we are today, and where she thinks we might be tomorrow… it’s one solid hour of April at her candid best… you really don’t want to miss it.

Just click the play button below and turn up your speakers…

… it’s a Mandelman Matters Podcast

with Jacksonville Legal Aid Senior Attorney, April Charney…


Mandelman out.

Nov
22

Janet M. Tavakoli | MF Global Revelations Keep Getting Worse

MF Global Revelations Keep Getting Worse By Janet Tavakoli – November 21, 2011 When MF Global collapsed on October 21, it was the biggest financial firm to collapse since Lehman in September 2008. Then Chairman and CEO Jon Corzine is connected to the head of one of his key regulators, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission … Read more Related posts:
  1. Foreclosuregate | Janet Tavakoli – Repairing the Damage of “Fraud as a Business Model”
  2. A Global View of the Housing Bubble (CHART)
  3. Wikileaks – Interpol Issues Global Arrest Warrant for Julian Assange for “Sex Crimes”
Nov
22

A Chart of All the Money

Click to Enlarge ~ 4closureFraud.org Tweet Related posts:Pompous Prognosticators Chart of the Great Depression Pompous Prognosticators Chart of the Great Depression A Global View of the Housing Bubble (CHART) Related posts:
  1. Pompous Prognosticators Chart of the Great Depression
  2. Pompous Prognosticators Chart of the Great Depression
  3. A Global View of the Housing Bubble (CHART)
Nov
15

$50 – $100 Billion | White Paper – Is FHA the Next Housing Bailout?

Joseph Gyourko1 Martin Bucksbaum Professor of Real Estate, Finance, and Business & Public Policy The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania ~ Is FHA the Next Housing Bailout? Introduction Yes, is the answer to the question posed in the title of this report. That will seem a brave conclusion to some, given that the Federal Housing … Read more Related posts:
  1. Brad Miller Letter to Federal Housing Finance Agency Acting Director Ed DeMarco RE BofA $8.5 Billion Settlement
  2. Explaining the Housing Bubble – A Georgetown University Law Center Paper
  3. Bank of America Pays $1.1 BILLION to Settle Insurer’s Reps and Warranties Claims
Nov
14

A Global View of the Housing Bubble (CHART)

  A Global View of the Housing Bubble Interesting chart from (of all places) McKinsey, circa October 2009: “From 2000 through 2007, a remarkable run-up in global home prices occurred (see chart). But that trend has reversed abruptly. In 2008, the value of US residential real estate fell 10 percent; the global average fared only … Read more Related posts:
  1. Explaining the Housing Bubble – A Georgetown University Law Center Paper
  2. Regulators and Industry Insiders KNEW We Were in a Housing Bubble
  3. What Happens to Household Formation in a Recession
Nov
11

Private Wall Street Companies Caused The Financial Crisis – Not Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Or The Community Reinvestment Act

Private Wall Street Companies Caused The Financial Crisis — Not Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Or The Community Reinvestment Act In the four years since the housing bubble burst, triggering a collapse in global financial markets whose value had been propped up through the repackaging and trading of home loans via complex financial instruments, there’s been … Read more Related posts:
  1. Report | WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse
  2. Abigail Field | Policy Makers: Bank and Wall Street Greed, Not “Irresponsible Homeowners”, Caused Our Crisis
  3. Financial Crisis Commission Finds Cause For Prosecution Of Wall Street
Nov
09

The US’s Missing Housing Policy

The United States has no housing policy. And there's none on the horizon either. That's a scary thing, given the centrality of housing to domestic economic woes.  

Once upon a time, the US had a housing policy. It was focused on increasing homeownership. It might have been a misguided policy or at least a policy taken too far, but it was a policy and everyone understood that. It meant that programs were designed to work toward that goal.

Today, 4 years into a housing crisis, we still have no housing policy. There's no plan to clean up the legacy of the housing bubble and no plan to build the future of housing finance. This sad state reflects a singular failure of political leadership.  It also reflects a deeply fragmented housing finance world in which no one is in a position to call the shots. 

Legacy Issues

Let's start with the legacy problems, namely the foreclosure crisis and the collapse of home prices. The Administration has never really figured out where it stands on these issues. It makes nods to the need to fix the housing market as part of economic recovery, yet it has assiduously avoided confronting the foreclosure crisis and housing price collapse as a macroeconomic issue. Instead, it has come up with a stream of poorly integrated, small-bore programs that it has greatly overhyped, even as the programs under-deliver. This is HAMP, HARP, FHAShortRefi, etc. 

HARP 2.0 and the proposed multi-state foreclosure settlement don't even qualify as manque housing policy. They are just continuations of the small-bore approach. The reason it feels like there is no plan is because there is no plan.  The problem here isn't just that people are losing their houses. It's that we've lost control of the ship. We've lost a policy vision. 

Why this non-commital approach? Because there is simply no way of dealing with the legacy problem without dealing with negative equity, and that means forcing loss recognition somewhere in the system, either on banks or on taxpayers. That's a painful move politically, and the Administration has kept trying to avoid manning up to the problem. As a result, it looks a lot like Greece, where there's lots of energy spent denying the inevitable. From a good government perspective, however, it's horrendeously irresponsible. 

So who is calling the shots? I was just on a panel about this at the fabulous AmeriCatalyst housing conference, and it is painfully obvious that no one is calling the shots. The ship is rudderless on housing. Part of this is because of the fragmented administrative authority.  HUD would seem to be the go-to office, but HUD's authority is over FHA and VA and Ginnie Mae, all a limited part of the market. FHFA has authority over the GSEs, but it is as a receiver, and the FHFA Director is an acting director and a career civil servant. The prudential bank regulators each have their own sphere and they aren't interested in housing policy. They are interested in the safety-and-soundness of their regulatory charges. Treasury and the Fed would both seem to have a macro-view of the world, but neither is really expert in housing. Prior to 2008, Treasury had never done anything with housing, while the Fed has only ever approached housing in terms of interest rate manipulation and as a bank regulator. The Council of Economic Advisors and the Domestic Policy Council in the White House would seem to be places where one would find a larger cross-market view and a policy focus, but they aren't staffed with "housies". There's no one in a position to see the whole market and with the expertise and authority to craft a policy.  One of these entities could step forward to try and take some leadership, but the personalities just don't seem to be there for that to happen. Instead, housing policy on legacy issues is being made one case at a time in the courts with foreclosure suits. Is that how a national market should work?

One suggestion has been for a national "foreclosure czar".  The right person in such a job could help corral the various disparate interests at play, but I would not be overly optimistic. A foreclosure czar would have a convening power proportionate to his or her personal prestige, but no ability to impose a policy vision. The leadership here needs to come from the White House, I think, but it hasn't been forthcoming. 

Future of Housing Finance 

We also have no plan for the future of housing finance. There are several well-developed future of housing finance plans circulating (including one from the Center for American Progress's Mortgage Finance Working Group, of which I am a member), but that proposal is just a proposal. It isn't policy. We've gotten a non-committal set of options from Treasury and HUD, but haven't seen things move beyond that.

In fairness to the Administration, the lack of forward-looking housing finance reform isn't solely its fault. Housing finance is a political 3d rail. There's deep, deep ideological divide on the solution, and the hybrid public-private nature of the past system has given everyone ammo for their position.

The ideological right blames everything on the role of government in the system and wants to privatize, damn the torpedos. Never mind that there isn't the private-risk capital in the world to support our $6T in securitized residential housing assets.

There's a left position that wants to see something more like nationalization or at least a very prominent government affordable housing role.  And then there's the non-engaged left, that just doesn't give a damn about the future of housing finance. In their view, the ability of homeowners to buy a house in 10 years doesn't matter much when people are losing their houses today. 

There's a fair amount of consensus on the big picture between the craven right and the moderate left that there needs to be a continuation of the public-private system in some form, but no consensus on the details. The extremes on both ends of this debate have prevented the moderate consensus from solidifying or advancing, at least until after the 2012 election. 

Is There a GOP Alternative?

So if the Administration doesn't have a housing policy, do any of the GOP contenders?  No, sadly. Watching the GOP debate this evening, it was clear why none of the candidates has emerged as a front-runner:  none of them are ready for prime time. Romney seemed a notch or two more polished than the rest (he also looked like he just got off the red-eye), but it was hard to ignore the pointed question posed to him about why his 59 point economic plan has nothing on housing. The response that it's a "jobs plan" not a housing plan just underscored that he doesn't have any ideas on how to address the elephant in the room for the economy. If he had a housing plan, that was the time to present it. 

Nov
01

Bloomberg to OWS: Congress caused the mortgage crisis, not the banks

The smoking gun?


By this time, everyone should be aware of the federal policies that precipitated the housing bubble and its collapse — the push by Congress and two administrations to push higher-risk lending in order to expand home ownership, as well as the effort by Congress to get Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to spread that risk [...]

Read this post »

Oct
24

Fraudclosures | Regulators Seize Main PMI Subsidiary

Regulators Seize Main PMI Subsidiary The main subsidiary of mortgage insurer PMI Group Inc. has been seized by insurance regulators in Arizona, and will begin paying just 50% of claims beginning Monday, according to its website. The remainder of each claim will be deferred, the company said. PMI becomes the second mortgage insurer since the … Read more Related posts:
  1. Fraudclosures | Who’s Lying? Federal Regulators? MBS Trustees & Document Custodians? Florida Bankers?
  2. Feds Investigating LPS Subsidiary DOCX
  3. Regulators and Industry Insiders KNEW We Were in a Housing Bubble
Oct
18

The Sweep-It-Under-the-Rug Housing Plan (updated)

There is $700 billion in negative equity in the US. That is the critical figure. Any housing plan that doesn’t take a serious bite out of that $700 billion isn’t worth discussing. It’s just window dressing. And that’s exactly what the latest iteration of the Tom Miller-led AG mortgage servicing settlement is. Sure it’s been sweetened by the addition of some interest rate reductions for underwater, but current homeowners (discussed at the end of this post), but that’s small potatoes. The latest settlement proposal is an exercise in rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

It’s time that we recognize that negative equity is the critical problem in the US economy. Fix negative equity and you will fix the US economy. That is because negative equity is the key for repairing household balance sheets, and that is the catalyst for getting consumers spending again, getting banks lending again, and getting businesses hiring again. If we're serious about dealing with negative equity, we need to address it directly and not engage in an extend and pretend dance. 

It's also time that we recognize that negative equity didn't just appear by itself.  This wasn't a freak weather event.  It was a man-made disaster.  We ended up with negative equity because of a housing bubble inflated by very deliberate acts by a limited number of financial institutions that profitted greatly from bloating the economy with cheap and unsustainable mortgage financing. We witnessed a macro-economic crime and are living with the consequences of it. 

Why negative equity matters for the economy

Consumer spending is 70% of GDP. If there’s any stagnation or contraction in consumer spending, its effects reverberate throughout the economy. That’s where we are today. We’re in a balance sheet recession caused by households pulling back on their spending because their concerned about their households’ financial position. The central reason for this concern is that houses—historically the major asset of most households—are worth much less than they were and, in many cases, worth less than the debt they secure. Unless households feel more confident in their balance sheets, they won't go out and spend (and banks won't make them loans to spend).  And that means less consumer demand for goods/services, which means less jobs, and a vicious cycle starts.

The Administration and the AGs’ goal seems to be to make the housing problem go away. It won’t go away. That should be patently obvious by now. The goal has to be to fix the market, not to cover it up its problems.

Negative Equity is a Market Clearing Problem

To understand what is so problematic about negative equity, it’s worth thinking about how a market should function—willing buyers and willing sellers should meet and agree on a price. When they do the deal, the market clears at the deal price and welfare is enhanced through exchanges that both parties see as value-enhancing. The problem with the housing market is that willing buyers and willing sellers can agree on a price, but can’t do the deal. They can’t do it because of the presence of a mortgage on the property. To wit, if you agree to buy my house for $200k, we can’t do the deal if there’s a $265k mortgage on the house. There’s a “due-on-sale” clause on the mortgage, that would accelerate the entire debt. And unless I can pay off the mortgage, it would continue to be on the house, and the lender could foreclose and take the house away from you unless you paid the $65k.

Foreclosures Are an Inefficient Market Clearing Mechanism

We do have one way of clearing the housing market: foreclosures. But foreclosures are an incredibly slow and inefficient method of market clearing, even in the best of times. Foreclosures are rife with negative externalities on neighbors, communities, and local government, and they can result in the market over-clearing because of information problems (foreclosure sale purchasers don’t have a right of inspection pre-sale, so they can’t tell if the plumbing has been torn out before they buy. No refunds. Even if the house is packed with dead cats. Yup. That’s a real case.)

What this means is that Mitt Romney is just delusional when he suggests that the solution to Nevada’s problems is to speed up the pace of foreclosures. The foreclosure timetable has gotten a lot slower, not least because of banks’ paperwork snafus, but there are also system capacity issues. And lots of fast foreclosures would have a firesale effect on prices and drive down prices further. We saw this in other markets in fall 2008. And yes, even delinquent borrowers have due process rights. Delinquent homeowners are people too, my friend.

Now this isn’t the first time in recent memory we’ve had a market freeze. In the fall of 2008, we had market freezes across the economy—markets weren’t clearing because sellers were concerned whether their buyers would be money good. We fixed that with a simple tool—the government guarantee. The government pretty much said it stood behind everyone major. That unfroze markets. But it didn’t unfreeze the mortgage market because the government didn’t stand behind the mortgages. Indeed, the thought of doing so wasn’t even on the table. Treasury and the Fed really only have one tool in their toolbox—throwing the financial wherewithal of the United States behind a faltering entity. That’s easy to do with a few thousand banks. But with millions of homeowners? Not in Treasury’s conceptual universe.

How to Deal with Negative Equity

So we’re left with the problem of negative equity preventing the housing market from clearing. There’s only one way to skin this cat. The negative equity has to be eliminated. Period. We hoped at first that we’d grow out of it. Fat chance. This is the anchor weighing down the ship. So now it’s just a question of whether we try to clear the market via foreclosure or whether someone pays to clear the market, meaning that the book values at which mortgages are carried are written down to market values or something close to it.

Who should pay? This is basic justice. Those who broke the economy should pay to fix it.  You break it, you take it. We bailed out the banks because they are indispensible to the economy as a whole, but that doesn’t mean that they shouldn’t have to pay now. $20-25 billion is a fine price tag for robosigning. But this isn’t and shouldn’t be about robosigning. Robosigning was symptom of a much larger endeavor in reckless lending, in which corner cutting was the order of the day, from MERS to securitization paper work to no-doc loans.  All of this was done to maximize profits and to enable a housing bubble that was hugely profitable to a limited number of financial institutions and with extraordinary collateral damage.  Simply put, there needs to be accountability for blowing up the economy.

