Jan
23

How Banks View Loan Modifications

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I can’t think of any subject that has been so widely and frequently discussed and studied, over such a long period of time, by such a large number of experts and observers, who continually espouse such a diverse range of opinions and cite such a large number of conflicting facts, that is still so misunderstood… or understood differently by different people… or in short, is such a mess… that affects so many people… and is so important to our government and our economy… yet remains pretty much unsolvable… AS LOAN MODIFICATIONS.

See… loan modifications today represent such a complex subject that even writing a sentence describing the situation surrounding them, such as the one above, was a pain in the neck.

Let’s start with the questions on everyone’s mind… Why aren’t more loans getting modified?  Why is it so difficult to get the bank to modify a mortgage?  Why are trial modifications ending in foreclosure?  Why is it that people are consistently treated so poorly by the banks?  Is it the investors that are making it hard to get a loan modification?  Is the government doing enough to get banks to modify loans?  And should people hire an attorney to help them obtain a loan modification, or go it alone?  That’s at least a pretty good start, right?

I think the fundamental thing that almost no one understands involves how a bank views a borrower’s request for a loan modification.  Lot’s of people, including me in past articles, have said that banks simply don’t want to modify mortgages.  Lot’s of people, including me, have also pointed out that servicers make more money by foreclosing than modifying loans.

All of those points apply in certain circumstances, but they’re also beside the point to some degree.

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A Banker’s View…

Your bank views you calling to request that your mortgage be modified as the beginning of a process.  Maybe you truly need and deserve a loan modification, but maybe not.  The only way the bank will be able to tell one way or the other is by putting you through that process, and it’s not a pleasant process in the least.

Let’s say that you’re someone that has good credit, you’ve never missed a payment, and now are saying that you need your loan modified or you may lose your home to foreclosure.  When you call your bank to ask about a loan modification, they’re going to tell you that they can’t talk to you until your payment is delinquent by at least 30 days.

You hang up the phone.  You’re disappointed.  And you now have your first decision to make: Do you let your credit score get trashed by going 30 days late on your mortgage?  It’s not an easy decision.  Once you head down that path it’ll be years before your credit score is back up where it’s always been, and if you need your credit to be good for other reasons, chances are you’ll decide that you no longer want a loan modification because the cost of trying to get one… sacrificing your credit score… is too high.

The bank’s process has just saved the bank quite a bit of money.  Had the bank agreed to modify your loan, it would have been like throwing money away unnecessarily because you kept making your payments without them having to modify your loan.

Now, let’s say that you decide to go 30 days delinquent on your mortgage.  You call back, now 30 days late, but now your bank tells you that you have to be 90 days late before you can be transferred to a negotiator.  You hang up the phone.  Again, you’re disappointed.  Do you go 90 days late, or do you bring your loan current and forget the whole thing?  Some bring their loans current, others don’t.

If you don’t bring your loan back to current status, you’re about to start receiving a series of letters and phone calls designed to make you feel ashamed, guilty and scared.  And those letters will come more and more frequently, and they’ll be written using stronger and stronger terms.  And chances are you’ll feel worse and worse as time goes by.

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Then in 90 days, assuming you’ve gone the distance, you call the bank again.  This time they’ll tell you that your credit score is now too low to qualify for a loan modification.  Now you’re enraged.  You stomp your feet.  And then, if there’s anyway you can do it, chances are you bring your loan current and try to forget the whole idea of a loan modification.  Maybe you get rid of a car payment to do it, maybe you rent out a room or take on a part-time job to generate the extra income you need, or maybe you borrow the money from a relative.

You never even bring up the whole experience to your friends or family members because you’re ashamed that it even happened.  You’re ashamed that you were having trouble making the mortgage payment that you signed up for, and you’re ashamed about having gone 90 days late on your mortgage payment and almost losing your home.  The whole thing becomes one of those skeletons that you hope will soon fade away in your closet of memories.

Besides, what would your friends or family members even say if you did tell them?  Do you think they’d be on your side and angry at the way your bank treated you?  Or would they take the view that the bank had every right to handle your situation the way they did, because after all, you signed the mortgage and agreed to make the payments… the bank has no obligation to lower your payment just because you having trouble making it.  You’re lucky the bank didn’t foreclose, in the eyes of your friends or family members.

Oh, and one or two more things, while we’re at it… maybe you should have opted for a little less house and not gone quite so far out on a limb… maybe you should have spent a little less on your car too, and not used your credit cards for all those nice clothes you wear… maybe you’re just living way beyond your means.  You’re probably not saving for retirement either.  You’re one of THOSE irresponsible people and maybe losing your home to foreclosure would teach you a lesson.

Whew… it’s exhausting, isn’t it?

But, let’s say for a moment that you could not find a way to bring your mortgage payment current when told, when you were 90 days delinquent, that your score was now too low to qualify for a modification.  Now you’re 120 days behind, and soon it’s been six months since you’ve made a payment to your bank on your loan.

By now the bank is sending you the most threatening letters imaginable.  They could foreclose at any moment according to the letters, and their tone tells you that you are basically an irresponsible failure who cannot be trusted because your word means nothing.  You promised to make the payment and now you’re not living up to that promise.  You’re a promise breaker… a liar.  How do you sleep at night?  You shouldn’t even have friends, because if your friends knew what you were up to, they likely wouldn’t want to be your friend anymore.

Nonetheless, you’re now seven months late, then eight, and then nine.  Now the bank is calling you almost daily, the pressure is becoming unbearable, you’re trying everything to make more money so that you can make the payment.  If you do find a way to come up with the cash, you bring your mortgage payment current immediately.  If you get a new job that pays more, you call your bank and start begging and explaining that everything is going to be okay… you’re working again… if they’d just please understand… you’re a good person… you’ll pay your payment every month and on time from now on… you’re sooooo sorry to have gotten behind… How about $1200 this week, and then $1200 the following week, and then $2000 by the end of the… blah, blah, blah.

You’re a babbling fool that will agree to just about anything the bank says at that moment.  If the person you’re talking to at the bank acts the slightest bit nice to you, or comes off as even a little bit understanding of your situation… you gush with appreciation and feel like you want to be their BFF.   Thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you… really… thank you so much.  My husband thanks you, my children thank you… my dog thanks you.  Yuck.  It’s disgusting, really.

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Or, maybe that’s not what happens.  And now you’re almost eleven months late.  You’re working.  You could make a reasonable payment if you weren’t so far behind.  You’ll never be able to pay off the arrears though, so what’s the point.  You’re desperate… you’re about to give up and resign yourself to the fact that you’re going to lose your home to foreclosure.  You’re trying to get used to the idea that you’ll soon be packing and calling the moving truck… its heart wrenching for anyone to watch.

Well, guess what?  Depending on the specifics of your situation… whether there’s any equity in your home… how far underwater you are… how long are homes like yours and in your area remaining on the market before being sold? Things like that.

Do you see what’s going on?

Since foreclosure is now imminent, the bank can’t threaten to ruin your credit score anymore, as it’s already ‘F’ and would be ‘G’ if scores went that low.  The bank is now trying to figure out two things:

1. What is the likelihood of you being able to make the payment if the bank modifies your loan?  What if they take the amount in arrears, tack it on to the back end of the loan, and reduce your monthly payment by a couple hundred a month?  Would that do it?  Or would you agree to the deal and then not be able to make the modified payment… and again in six months end up right back in foreclosure where you are now.

If the bank thinks that might happen, they won’t modify your loan.  They’d rather foreclose now than go through this same thing next year and end up foreclosing then.  Real estate values will likely be lower next year, so by waiting the bank just assures itself of a bigger loss on the property.

The cost of foreclosure to your bank is going to be 30% to 50%, or even more in the worst of instances.  But that’s not the most important factor to your bank… this is all about your bank’s degree of certainty that if they modify your loan, you won’t be back in foreclosure anytime soon, and likely never.  Your bank views a loan modification as pretty close to unthinkable in the first place, so it’s unquestionable that it’s a once in a lifetime thing in their eyes.  You should be too embarrassed to even ask a bank to modify a loan a second time, according to your bank.  It’s almost like… if that happens, you’ll probably want to change your name and move to another state. What a load of crap the banks have peddled our way all these years.

So, you see… it’s a range.  In order to get your loan modified, you need to fall somewhere between “Definitely won’t default again if loan reasonably modified,” and “Will self-cure the mortgage before home is actually taken back by the bank”.  Get it?

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I talk to people all the time that have recently applied for a loan modification, and they always talk to me about how it will cost the bank more to foreclose on their particular house, so they expect the bank to modify the loan.  But then the bank refuses, and I hear people say that they can’t understand it because the bank should do what’s in the best interests of investors.  Then we start talking about how servicers make more money foreclosing, all of which is true.

The problem with this line of thinking, however, is that it fails to incorporate all the data… it’s not just a numbers game to the bank.  First they need to know, if they offer you nothing, will you really end up losing the home to foreclosure, or will you let the Devil himself rent out a room to avoid that shameful outcome?  Then they need to know that if they do accommodate you and provide you with a modification, chances are good that you’ll never miss a payment for the rest of your life.

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Shame, shame, shame…

So, how should a bank go about getting the answer to either or both of those key questions?  Self-cure and/or re-default?  It’s not like you can find the answer to either of those questions from looking at an application or a credit report.  You certainly can’t tell by talking to someone on the phone.

The only way a bank can know for sure whether you’re going to self-cure and eject yourself from the foreclosure process, is to let you get to that point and see what you do.

It’s like a game of poker… will you fold under extreme stress and pressure and show up with the money to save your home, or will the bank actually be forced to foreclose, and therefore better off to modify your loan… and if they do approve your “mod,” as they say in the biz, will you make it just fine for a long, long time, or will you end up right back where you are today, next year at this time, if not sooner?

Once a bank knows the answer to those two questions about you, then the bank’s cost comparison between modification and foreclosure becomes pivotal, but until then, chances are the bank will play out its inherently superior hand and count on you folding your cards before foreclosure by coming up with the money you said you could not possibly come up with when you were talking with your bank’s representative about a loan modification.

I talked to a woman a few days ago, she said she was in her early sixties, said she owned two homes, desperately needed at least one loan modified and probably both, otherwise she’s going to be on the street.  She wanted me to recommend a few attorneys for her to talk to, and I gave her the contact information for the lawyers I knew in reasonably close proximity to her home.  Then she asked me a few questions, and the last one I’ll always remember.  Referring to the lawyer, she said:

“Do you think I have to tell him about my trust account?”  (Adorable, right?)

I answered as honestly as I could.  I said: “I wouldn’t.”  (It’s probably not the right answer, I realize, but I’m just saying…)

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If this were a tennis match, the score would always read: Advantage – Banks & Servicers

The reason that, other things being equal, I advise people to hire an attorney to help them negotiate a loan modification is that their lender or servicer will ALWAYS have a huge built in advantage in any negotiation over the settlement of a debt you contracted to repay, because the moral norms for borrowers work against them, and the market norms that apply to banks, support the bank doing pretty much whatever it thinks it needs to do to get the borrower into compliance with the terms of his or her loan… or reclaim the property.

Even when people hear that a bank did something really egregious or even illegal, many of them just say: “Yeah, well, I guess that can happen.”  It’s as if to say that perhaps the bank went too far, but the borrowers were juggling flaming chainsaws in terms of risk, and the bank still has the right to take back its home and punish the irresponsible homeowner who fell outside of our society’s norms by failing to fulfill his or her promise to repay a debt.

See, there are some things in our society that work the way they do only because we believe they will work the way they do.  The FDIC, or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is a commonly offered example of this principle at work.  The FDIC “guarantees” cash deposits up to $250,000 per account, as of last year, I believe.  So, no one has to worry about rushing down to the bank to get their money out if there’s a problem at the bank, the FDIC will cover any loss up to $250,000 per account.

Except, even in the best of times, the FDIC could not possibly come up with the money to cover even a small fraction of bank deposits in this country.  If there ever were a disaster that caused all the banks to fail, the FDIC would be meaningless.  The FDIC is an independent agency of the federal government and you might call it a “faith based” organization because it only exists to give us faith in our banking system, and only works as intended because of that faith.

Well, loan modification negotiations are a little bit like that.  The bank gets to use shame, guilt and fear to get you into compliance with your loan.  Once you’re deeply ashamed, you won’t tell anyone what’s going on… and you’ll feel worse every day.  Then you become afraid to answer the phone.  Then you’re turning off the machine… you won’t even want to hear the phone ring.

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Your bank will also greatly exaggerate what it will cost you to lose your property to foreclosure.  You’ll be told that you won’t be able to buy anything for a decade, and all kinds of other nonsense.  By the time you’re done reading a few of the letters you get from your lender each week, you can easily become convinced that losing your home is almost the end of all opportunity in your life.  Might as well be a bum after that.  It’s absurd of course… you can buy another home in 2-3 years, if that’s even what you want to do.  There’ll be so many foreclosures on the market… you’re going to be hearing about foreclosures selling ten years from now.

The Point Is…

The point is, that when homeowners start the process of negotiating with their lender, they’re not only subject to being made to feel guilty and ashamed, but they are also likely to over-estimate the personal cost of foreclosure, all as a result of the bank’s and our society’s intentional efforts to make borrowers feel that way.  It’s no accident, is what I’m trying to say.

You see, we keep the banks open and safe by believing in the FDIC, and we keep people from walking away from their homes when the value of those homes drops significantly by imposing our society’s moral norms, which include shame, guilt and fear, related to repaying debts.  If the government and the banks can make homeowners deeply ashamed and afraid to lose their homes, then fewer people will even ever ask for a modification in the first place.  With me?

Why the Bank Doesn’t Want You to Hire a Lawyer or other Expert…

When a homeowner hires an attorney to help negotiate a loan modification, that attorney is not going to being made to feel ashamed, guilty, or afraid… the borrower can be made to feel all of those things and more, but the lawyer, not so much.  He or she is a hired gun, if you will.  That’s why the banks don’t want homeowners to be represented, and why they want homeowners to call them directly.