Again, those who broke the economy should pay to fix it. And someone needs to go to jail. (We sent over a thousand folks to the pokey for the S&L debacle. So far we’ve sent a couple of small fry to jail. That’s grossly inadequate for justice. But that’s another matter.)  The point is that $20-25 billion is 3% of the book value of the 5 big servicers and just 6% of their market cap. Hardly “breaks the bank.” This settlement is a blip for them. If they can pay $25 billion and see their market value go up $40 billion because of the uncertainty cleared up, it’s a no-brainer for them. But when you look at BoA and see that it’s market cap is $65 billion against a book value of $220 billion, it shows that the market recognizes that BoA’s assets aren’t worth what BoA claims (or that BoA’s got huge unrecognized liabilities). Writing down negative equity would start to make book and market values converge, which is where they should be. And that’s important for getting banks lending.

The Latest Version of the Tom Miller AG Settlement Plan

Sadly, the Tom Miller-DOJ plan doesn't seem to do anything on this front.  As far as I can tell, the Tom Miller-DOJ plan is only about servicing issues. But while servicing is the consumer protection issue of the day, it’s a nothing relative to the scope of the harm involved. If one approaches this as a prosecutor, the major harm done wasn’t the servicing fraud. It was the pump-and-dump the banks did on the entire housing market. They recklessly inflated the housing prices and profited greatly from it. And the taxpayers, the government, and mortgage investors were left holding the bag. Tagging the banks for $20-25 billion and calling it a day would be nothing short of a disgrace. On this one the Tom Miller-led group of AGs need to need to play big or they need to pack it up and go home. Dicking around over $25B with five institutions that have a market cap of around $400 billion is just bush league. But then, that’s all they really can hope to get when they try to negotiate a settlement without doing any investigation. It’s frankly an abuse of the public trust for AGs to be settling claims without investigation.  

[update:  now we learn that this settlement is going to include a release of origination fraud claims against the banks in exchange for an additional $2B-$4B. It's Keystone Cops worse than Keystone Cops. For a while the AGs just looked incompetent in the settlement negotiations. But now it's gone from incompetence to outright malfeasance. To contemplate a release of origination claims that have never been investigated for an additional $4B is so shocking that I have trouble finding genteel words to say about it. To paraphrase Rep. Elijah Cummings, "Is Tom Miller a chump?" Why on earth does he feel compelled to even discuss such a patently bad deal?]    

How Many People Will It Help? Not Many. [Perhaps 60,000.]

Turning to the newest proffer on the table from the banks, they are offering to lower interest rates on performing, underwater mortgages that they hold on their own balance sheets. How many homeowners does that help and how does that compare to the scope of the problem? Let’s assume that there are no eligibility requirements other than that a mortgage be held by a commercial bank, that it be performing, and that it be underwater (which might require a fresh appraisal, but that’s another matter). Commercial banks hold about 20% of the mortgages in the US by principal ($2.12 trillion and roughly 50 million mortgages, we think). The big 4 hold $1.1 trillion in performing mortgages. That’s roughly 10% of the mortgages in the U.S. Let’s assume that 25% of those are underwater, so that’s 2.5% of the mortgages in the US ($279.2 billion or roughly 1.4 million homeowners) that might be affected.

So we’re looking at an upper bound figure of 1.4 million homeowners being helped. I suspect it will be quite a bit lower in practice.  The banks might not agree on which mortgages are underwater and might require various further requirements for getting the interest rate reduction, including waiver of claims by the homeowners. The effect will be to lower the number of homeowners helped, much as all of the various HAMP eligibility requirements made the program capable of helping very few homeowners.

[update:  Actually, we now know roughly how many homeowners will be helped. Perhaps 60,000. Yup. I didn't forget a zero there. it will be much lower.  The debate at present is whether there will be $2B or $4B applied to interest rate reductions.  The banks are offering $2B and Tom Miller is pushing for an extra $2B.  Now we could assume that lots of homeowners get a very small interest rate reduction. If so, it's a yawn. But let's assume that this money is being used to pay down interest rather than pay down principal--both are economically interchangeable, but only a principal reduction affects the balance sheet. (I recognize that one can argue with me on this, but if I'm wrong, it's not by an order of magnitude.  It's by a multiple of 2-3 at most.)  The average amount of negative equity on a home is $65,000.  Take $4B and divide by $65,000 and you get 61,538.  That's a pretty good measure of the number of homeowners who will be helped nationwide.  So if Tom Miller gets his way, another 30,000 homeowners nationwide will get some relief. 

If you want to test my numbers, try thinking of it like this.  With a $200k mortgage at 6.5% the interest payments in a year are $13k.  If the mortgage were refi'd to 4%, the interest payments would be $8k annually.  So a difference of $5k per year. Assume that this lasts 7 years.  That's a cost of $35k/mortgage. (I'm not going to try discounting to present values and am not sure if the $2B or $4B figures include such discounting, but I would guess not.)  So with $4B, we're looking at 114,000 homeowners being helped, and with $2B, we're looking at 57,000 homeowners. That tells me that I'm in the ballpark.  It might be 50,000, it might be 80,000, it might be 120,000, but it's no where close to the 11 million at-risk mortgages identified by Laurie Goodman of Amherst Mortgage Securities.  $4B is a rounding error when dealing with the US mortgage market.  At best this settlement helps 1% of the at-risk population.  How do you think the rest of them are going to feel about their AGs come next election?]

The proposal is also terribly arbitrary in who it helps. You get some help if your loan wasn’t securitized. But homeowners don’t choose whether their loans are securitized. That means if you had a Countrywide Loan, you’re SOL, because there’s a 96% chance your loan was securitized. Given that some lenders had much bigger shares in certain states, the relief will be geographically uneven. I would think that California, for example, would come up short on this deal, even within the context of it being a bad deal in the first place. 

How Much Will It Help?  Not Much.

What about the substance of the relief? The plan seems to be to refinance these underwater, but current homeowners into new loans. Whatever the transaction form, the proposal is effectively for payment mods (albeit with the elimination of all claims and defenses that could have been raised regarding the original loan). To repeat, these refis, are payment mods, not principal write downs. We know that payment mods just don’t work very well, especially if there is deep negative equity. Why are we repeating the same bad idea here? It avoids the banks having to take a write-down (interest shows up on the income statement over time, not the balance sheet).

The mod will make the mortgage more affordable, but will the monthly P&I payments be market rate for the property? Not a chance. The homeowners will still be paying too much for houses in which they have no equity. They won’t be paying quite as much as before, but they’ll still be overpaying. If they run into any trouble and encounter the 4 “D”s: divorce, disability, dismissal, and death, the home will go into foreclosure. These are life cycle events that aren’t going away. Payment mods might have some economic stimulus effect, but this plan isn’t going to save very many homes.

And it’s also not clear what this sort of relief has to do with servicing, if that is what the settlement is about, as the servicing problems are really much more on securitized than portfolio loans. Requiring short sale approval if the sale offer is within 5% of current appraised value would be a much better approach if you want to try to deal with negative equity. It would let borrowers get out of their homes if they wanted to leave.

So the newest feature to the Tom Miller plan would help very few of the underwater homeowners around and won’t help them that much. And this is front-page Wall Street Journal news why? Every time the Administration comes out trumpeting a breakthrough and then fails to deliver something that helps the majority of homeowners it takes a political hit. Haven’t they learned this doesn’t work?

I don’t know what is motivating Tom Miller and the AGs who are going along with the settlement or the DOJ or the Administration in general other than the desire to make this problem go away (US Attorney General Eric Holder has a bit of a conflict in all of this since his old law firm, Covington & Burling, issued the infamous MERS insurance policy opinion letter, blessing that operation--has he recused himself?), but the AG settlement plan that they’re proposing is a travesty. It won’t help fix the economy in a meaningful way, much less address the scope of the wrongdoing: the crippling of the US economy. That’s serious harm, and it calls for a serious remedy. This ain’t it.

Oct
17

What Obama Should Have Done – Ezra Klein, Part 2


Ezra Klein wrote a follow-up piece to his treatise on the Obama Administration’s decisions and its rationale for those decisions that I commented on a couple of days ago.  If you read it, you know that I found him to be a bit of an apologist for the administration, but I suppose you have to be to get access to those people in the first place, and I’m glad he was able to do so.

Who is this kid Ezra Klein?  He looks young in his picture, so I call him a kid.  And he’s wrong about quite a few things, but I like the way he writes and he’s got some chutzpah to tackle on the topics he does.  All in all, I like him.

In his latest piece on the economy and the Obama Administration, titled: “Economic Recovery: What Washington Should Have Done,” a lot of what he says is correct, if a bit, well… pedestrian.  I mean, we all understand that the Republicans have been voting like a single cell amoeba since the economic stimulus bill was proposed in the first thirty days of the Obama Administration.  They’d vote no on a bill proposing cream in coffee, if they found Obama was for it.

I personally think that they should have to wear matching sweaters if they’re going to vote in unison like that… if you’re going to vote like a glee club, you should have to dress the part.  And that way, maybe we could get them to sing out their collective “Noooo” in some kind of multi-part harmony.

The point is that we all see the problem Obama faces across the aisle, right?

So, Klein starts out by acknowledging that the stimulus was too small and couldn’t be spent properly even if bigger, it seems to be what he learned while interviewing insiders for his last piece.  I don’t know if he’s right about that… truth is I don’t care, because in trying to tell us what the White House should have done, he misses the entire point right off the bat, just like the Administration did.

The economic crisis that made primetime during the fall of 2008, actually began during the summer of 2007, when two of the ratings agencies announced they’d be downgrading less than one percent of the bonds out there backed by sub-prime loans… PBS’s Frontline, at the time, referred to what followed as “the abrupt re-pricing of risk.”

A more appropriate phrase might have been, “the abrupt reduction in trust,” because that was when investors stopped trusting the ratings placed on securitized debt securities.

What followed, were it only to have involved going long, would have been complicated enough, but when credit default swaps were thrown into the mix… the unregulated short side, if you will… then the whole thing jumped the shark in terms of complexity.

I don’t think there’s any question that the world has never come close to having to grapple with a financial crisis on this scale of obscurity or convolution.  Even for those with the background knowledge and willingness to read a few hundred pages of text would struggle to pick up on every aspect of this evolving mess.

Which is why, by the way, the bankers have had such an easy time shifting the blame to the concept of “irresponsible borrowers,” a nameless, faceless enormous group of people in this country that all went out around the same time and bought homes they could not afford.  Just a few moments of rational thinking and you realize that it’s a preposterous allegory that would require some sort of spectacular Bondian villain to have put something in the water supply for it to be true.

Nonetheless, America is experiencing the global credit crisis through its housing market, so it is what it is.  And I think the willingness for so many among us to accept the ludicrous notion that this whole thing is the fault of irresponsible sub-prime borrowers, comes from what I refer to as the jealousy effect.

It’s simple really… by 2005 – 2006, people were driving around seeing yet another McMansion popping up here or there and they started to wonder how it was that they hade fallen so far behind their peers.  They weren’t buying a huge new home, why were so many others able to do so?  Had they truly missed out on something they should have seen… “Honey, Bob and Judy are buying another huge home, how come we’re not buy another huge home?” was the unspoken mantra of the times.  A certain jealousy had set in among a large percentage of the populous.

So, when the bubble popped during the summer of 2006, the result of Greenspan having raised interest rates 17 times in a row, no one said much about anything.  But a year and a few months later, when Ben Bernanke referred to what was happening as a sub-prime crisis, one being caused by irresponsible sub-prime borrowers having bought homes they could not afford, it was as if that huge percentage of homeowners in this country all simultaneously said:

“AH HA!  I knew it wasn’t me that had fallen behind it was they who were being irresponsible.  Well, fine then… they must be punished and forced to learn their lesson.  Who cares if housing prices fall and I lose my equity too.  Once the prices have fallen, then I’ll scoop up the bargains and then I’ll be rich, it’ll be my turn, yes… Bwahahahahaha.”

And that’s why we are where we are today… that’s why as Ezra Klein put it in his last article on the Obama White House, “the politics of housing are hideous,” although if memory serves, he was actually quoting John McCain’s economic advisor during the 2008 presidential campaign, Douglas Holtz-Eaken.  Or, as I like to call him: The Hyphenating Man.

Douglas Holtz-Eaken

In any case, the politics of housing are out of whack, as Klein too understands, and perhaps someone who reads this will tell him why.  Hey, I want the kid to succeed, and I think all he needs is a few more years under his belt.

My point is that the crisis inherited by the Obama Administration in January of 2009 was like the equivalent of something that might otherwise be studied at CERN’s particle physics laboratories in Geneva, so when Klein starts off his analysis by presenting the unsolvable problem of the stimulus not being big enough, but there being no chance of it being larger and passing, he paints himself into a corner from which no one could emerge.

Perhaps it would help if I explained why I voted for Barack Obama, because I didn’t decide to do so until the very end of the campaign.  Well, I mean besides the “Wiley Woman from Wasilla,” that “Mother Mayor from Matanuska,” that Tina Fey Look-alike we all know and love, Fox News’ own… Sarah Palin.  I mean, why I voted for Obama… besides her.

I voted for Obama because I believed he could and therefore would, communicate… and that would neutralize the traditional Republican’s ability and tendency to block and tackle anything the Democrats proposed in the way of legislation.

Look, let’s be honest here… the Republicans often oppose things that just plain old make sense, the economic stimulus bill being a fine example, and the reason they can do it is that they simply don’t require any substantive arguments, they’ve learned to go with whatever is handy and can be turned into a sound bite.

I remember the Sunday morning political shows around the time of the economic stimulus faux-debates.  It was wall-to-wall Republicans challenging what was originally an $800 billion spending bill by serving up such key counter-points as the money in the proposed bill that was to purchase condoms for high-school students, and pay for the reseeding of the National Mall, which basically runs from the Lincoln Memorial to the U.S. Capitol.

Never mind that the sum total of what they were objecting to was a miniscule percentage of the $800 billion being proposed… the Republicans are not to be deterred by grocery store math.  They have developed the ability to just say things over and over again until what wasn’t an issue becomes the reason their constituents aren’t supporting whatever it is they’re trying to stop or oppose.

Since Obama’s been president, I’ve had to ask quite a few from the GOP what the heck they weren’t liking about Obama, because he’s certainly wasn’t a socialist, as they had proclaimed ad nauseam during the last few months of the campaign.  In fact, he’s been about as Bushian as one could imagine.

He didn’t close Guantanamo, although I would argue that’s a good thing because we’ll need somewhere to incarcerate the bankers during his second term, should he prevail in 2012.  He gave Wall Street everything it wanted and then some.  He didn’t pull troops out of anywhere.  No public option in the health care reform bill.  No regulations of derivatives in financial reform.  Extension of the Bush tax cuts.  And his latest setback in the senate, the death of his jobs creation bill that was pretty much tax cuts on top of tax cuts.  What is it these RNC people want?  I’ll bet a nickel that McCain would have made a better Democrat in practice.

To my way of thinking, Obama had proven during the campaign that he could communicate effectively, and he could do so without the mainstream media if necessary.  I don’t watch much television news… hardly any, truth be told.  But I couldn’t escape seeking and hearing from him every single day online and through email throughout 2008.

So, I figured that Obama wouldn’t allow his agenda to be stymied by Republican talking points that made no sense, and it wouldn’t matter how many times the inane points were echoed on Fox News.  I thought that Obama would communicate directly with the American people online, as he had one so masterfully and consistently throughout the campaign.  And being a teacher of sorts, he’d explain things to this country, and as a result we’d do things smarter than in the past.