Treasury looks the other way on this “put-the-borrower-through-hell” process because it understands that banks have to make sure that they are not throwing away money by modifying loans for borrowers who would have self-cured.  Nor does the government want the banks to modify loans for people who won’t be able to make the modified payment.  And since the only way for the bank to really know either of those things is to put the borrowers through their paces, as it were.  Many will self-cure, some should be foreclosed upon… blend, shake, stir and pour,,, see what comes out.  And of those that fall somewhere in the middle, some will have more or less equity, and some will be in markets where houses are selling relatively faster than others.

Out of that psycho-social-financial-market analysis, the bank will modify some loans… but the process used to conduct the so-called analysis is guaranteed to frustrate the hell out of everyone who enters it that’s determined to obtain a loan modification.

Being represented by an attorney or other expert throughout the process is unquestionably better than not being represented, mostly because that attorney won’t be subject to the bank’s tactics of trying to shame, guilt or scare, and as a result of that, is likely to think more clearly than you would be able to.  And also because of the attorney’s or other expert’s knowledge of the law related to the foreclosure process and the HAMP guidelines, that attorney is more likely to get a result that’s acceptable to you, the homeowner… and by acceptable, I mean a modification that’s sustainable over time.

Is This How Things Should Be Done Today?

Absolutely not.  The situation we’re in today is NOT a normal market correction, and I thought I’d better make it clear how I feel about how the banks are handling loan modifications: I hate everything about it, and I think it could not be more wrong.  The Obama Administration has continued our government’s tradition of implementing pointless programs designed to help stop the foreclosure crisis.  Nothing our government has done has helped in the least… they’ve failed us at every turn.

It’s not today’s homeowners that are responsible for the position in which they find themselves… no matter what anyone tells you… it is NOT your fault.  If someone would like to debate that point with me, bring it.  I’m easy to find and can be emailed at mandelman@mac.com.  But come to the discussion prepared, because I am.

This meltdown was caused by this country’s financial institutions, and not by people with mediocre credit scores who wanted to buy houses.  It’s the banks that did this, but no one is making them do anything to fix what they’ve clearly broken.

We’ve given the banks in this country something like $11 TRILLION so far, and we’re going to have to give them a lot more.  The so-called toxic assets are still right where they were last fall, and the banks that were too big to fail last year, are now bigger.  They have an obligation to act in the best interests of the homeowners they screwed, and in the best interests of our nation’s economy because without American taxpayers, they wouldn’t even be open for business.

So, don’t read what I’ve written and come away thinking that I approve of the way banks view borrowers asking for loan modifications… I don’t.  I’ve only written what you’ve just read because I think it’s important that people understand the dynamics of what’s going on… that the reason they feel guilty and ashamed is because the banks and our government want them to feel that way, so that people don’t just start walking away from their mortgages because they’re so far underwater.

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They’re manipulating you into feeling ashamed for being in trouble on your mortgage… but don’t let them make you feel that way.  It’s not your fault… it’s the banks that wear the black hats in this horror movie, make no mistake about that.

And, in the event that you’ve already lost a home to foreclosure, don’t believe the crap about how your life will be ruined for another ten years.  It’s simply not true.  You may not be able to buy another house for the next few years, but so what?  We haven’t come close to hitting bottom, so you wouldn’t want to buy another home in the near future anyway.

All forecasts say that we’ll have 12 million more foreclosures in the next two years, and that number is probably low, so don’t feel alone and ashamed about your situation.  The people you’re talking to down the street have problems too, they’re just too ashamed to tell anyone about their situation, just like you’ve been afraid to talk about yours.

Let it go… and let’s turn up the heat on exposing what the banks have done and continue to do.  Next year the mid-term elections will mean that every single representative in the House is up for re-election.  Let’s just see if we can’t send a message they’ll hear and listen to… I’m sure we can, if we want to.

It’s not over until it’s over.  Don’t give up the fight.  Knowledge is power.  As Winston Churchill once said:

“Never give up.  Never give up.  Never.  Never.  Never.”

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Jan
19

Investors Suing Banks Are On The Same Side As Homeowners In Foreclosure

EMC-MortgageIt’s next to impossible to get any information while you’re in foreclosure from the servicer or trustee.   Reasonable discovery requests for basic information are objected to and almost never complied with.  It’s not just homeowners receiving the cold shoulder…the investors are as well….JUST WHAT ARE THEY HIDING?

JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMC Mortgage, facing homeowner lawsuits over foreclosures, was sued by the trustee of a mortgage portfolio for refusing to turn over documents detailing the quality of loans bought by the trust.

Wells Fargo & Co., the trustee, is seeking access to files for more than 2,000 underlying mortgages in the Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR2, according to the complaint filed today in Delaware Chancery Court in Wilmington.

BLOOMBERG

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Jan
07

Ibanez- Watch The Banks Crash.

The impact of the Ibanez decision cannot be understated.  For far too long trial courts and even appellate courts across this country have ignored the sloppy or fraudulent practices of the banks, sometimes excusing their conduct, other times explaining it away.  The Ibanez decision made it clear….even banks that are too big too fail have a responsibility to keep basic records and their failure to do so cannot just be ignored.

This decision will reverberate across the country….just wait until the investors wake up to this decision on Monday….oh and what this I hear about these Wikileaks?

There has got to be a fundamental realignment in this country…the rule of law must begin to be re-established…..Ibanez pushes us in that direction.

Wall Street Journal

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Dec
12

Experts Weigh In- Fraudclosure Continues To Plague Courts- We All Pay The Costs

Just last week, the Palm Beach Post reported on hundreds of foreclosure sales that occurred, but which are a catastrophic mess, to put the term politely….

Scores of Palm Beach County homes were sold to investors at foreclosure auction this month for as low as $200 following the collapse of the David J. Stern law firm and ensuing confusion as thousands of its cases are reassigned.

It’s yet another muddle for the already overwhelmed foreclosure courts to sort out as former Stern cases went to auction with no bank representation, bids or proper public notice.

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Palm Beach Post

Today’s Bradenton Herald likewise reports on a larger scope of problems with foreclosure cases that plague their court system

there’s been no concerted, effective effort to solve the crisis because it defies easy solutions and is merely a symptom of broader economic issues.

“The magnitude of the problem is so severe that no one can wrap their minds, their heads, their jurisdictions, their enforcement powers around it,” he said. “This is a problem of such profound magnitude that our best minds … simply can’t fathom a solution.”

BRADENTON HERALD

The larger world is starting to grasp that this effects us all.  Every last one of us.  It hits us all right in the pocketbooks. Log onto those stories and leave comments….our press is our only hope.

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Dec
10

A Foreclosure-Based Economy

housing-watch-foreclosuresWe all need to continually challenge the absurd notion that completing foreclosures (even if the documentation and right to foreclose was true and accurate) is in the best interests of society.

We need to advance the discussion and focus on the basic economics….foreclosed homes are a bigger liability to the lenders/investors and society as a whole than a home that has a homeowner in the home paying even a reduced mortgage.