I feel like an idiot saying this now, but I actually believed that Barack Obama would be the first president to transcend the political barriers and force both sides to vote for what was best because the people understood what was best and why.  I could never have imagined that anyone could utterly destroy the meaning of the word “transparency” as President Obama has managed to do.

Largely, I understand, that’s been the result of Tim “Transparency” Geithner, who never met a black hole he didn’t like and want to hide in, but still… Obama interviewed him for under an hour, as I understand it, and then hired him.  So, if the man from Treasury deserves to be in a cell, it’s on the president to pick up his check.

The question is not what he SHOULD have done, Ezra, it’s what he SHOULD NOT have done that matters.

What Obama should have done upon entering the White House is NOT start debating an economic stimulus spending package that by the White House’s own admission, according to Klein’s last article, was conceived not based on careful analysis as to need, but almost entirely on what Larry Summers and his Rubinesque Deregulating Band of Crony Capitalists considered politically expedient.

I mean, here we had our “smart” president, and the first thing he does upon taking the reins of a nation in real economic peril, is throw together a spending bill whose numbers were pulled directly from the hindquarters of Larry Summers?  And now someone is surprised that it failed to solve the most complex economic and financial catastrophe in the history of the world?  Seriously, Ezra?  Are you feeling me on this?  Is that not the single most intellectually bankrupt plan you can imagine?

I taught fifth and sixth grade social studies a few years back and I’m telling you, my kids were way smarter than anyone backing that idea as a sure winner.  If that was going to be the plan, they likely could have done better spinning a wheel or drawing little slips of paper out of a hat.  In fact, now that I know how the whole thing was done… and I can’t believe I’m even saying this, but that planning process is the only thing that could have actually given credence to the Republican criticisms of its spending on condoms and grass seed.

What President Obama should have done upon moving into the White House is… nothing resembling the “Fire, Ready, Aim” nonsense that went on, he should have done what was most important at that moment… communicate with the American people so they’d start to understand what had happened to cause the meltdown of Wall Street, and what he was doing to address it effectively.

I wanted to see my president take over network television over five consecutive evenings, let’s say from 8-9:00 PM, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.  And on each night he could have come into America’s living rooms to teach us about what we couldn’t possibly already know, but was now having a major and terrible impact on our nation, our lives, and the world.

I’ve explained mortgage-backed securities to thousands of people who had no background in finance or investment… people who knew absolutely nothing about the bond market, and they all came away with a pretty good idea of what had transpired that triggered the meltdown of the mortgage market and then housing prices.  And I’m not the President of the United States, nor do I have his resources, so I have to think that he could have fared quite a bit better than me, in terms of effectively educating the American people.  Ya think?

The people were hungry for knowledge at that moment too… and he was someone they liked listening too… and he was even a teacher, with experience teaching Constitutional Law at the University of Chicago.  That no one even considered such an approach is a testament to their arrogance and their lack of respect for the Americans that elected him.

Such an approach would have provided a foundation of knowledge that would have made it next to impossible for the Republicans to mount their goofy universal NO objections to anything Obama.  And while the country was learning about what had occurred, the president’s team could have been thoughtfully examining the national situation, and looking ahead at what was unquestionably to come as a result of credit markets being frozen.

Perhaps most importantly, such an approach would have attacked the admittedly hideous politics of housing, by elevating the dialog from the realm of the sound bite into a thoughtful discussion of what we needed to do to in order to save us all from the pain that was otherwise a certainty.

In case someone is thinking that the bankers wouldn’t have liked it, I can only respond by saying: Tough cheese.  They got their multi-trillion dollar bailout, so I’m sorry if the newly elected president thinks it important to tell those who would be funding that bailout the truth about what had precipitated the need for such an unprecedented thing in the first place.

And I would have like to see the Wall Street lobbyists and bank-funded PR spokesliars come out in opposition to five nights of carefully constructed education so that we the people would understand what we as a nation needed to do to prevent our living standards from evaporating over the next decade.

Our banker class may not have liked the idea, but they would have sat on their hands like good little boys and girls and watched as the teacher-in-chief took the time to teach us what we now very much needed to know.  Or, we would have run them out of town on a rail.

My point, Ezra, my conscientious, erudite and politically astute young man, is that what I’m describing would have changed everything for the first three years of the Obama presidency, and likely for future presidencies as well.  Unquestionably, it was the right thing to do for a list of reasons as long as I am tall and then some.

But, you see Ezra… and you didn’t mention this in your “What Washington Should Have Done,” follow-up piece, Barack Obama surrounded himself with a team of advisors that were all cut from identical cloth, and so the one thing he was sure not to get from them was diverse or original ideas.

Like a deregulation family tree, spawned from Robert Rubin to Larry Summers to Peter Orszag to Timothy Geithner to Michael Froman and Jason Furman… even including James P. Rubin, the son of the great man himself… it’s hard to imagine a more inbred group in control of a nation since the Romanoff’s ruled over Czarist Russia.

Rubin was the key architect of the extreme financial deregulation that brung us to this economic dance with financial ruin.  And from there he hopped on over to Citibank where he proceeded to utterly destroy one of the world’s largest banks with his speculation in the derivatives of securitized loans and off-balance sheet bullshit.

Can’t we all just imagine that kind of groupthink going on in the White House, with Barack Obama in the center, as all the rest of the insufferable sycophants fawn all over our first African America president, making him feel as if he’s actually in their club… actually in charge, but winking behind his back at their incredibly good fortune to have all gotten back into the corridors of power.  It quite literally turns one’s stomach to picture it.

So, Ezra… it’s not about the size of the stimulus, or the hideous politics of housing, none of that should have been allowed to exist and fester through the three years of a president who had the power and ability to effectively communicate with the American people, with or without the cooperation of network and cable television.

And the “game changer,” as you put it, would not have been massive debt forgiveness, in fact, whatever Holtz-Eaken was babbling about to you made almost no sense.  You say the following in your article…

“The game changer, however, would have been massive debt forgiveness. This could have been done through a federal program to purchase troubled mortgages and give homeowners better rates, as John McCain proposed late in the 2008 campaign, or by nationalizing the banks and taking the bad debts off their books, or some other option.”

Ezra, I know you know inside that you have no idea what you were talking about there because of the way you finished the paragraph… “or some other option.”


Come on, son… which one are you trying to be there, Beavis or Butthead?  Or some other option?  You’re proposing a plan for massive debt forgiveness, have no idea what the implications involved would be, and so you wrap it up by saying… well… or something else.

Yeah… heh heh… thinking sucks, heh, heh, doesn’t it Beavis?


You can’t have some sort of massive debt forgiveness, no way, not going to happen.  Not even going to be discussed.  Heck, you can’t even get the bankers to agree to lower a balance when it would be in the best interests of investors to do that.  What planet do the people of the massive debt forgiveness live on, because it’s not this one.  You should stop bringing that up, it sounds ridiculous.  Or, at least try answering a few of the questions in the paragraph that follows before thinking it’s a good idea again…

You do understand that if you were to mandate the widespread writing down of mortgage debt you wouldn’t be harming the bankers, you’d be taking the money from the Fire Fighters of St. Louis, or the Teachers Federal Pension Plan… places like that.  And what about the people who don’t need to have their debt written down… the ones who could and would pay without a writing their balance down?  And how much should we make the pension plans sacrifice?  How much should each person have taken off their balance?  Will it be a taxable event?  How will we force Fannie Mae to participate?  What about the terms found in the Pooling and Servicing Agreements that don’t allow balance write downs… and all are different, by the way, what about that?  And who is going to administer the program?  The same bankers who wouldn’t modify loans unless under duress?  Do you have to be delinquent to qualify?  What’s the impact to your credit score?

Would you like me to go one?  I mean… are you kidding me?

From there you proceed straight downhill into the same morass of inadequate understanding that the president needed to extract us from before locking us into the race to the bottom.  You say:

“How do you explain to people who decided against buying homes they couldn’t afford that they’re now paying the mortgages of those who made the opposite decision?”

Yep, well I supposed framed in that ridiculous way, there are no answers, are there?  Nope, I suppose not.  Oh well… look out below ‘cause we’re going down.

Look, Ezra… you don’t need to put your fingers into the Chinese finger trap just because some economic advisor tells you it’s the only way to define a problem.  He’s already got is fingers stuck in there, keep yours free and nimble and you’ll find other ways to view a problem and hence other solutions will present themselves.  You say:

“… the stimulus was an attempt to grow our way out of the recession, and our housing policies were an attempt to reduce the debt that was keeping us in the recession.”


Okay, so lets go with that line of thinking.  Which one had to be dealt with first?  Do you start spending to drive growth while there’s a force pulling hard in the opposite direction?  Or, do you do something to reduce the force opposing growth before you start?

Another way to view the problem is that foreclosures represent a hole in the bottom of our boat. And we’ve got some buckets and are bailing water… but what do we need to do before we drive the boat towards growth?  Get more buckets?   Or… should we fix the hole in the bottom of the boat before leaving port?

Metaphors aside, there are several specific things you need to understand in order to intelligently address the economic downturn, or at this point, the deflationary spiral, in which we find ourselves today.  And these are not things one needs to check against economic data…

Beginning in July of 2007, the credit crisis overshadowed the housing bubble’s demise as the cause of foreclosures.

  • Mortgages of the bubble were designed for refinancing every few years, so the inability to refinance, due to the credit crisis and increasingly underwater loans, could only lead to more foreclosures… which further lowers home values.
  • Home values are a part of the American retirement plan, and there are 78 million baby-boomers closing in on retirement in this country, so falling home values will tend to reduce consumer spending, roughly 70% of GDP.
  • Reduced consumer spending lowers corporate profits leading to rising unemployment and reduced incomes… which fuels additional foreclosures.
  • Wages continue to decline, delays in family formation, aging boomers, growing shadow inventory of homes, lack of qualified buyers, more homeowners underwater, and ultimately strategic defaults, all exacerbate the foreclosure problem.
  • While inflation can be addressed by a central bank’s monetary policy, deflation cannot be addressed by centralized solutions, because need is to put money in people’s pockets to stimulate consumer spending… rife with moral hazard.
  • As long as home values are falling, consumer spending will keep falling, unemployment will continue to rise, incomes fall, foreclosures rise… downward spiral continues.

“No economic recovery will take hold without serious attention paid to home foreclosures. Consumer spending, the job-heavy construction industry and bank stability hang in the balance.”  San Francisco Chronicle, 10-16-2011

And the longer a deflationary spiral is allowed to go on, the harder it becomes to reverse its cost.  Those that lived through the Great Depression, for example, never recovered.

The issue that continues to stymie everyone in government appears to be purely political, as exemplified by your statement:

“How do you explain to people who decided against buying homes they couldn’t afford that they’re now paying the mortgages of those who made the opposite decision?”

Now, as I discussed earlier, part of the problem with this type of statement is that it reflects an appalling lack of knowledge of the situation.  Obviously, that’s why I said what I did about what the president should have done to educate the citizens of this country beginning on day one of his presidency.  And truth be told, I have quite a bit to say about this issue, but if I go into it here this article is going to be longer than the last one, and we can’t have that.

You should know that this is the very reason I started my blog roughly three years ago… because we started blaming the borrowers, and I knew then that was a terrible idea because we’d never be able to fix the problem if that meant bailing out irresponsible sub-prime borrowers.  And here we are three years later, and we painted ourselves right into that very corner.

The simple fact is that homeowners not at risk of foreclosure that aren’t interested in stopping foreclosures are taking a position directly opposed to their own best interests.  That has to change, because they’re the ones killing us all, and themselves at the same time.

Ezra, do you understand that it wasn’t the borrowers and it wasn’t the loans that caused our economic meltdown… it was the securities and the leverage?  We have to stop blaming the borrowers, because it wasn’t the borrowers, it was the banks.

I do have some advice for homeowners who don’t think their neighbors at risk of foreclosure should be helped out in any way…

When you find yourself in a hole… stop digging.

By the way,  you’re quite right when you wrap up your article by saying that it’s the Republicans that haven’t and don’t want to “pull the trigger,” as you phrased it.  There’s no question about that.

But we’re not supposed to be letting them define the rules of the game, remember?  We’re not supposed to be playing their game they’re supposed to be playing ours.  And ours was not supposed to be some Wall Street inspired board game where only one player wins, while the rest of the players starve.

We were, after all, about change we could believe in, Ezra… change we did believe in.  What should we believe in now?

Mandelman out.

P.S. I don’t mean to be so hard on Ezra Klein, I think he’s a fine young man, and darn fine writer too.  He’s just young, so he’s wrong about this particular issue a little too often, but I see potential in Mr. Klein, so check out his blog here: Ezra Klein’s Wonkblog.

Oct
12

Cain: I didn’t realize in 2005 that the housing bubble existed

Ouch.


As Jazz Shaw predicted, the national media has suddenly begun doing a lot of homework on Herman Cain now that he’s riding high in the polls, and the first one to take a crack at the new Not-Romney is NBC’s Chuck Todd.  Todd challenges Cain on a 2005 column he wrote that dismissed concerns of [...]

Read this post »

Sep
02

New plan: Let’s sue all the banks!

Revenuers


Dear Banks, Remember all of that bailout money you received? Sure hope you saved some of it. US authorities are preparing to sue more than a dozen big banks over claims they misrepresented the quality of mortgages sold during the 2006-7 housing bubble. The US Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which is overseeing the remains [...]

Read this post »

Aug
16

Credit Card Securitization and Skin-in-the-Game

I have a new paper on credit card securitization and what it teaches us about the likely effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act's skin-in-the-game risk retention requirements. Credit card securitization has long required 4%-7% credit risk retention (cf. 5% under Dodd-Frank).  

I argue that when combined with other features of credit card securitization it was actually counterproductive at aligning issuer/securitizer and investor incentives and likely contributed to rate-jacking. Instead, credit card securitization didn't go off the rails like mortgage securitization because of the existence of implied recourse, effectively 100% skin-in-the-game. This suggests that skin-in-the-game cannot be relied upon as a one-size-fits-all cure. Its effectiveness will instead depend on the other securitization features with which it is combined.  

If you're interested in going into the sausauge factory of credit card securitization, there's plenty of gore and detail here for you. If you're interested in the connections between credit card securitization and rate-jacking, there's something here for you. And if you're interested in whether Dodd-Frank's risk retention requirements will be effective, there's something here for you too.  

The (overly long) abstract is below the break:

The Dodd-Frank Act’s “skin-in-the-game” credit risk retention requirement is the major reform of the securitization market following the housing bubble. Skin-in-the-game mandates that securitizers retain a 5% interest in their securitizations. The premise behind skin-in-the-game is that it will lessen the moral hazard problem endemic to securitization, in which loan originators and securitizers do not bear the risk on the ultimate performance of the loans. 

Skin-in-the-game requirements have long existed in credit card securitizations. Their impact, however, has not been previously examined. This Article argues that credit card securitization solves the moral hazard problem not through the limited risk retention of formal skin-in-the-game requirements, but through implicit recourse to the issuer’s balance sheet. 