The Florida Supreme Court estimates that there will be more than 500,000 foreclosures by 2011.  What would happen if we granted even

AOL Housing Watch Article

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Nov
18

Investor and Institutional Lawsuits Offer Keys to Defending Homeowners in Foreclosure

countrywide-lawsuitWe all know that most, if not all, of the subprime lenders that were originating the loans we are now defending for homeowners were engaging in various degrees of widespread fraud and deceit in order to close the loans.  Our borrower clients were not sophisticated enough to catch the fraud or participate in it, but every level of the originating lenders were.  Take the attached lawsuit against filed by a mortgage insurance company against Countrywide Home Loans for instance, in it,

They admit we didn’t actually review the loans we were insuring, we trusted Countrywide and relied on our “delegated” model for reviewing. (That means we didn’t look at all at the loans, we just issued an insurance policy.) The astonishing this is that there were billions of dollars sloshing around between originating the loans with shady brokers here on the ground level to when they were packaged, insured and sold to trustee, then investors and no one was actually looking at the loans themselves. I was a broker, we made loans and we would never do a loan unless we actually looked at everything, credit, income, visit the home.

The subprime mess was caused because no one, and I mean no one was looking at anything and they were all lying to one another…every player at every step in the process. And they needed unsophisticated players like our clients to start the chain of lies that started when the loans were originated then went all the way to the White House.

There is so much pushback from the remaining servicers and lenders who are fighting and preventing even reasonable modifications from occurring.  One fascinating thing that befuddles me is the fact that if the laws on fraud and improper inducement were really followed here that might provide us with real opportunities to use proven allegations of fraud to force the hands in these modifications.

Read the lawsuit and let’s use the swarm strategies to pull all these pieces together.

countrywidelawsuit

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Nov
12

The American Bankers Association ‘splains Why No One is Responsible For FraudclosureGate

Gotta hand it to the Fat Cats, they’ve twisted this thing up so tight, everyone can point fingers in eight directions at once and disavow any responsibility for the chaos that is Fraudclosuregate.

ABS-documents

As a basic principle, the Committee acknowledges the need for more clarity in transaction documents generally going forward. However, the Committee’s position is that any issues that were neither contemplated by nor addressed in the documents governing current ABS transactions must be resolved in accordance with the legal contracts governing those transactions and generally accepted rules of contractual interpretation. Reliance on clear hindsight, even with the goal of protecting particular constituencies or investors generally, to impose duties retroactively on trustees that are clearly outside the range of duties undertaken in their contracts effectively abrogates those contracts and violates basic tenets of U.S. contract law.

Read the full white paper below.

whitepaper

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Oct
19

DAVID J. STERN REPLACED AS CHAIRMAN OF DAVID J. STERN ENTERPRISES!

According to a news release, David J. Stern has been replaced!  OH NO!  How can the company that bears one’s name function without the man behind the name?  Whoever will be in charge of performing the “non legal functions” of the enterprise?  What can this mean?

On the conference call just a few short weeks ago, Stern reassured investors that all was fine in China Town. (Nothing to see here folks, just move right along.)  Why I even heard him reassure investors that they had only discovered “problems” with 21 assignments of mortgage. (Or something to that affect.)  If I were an investor in DJSP and I based my decisions solely on the statements made in that conference call, I’d think everything was just fine.  Now did these depositions and AG investigations just materialize overnight after that conference call?  Did no one making those statements on that conference call have any knowledge of the severity of the Category 5 Hurricane of investigations and allegations swirling around?

Press Release

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Sep
18

What’s this “HAMP” I keep hearing about?

HAMP-floridaUnless you’ve been on another planet, you’d know that it’s just a pesky little federal program that prohibits lenders from continuing with foreclosure as long as the borrower is complying.  But why should anyone be concerned about that?  I mean, why in god’s name would it matter that a homeowner is under a binding, written contract while their home is being sold out from underneath them…I mean after all, WE’VE GOT A FORECLOSURE DOCKET TO PLOW THROUGH!

Just wait, till these sales start happening and the stories of homeowners who’s rights have been blatantly violated start flooding in….oh, but wait, no one cares because, WE’VE GOT A FORECLOSURE DOCKET TO PLOW THROUGH!

And now a report from that legal twilight zone we refer to as South Florida…..

From Miami-Dade

I went with a family member to court in attempts to stop a foreclosure sale scheduled for August by the 2nd mortgage holder who is a private lender who btw has like 12 of his own properties under foreclosure, so he really needs the money. Anyway, we were there sitting in court waiting for our case to be called. Meanwhile I heard this judge take on other cases. The court room was filled with attorneys representing lenders/investors. There were homwowners with and without legal representation. Regardless of their issue this judge just kept on denying every motion that he was hearing. Not even taking the time not even a minute or a second to even glance at the documents these poor homeowners were bringing to him.

People were telling him that they have been approved and/or were being considered for a modification under HAMP and that they were there to ask to have the sale of thier home stopped because apparently the plaintiffs attorneys were not aware of this information. As you may all know, most of these attorneys DO NOT maintain constant contact with thier clients, therefore servicers even though they may place in thier system for a sale to be postponed based on loss midigation approval, still, it doesn’t reach thier attorneys in time to actually stop the sale. So homeowners are being told by the servicers to actuallly try and contact the attorneys because they are not able to. Unbelievable but true. Anyway, this judge must have rocket through about 35 cases before we were called. and he denied every single one of them except one which was from an association foreclosing on a property with an approved sale and the buyer was there with the approval and the proof that she was going to pay for the associations fees. The one thing I must say is that… one of the first cases that was being heard and the homeowner stated that he was approved for a HAMP mod, and to please stop the sale, then the judge asked the plaintiffs attorney how long has he been in the property without paying and the plaintiff would respond almost 29 months then the judge said… “3 years and you expect to continue in that house? denied.… the homeowner tried to explain his situation, loss of job, adjustable rate, not being able to refinance etc… but still the judge would not hear him out and just flat out denied his request to stop the sale.

Once the homeowner left the court room the judge asked… “what is this HAMP that these people keep claiming they are approved for?” mannnnn i said to myself… “this judge myst have been pulled from retirment from another part of this world, and to get put on the stand to make these decissions… the courts must really be desperate for not even taking the time to even educate them about the huge issue at hand with these foreclosures and modifications and fraudulent documents etc…. then after denying a few more cases in less than 2 minutes he said… “WOW… and i got paid to do this everyday 5 days a week?… this is easy..… I was so close to saying something, but my cousin stopped me since his case still had not been heard.