Absent this implicit recourse, skin-in-the-game would actually create a severe incentive misalignment between card issuers and investors because card issuers have lopsided upside and downside exposure on their securitized card receivables. The card issuers bear a small fraction of the downside exposure, but retain 100% of the upside, should the card balance generate more income than is necessary to pay the investors. 

The risk/reward imbalance creates a distinct problem because the card issuer retains control over the terms of the credit card accounts. Prior to the Credit CARD Act of 2009, the issuer could increase a portfolio’s volatility through rate-jacking: when interest rates and fees are increased, some accounts will pay more and some will default. Per the Black-Scholes option-pricing model, the increased volatility benefits the issuer because of the risk-reward imbalance. 

Despite the problems posed by the risk-reward imbalance, credit card securitization avoided the excesses of mortgage securitization. The explanation for this is that credit card securitization features complete implicit recourse. Implicit recourse exists because credit card securitization is not about risk transfer, but instead about regulatory capital arbitrage and creating a funding and liquidity source for the issuer. 

The implication of this study is that skin-in-the-game requirements alone may be insufficient to ensure against moral hazard problems in securitization. Instead, the effectiveness of skin-in-the-game is highly dependent on its interaction with other variable features of securitization transactions.
Mar
01

Economic Warfare- Fraudclosuregate is Just One Battle in World War III

Nothing in this current economy makes any sense.  The stock market should not be humming along….and I don’t even trust what that means anyway.  Wall Street should not have reported its fourth most profitable year on record in 2010.  Our unemployment numbers quoted are wholesale lies.  Real people in this country are hurting like no time since the Great Depression.  The economics that led up to  the real estate crisis were not plausible to anyone with a 5th grade education.  And things are not getting any better.  So what is going on in this country?  One potential explanation is that we are already at war and our impotent government is trapped, unable to formulate a strategy to response to this new war.

First Read the Newspaper Accounts of Emerging Information About Financial Terrorism HERE

Serious risks to the global economic system were exposed by the crisis of 2008, raising legitimate questions regarding the cause of the turmoil. An estimated $50 trillion of global wealth evaporated in the crisis with more than a quarter of that loss suffered by the United States and her citizens.

A number of potential causative factors exist, including sub-prime real estate loans, a housing bubble, excessive leverage, and a failed regulatory system. Beyond these, however, the risks of financial terrorism and/or economic warfare also must be considered. The stakes are simply too high for these potential triggers to be ignored.

The preliminary conclusions of the research suggest that, without question, there were actors who had the motive to harm the U.S. economy. These motives can be categorized as both economic and non-economic. In addition, these same actors have clearly demonstrated the means to carry out such an attack. Finally, the opportunity was clearly present given the existing economic condition and regulatory framework in operation.

The hypothesis under consideration is that a three-phased attack is underway with two of those phases completed to date.
The first phase was a speculative run-up in oil prices that generated as much as $2 trillion of excess wealth for oil-producing nations, filling the coffers of Sovereign Wealth Funds, especially those that follow Shariah Compliant Finance. This phase appears to have begun in 2007 and lasted through June 2008.

Economic Warfare: Risks and Responses

The rapid run-up in oil prices made the value of OPEC oil in the ground roughly $137 trillion (based on $125/barrel oil) virtually equal to the value of all other world financial assets, including every share of stock, every bond, every private company, all government and corporate debt, and the entire world‘s bank deposits. That means that the proven OPEC reserves were valued at almost three times the total market capitalization of every company on the planet traded in all 27 global stock markets.

The second phase appears to have begun in 2008 with a series of bear raids targeting U.S. financial services firms that appeared to be systemically significant. An initial bear raid against Bear Stearns was successful in forcing the firm to near bankruptcy. It was acquired by JP Morgan Chase and the systemic risk was averted briefly. Similar bear raids were conducted against various other firms during the summer, each ending in an acquisition. The attacks continued until the outright failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-September. This created a system-wide crisis, caused the collapse of the credit markets, and nearly collapsed the global financial system.

The bear raids were perpetrated by naked short selling and manipulation of credit default swaps, both of which were virtually unregulated. The short selling was actually enhanced by recent regulatory changes including rescission of the uptick rule and loopholes such as ―the Madoff exemption.‖
While substantial, unusual trading activity can be identified, the source of the bear raids has not been traceable to date due to serious transparency gaps for hedge funds, trading pools, sponsored access, and sovereign wealth funds. What can be demonstrated, however, is that two relatively small broker dealers emerged virtually overnight to trade ―trillions of dollars worth of U.S. blue chip companies. They are the number one traders in all financial companies that collapsed or are now financially supported by the U.S. government. Trading by the firms has grown exponentially while the markets have lost trillions of dollars in value.‖1

The risk of a Phase Three has quickly emerged, suggesting a potential direct economic attack on the U.S. Treasury and U.S. dollar. Such an event has already been discussed by finance ministers in major emerging market nations such as China and Russia as well as Iran and the Arab states. A focused effort to collapse the dollar by dumping Treasury bonds has grave implications including the possibility of a downgrading of U.S. debt forcing rapidly rising interest rates and a collapse of the American economy. In short, a bear raid against the U.S. financial system remains possible and may even be likely.

The recent seizure of $134 billion face value in supposedly counterfeit U.S. Federal Reserve bonds underscores the reality of the economic threat. This may be as significant as the Japanese radio intercepts were before December 1941.

Immediate consideration of the issues outlined in this report is vital. Further study is essential and prospective responses must be crafted to address future risks. Finally, there are legitimate questions about the performance of the regulatory regime and Wall Street institutions. Implications that these parties have been complicit or otherwise co-opted cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that this study and any task-force response be conducted outside of traditional Washington and Wall Street circles.

―This paper outlines a theory concerning why Muslim terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers on Sept. 11, 2001, bombed London‘s subway during the G-8 economic summit on July 7th, and detonated blasts in an Egyptian resort on 23rd July. The reason for these attacks was to create „Economic Terrorism.‟ Economic Terrorism is defined here as the attempt to assault and destroy a foe through decimation of the enemy‟s tax base via rank economic sabotage. Such attacks on economic infrastructures lower net tax yield, thereby shrinking the capital pool for military spending. There is historical warrant for the belligerent use of strategic economic destruction. This is detailed in an iconoclastic book on the Roman Empire‘s demise, by peerless Orientalist Henri Pirenne, called ‗Charlemagne and Muhammad‘ (1943). This work challenged Gibbon‘s thesis that Germanic barbarian assaults doomed Rome, posited in the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776). As we shall see, ‗Economic Terrorism‘ is the most potent weapon for Muslim radicals can deploy in their siege against the West. There is hard evidence Islamicists employed Economic Terrorism on Sept. 11 to mangle the US economy, which vicariously damaged the tax base. By extension, this was meant to prune U.S ability to pursue aggressive foreign policy, mount defense and wage war. Radical Islam has long reacted with ambivalence and rage towards capitalism. Framing this debate is a larger ideological struggle, pitting ‗atheistic‘ Western capitalistic economics against the Islamic idee fixe – the formulaic Muslim theocracy. Accordingly, a famous radical Muslim intellectual felt that, ―…democracy is a form of idol worship. So, too…capitalism, which is…is a form of idolatry.‖ We now know Al Qaeda was fixated on casing New York financial institutions for years before they attacked. If Islamic terrorists further pursue Economic Terrorism without an organized Western response, the impact upon economy and tax-derived defense will be massive. Also, such attacks won‟t be isolated, but recurrent — given the small cost of assaults and massive potential reward. Therefore, we must study Economic Terrorism and prepare an answer. Ultimately, as the poor and overmatched Islamic terrorists pursue their struggle against the West, they realize this is the best „small war‟ strategy of all

The Full Report is Below:

Economic Warfare

Tweet this!Tweet this! Share and Enjoy: Print Digg del.icio.us Facebook Google Bookmarks email FriendFeed Identi.ca LinkedIn Live MySpace PDF Ping.fm RSS StumbleUpon Technorati Tumblr Yahoo! Buzz Posterous Twitter Yahoo! Bookmarks

Scridb filter
Feb
02

Kramer & Kaslow’s “Mass Joinder” Lawsuit – Mandelman Interviews Attorney Phillip Kramer

Should homeowners join Kramer and Kaslow’s “Mass Joinder” lawsuit against Bank of America or any of the other banks being sued by Attorney Phillip Kramer or Attorney Mitchell Stein?  Mandelman interviews attorney Phil Kramer to see what he can find out.

Last week I posted a “Homeowner Warning” about a mailer I’d received from a homeowner promoting participation in a lawsuit, referred to as a “Mass Joinder” lawsuit, being filed against several major banks on behalf of homeowners by the law firm of Kramer & Kaslow.  Before I posted the “warning” I spoke with several attorneys I know that are well-versed in law firm marketing compliance, and I made two attempts to contact the Kramer & Kaslow attorneys at the number provided on the mailer, but received no response.

A couple of hours after I posted my “warning” my phone started ringing off the hook.  Several people were calling to tell me that the mailer was not sent out by Kraner & Kaslow, but rather was a rouge marketing effort by someone not authorized to use the Kramer & Kaslow name.

At first I was not persuaded and thought I should leave the post up until I received proof that Kramer & Kaslow were not, in fact, behind this deceptive mailer, but then someone I know at a reputable law firm called me and explained that my post was causing homeowners to contact the real Kramer & Kaslow and demand that the amounts they had paid as a retainer be returned.  They had read my post and wanted out on that basis alone.  They claimed that the lawsuit was real and that if I would just take down the post for a couple of hours, attorney Phillip would be calling me to straighten things out.

While I didn’t want to take down something that could protect homeowners from being taken advantage of, I also didn’t want to be the cause of homeowners withdrawing from a legitimate lawsuit because of a my critique of a mailer that wasn’t even sent out by the firm of Kramer & Kaslow.

I finally agreed, took the post down, and awaited Mr. Kramer’s call.

Two hours later I had still received no call from Phillip Kramer, but it was about 6:00 PM by that time, so I figured I’d wait until the following day, as anyone can get tied up and not be able to get to a call, no matter how important that call may be to one or both of the parties.

The next day I did receive a call from someone who identified himself as an employee of Kramer & Kaslow, telling me that he was trying to contact Mr. Kramer and that he would be calling me shortly.

In my original post, I said that I thought the mailer looked “extremely suspicious, and could be an illegal scam… because it appears to invite homeowners to participate in a SETTLEMENT, and presents such outcomes as a free and clear mortgage and up to $75,000 in monetary damages per individual participant.

I checked into this mass joinder lawsuit, and found that there had been no “settlement,” rather it was and is an ongoing lawsuit, and therefore I found the wording used in the mailer highly deceptive.

I also was informed by several homeowners that they had received phone calls from an auto-dialer, saying something to the effect of, “If you’re interested in finding out more about how you might get your home free and clear, press ‘1’”.

Law firms are not allowed to engage in outbound telemarketing, or solicit clients in this manner, and as I pointed out, if non-lawyers are doing this and being paid commissions as a result, this is called “running and capping and may involve fee splitting, and both practices are not legal for attorneys.”

I finished the post by urging homeowners to be “extremely careful before writing a check to Kramer & Kaslow, or anyone else suggesting that you pay to be part of a lawsuit promising a lucrative settlement, especially a free house, which is an extremely rare event.

I also mentioned that several attorneys had told me that there was and is an actual lawsuit filed, but that even if that were the case, it wouldn’t make the mailer in question, or the use of auto-dialers by a law firm in any way okay.

An Interview with Phillip Kramer, Attorney at Law

Phillip Kramer called me later in the day, apologizing for not speaking with me sooner, and assuring me that his firm didn’t send out or authorize the mailer I was warning consumers about, nor was his firm doing any telemarketing, or authorizing the use of auto-dialers or outbound telemarketing.

I asked Mr. Kramer if he would put something in writing and offered to publish it in my follow-up article clarifying why I had taken the “warning” down after just a few hours.  He said he would and in a subsequent email to me, he said the following:

“As we discussed, I became aware of the mass mailing piece bearing my firm’s name when I saw it on your website.  I immediately called the toll free number, was outraged to learn that the people handling the calls were falsely purporting to be with my firm, and I asked to speak with a supervisor.

I confirmed that the mailer was prepared by and sent by a law firm that I know.  The mailer was NOT approved by me.  I did NOT authorize the mailer.  I would NOT have authorized the mailer if I had been asked in advance.

My cases are progressing nicely, and I don’t need to mass market every homeowner.  I’d rather organically grow my client base.

I’m not opposed to representing a large number of clients in my mass joinder cases.  In fact, that is the idea of delivering economy of scale to clients and being able to properly litigate against banks.  However, I am opposed to careless and aggressive marketing campaigns, and I never was asked, nor did I approve, that law firm to market under my name, and/or to pose as my law firm when speaking with prospective clients.

In fact, I have never marketed these mass joinder cases, I have not approved any marketing under my name, nor have I authorized anyone to pose as me or to solicit prospective clients under my name.  As I become aware of people doing these things, I confront them and shut them down.

I know that Mitchell J. Stein feels the same way about people marketing under his name and he is also stopping offenders as he learns about them.”

After I received his statement, I sent him a few follow-up questions to ask if he’d like to clarify things further… he did, and he said he appreciated the opportunity.

Here’s what he said…

“I know of no outbound calling.  If asked, I would not approve of that.  I knew that some law firms wanted to send out mailers.  I have insisted that everyone comply with State Bar rules and that anything with my name must be pre-approved.  As of this date, no one has submitted any proposed marketing for my review.  That piece was done without my knowledge.

I am happy to pay a referral fee to other law firms.  I do not split fees, pay commissions, nor do I pay referral fees to non-lawyers.  I do not use cappers, and have never authorized anyone to robocall, telemarket, spam email, or undertake any mass marketing on my behalf.”

While we were discussing the merits of the lawsuits he was filing, which I’ll discuss in a moment, he mentioned that he had just hired a compliance attorney to train all staff attorneys at his firm.  I asked him to send me something in writing so I could describe the sales process in his own words.  Here’s what I received:

“I have recently hired a compliance attorney.  He is currently hiring and training a staff of lawyers to call all new prospective clients.

I will not take on a new client unless I have a licensed attorney speak with the prospective client, make certain that the prospective client understands the risks — and acknowledges that joining the case is not a substitute for making payments to the lender, etc.

If a prospective client does not understand the nature of what we can and cannot do, or if someone has made false statements and the prospective client has unrealistic expectations, we are not accepting them as clients.”

Well, that’s pretty clear, I would think.  And that’s why I agreed to take down my post last week that “warned” homeowners… to give Mr. Kramer a chance to state in no uncertain terms that the mailer shown above and the reported telemarketing efforts were not coming from his firm, Kramer and Kaslow.  And that he, nor attorney Mitchell Stein, in any way endorse any illegal marketing activities, such as capping or fee-splitting… which are both illegal ways of compensating non-lawyers for bringing clients to a law firm.

It’s great to hear that Kramer and Kaslow will do everything they can to put a stop to such rogue efforts, but that doesn’t mean that the mailer or auto-dialer are okay… they’re not.  And from checking online, there are clearly dozens of other obviously unauthorized marketing efforts out there… and homeowners should take care to avoid them.