I was appalled and had to step out for a breather and calm down. Then it was our turn, mind you, in my cousins case, this 2nd lender has been after my cousins house since the day he got the loan. The house is 278k upside down, there is a first mortgage with NOW Bank Of America as the servicer, and Bank of New York as the trustee. Since the original lender is in litigation (CW) then they were quick in providing him with a trial as soon as my cousin was able to find a new job. The intial foreclosure case was dismissed a year ago. Now the 2nd mortgage holder claims that since the 1st mortgage holder was not able to provide an original note or proper assignments then he considers himself the ONLY mortgage holder on that property (my cousin owes him 50k). We have tried to come up with sometype of payment or settlement arrangement but they claim we have not. So when were called to the stand the plaintiffs attorney was not present, so the judge actually took the time to call him, again, i had to be held back from saying anything. The judge got the plaintiffs attorney on the phone and asked the attorney (who btw is the 3rd attorney hired on this case), how long has it been since the defendant has paid you, and he replied, almost 3 years, and the judge said to my cousin… and you expect me to stop the sale? my cosing said, “but I am in a HAMP trial with the first mortgage and the 2nd refuses to come to an agreement with me”… the plaintiffs attorney stated that he was not aware of any attempts to come to an agreement… I stepped up to the judge to show him the many documents, mailed, faxed, delivered with the settlement proposals … but the judge flat out, said… without even glancing at the documents or the HAMP trial… he said… MOTION DENIED!!! you have been living way to long in this property without making payments, so, i am sure you have some money saved… Now I suggest that you come to an agreement with the plaintiff in order to stop the sale. I said that with his ruling he is only forcing my cousin to file Bankruptcy in order to wipe off the 2nd and stop the sale. That i did not agree plus i felt he was not taking the time to actually listen to the case and is on the plaintiffs side for all the cases. He said… “I have already ruled and that is that”, i replied that I am also a tax payer and part of his salary gets paid by those taxes and that at least we deserved for him to consider our written argument which was submitted to the court 2 days before, and that he was not even aware of all the documents that were wrongfullly entered and that the people on title were not even considered in those entries worse yet, properly notified of the attempts by the plaintiff and that according to state laws, the rights of all the title holdersof the property were completly dismissed! Then the bailiff came to me and asked us to leave because the judge had already ruled.

Yes, so beware, because… rocket dockets are being done by retired judges who have no knowledge of anything. and are just there to deny deny deny!!!

We are definaltely going to appeal and maybe even go public with this. I am even considering placing names and making all parties involved including the judge and the courts for the manner in which they are handling these cases.

It is literly a slaughterhouse of foreclosures, and people deserve to be properly heard and represented.

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Scridb filter
Aug
23

NEW RULES AND OLD RULES

EDITOR’S NOTE: Today’s editorial in the New York Times mirrors the outlook of most Americans. It’s time to pass some new rules. I agree but I think that puts the emphasis on the wrong place. Most of these “new rules” were already in the old rules. They were not enforced. So the first new rule I would propose is “let’s enforce the old rules.”

While the writer of the opinion acknowledges that it has become fashionable to blame the borrowers, there is not one word of why and how that is simply not an adequate explanation for the mortgage mess, nor does it give us a proper starting point for correcting it.

Here is why we got into this mess: borrowers and investors who advanced the funds for the borrowers to borrow were fooled by clickety-clack quant language and assurances about “this is standard”, and other meaningless phrases. The result was that they relied upon the persons who were offering them a financial product that actually had a negative value. Nearly all borrowers and nearly all investors who participated were genuinely fooled. It was the equivalent of a business calling itself a bank taking deposits and then not giving it back. It was the equivalent of selling a poison pill as a natural herb supplement.

It was fraud that got us into this mess and it is prosecution of fraud that will get us out. Anything else, any other way of looking at it, merely compounds the record title problems that will soon explode in our faces, the economic problems that can’t go away unless they are actually addressed (as opposed to “dressed” in nice clothes).

Any Judge who allows another one to slip by thus giving a free house to a snickering lawyer and his client who has the name “Bank” is compounding problems that are already projected to last for more than three decades.

Any lawyer who fails to object to a proffer of evidence without the real evidence being required is aiding and abetting the enemy. They were lying when they started this and they are lying now.

This wasn’t an event. Is was and remains an on-going process of fraudulent transfers and shell games building on an already successful ponzi scheme that has never been taken down.

August 22, 2010 New York Times

Now, the Rules

The new financial regulatory reform is supposed to curb the predatory lending practices that led to the collapse of the mortgage market and have put millions of Americans at risk of losing their homes.

The Federal Reserve must now translate the legislative language into rules that will govern how brokers, lenders, appraisers and investors behave from now on. Given the Fed’s long history of putting the financial industry first and consumer protection second, Congress will need to keep a close eye on the rule-making process.

It has become fashionable to blame profligate borrowers for the calamity. And there is no question that in the madness of the housing bubble, some people should never have sought mortgages or bought homes they clearly couldn’t afford. But the crisis was driven by Wall Street’s hunger for quick profits and its eagerness to buy mortgages and package them into securities. Banks, mortgage companies, brokers and appraisers all conspired to steer borrowers into loans with escalating interest rates, balloon payments and other conditions that made them highly prone to default.

The new law does not ban risky loans outright. It does establish several conditions that, if correctly implemented, should discourage lenders from issuing them.

Lenders must now take the common-sense precaution of documenting the borrower’s ability to pay. They can no longer penalize borrowers — eager to free themselves from subprime or other risky mortgages — for paying off the loans early. And lenders are forbidden to pay kickbacks — “yield spread premiums” — to brokers who push borrowers into costly, higher-interest loans.

If loans violate the law, borrowers will be able to stop a foreclosure and sue to recover damages. The risk of being hauled into court should persuade investors to look closer at the underlying loans to make sure that they conform with federal law.

These are all good, and desperately needed, reforms. Industry lobbyists, who do some of their best work in the rule-making phase, will work hard to water them down.

Consumer advocates are especially worried about how the Fed will formulate the rules that are supposed to stop lenders from steering creditworthy minority or female applicants into more expensive mortgages and end “wealth stripping,” under which lenders design loans that quickly rob homeowners of their equity.

Congressional leaders believe that the Fed was chastened by the crisis and will now do all that is needed to protect lenders. Given the agency’s long history of kowtowing to the banks, mortgage lenders and credit card companies, Congress will need to do more than trust. It will have to verify that the new rules finally give consumers — and the American economy — the strong, permanent protections they need.


Filed under: foreclosure
Aug
16

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors – Shell Game Continues

EDITOR’S NOTE: The shell game continues. While the media picks up stories about “settlements” giving rise to the presumption that Countrywide Home Loans and Bank of America and the rest of the securitization players committed various violations of statutes, duties, rules and regulations, the main point gets lost. Where is this money going and WHY? What is the tacit or express admission in paying that money and what effect does it have on the average homeowner sitting with a loan whose obligation is being paid in these settlements?

Think about it. If Bank of America, which now owns Countrywide, is paying “fractions” to investors who purchased mortgage bonds then who is it that owns the underlying mortgages and loans? Did Bank of America pay the investors do it under a reservation of rights (subrogation) to enforce the underlying loans? If not, then why are they foreclosing? All evidence is to the contrary. There is no subrogation under these purchases, insurance, credit default swaps or any other contract — not that I ever saw and not that my sources in the industry tell me was ever even contemplated much less executed. The same holds true for all those bonds the Federal Reserve is holding.

If Bank of America is paying “fractions” to investors who purchased mortgage bonds, why was it a fraction? Is it because the value of the bond was much lower than the price paid by the investor? Is it just a convenient settlement? Or is it because the investors have also received funds from other sources?