The bottom-line is… NEVER hire a law firm unless you’re talking to that law firm and can speak with a lawyer employed by that law firm before you do.  Don’t get scammed by someone who is NOT AUTHORIZED by Kramer and Kaslow… in fact, I think you should report those you suspect of unauthorized marketing activities and violations to the laws governing attorney marketing to offices of Kramer and Kaslow… at the very least.

Commentary on the Kramer and Kaslow Mass Joinder Case Itself…

Now, before I say anything… let me be very clear… I’m not an attorney and therefore I am not qualified to assess whether a given lawsuit is a good one or not, or right for you or not… so at the end of the day, homeowners have to make their own assessment and decision as to whether they want to participate or not.  All I can do is share my thoughts and ask around as to what others might think…

As I understand it, the cost to participate in the suit is about $5,000.  For some, that may sound like a cheap way to sue a bank, while for others it may be too much to gamble.  Because I think it’s worth noting that it is both of those things… a lawsuit against a bank… and a gamble.

The case at the core of the Kramer and Kaslow mass joinder lawsuit is: Ronald vs. Bank of America.  Basically, the case accuses Countrywide (subsequent cases being filed include Citibank, One West, GMAC/Ally Bank, and perhaps others) of perpetrating a massive fraud upon homeowners by knowingly inflating appraisals, creating a bubble the bank knew would pop and leave homeowner equity devastated, violate privacy statutes, and then Civil Code sections when they refused to modify… you get the idea.

The case says that Countrywide execs knew and did it anyway in order to make zillions of dollars securitizing the loans and therefore only others would incur the future losses.

Here’s an overview of what the third amended complaint says in its Introduction section:

2. This action seeks remedies for the foregoing improper activities, including a massive fraud perpetrated upon Plaintiffs and other borrowers by the Countrywide Defendants that devastated the values of their residences, in most cases resulting in Plaintiffs’ loss of all or substantially all of their net worths.

6. Hand-in-hand with its fraudulently-obtained mortgages, Mozilo and others at Countrywide hatched a plan to “pool” the foregoing mortgages and sell the pools for inflated value. Rapidly, these two intertwined schemes grew into a brazen plan to disregard underwriting standards and fraudulently inflate property values – county-by- county, city-by-city, person-by-person – in order to take business from legitimate mortgage-providers, and moved on to massive securities fraud hand-in-hand with concealment from, and deception of, Plaintiffs and other mortgagees on an unprecedented scale.

7. From as early as 2004, Countrywide’s senior management led by Mozilo knew the scheme would cause a liquidity crisis that would devastate Plaintiffs’ home values and net worths. But, they didn’t care, because their plan was based on insider trading – pumping for as long as they could and then dumping before the truth came out and Plaintiffs’ losses were locked in.

9. It is now all too clear that this was the ultimate high-stakes fraudulent investment scheme of the last decade. Couched in banking and securities jargon, the deceptive gamble with consumers’ primary assets – their homes – was nothing more than a financial fraud perpetrated by Defendants and others on a scale never before seen. This scheme led directly to a mortgage meltdown in California that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing the rest of the United States. From 2008 to the present, Californians’ home values decreased by considerably more than most other areas in the United States as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ scheme set forth herein.

This massive fraudulent scheme was a disaster both foreseen by Countrywide and waiting to happen. Defendants knew it, and yet Defendants still induced the Plaintiffs into their scheme without telling them.

10. As a result, Plaintiffs lost their equity in their homes, their credit ratings and histories were damaged or destroyed, and Plaintiffs incurred material other costs and expenses, described herein. At the same time, Defendants took from Plaintiffs and other borrowers billions of dollars in interest payments and fees and generated billions of dollars in profits by selling their loans at inflated values.

14. Since the time Plaintiffs filed the initial Complaint herein, Defendants’ improper acts have continued, including, inter alia: (i) issuing Notices of Default in violation of Cal. Civil Code §2923.5; (ii) misrepresenting their intention to arrange loan modifications for Plaintiffs, while in fact creating abusive roadblocks to deprive Plaintiffs of their legal rights; and (iii) engaging in intrinsic fraud in this Court and in Kentucky by stalling in addressing Plaintiffs’ legitimate requests to cancel notices of default and for loan modifications, and by refusing to respond, in any way, to Plaintiffs’ privacy causes of action.

Now, there’s no question… this is a real lawsuit.  Some attorneys believe it will be a very difficult case to win, while others think it’s quite viable and likely to settle.  I can see both sides of that argument.

On one hand, it would seem difficult to prove that Countrywide caused the housing bubble; there were certainly many parties involved and numerous other contributing factors as well.  On the other hand, the case has numerous aspects that are unquestionably true and certainly wrong.

Then there’s what’s known as “the banker factor.”  Actually, I’m making that up, but you know what I mean.  The banks aren’t going to lay down for this as it would open an enormous can of litigating worms… so they have to fight… or is there no percentage in that either?  Well, now you’ve seen first hand why I chose not to go to law school.

I really haven’t the foggiest idea what’s going to happen… and neither does anyone else.

But then, Columbus couldn’t exactly stop and ask for directions either, which, it’s worth noting is why, when sailing for The New World, he landed in the Bahamas and named them San Salvador, but assumed he had found the Indies so he named the native people Indians (leading me to always wonder what he would have named them had he not gotten so hopelessly lost.)

(What if his favorite word was “Jujubees,” and he had named the natives “Jujubees?”  Then I would have grown up playing Cowboys & Jujubees?)

So, since no one can know what’s going to happen in the future of this case, I thought I’d take a look at where it is today.  From a review of the Los Angeles Superior Court’s online records database we find these events have transpired to-date or are set for the near future…

1. Original complaint was filed in March 2009.

2. First amended complaint was in June of 2009.

3. Second amended complaint March 2010.

4. August 2010: the banks try to remove the case to federal court, but fail.

5. Third amended complaint was filed July 7, 2010.

6. The defendant banksters have demurred again, but it doesn’t appear that the demurs filed in December have been heard.

7. Status conference set for Thursday, February 3rd, 2011.

8. There is a hearing date scheduled for March 29, 2011, but it’s not clear to me what will be happening at that hearing.

So, this is their third “amended complaint.”  That means the defendants… the banks… have demurred twice.  That means that the banks have come to court claiming that the mass joinder plaintiffs don’t state a cause of action… or in other words saying the plaintiffs have no case… and the court has allowed the plaintiffs to amend the complaint three times so far.

Like almost everything in the law, I guess you could read that a couple of different ways.  On one hand it seems positive… the case brought by the mass joinder plaintiffs has not been tossed out by the judge yet.  That’s good, right?

On the other hand… the court could “sustain the demur without leave to amend,” in which case the mass joinder suit would be over and done.

And that’s why litigating is always a gamble, and by no means a sure thing.

Here’s an oversimplified look at the mass joinder’s causes of action.

First Cause of Action… Fraudulent Concealment – This is saying that the bank was hiding things from the borrowers.

Second Cause of Action… Intentional Misrepresentation – This is lying when you knew you were lying.  In other words, you knew an appraisal was wrong… it came in at $500,000, but you knew it was worth $400,000 and you passed it off anyway.

Third Cause of Action… Negligent Misrepresentation – This is like saying that you’re lying but it wasn’t intentional.  Let’s say that you ordered an appraisal but never really looked at the appraisal to make sure it was done correctly.  You include this cause of action in case the conduct doesn’t rise to the level of intentional misrepresentation, and perhaps because some insurance policies don’t cover intentional acts.

Fourth Cause if Action… Invasion of Constitutional Right to Privacy – This is saying that the banks disclosed personal information… perhaps when selling the loans to another investor.

Fifth Cause of Action… Violation of California Financial Information Privacy Act – See above or read the actual complaint.

Sixth Cause of Action… Civil Code 2923.5 – Defendants are prohibited by statute from recording a Notice of Default against the primary residential property of any Californian without first making contact with that person as required under § 2923.5 and then interacting with that person in the manner set forth in detail under § 2923.5.  Nothing special here, but its been upheld by other courts in California.

Seventh Cause of Action… Civil Code 1798 – When they gave away your private information, they didn’t tell you they did it?  Defendants failed to timely disclose to Plaintiffs the disclosure of their personal information as required under California Civil Code § 1798.82

Eighth Cause of Action… Unfair Competition Against All Defendants – Defendants’ actions in implementing and perpetrating their fraudulent scheme of inducing Plaintiffs to accept mortgages for which they were not qualified based on inflated property valuations and undisclosed disregard of their own underwriting standards and the sale of overpriced collateralized mortgage pools, all the while knowing that the plan would crash and burn, taking the Plaintiffs down and costing them the equity in their homes and other damages, violates numerous federal and state statutes and common law protections enacted for consumer protection, privacy, trade disclosure, and fair trade and commerce.

In Conclusion…

Attorney Phillip Kramer, in his own words, made it quite clear that his firm was not responsible for the mailer I received or the telemarketing about which I’ve been notified.  Once again, he says…

“I know of no outbound calling.  If asked, I would not approve of that.  I knew that some law firms wanted to send out mailers.  I have insisted that everyone comply with State Bar rules and that anything with my name must be pre-approved.  As of this date, no one has submitted any proposed marketing for my review.  That piece was done without my knowledge.

I am happy to pay a referral fee to other law firms.  I do not split fees, pay commissions, nor do I pay referral fees to non-lawyers.  I do not use cappers, and have never authorized anyone to robocall, telemarket, spam email, or undertake any mass marketing on my behalf.”

So, if you want more information from Kramer and Kaslow about the “mass joinder” lawsuit, there’s only one way to get it… from the source’s mouth at Kramer & Kaslow.  And nowhere else, because no other marketing efforts have been approved, according to Mr. Kramer.

As to the law suit… it’s a real lawsuit… and I’ll be following it closely here on Mandelman Matters, you can count on that.

Mandelman out.

Dec
18

Watch Which Words You Use With Republicans – They Could Take Their Toys and Go Home

Derivatives, deregulation, Wall Street, shadow banking, interconnection… all words that might be used to describe the financial crisis that has thrown this country into an abyss so deep, that I don’t think anyone can even fathom just how much pain it will ultimately cause as the years awaiting a recovery that never seems to come, flow by.

They’re also good words to have on hand if you’re part of a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission responsible for authoring a report on what caused the nation’s financial crisis, how the largest financial institutions managed to become permanently insolvent in unison, how these same geniuses managed to destroy the global credit markets and our country’s regulatory credibility over a single summer, and then how they managed, after being shamelessly bailed out by American taxpayers, to maintain their smug and entitled attitudes, all the while doing whatever they could think of to abuse and torture American consumers.

But none will be used in the upcoming report to be issued by the Republican members of the Commission, who have decided to jump out in front and publish their own report, ostensibly because the 500 page report to be released next month by the Democrats just wasn’t robust enough for their liking.  And besides, it talks about all that excessive risk taking, unscrupulous practices by lenders, and lack of derivatives regulation that the Republicans see as having nothing to do with the economic meltdown.

The Republican’s version of the report is said to be a whopping 13 pages long, and is expected to place the blame for the crisis squarely on the shoulders of poor people who wanted to buy houses, and how some combination of Fannie, Freddie and the Community Reinvestment Act, facilitated their wanton irresponsibility.  If those damn poor people could have just paid their mortgages as they agreed to, everything would have been fine.

Well, that… and that handy little agreement Geithner forced AIG to sign before the bankrupted insurance giant received its two hundred billion dollar bailout, saying that AIG can’t sue Goldman Sachs for lying, cheating or stealing.  I’m paraphrasing there, of course.

The Republicans involved in this foray into censorship and revisionist history were former California congressional representative, Bill Thomas, Keith Hennessey, who was an economic adviser to President George W. Bush; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, who you might remember as the three names running the CBO a while back, and Peter J. Wallison, one time White House counsel to President Ronald Reagan.

Shahien Nasiripour, writing for Huffington Post, covered the Commission’s partisan demise… I mean hissy fit… thoroughly in his article posted on December 12th.

“During a private commission meeting last week, all four Republicans voted in favor of banning the phrases “Wall Street” and “shadow banking” and the words “interconnection” and “deregulation” from the panel’s final report, according to a person familiar with the matter and confirmed by Brooksley E. Born, one of the six commissioners who voted against the proposal.”

“I think a number of us had really pulled for” bipartisan consensus, said Born, a Democratic commissioner who famously tried to regulate certain derivatives as head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. “But this action by the Republicans indicates they have decided to go their own way.”

But, without question, it was Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism who grabbed for and got the brass ring, with her blog post on the actions of the Republicans on the Commission’s progress, or lack thereof, titled: Republican Members of FCIC to Promote Crisis Urban Legends, Shift Blame From Banks.”

Responding to the Republicans contention that the crisis was primarily caused by Fannie and Freddie, Smith put it this way:

“Let’s look at a few inconvenient facts.  We had housing bubbles in the UK, Australia, Ireland, Spain, Iceland, Latvia, Canada, and a lot of Eastern Europe.  Can we blame the CRA and Fannie and Freddie for that?  How about the M&A boom, which resulted in a ton of leveraged loans being issued at super low spreads?  If the Fed and other central banks had not driven rates to the floor, we’d see a good bit more distress and dislocation in this sector of the market.  Oh, and how about the fact that banks in Continental Europe, which had no housing bubble in their home markets, and no evil Fannie or Freddie analogues, also nearly keeled over in the crisis?

This whole line of thinking is garbage, the financial policy equivalent of arguing that the sun revolves around the earth.”

I told you… is she hot or what?  And when she chimes in somewhere in the middle of a piece, she goes: “Yves here.”  Totally hot.

My first reaction to reading Nasiripour’s article was that we needed to send a tenured elementary school teacher to run these types of Commissions in the future because there’s no way an experienced teacher of third grade would put up with four out of ten of her students picking up their toys and going home in the middle of an assignment.

The Republicans demanding that certain words be omitted from the final report was a goofy idea, in my mind… I mean, you can’t use the words “Wall Street?” in a report about… well… Wall Street?

For a moment I considered the idea of these guys being the biggest babies ever seen in such a setting, but then I remembered that I was talking about the U.S. House of Representatives, so that wasn’t likely to be the case.

But seriously… how can you talk about the financial crisis we’re still enduring without using the word “deregulation?”  Or the word: “derivatives?”

I suppose you could take a page out of Ben Bernanke’s handbook on how to avoid using the word: “deflation,” and talk about “somewhat reduced regulatory expectations,” or some such drivel.  But “derivatives?”  There’s no way to touch the subject matter without specifically discussing the impact of derivatives.

I wonder if after the Republicans made their demands to omit certain words, if some of the Democrats started using the words even more frequently, until the Republicans started putting their fingers in their own ears, saying “La, La, Las… we can’t hear you…”  And then the babies ran out of the room crying?  I don’t know, just thinking out loud.

Yves again…

“This pathetic development shows how deeply this country is in thrall to lobbyists. But these so-called commissioners, who are really no more than financial services minions out to misbrand themselves as independent, look to have overplayed thier hand.  This stunt shows more than a tad of desperation on the part of banks and their operatives in their excessive efforts block any remotely accurate, and therefore critical, report on the industry.”

I couldn’t agree more, and there’s no reason for me to say anything further about that, as Yves has phrased it flawlessly.  And check out what she said towards the end of her blog post:

“It may also suggest that the banking industry is feeling more cornered than its continued high-handed posture might suggest.  I continue to receive reports from industry insiders confirming that the biggest banks in the US are insolvent.  The only sensible resolution of the mortgage mess involves deep principal mods, which will force the top four banks to write down their second mortgage books, blowing big holes in their balance sheets, and raising numerous, embarrassing questions (how could they and the Treasury defend paying back the TARP, much the less the level of 2009 and 2010 bonuses?)”

And finally Yves puts a bow on the whole thing…

“In other words, the banks may be worried about the possibility of a backlash that might actually be effective.  But they are already too late to stop the inevitable.

They refuse to halt the juggernaut, a doomsday machine that continues to grind up families and communities and saddle innocent bystanders with the costs of higher taxes, unemployment, sagging infrastructure, and poor prospects for their children. This next two years may be the last window to leash and collar a parasitic financial services industry.

If the authorities fail yet again, the cost will be both the rule of law and our unwritten social compact. If you tear asunder structures that fundamental, expect to reap a whirlwind.”

Here, here, Yves Smith!  Very well said.

Mandelman out.

Jul
26

The Truth? Read Matt Taibbi in Rolling Stone

EDITOR’S NOTE: How refreshing to see someone who approached this not with caution but with a desire for truth. Read this and you will understand a lot more about the Great Recession.
“The “Pig in the Poke” scam is another key to the entire bailout era. After the crash of the housing bubble — the largest asset bubble in history — the economy was suddenly flooded with securities backed by failing or near-failing home loans. In the cleanup phase after that bubble burst, the whole game was to get taxpayers, clients and shareholders to buy these worthless cats, but at pig prices.

“The only reason such apathy exists, however, is because there’s still a widespread misunderstanding of how exactly Wall Street “earns” its money, with emphasis on the quotation marks around “earns.” The question everyone should be asking, as one bailout recipient after another posts massive profits — Goldman reported $13.4 billion in profits last year, after paying out that $16.2 billion in bonuses and compensation — is this: In an economy as horrible as ours, with every factory town between New York and Los Angeles looking like those hollowed-out ghost ships we see on History Channel documentaries like Shipwrecks of the Great Lakes, where in the hell did Wall Street’s eye-popping profits come from, exactly? Did Goldman go from bailout city to $13.4 billion in the black because, as Blankfein suggests, its “performance” was just that awesome? A year and a half after they were minutes away from bankruptcy, how are these assholes not only back on their feet again, but hauling in bonuses at the same rate they were during the bubble?
Con artists have a word for the inability of their victims to accept that they’ve been scammed. They call it the “True Believer Syndrome.” That’s sort of where we are, in a state of nagging disbelief about the real problem on Wall Street. It isn’t so much that we have inadequate rules or incompetent regulators, although both of these things are certainly true. The real problem is that it doesn’t matter what regulations are in place if the people running the economy are rip-off artists. The system assumes a certain minimum level of ethical behavior and civic instinct over and above what is spelled out by the regulations. If those ethics are absent — well, this thing isn’t going to work, no matter what we do. Sure, mugging old ladies is against the law, but it’s also easy. To prevent it, we depend, for the most part, not on cops but on people making the conscious decision not to do it.
By  Matt Taibbi
Feb 17, 2010 5:43 PM EST

On January 21st, Lloyd Blankfein left a peculiar voicemail message on the work phones of his employees at Goldman Sachs. Fast becoming America’s pre-eminent Marvel Comics supervillain, the CEO used the call to deploy his secret weapon: a pair of giant, nuclear-powered testicles. In his message, Blankfein addressed his plan to pay out gigantic year-end bonuses amid widespread controversy over Goldman’s role in precipitating the global financial crisis.

The bank had already set aside a tidy $16.2 billion for salaries and bonuses — meaning that Goldman employees were each set to take home an average of $498,246, a number roughly commensurate with what they received during the bubble years. Still, the troops were worried: There were rumors that Dr. Ballsachs, bowing to political pressure, might be forced to scale the number back. After all, the country was broke, 14.8 million Americans were stranded on the unemployment line, and Barack Obama and the Democrats were trying to recover the populist high ground after their bitch-whipping in Massachusetts by calling for a “bailout tax” on banks. Maybe this wasn’t the right time for Goldman to be throwing its annual Roman bonus orgy.

Not to worry, Blankfein reassured employees. “In a year that proved to have no shortage of story lines,” he said, “I believe very strongly that performance is the ultimate narrative.”

Translation: We made a shitload of money last year because we’re so amazing at our jobs, so fuck all those people who want us to reduce our bonuses.

Goldman wasn’t alone. The nation’s six largest banks — all committed to this balls-out, I drink your milkshake! strategy of flagrantly gorging themselves as America goes hungry — set aside a whopping $140 billion for executive compensation last year, a sum only slightly less than the $164 billion they paid themselves in the pre-crash year of 2007. In a gesture of self-sacrifice, Blankfein himself took a humiliatingly low bonus of $9 million, less than the 2009 pay of elephantine New York Knicks washout Eddy Curry. But in reality, not much had changed. “What is the state of our moral being when Lloyd Blankfein taking a $9 million bonus is viewed as this great act of contrition, when every penny of it was a direct transfer from the taxpayer?” asks Eliot Spitzer, who tried to hold Wall Street accountable during his own ill-fated stint as governor of New York.

Beyond a few such bleats of outrage, however, the huge payout was met, by and large, with a collective sigh of resignation. Because beneath America’s populist veneer, on a more subtle strata of the national psyche, there remains a strong temptation to not really give a shit. The rich, after all, have always made way too much money; what’s the difference if some fat cat in New York pockets $20 million instead of $10 million?

The only reason such apathy exists, however, is because there’s still a widespread misunderstanding of how exactly Wall Street “earns” its money, with emphasis on the quotation marks around “earns.” The question everyone should be asking, as one bailout recipient after another posts massive profits — Goldman reported $13.4 billion in profits last year, after paying out that $16.2 billion in bonuses and compensation — is this: In an economy as horrible as ours, with every factory town between New York and Los Angeles looking like those hollowed-out ghost ships we see on History Channel documentaries like Shipwrecks of the Great Lakes, where in the hell did Wall Street’s eye-popping profits come from, exactly? Did Goldman go from bailout city to $13.4 billion in the black because, as Blankfein suggests, its “performance” was just that awesome? A year and a half after they were minutes away from bankruptcy, how are these assholes not only back on their feet again, but hauling in bonuses at the same rate they were during the bubble?

The answer to that question is basically twofold: They raped the taxpayer, and they raped their clients.

The bottom line is that banks like Goldman have learned absolutely nothing from the global economic meltdown. In fact, they’re back conniving and playing speculative long shots in force — only this time with the full financial support of the U.S. government. In the process, they’re rapidly re-creating the conditions for another crash, with the same actors once again playing the same crazy games of financial chicken with the same toxic assets as before.

That’s why this bonus business isn’t merely a matter of getting upset about whether or not Lloyd Blankfein buys himself one tropical island or two on his next birthday. The reality is that the post-bailout era in which Goldman thrived has turned out to be a chaotic frenzy of high-stakes con-artistry, with taxpayers and clients bilked out of billions using a dizzying array of old-school hustles that, but for their ponderous complexity, would have fit well in slick grifter movies like The Sting and Matchstick Men. There’s even a term in con-man lingo for what some of the banks are doing right now, with all their cosmetic gestures of scaling back bonuses and giving to charities. In the grifter world, calming down a mark so he doesn’t call the cops is known as the “Cool Off.”

To appreciate how all of these (sometimes brilliant) schemes work is to understand the difference between earning money and taking scores, and to realize that the profits these banks are posting don’t so much represent national growth and recovery, but something closer to the losses one would report after a theft or a car crash. Many Americans instinctively understand this to be true — but, much like when your wife does it with your 300-pound plumber in the kids’ playroom, knowing it and actually watching the whole scene from start to finish are two very different things. In that spirit, a brief history of the best 18 months of grifting this country has ever seen:

CON #1 THE SWOOP AND SQUAT

By now, most people who have followed the financial crisis know that the bailout of AIG was actually a bailout of AIG’s “counterparties” — the big banks like Goldman to whom the insurance giant owed billions when it went belly up.

What is less understood is that the bailout of AIG counter-parties like Goldman and Société Générale, a French bank, actually began before the collapse of AIG, before the Federal Reserve paid them so much as a dollar. Nor is it understood that these counterparties actually accelerated the wreck of AIG in what was, ironically, something very like the old insurance scam known as “Swoop and Squat,” in which a target car is trapped between two perpetrator vehicles and wrecked, with the mark in the game being the target’s insurance company — in this case, the government.

This may sound far-fetched, but the financial crisis of 2008 was very much caused by a perverse series of legal incentives that often made failed investments worth more than thriving ones. Our economy was like a town where everyone has juicy insurance policies on their neighbors’ cars and houses. In such a town, the driving will be suspiciously bad, and there will be a lot of fires.

AIG was the ultimate example of this dynamic. At the height of the housing boom, Goldman was selling billions in bundled mortgage-backed securities — often toxic crap of the no-money-down, no-identification-needed variety of home loan — to various institutional suckers like pensions and insurance companies, who frequently thought they were buying investment-grade instruments. At the same time, in a glaring example of the perverse incentives that existed and still exist, Goldman was also betting against those same sorts of securities — a practice that one government investigator compared to “selling a car with faulty brakes and then buying an insurance policy on the buyer of those cars.”

Goldman often “insured” some of this garbage with AIG, using a virtually unregulated form of pseudo-insurance called credit-default swaps. Thanks in large part to deregulation pushed by Bob Rubin, former chairman of Goldman, and Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton, AIG wasn’t required to actually have the capital to pay off the deals. As a result, banks like Goldman bought more than $440 billion worth of this bogus insurance from AIG, a huge blind bet that the taxpayer ended up having to eat.

Thus, when the housing bubble went crazy, Goldman made money coming and going. They made money selling the crap mortgages, and they made money by collecting on the bogus insurance from AIG when the crap mortgages flopped.

Still, the trick for Goldman was: how to collect the insurance money. As AIG headed into a tailspin that fateful summer of 2008, it looked like the beleaguered firm wasn’t going to have the money to pay off the bogus insurance. So Goldman and other banks began demanding that AIG provide them with cash collateral. In the 15 months leading up to the collapse of AIG, Goldman received $5.9 billion in collateral. Société Générale, a bank holding lots of mortgage-backed crap originally underwritten by Goldman, received $5.5 billion. These collateral demands squeezing AIG from two sides were the “Swoop and Squat” that ultimately crashed the firm. “It put the company into a liquidity crisis,” says Eric Dinallo, who was intimately involved in the AIG bailout as head of the New York State Insurance Department.

It was a brilliant move. When a company like AIG is about to die, it isn’t supposed to hand over big hunks of assets to a single creditor like Goldman; it’s supposed to equitably distribute whatever assets it has left among all its creditors. Had AIG gone bankrupt, Goldman would have likely lost much of the $5.9 billion that it pocketed as collateral. “Any bankruptcy court that saw those collateral payments would have declined that transaction as a fraudulent conveyance,” says Barry Ritholtz, the author of Bailout Nation. Instead, Goldman and the other counterparties got their money out in advance — putting a torch to what was left of AIG. Fans of the movie Goodfellas will recall Henry Hill and Tommy DeVito taking the same approach to the Bamboo Lounge nightclub they’d been gouging. Roll the Ray Liotta narration: “Finally, when there’s nothing left, when you can’t borrow another buck . . . you bust the joint out. You light a match.”

And why not? After all, according to the terms of the bailout deal struck when AIG was taken over by the state in September 2008, Goldman was paid 100 cents on the dollar on an additional $12.9 billion it was owed by AIG — again, money it almost certainly would not have seen a fraction of had AIG proceeded to a normal bankruptcy. Along with the collateral it pocketed, that’s $19 billion in pure cash that Goldman would not have “earned” without massive state intervention. How’s that $13.4 billion in 2009 profits looking now? And that doesn’t even include the direct bailouts of Goldman Sachs and other big banks, which began in earnest after the collapse of AIG.

CON #2 THE DOLLAR STORE

In the usual “DollarStore” or “Big Store” scam — popularized in movies like The Sting — a huge cast of con artists is hired to create a whole fake environment into which the unsuspecting mark walks and gets robbed over and over again. A warehouse is converted into a makeshift casino or off-track betting parlor, the fool walks in with money, leaves without it.

The two key elements to the Dollar Store scam are the whiz-bang theatrical redecorating job and the fact that everyone is in on it except the mark. In this case, a pair of investment banks were dressed up to look like commercial banks overnight, and it was the taxpayer who walked in and lost his shirt, confused by the appearance of what looked like real Federal Reserve officials minding the store.

Less than a week after the AIG bailout, Goldman and another investment bank, Morgan Stanley, applied for, and received, federal permission to become bank holding companies — a move that would make them eligible for much greater federal support. The stock prices of both firms were cratering, and there was talk that either or both might go the way of Lehman Brothers, another once-mighty investment bank that just a week earlier had disappeared from the face of the earth under the weight of its toxic assets. By law, a five-day waiting period was required for such a conversion — but the two banks got them overnight, with final approval actually coming only five days after the AIG bailout.

Why did they need those federal bank charters? This question is the key to understanding the entire bailout era — because this Dollar Store scam was the big one. Institutions that were, in reality, high-risk gambling houses were allowed to masquerade as conservative commercial banks. As a result of this new designation, they were given access to a virtually endless tap of “free money” by unsuspecting taxpayers. The $10 billion that Goldman received under the better-known TARP bailout was chump change in comparison to the smorgasbord of direct and indirect aid it qualified for as a commercial bank.

When Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley got their federal bank charters, they joined Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and the other banking titans who could go to the Fed and borrow massive amounts of money at interest rates that, thanks to the aggressive rate-cutting policies of Fed chief Ben Bernanke during the crisis, soon sank to zero percent. The ability to go to the Fed and borrow big at next to no interest was what saved Goldman, Morgan Stanley and other banks from death in the fall of 2008. “They had no other way to raise capital at that moment, meaning they were on the brink of insolvency,” says Nomi Prins, a former managing director at Goldman Sachs. “The Fed was the only shot.”

In fact, the Fed became not just a source of emergency borrowing that enabled Goldman and Morgan Stanley to stave off disaster — it became a source of long-term guaranteed income. Borrowing at zero percent interest, banks like Goldman now had virtually infinite ways to make money. In one of the most common maneuvers, they simply took the money they borrowed from the government at zero percent and lent it back to the government by buying Treasury bills that paid interest of three or four percent. It was basically a license to print money — no different than attaching an ATM to the side of the Federal Reserve.

“You’re borrowing at zero, putting it out there at two or three percent, with hundreds of billions of dollars — man, you can make a lot of money that way,” says the manager of one prominent hedge fund. “It’s free money.”