This is what I am referring to when I address “factual constipation.” How are these payments being allocated? Did the owners of the bonds actually have any definable interest in the underlying mortgage loans? If they did, why are these payments not being allocated to the obligations or payments due under those underlying mortgage loans? If they didn’t, why did they get paid anything? How will we ever know without getting a full accounting from all the parties that claim some stake or ownership interest or receivable interest in me is underlying mortgage loans?

It is black letter law as well as common law dating back centuries that nobody can collect the same debt more than once. If they do collect more than once there is a clear right of action by the borrower to collect the excess payment through a lawsuit for unjust enrichment, breach of contract and other causes of action. Here we have an intentional act designed to collect the same debt multiple times. In my opinion this does not merely indicate the presence of an action for fraud, it clearly shows an interstate pattern of racketeering that at one time in our history had the Department of Justice and the FBI busy putting people in jail.

Only in America where the news has turned into an entertainment blitz used by those with the most power and the most money to get their message across, even if it is a total lie. Somehow many if not most people have the impression that the borrowers and the securitized mortgages executed between 2001 and 2009 are not entitled to the relief that any other debtor is entitled to receive––that is the obligation has been reduced for any reason, the borrowers should get credit and if any party receives money in excess of the net amount due after credits, the creditor becomes the debtor owing money to the former borrower.

The bullet point that is being used to distort the perception of our citizens and policymakers is that these borrowers should not get a  “free house.” Without getting a full accounting from all parties that advanced funds to and from the original investors who purchased mortgage bonds or collateralized debt obligations and related hedge products, there is no way of knowing the amount of the credit which is due to the borrower. Yes, it is possible that the amount received by the various intermediaries in the securitization chain exceeded the original obligation due from the borrower.

In that case, the borrower owes nothing to the originating lender or the successors to that lender. But if there is still a class of investor or institution that can prove a loss resulting from the nonpayment of the obligation by the borrower (as opposed to non-payment from other parties in the securitization chain) then the law allows that party to recover the loss from those that caused it.  That probably includes the borrower, which means that we are not seeking a free house, we are seeking a truthful accounting.

BUT the fact that this obligation theoretically exists does not mean and never did mean under any legal decision in existence that the obligation should be paid to anybody who claims it. By all substantive and procedural law, the obligation is payable to one who proves the obligation and to one who proves it is owed to them and nobody else.

Yet in the view of many judges the challenge by the borrower is viewed as a delay tactic or an attempt to use technical deficiencies to a gain a free house on a lawn that the borrower sought but could not pay.  No doubt this is true in some cases. But in nearly all the cases, armies of salespeople using names like “loan expert” pounded on doors and rang the phones of people who had no thought of borrowing money on homes, in many cases, that were debt-free and had been in the family for generations. Now many of those homes are bank owned property.

The simple question that needs to be posed to anyone who looks at the borrower as anything other than a victim is which is more likely? Did the owners of 20 million homes enter into a conspiracy to defraud the financial system, half society and our taxpayers? Did these people have the sophistication, education, knowledge, experience or training to pull off such a caper? Or is it more likely that the Wall Street titans stepped over the line and instead of increasing liquidity for the benefit of consumers and small businesses, used their position to deplete the resources of unsuspecting citizens, pension funds, financial institutions and governmental units from the top federal levels down to the smallest local geographical areas?

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors

By ALAN ZIBEL (AP) – Aug 3, 2010

WASHINGTON — Former shareholders of fallen mortgage giant Countrywide Financial Corp. are in line to recoup a fraction of their investments now that a Los Angeles judge has approved a settlement worth more than $600 million settlement.

The payoff doesn’t come close to compensating for the money lost by investors. But it could prompt more lenders to settle legal disputes at the center of the housing bust.

Bank of America, which bought Countrywide two years ago, agreed to pay $600 million to end a class-action case filed against the company. KPMG, Countrywide’s accounting firm, will pay $24 million.

Several New York pension funds who served as lead plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide hid how risky its business had become during the housing market’s boom years. Calabasas, Calif.-based Countrywide was once the nation’s largest mortgage lender.

The agreement stands to return about 40 cents per share of Countrywide’s common stock, before legal fees and expenses. Consider that the stock peaked at $45 a share in February 2007, before the financial crisis. So an investor who held 100 shares could bank on receiving $40 for an investment that was once worth $4,500.

Shareholders did receive 0.1822 shares of Bank of America’s stock for each share of Countrywide they owned when Bank of America acquired Countrywide. That worked out to about one share for every 5.5 shares of Countrywide stock. Shares of Bank of America closed at $14.34 on Tuesday. So that same 100 shares of Countrywide would be worth about $261 today in Bank of America stock.

Add the $40 from the settlement and those shares are now worth little more than $300.

Lawyers for the pension funds are requesting $56 million, or 4 cents per share, for fees and other costs.

Investors “will be compensated for a significant portion of the legal damages that they suffered as a result of what we believe was a violation of the securities laws,” said Joel Bernstein, a lawyer for the pension funds. “They won’t be compensated for every penny of that.”

Bank of America has been trying to put Countrywide’s legal problems behind it. In June, the Charlotte, N.C.-based company agreed to pay $108 million to settle the Federal Trade Commission’s charges that Countrywide collected outsized fees from about 200,000 borrowers facing foreclosure.

It reached a settlement Monday primarily to keep legal fees from escalating, a bank spokeswoman said.

“Countrywide denies all allegations of wrongdoing and any liability under the federal securities laws,” said Shirley Norton, a spokeswoman for Bank of America. “We agreed to the settlement to avoid the additional expense and uncertainty associated with continued litigation.”

Plaintiffs attorneys have pursed lawsuits against numerous lenders and investment banks in the wake of the housing market’s devastating downturn, and the Countrywide settlement could encourage even more such cases, said Paul Hodgson, a senior research associate at The Corporate Library, an independent corporate governance research firm.

“There are a lot of suits out there waiting to get launched,” Hodgson said. “I think this is the opening of the floodgates.”

Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo, former President David Sambol, former CFO Eric Sieracki and former board members were named in the litigation but are not contributing to the settlement.

But it does not end their legal problems. More than a year ago the Securities and Exchange Commission brought civil fraud charges against Mozilo and the two other former executives. Mozilo, the most high-profile individual to face charges from the government in the aftermath of the financial crisis, has denied any wrongdoing.

For Countrywide, “This is only a chapter and not the end of the book,” said John Coffee, a securities law professor at Columbia University.


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, education, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, foreign relations, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Servicer, trustee Tagged: ALAN ZIBEL, AP, Bank of America, countrywide, Joel Bernstein, KPMG, New York pension funds
Jul
24

HERE IS SOMETHING YOU CAN DO–MAKE ELIZ. WARREN HEAD OF BCFP

WHAT IS ABOUT TO HAPPEN: The appointment of the head of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection recently created by the new federal legislation on financial reform. Elizabeth Warren and Mary Schapiro essentially defined the job. Ms. Schapiro is already head of the SEC and is  vigorously investigating and prosecuting the mortgage fraud business across the board. That covers the investor side. Elizabeth Warren has been vigorously investigating but unable to bring action on behalf of homeowners and borrowers because she is “only” chairman of the task force on financial reform.