Which goes a long way to explaining Goldman’s enormous profits last year. But all that free money was amplified by another scam:

CON #3 THE PIG IN THE POKE

At one point or another, pretty much everyone who takes drugs has been burned by this one, also known as the “Rocks in the Box” scam or, in its more elaborate variations, the “Jamaican Switch.” Someone sells you what looks like an eightball of coke in a baggie, you get home and, you dumbass, it’s baby powder.

The scam’s name comes from the Middle Ages, when some fool would be sold a bound and gagged pig that he would see being put into a bag; he’d miss the switch, then get home and find a tied-up cat in there instead. Hence the expression “Don’t let the cat out of the bag.”

The “Pig in the Poke” scam is another key to the entire bailout era. After the crash of the housing bubble — the largest asset bubble in history — the economy was suddenly flooded with securities backed by failing or near-failing home loans. In the cleanup phase after that bubble burst, the whole game was to get taxpayers, clients and shareholders to buy these worthless cats, but at pig prices.

One of the first times we saw the scam appear was in September 2008, right around the time that AIG was imploding. That was when the Fed changed some of its collateral rules, meaning banks that could once borrow only against sound collateral, like Treasury bills or AAA-rated corporate bonds, could now borrow against pretty much anything — including some of the mortgage-backed sewage that got us into this mess in the first place. In other words, banks that once had to show a real pig to borrow from the Fed could now show up with a cat and get pig money. “All of a sudden, banks were allowed to post absolute shit to the Fed’s balance sheet,” says the manager of the prominent hedge fund.

The Fed spelled it out on September 14th, 2008, when it changed the collateral rules for one of its first bailout facilities — the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, or PDCF. The Fed’s own write-up described the changes: “With the Fed’s action, all the kinds of collateral then in use . . . including non-investment-grade securities and equities . . . became eligible for pledge in the PDCF.”

Translation: We now accept cats.

The Pig in the Poke also came into play in April of last year, when Congress pushed a little-known agency called the Financial Accounting Standards Board, or FASB, to change the so-called “mark-to-market” accounting rules. Until this rule change, banks had to assign a real-market price to all of their assets. If they had a balance sheet full of securities they had bought at $3 that were now only worth $1, they had to figure their year-end accounting using that $1 value. In other words, if you were the dope who bought a cat instead of a pig, you couldn’t invite your shareholders to a slate of pork dinners come year-end accounting time.

But last April, FASB changed all that. From now on, it announced, banks could avoid reporting losses on some of their crappy cat investments simply by declaring that they would “more likely than not” hold on to them until they recovered their pig value. In short, the banks didn’t even have to actually hold on to the toxic shit they owned — they just had to sort of promise to hold on to it.

That’s why the “profit” numbers of a lot of these banks are really a joke. In many cases, we have absolutely no idea how many cats are in their proverbial bag. What they call “profits” might really be profits, only minus undeclared millions or billions in losses.

“They’re hiding all this stuff from their shareholders,” says Ritholtz, who was disgusted that the banks lobbied for the rule changes. “Now, suddenly banks that were happy to mark to market on the way up don’t have to mark to market on the way down.”

CON #4 THE RUMANIAN BOX

One of the great innovations of Victor Lustig, the legendary Depression-era con man who wrote the famous “Ten Commandments for Con Men,” was a thing called the “Rumanian Box.” This was a little machine that a mark would put a blank piece of paper into, only to see real currency come out the other side. The brilliant Lustig sold this Rumanian Box over and over again for vast sums — but he’s been outdone by the modern barons of Wall Street, who managed to get themselves a real Rumanian Box.

How they accomplished this is a story that by itself highlights the challenge of placing this era in any kind of historical context of known financial crime. What the banks did was something that was never — and never could have been — thought of before. They took so much money from the government, and then did so little with it, that the state was forced to start printing new cash to throw at them. Even the great Lustig in his wildest, horniest dreams could never have dreamed up this one.

The setup: By early 2009, the banks had already replenished themselves with billions if not trillions in bailout money. It wasn’t just the $700 billion in TARP cash, the free money provided by the Fed, and the untold losses obscured by accounting tricks. Another new rule allowed banks to collect interest on the cash they were required by law to keep in reserve accounts at the Fed — meaning the state was now compensating the banks simply for guaranteeing their own solvency. And a new federal operation called the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program let insolvent and near-insolvent banks dispense with their deservedly ruined credit profiles and borrow on a clean slate, with FDIC backing. Goldman borrowed $29 billion on the government’s good name, J.P. Morgan Chase $38 billion, and Bank of America $44 billion. “TLGP,” says Prins, the former Goldman manager, “was a big one.”

Collectively, all this largesse was worth trillions. The idea behind the flood of money, from the government’s standpoint, was to spark a national recovery: We refill the banks’ balance sheets, and they, in turn, start to lend money again, recharging the economy and producing jobs. “The banks were fast approaching insolvency,” says Rep. Paul Kanjorski, a vocal critic of Wall Street who nevertheless defends the initial decision to bail out the banks. “It was vitally important that we recapitalize these institutions.”

But here’s the thing. Despite all these trillions in government rescues, despite the Fed slashing interest rates down to nothing and showering the banks with mountains of guarantees, Goldman and its friends had still not jump-started lending again by the first quarter of 2009. That’s where those nuclear-powered balls of Lloyd Blankfein came into play, as Goldman and other banks basically threatened to pick up their bailout billions and go home if the government didn’t fork over more cash — a lot more. “Even if the Fed could make interest rates negative, that wouldn’t necessarily help,” warned Goldman’s chief domestic economist, Jan Hatzius. “We’re in a deep recession mainly because the private sector, for a variety of reasons, has decided to save a lot more.”

Translation: You can lower interest rates all you want, but we’re still not fucking lending the bailout money to anyone in this economy. Until the government agreed to hand over even more goodies, the banks opted to join the rest of the “private sector” and “save” the taxpayer aid they had received — in the form of bonuses and compensation.

The ploy worked. In March of last year, the Fed sharply expanded a radical new program called quantitative easing, which effectively operated as a real-live Rumanian Box. The government put stacks of paper in one side, and out came $1.2 trillion “real” dollars.

The government used some of that freshly printed money to prop itself up by purchasing Treasury bonds — a desperation move, since Washington’s demand for cash was so great post-Clusterfuck ’08 that even the Chinese couldn’t buy U.S. debt fast enough to keep America afloat. But the Fed used most of the new cash to buy mortgage-backed securities in an effort to spur home lending — instantly creating a massive market for major banks.

And what did the banks do with the proceeds? Among other things, they bought Treasury bonds, essentially lending the money back to the government, at interest. The money that came out of the magic Rumanian Box went from the government back to the government, with Wall Street stepping into the circle just long enough to get paid. And once quantitative easing ends, as it is scheduled to do in March, the flow of money for home loans will once again grind to a halt. The Mortgage Bankers Association expects the number of new residential mortgages to plunge by 40 percent this year.

CON #5 THE BIG MITT

All of that Rumanian box paper was made even more valuable by running it through the next stage of the grift. Michael Masters, one of the country’s leading experts on commodities trading, compares this part of the scam to the poker game in the Bill Murray comedy Stripes. “It’s like that scene where John Candy leans over to the guy who’s new at poker and says, ‘Let me see your cards,’ then starts giving him advice,” Masters says. “He looks at the hand, and the guy has bad cards, and he’s like, ‘Bluff me, come on! If it were me, I’d bet everything!’ That’s what it’s like. It’s like they’re looking at your cards as they give you advice.”

In more ways than one can count, the economy in the bailout era turned into a “Big Mitt,” the con man’s name for a rigged poker game. Everybody was indeed looking at everyone else’s cards, in many cases with state sanction. Only taxpayers and clients were left out of the loop.

At the same time the Fed and the Treasury were making massive, earthshaking moves like quantitative easing and TARP, they were also consulting regularly with private advisory boards that include every major player on Wall Street. The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee has a J.P. Morgan executive as its chairman and a Goldman executive as its vice chairman, while the board advising the Fed includes bankers from Capital One and Bank of New York Mellon. That means that, in addition to getting great gobs of free money, the banks were also getting clear signals about when they were getting that money, making it possible to position themselves to make the appropriate investments.

One of the best examples of the banks blatantly gambling, and winning, on government moves was the Public-Private Investment Program, or PPIP. In this bizarre scheme cooked up by goofball-geek Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, the government loaned money to hedge funds and other private investors to buy up the absolutely most toxic horseshit on the market — the same kind of high-risk, high-yield mortgages that were most responsible for triggering the financial chain reaction in the fall of 2008. These satanic deals were the basic currency of the bubble: Jobless dope fiends bought houses with no money down, and the big banks wrapped those mortgages into securities and then sold them off to pensions and other suckers as investment-grade deals. The whole point of the PPIP was to get private investors to relieve the banks of these dangerous assets before they hurt any more innocent bystanders.

But what did the banks do instead, once they got wind of the PPIP? They started buying that worthless crap again, presumably to sell back to the government at inflated prices! In the third quarter of last year, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup and Bank of America combined to add $3.36 billion of exactly this horseshit to their balance sheets.

This brazen decision to gouge the taxpayer startled even hardened market observers. According to Michael Schlachter of the investment firm Wilshire Associates, it was “absolutely ridiculous” that the banks that were supposed to be reducing their exposure to these volatile instruments were instead loading up on them in order to make a quick buck. “Some of them created this mess,” he said, “and they are making a killing undoing it.”

CON #6 THE WIRE

Here’s the thing about our current economy. When Goldman and Morgan Stanley transformed overnight from investment banks into commercial banks, we were told this would mean a new era of “significantly tighter regulations and much closer supervision by bank examiners,” as The New York Times put it the very next day. In reality, however, the conversion of Goldman and Morgan Stanley simply completed the dangerous concentration of power and wealth that began in 1999, when Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act — the Depression-era law that had prevented the merger of insurance firms, commercial banks and investment houses. Wall Street and the government became one giant dope house, where a few major players share valuable information between conflicted departments the way junkies share needles.

One of the most common practices is a thing called front-running, which is really no different from the old “Wire” con, another scam popularized in The Sting. But instead of intercepting a telegraph wire in order to bet on racetrack results ahead of the crowd, what Wall Street does is make bets ahead of valuable information they obtain in the course of everyday business.

Say you’re working for the commodities desk of a big investment bank, and a major client — a pension fund, perhaps — calls you up and asks you to buy a billion dollars of oil futures for them. Once you place that huge order, the price of those futures is almost guaranteed to go up. If the guy in charge of asset management a few desks down from you somehow finds out about that, he can make a fortune for the bank by betting ahead of that client of yours. The deal would be instantaneous and undetectable, and it would offer huge profits. Your own client would lose money, of course — he’d end up paying a higher price for the oil futures he ordered, because you would have driven up the price. But that doesn’t keep banks from screwing their own customers in this very way.

The scam is so blatant that Goldman Sachs actually warns its clients that something along these lines might happen to them. In the disclosure section at the back of a research paper the bank issued on January 15th, Goldman advises clients to buy some dubious high-yield bonds while admitting that the bank itself may bet against those same shitty bonds. “Our salespeople, traders and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and our proprietary trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research,” the disclosure reads. “Our asset-management area, our proprietary-trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.”

Banks like Goldman admit this stuff openly, despite the fact that there are securities laws that require banks to engage in “fair dealing with customers” and prohibit analysts from issuing opinions that are at odds with what they really think. And yet here they are, saying flat-out that they may be issuing an opinion at odds with what they really think.

To help them screw their own clients, the major investment banks employ high-speed computer programs that can glimpse orders from investors before the deals are processed and then make trades on behalf of the banks at speeds of fractions of a second. None of them will admit it, but everybody knows what this computerized trading — known as “flash trading” — really is. “Flash trading is nothing more than computerized front-running,” says the prominent hedge-fund manager. The SEC voted to ban flash trading in September, but five months later it has yet to issue a regulation to put a stop to the practice.

Over the summer, Goldman suffered an embarrassment on that score when one of its employees, a Russian named Sergey Aleynikov, allegedly stole the bank’s computerized trading code. In a court proceeding after Aleynikov’s arrest, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Facciponti reported that “the bank has raised the possibility that there is a danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to manipulate markets in unfair ways.”

Six months after a federal prosecutor admitted in open court that the Goldman trading program could be used to unfairly manipulate markets, the bank released its annual numbers. Among the notable details was the fact that a staggering 76 percent of its revenue came from trading, both for its clients and for its own account. “That is much, much higher than any other bank,” says Prins, the former Goldman managing director. “If I were a client and I saw that they were making this much money from trading, I would question how badly I was getting screwed.”

Why big institutional investors like pension funds continually come to Wall Street to get raped is the million-dollar question that many experienced observers puzzle over. Goldman’s own explanation for this phenomenon is comedy of the highest order. In testimony before a government panel in January, Blankfein was confronted about his firm’s practice of betting against the same sorts of investments it sells to clients. His response: “These are the professional investors who want this exposure.”

In other words, our clients are big boys, so screw ‘em if they’re dumb enough to take the sucker bets I’m offering.

CON #7 THE RELOAD

Not many con men are good enough or brazen enough to con the same victim twice in a row, but the few who try have a name for this excellent sport: reloading. The usual way to reload on a repeat victim (called an “addict” in grifter parlance) is to rope him into trying to get back the money he just lost. This is exactly what started to happen late last year.

It’s important to remember that the housing bubble itself was a classic confidence game — the Ponzi scheme. The Ponzi scheme is any scam in which old investors must be continually paid off with money from new investors to keep up what appear to be high rates of investment return. Residential housing was never as valuable as it seemed during the bubble; the soaring home values were instead a reflection of a continual upward rush of new investors in mortgage-backed securities, a rush that finally collapsed in 2008.

But by the end of 2009, the unimaginable was happening: The bubble was re-inflating. A bailout policy that was designed to help us get out from under the bursting of the largest asset bubble in history inadvertently produced exactly the opposite result, as all that government-fueled capital suddenly began flowing into the most dangerous and destructive investments all over again. Wall Street was going for the reload.

A lot of this was the government’s own fault, of course. By slashing interest rates to zero and flooding the market with money, the Fed was replicating the historic mistake that Alan Greenspan had made not once, but twice, before the tech bubble in the early 1990s and before the housing bubble in the early 2000s. By making sure that traditionally safe investments like CDs and savings accounts earned basically nothing, thanks to rock-bottom interest rates, investors were forced to go elsewhere to search for moneymaking opportunities.

Now we’re in the same situation all over again, only far worse. Wall Street is flooded with government money, and interest rates that are not just low but flat are pushing investors to seek out more “creative” opportunities. (It’s “Greenspan times 10,” jokes one hedge-fund trader.) Some of that money could be put to use on Main Street, of course, backing the efforts of investment-worthy entrepreneurs. But that’s not what our modern Wall Street is built to do. “They don’t seem to want to lend to small and medium-sized business,” says Rep. Brad Sherman, who serves on the House Financial Services Committee. “What they want to invest in is marketable securities. And the definition of small and medium-sized businesses, for the most part, is that they don’t have marketable securities. They have bank loans.”

In other words, unless you’re dealing with the stock of a major, publicly traded company, or a giant pile of home mortgages, or the bonds of a large corporation, or a foreign currency, or oil futures, or some country’s debt, or anything else that can be rapidly traded back and forth in huge numbers, factory-style, by big banks, you’re not really on Wall Street’s radar.