ELIZABETH WARREN IS NOT JUST A VIABLE CANDIDATE FOR THE JOB OF HEAD OF THE BUREAU OF FINANCIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION, SHE IS THE ONLY ONE ON EARTH WITH SUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT REALLY OCCURRED TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THAT JOB.

HERE IS THE PROBLEM: The Banks will do ANYTHING to keep her from getting that job. If the President nominates her, it will provoke a big fight in the Senate. If you like the idea of bailing out the banks again, if you like the idea of plunging the country into a recession, if you like the idea of ruining the lives of 20 million homeowners, and if you like the idea of stealing money from investors all around the world, then by all means join hands with the banks and do nothing.

But if you would really like to see something happen — something that will actually MEAN something in your life and the lives of millions of Americans, then spend 30 minutes, and write to the President, your senators, and your congressman. With  separate letter to each one, I suggest the following wording, but write anything you like:

Dear _______,

I am aware that you face a difficult choice of nominating and confirming a candidate to lead the new consumer financial protection bureau created in the financial reform package you just signed into law. The choice however is not who would best serve in that position. Everyone knows it is Elizabeth Warren. Even the banks who oppose her nomination know it, which is why they gearing up for battle. She is the one they are afraid of because we all know that the entire truth of this mess is still being revealed.  If she is not the nominee than the entire plan for protection of consumers is undermined. She defined the position and she should be appointed not as a reward but as protection for myself, my family, my friends and neighbors. PLEASE NOMINATE AND CONFIRM ELIZABETH WARREN NOW.

SIGN YOUR NAME

PUT IN YOUR ADDRESS


Filed under: foreclosure
Jul
16

Investors Sue Citi for Fraud Citing Appraisals and Other Issues

I7.13.10N RE CITIGROUP INC


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
23

Mounting Evidence on Phantom “Trusts”

First they started with servicers bringing foreclosures, and that didn’t work. Then they tried MERS to bring foreclosures, and that didn’t work. Then they tried backdated, fabricated and forged documents from non-existent originators with signatures from phantom people as “limited signing officer” or “assistant vice president” and that is going down the drain. Now they are bringing foreclosures in the name of “Trustees” and the cracks in that strategy are already appearing.

What they were doing was buying time. The ‘Trustee” in fact had virtually no powers on paper and certainly no power in practice. The “Trust” was an entity “to be formed by the Master Servicer” and never was. And now the reality is the investors have been written off, with the Master Servicer buying the pool, and engaged in repackaging loans that are already dead or dying, selling an entirely new securitization package to anew group of investors with a similar structure as the old one but with new investors, underwriting, etc.

The investment bank, through the Master Servicer declares that the value of the “pool” has gone down. They don’t actually know or care whether or how much the value of the pool has gone down or up, they just declare it because they can according to the securitization documents. That triggers the Master Servicer to put a value on the pool and buy it at that value or even lower if the pool is seen as a declining asset.

Keep in mind that the pool is a process rather than a single thing or event. Loans are being taken out and new ones are put in. Assignments during litigation are direct violations of the pooling and servicing agreements that prohibit acceptance of the assignment of a non-performing loan after the cutoff date which is usually years before the litigation. So in truth nobody really knows what really made it into the pool or if there really was a pool by any name, whether any particular loan is STILL in the pool.

So the Master Servicer buys the pool and the investors settle for pennies on the dollar. Then the write-down of the pool on the mere declaration of the investment bank or its agents or affiliates, triggers claims for losses backed up by insurance, credit enhancements, credit default swaps, guarantees etc. Since there are no investors left in the pool by virtue of the Master Servicer’s purchase, the proceeds of the third party payments go to the party that owns the policy or contract, to wit: the investment bank, Master Servicer or other affiliate, which in turn takes part of the money as profit and sends the rest to London or Luxembourg.

Under this scenario, the investors who were the lenders in the borrower’s loan are no longer in the picture and arguably have no right or claim to third party payments. Since they were the creditor, the allocation of third party payments to the obligation from the borrowers never occurs. Hence while the loan is paid off sometimes multiple times, neither the borrower nor the investor get to see a penny of it.

To make matters worse, the “Trustee” is now bringing foreclosure actions on behalf of dormant or dissolved pools that never existed as actual legal trusts, and which have been dissolved anyway. So they get the money from the yield spread premium where they took the investor money and only invested part of it in mortgages. They get the money from third party payments. And now they are going after the houses.

Somehow all this is being allowed because under some philosophical theory it is more equitable for these intermediaries who never invested a penny in any loan deal to make a profit than to let the borrower keep a house of dubious value. The borrower who was cheated by the false appraisals just like the like the investors were cheated by the false appraisals of the securities they bought, now is sitting with a defective loan, a devalued house, and a life in shambles. How is that a good thing?


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
23

Investors Class Action Against Securitizers

6 13 10investors-suing-chase-includes-list-of-mortgage-backed-securities-various-originators-like-new-century-wamu-wells-fargo-resmae-greenpoint-coun

As Weidner points out, these cases are well worth your time in research. With their minions of lawyers, they have more information that is industry specific than you can accumulate or absorb.

Investors are aligning themselves with the interests of the borrowers. Here they are attacking the false representations of underwriting standards, but more importantly, they are confirming what we have been saying all along: the loan originator (who is really a mortgage broker) was named as Lender in the closing documents but had nothing to do with underwriting or funding the loan. They were an agent working for an undisclosed principal.


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
15

MERS Attempting to Get Correct Identity of Investors

Training Bulletin
Number 2010-05
To: All MERS Members
`
May 26, 2010
Re: Identifying Investors on MERS® System

MERS® System Release 19.0 on June 14, 2010, will include Phase II of MERS® InvestorID. Phase I was introduced on June 19, 2009, to help our Members meet the requirements of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 by using information entered on the MERS® System to generate a Notice of New Creditor when a Transfer of Beneficial Rights (TOB) transaction was completed.

Besides providing a more robust solution for generating Mortgage Loan Transfer Notices, Phase II provides Investor
contact information to the public in MERS® ServicerID and the telephone Servicer Identification System, and to MERS®
Link Subscribers and MERS® Members in MERS® Link. Investor contact information also is provided to MERS
Members in MERS® OnLine, and in the XML and batch inquiry transactions.

Because of this increased visibility of Investor information, it is even more important that the Investor be represented
correctly for each loan on the MERS® System. As noted in the Draft Procedures Manual for Release 19.0 released on
April 15, 2010, Servicers may not insert their own Org ID as Investor on MINs for which they do not hold the
beneficial rights after June 14, 2010. If the actual investor does not have an Org ID, the Servicer may insert 1000002
(Undisclosed Investor) in the Investor field. Servicers may begin immediately inserting this Org ID in the Investor field
when appropriate, and may create a TOB Option 2 from their own Org ID to 1000002 to insert this Org ID on loans for
which they had previously inserted their own Org ID as Investor because the actual investor did not have an Org ID.