So with small business out of the picture, and the safe stuff not worth looking at thanks to the Fed’s low interest rates, where did Wall Street go? Right back into the shit that got us here.

One trader, who asked not to be identified, recounts a story of what happened with his hedge fund this past fall. His firm wanted to short — that is, bet against — all the crap toxic bonds that were suddenly in vogue again. The fund’s analysts had examined the fundamentals of these instruments and concluded that they were absolutely not good investments.

So they took a short position. One month passed, and they lost money. Another month passed — same thing. Finally, the trader just shrugged and decided to change course and buy.

“I said, ‘Fuck it, let’s make some money,’” he recalls. “I absolutely did not believe in the fundamentals of any of this stuff. However, I can get on the bandwagon, just so long as I know when to jump out of the car before it goes off the damn cliff!”

This is the very definition of bubble economics — betting on crowd behavior instead of on fundamentals. It’s old investors betting on the arrival of new ones, with the value of the underlying thing itself being irrelevant. And this behavior is being driven, no surprise, by the biggest firms on Wall Street.

The research report published by Goldman Sachs on January 15th underlines this sort of thinking. Goldman issued a strong recommendation to buy exactly the sort of high-yield toxic crap our hedge-fund guy was, by then, driving rapidly toward the cliff. “Summarizing our views,” the bank wrote, “we expect robust flows . . . to dominate fundamentals.” In other words: This stuff is crap, but everyone’s buying it in an awfully robust way, so you should too. Just like tech stocks in 1999, and mortgage-backed securities in 2006.

To sum up, this is what Lloyd Blankfein meant by “performance”: Take massive sums of money from the government, sit on it until the government starts printing trillions of dollars in a desperate attempt to restart the economy, buy even more toxic assets to sell back to the government at inflated prices — and then, when all else fails, start driving us all toward the cliff again with a frank and open endorsement of bubble economics. I mean, shit — who wouldn’t deserve billions in bonuses for doing all that?

Con artists have a word for the inability of their victims to accept that they’ve been scammed. They call it the “True Believer Syndrome.” That’s sort of where we are, in a state of nagging disbelief about the real problem on Wall Street. It isn’t so much that we have inadequate rules or incompetent regulators, although both of these things are certainly true. The real problem is that it doesn’t matter what regulations are in place if the people running the economy are rip-off artists. The system assumes a certain minimum level of ethical behavior and civic instinct over and above what is spelled out by the regulations. If those ethics are absent — well, this thing isn’t going to work, no matter what we do. Sure, mugging old ladies is against the law, but it’s also easy. To prevent it, we depend, for the most part, not on cops but on people making the conscious decision not to do it.

That’s why the biggest gift the bankers got in the bailout was not fiscal but psychological. “The most valuable part of the bailout,” says Rep. Sherman, “was the implicit guarantee that they’re Too Big to Fail.” Instead of liquidating and prosecuting the insolvent institutions that took us all down with them in a giant Ponzi scheme, we have showered them with money and guarantees and all sorts of other enabling gestures. And what should really freak everyone out is the fact that Wall Street immediately started skimming off its own rescue money. If the bailouts validated anew the crooked psychology of the bubble, the recent profit and bonus numbers show that the same psychology is back, thriving, and looking for new disasters to create. “It’s evidence,” says Rep. Kanjorski, “that they still don’t get it.”

More to the point, the fact that we haven’t done much of anything to change the rules and behavior of Wall Street shows that we still don’t get it. Instituting a bailout policy that stressed recapitalizing bad banks was like the addict coming back to the con man to get his lost money back. Ask yourself how well that ever works out. And then get ready for the reload.


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, securities fraud, STATUTES, taxes, trustee Tagged: AIG, AIG counter-parties, Blankfein, Federal reserve, Goldman Sachs, Matt Taibbi, Societe Generale
Jun
16

The REAL NUMBERS PLEASE!

What We Know (and Don’t Want to Know) About Housing Today, June 16, 2010, 34 minutes ago | noreply@blogger.com (Charles Hugh Smith) The housing market is doomed in the U.S., and the causal factors are all well-known. But we don’t want to know, because that knowledge would re-order the American culture and economy.

Yesterday I suggested that what we don’t want to know is as important as what we know/don’t know. We know housing values are artificially and unsustainably high, but we don’t want to know this.

About two-thirds of U.S. households own a house (75 million); 51 million have a mortgage and 24 million own homes free and clear (no mortgage). Most of the other 36 million households are moderate/low income and have limited or no access to credit and limited or no assets.

Who benefits from a housing market propped up by massive government subsidies? The homebuilders, lenders and real estate industries, of course, but the 75 million “stakeholders” in the housing market also want to believe the market is “fairly priced” and bound to recover its bubble-era heights.

Why? As I reported in Housing and the Collapse of Upward Mobility (April 16, 2010), the stupendous equity extraction of the bubble years left U.S. homeowners with little equity in their homes. The bursting of the housing bubble thus effectively destroyed most of the middle-class wealth held in housing:

If we look up all the gory details in theFed Flow of Funds, we find that household real estate fell from $23 trillion in 2006 to $16.5 trillion at the end of 2009. That is a decline of $6.5 trillion, more than half the total $11 trillion lost in the credit/housing bust.

Home mortgages have fallen a negligible amount, from $10.48 trillion in 2007 to $10.26 trillion at the end of 2009. As of the end of 2009, total equity in household real estate was a paltry $6.24 trillion of which about $5.25 trillion was held in free-and-clear homes (32% of all household real estate, i.e. 32% of $16.5 trillion).

That leaves about $1 trillion–a mere 1.85% of the nation’s total net

worth– of equity in the 51 million homes with mortgages.

The orgy of speculation, leverage and debt incentivized by the credit/housing bubble of 2000-2006 has, in the aftermath of the bubble’s bursting, destroyed most of the nation’s middle-class wealth.

In effect, three generations of accumulated equity was blown off in “wannabe wealthy” consumption and speculation.

That $6 trillion in wealth is gone. For many households, that was the majority of their wealth. Naturally, all of us who saw the value of our property skyrocket in the bubble years want those valuations (and all that equity/wealth) back.

But it is not to be, for fundamental, undeniable reasons.

1. There is a gargantuan oversupply of homes. U.S. vacant housing hits record 19 million:

The number of vacant housing units in the United States increased to a record

19 million in the first quarter of the year, up from 18.9 million in the fourth quarter. In the past year, the housing inventory rose by

1.14 million to 130.9 million, while occupied homes increased by 1.07 million to 111.9 million.

According to Census data, perhaps 4-5 million of these are truly second/vacation homes. We can estimate that several million other houses might be located in places no one wants to live any more, or they are no longer habitable. Deduct as many millions as you plausibly can, and you still have 10+ million vacant dwellings.

In the best-case scenario, it will take nine years to unload current inventory:

104 months to clear housing inventory, shadow inventory.

Basic supply and demand suggests that prices must fall as supply far exceeds demand.

Since Baby Boomers will be downsizing and defaulting for years to come, the supply of homes for sale could easily expand beyond today’s inventory.

2. The generations following the Baby Boomers are not numerous enough to provide demand for more housing. I reported the unyielding facts of demographics in Housing Headwinds and Baby Boom Demographics (April 13, 2010). As the baby Boom downsizes and defaults en masse, there aren’t enough potential buyers to soak up all the suburban homes and second homes that the Boomers will be selling.

3. The entire mortgage market has been socialized by the Federal government, which is poised to lose hundreds of billions of dollars propping up the housing market.

Wake-Up Time for a Dream:

As wards of the state, Fannie and Freddie are insuring three out of every four mortgages. Most of the remaining 25 percent are being guaranteed by the F.H.A. As much as you might resent the fact that the taxpayers now have to pick up behind new Fannie and Freddie, the sad truth is that without them, no one in America would be able to buy a home.

Literally 99% of the mortgages are government-backed: With a big boost from the Feds, investors again like securities backed by assets:

(In 2009), government-backed loans have accounted for 99%, or $1.5 trillion, of mortgage securities. Banks and other private firms have issued a mere $15 billion. In addition, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have spent nearly $1.25 trillion buying those bonds to support the housing and broader credit markets. “The government is literally plowing trillions of dollars into the U.S. mortgage market to keep it afloat,” says Guy D. Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance.

Meanwhile, the costs of this unprecedented subsidy of housing may cost

$1 trillion in losses on Fannie and Freddie alone.

4. The Roots of the Housing Bubble Remain Unchanged: moral hazard, unregulated risk, extreme leverage, fraud, you name it–nothing’s changed.

5. Defaults and foreclosures will dump millions more homes on the market.

The default rate on low-down-payment FHA loans is a staggering 20% on loans written in 2008–after the housing bust had already unfolded and the risk was undeniable: F.H.A. Problems Raising Concern of Policy

Makers:

F.H.A. commissioner, David H. Stevens, acknowledged that some 20 percent of F.H.A. loans insured last year — and as many as 24 percent of those from 2007 — faced serious problems including foreclosure.

The problem with that willingness to absorb risk for the sake of incentivizing borrowing for home ownership is that next year another 20% will default, and then the following year another 20% will default, and by year Five the vast majority of those loans backed by FHA will be in default.

FHA Facing “Cataclysmic” Default Rates:

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has guaranteed about 25% of all new U.S. mortgages written in 2009, up from just 2% in 2005.

6. Mortgage re-sets will trigger additional defaults. The chart says it all:

Not knowing and/or not believing will not change the negative dynamics of the housing market.


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
16

The REAL NUMBERS PLEASE!

What We Know (and Don’t Want to Know) About Housing Today, June 16, 2010, 34 minutes ago | noreply@blogger.com (Charles Hugh Smith) The housing market is doomed in the U.S., and the causal factors are all well-known. But we don’t want to know, because that knowledge would re-order the American culture and economy.

Yesterday I suggested that what we don’t want to know is as important as what we know/don’t know. We know housing values are artificially and unsustainably high, but we don’t want to know this.

About two-thirds of U.S. households own a house (75 million); 51 million have a mortgage and 24 million own homes free and clear (no mortgage). Most of the other 36 million households are moderate/low income and have limited or no access to credit and limited or no assets.

Who benefits from a housing market propped up by massive government subsidies? The homebuilders, lenders and real estate industries, of course, but the 75 million “stakeholders” in the housing market also want to believe the market is “fairly priced” and bound to recover its bubble-era heights.

Why? As I reported in Housing and the Collapse of Upward Mobility (April 16, 2010), the stupendous equity extraction of the bubble years left U.S. homeowners with little equity in their homes. The bursting of the housing bubble thus effectively destroyed most of the middle-class wealth held in housing:

If we look up all the gory details in theFed Flow of Funds, we find that household real estate fell from $23 trillion in 2006 to $16.5 trillion at the end of 2009. That is a decline of $6.5 trillion, more than half the total $11 trillion lost in the credit/housing bust.

Home mortgages have fallen a negligible amount, from $10.48 trillion in 2007 to $10.26 trillion at the end of 2009. As of the end of 2009, total equity in household real estate was a paltry $6.24 trillion of which about $5.25 trillion was held in free-and-clear homes (32% of all household real estate, i.e. 32% of $16.5 trillion).

That leaves about $1 trillion–a mere 1.85% of the nation’s total net

worth– of equity in the 51 million homes with mortgages.

The orgy of speculation, leverage and debt incentivized by the credit/housing bubble of 2000-2006 has, in the aftermath of the bubble’s bursting, destroyed most of the nation’s middle-class wealth.

In effect, three generations of accumulated equity was blown off in “wannabe wealthy” consumption and speculation.

That $6 trillion in wealth is gone. For many households, that was the majority of their wealth. Naturally, all of us who saw the value of our property skyrocket in the bubble years want those valuations (and all that equity/wealth) back.

But it is not to be, for fundamental, undeniable reasons.

1. There is a gargantuan oversupply of homes. U.S. vacant housing hits record 19 million:

The number of vacant housing units in the United States increased to a record

19 million in the first quarter of the year, up from 18.9 million in the fourth quarter. In the past year, the housing inventory rose by

1.14 million to 130.9 million, while occupied homes increased by 1.07 million to 111.9 million.

According to Census data, perhaps 4-5 million of these are truly second/vacation homes. We can estimate that several million other houses might be located in places no one wants to live any more, or they are no longer habitable. Deduct as many millions as you plausibly can, and you still have 10+ million vacant dwellings.

In the best-case scenario, it will take nine years to unload current inventory:

104 months to clear housing inventory, shadow inventory.

Basic supply and demand suggests that prices must fall as supply far exceeds demand.

Since Baby Boomers will be downsizing and defaulting for years to come, the supply of homes for sale could easily expand beyond today’s inventory.

2. The generations following the Baby Boomers are not numerous enough to provide demand for more housing. I reported the unyielding facts of demographics in Housing Headwinds and Baby Boom Demographics (April 13, 2010). As the baby Boom downsizes and defaults en masse, there aren’t enough potential buyers to soak up all the suburban homes and second homes that the Boomers will be selling.

3. The entire mortgage market has been socialized by the Federal government, which is poised to lose hundreds of billions of dollars propping up the housing market.

Wake-Up Time for a Dream:

As wards of the state, Fannie and Freddie are insuring three out of every four mortgages. Most of the remaining 25 percent are being guaranteed by the F.H.A. As much as you might resent the fact that the taxpayers now have to pick up behind new Fannie and Freddie, the sad truth is that without them, no one in America would be able to buy a home.

Literally 99% of the mortgages are government-backed: With a big boost from the Feds, investors again like securities backed by assets:

(In 2009), government-backed loans have accounted for 99%, or $1.5 trillion, of mortgage securities. Banks and other private firms have issued a mere $15 billion. In addition, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have spent nearly $1.25 trillion buying those bonds to support the housing and broader credit markets. “The government is literally plowing trillions of dollars into the U.S. mortgage market to keep it afloat,” says Guy D. Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance.

Meanwhile, the costs of this unprecedented subsidy of housing may cost

$1 trillion in losses on Fannie and Freddie alone.

4. The Roots of the Housing Bubble Remain Unchanged: moral hazard, unregulated risk, extreme leverage, fraud, you name it–nothing’s changed.

5. Defaults and foreclosures will dump millions more homes on the market.

The default rate on low-down-payment FHA loans is a staggering 20% on loans written in 2008–after the housing bust had already unfolded and the risk was undeniable: F.H.A. Problems Raising Concern of Policy

Makers:

F.H.A. commissioner, David H. Stevens, acknowledged that some 20 percent of F.H.A. loans insured last year — and as many as 24 percent of those from 2007 — faced serious problems including foreclosure.

The problem with that willingness to absorb risk for the sake of incentivizing borrowing for home ownership is that next year another 20% will default, and then the following year another 20% will default, and by year Five the vast majority of those loans backed by FHA will be in default.

FHA Facing “Cataclysmic” Default Rates:

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has guaranteed about 25% of all new U.S. mortgages written in 2009, up from just 2% in 2005.

6. Mortgage re-sets will trigger additional defaults. The chart says it all:

Not knowing and/or not believing will not change the negative dynamics of the housing market.


Filed under: foreclosure