After the release, all MERS® InvestorID-related options will be visible to each Member in MERS® OnLine, including:

Mortgage Loan Transfer Notice (defaults to selected; if you have opted out of InvestorID it is deselected)
If selected, a Mortgage Loan Transfer Notice will be generated when a TOB transaction is completed with your Org
ID as the New Investor. Members cannot update this option. To request it be changed, currently you must email

InvestorID@mersinc.org. After the release, you will email the MERS Product Performance Department at
ppd@mersinc.org to change this option, as for other Member Profile changes.
New information display options that can only be changed by MERS (displayed under Investor Options):
o
Disclose Investor Information– Proprietary (defaults to selected)
If selected, Investor contact information will be included for all loans with your Org ID as Investor:
For non-rightsholder Members on the MIN Summary page in MERS® OnLine
For Members and MERS® Link Subscribers on the MIN Summary page in MERS® Link
In all Status and Summary responses in XML Inquiry and Batch Inquiry
o
Disclose Investor Information– Public (defaults to selected)
If selected, Investor contact information will be displayed for all loans with your Org ID as Investor:
In MERS® ServicerID
In the telephone Servicer Identification System
If you wish to have either option deselected for your Org ID before the release, please email your request to
InvestorID@mersinc.org, including your Org ID and company name, by June 9, 2010. Requests received after June
9 will be processed starting on June 14. After the release, you will email the MERS Product Performance
Department atppd@mersinc.org to change these options, as for other Member Profile changes.
New information display options that can be changed by the Member (on the Name/Address page):
o

Use Investor Alternate Address– Public (defaults to unselected)
If selected, the new Investor Alternate Address is used in MERS® ServicerID and the telephone Servicer
Identification System, and on Mortgage Loan Transfer Notices, for loans with your Org ID as Investor

o

Use Servicer/Subservicer Alternate Address– Public (defaults to unselected)
If selected, the new Servicer/Subservicer Alternate Address is used in MERS® ServicerID and the telephone
Servicer Identification System, and on Mortgage Loan Transfer Notices, for loans with your Org ID as Servicer
or Subservicer.


Filed under: foreclosure Tagged: MERS
Jun
03

In States Requiring Mediation

More and more states are following the example set by the federal government in requiring mediation or modification attempts before going forward with litigation. We think that is a good idea in theory, but without the teeth that is in the enabling rules and statutes in Florida, you are just going to end up playing the same game of “who’s my lender.?”

Even in Florida, as in all cases, YOU must bring up the the issue of the authroity of the person being offered as a decision-maker.” 99 times out of a hundred they are not. The most they have is some authority from a dubious source to agree to some minor adjustments, like adding the payments to the back end of the mortgage.

Make no mistake about it — there is no decision-maker unless they have full power over that mortgage. That means they could if they want to, reduce the principal. They will argue that nobody has that power because the securitization documetns prohibit it. That is their little way of getting your eye off the ball.

Of course the securitization documents don’t allow certain things to be done to the mortgage. Those documents are aimed at restricting the actions of the agents of the principal (i.e. the creditor/lender).

It is ONLY an authorized representative of the investors who DO have the final say over any settlement that is needed in that mediation room and proof of that authority, which means notice to the investors, which means disclosing that notice to the investors and proof that a sufficient number of investors under the documents have approved the grant of decision-making authority to modify, amend, alter or change the obligation, note and/or mortgage.

Unless the person offered for the mediation has the authority to sign a satisfaction of mortgage on whatever terms he/she sees fit, they are not the decision-maker. If the other side refuses to comply move for contempt, sanctions and to strike their pleadings with prejudice.

If the other side fights this and they probably will, you should probably argue that this is a flat out admission that the principal (i.e., real party in interest, creditor, lender) is not represented in the proceedings because the other party in your litigation refuses to disclose them contrary to the requirements of federal law, state law and the rules of civil procedure.

If they can’t produce this authority then they also lack authority to foreclose. It might even be an admission that they are seeking to steal the house, put in their own entity and keep the proceeds of sale contrary to the interests of the investor who is entitled to be paid and contrary to the borrower who is entitled to a credit against the obligation that is due.


Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, foreign relations, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, trustee, workshop Tagged: authority, decision-maker, Florida Modification, investors, mediation, modification, Mortgage, note, Obligation
May
21

Assignments: Why Were They Needed?

Since the entire scheme was based upon using money advanced by investors, why are they not the beneficiaries on the mortgage or deed of trust and why were they not the payee on the note?

The investors would not have advanced any money without getting a certificated or non-certificated interest in the pool of assets “purchased” with money from a pool of money collected from a group of investors.

There could be no certificate of asset backed series xxx-2006A without there being something in existence bearing the name asset backed series xxx-2006A.

There could be no entity (SPV) bearing the name asset backed series xxx-2006A without a framework of securitization of money (SIV) and assets (SPV).

That framework could not exist but for the existence of securitization documents including the pooling and service agreement.

Thus all this must be in place before accepting the first application for a loan.

Therefore when the loan closed the true beneficiaries and payees on the note were known and should have been named as such without a nominee (MERS) or any other intermediaries. Of course THAT would have ceded control over the pool of assets to the owners of that investment, something that neither the investment bank nor any of the other intermediaries wanted. It would mean that loans and claims could be modified or settled easily since all parties are known.

It would also mean that if the intermediaries did anything wrong, like for example investing only part of the money into mortgages and keeping the rest, BOTH the investor and the borrower would probably find out. And it would mean that third party payment would be made to the investors and the investors would deduct those payments from the balance due on the obligation and statements sent out to borrowers would reflect the change _ i.e., either a deduction or subrogation of rights, spreading the ownership out to the third parties who made the payments.

And THAT would mean all those illicit profits would be the subject of liability and damages in lawsuits and maybe criminal liability. So the pretender lenders are right. This is a simple matter — or would be — if they had played by the rules and named the right parties to begin with. Maybe they would even have used industry standard underwriting principles since there was real risk involved.


Filed under: foreclosure
May
13

Ratings Arbitrage a/k/a Fraud

Investment banks bundled mortgage loans into securities and then often rebundled those securities one or two more times. Those securities were given high ratings and sold to investors, who have since lost billions of dollars on them.

Editor’s Note: The significance of this report cannot be overstated. Not only did the investment bankers LOOK for and CREATE loans guaranteed to fail, which they did, they sold them in increasingly complex packages more than once. So for example if the yield spread profit or premium was $100,000 on a given loan, that wasn’t enough for the investment bankers. Without loaning or investing any additional money they sold the same loans, or at least parts of those loans, to additional investors one, two three times or more. In the additional sales, there was no cost so whatever they received was entirely profit. I would call that a yield spread profit or premium, and certainly undisclosed. If the principal of the loan was $300,000 and they resold it three times, then the investment bank received $900,000 from those additional sales, in addition to the initial $100,000 yield spread profit on sale of the loan to the “trust” or special purpose vehicle.

So the investment bank kept $1 million dollars in fees, profits or compensation on a $300,000 loan. Anyone who has seen “The Producers” knows that if this “show” succeeds, i.e., if most of the loans perform as scheduled and borrowers are making their payments, then the investment bank has a problem — receiving a total of $1.3 million on a $300,000 loan. But if the loans fails, then nobody asks for an accounting. As long as it is in foreclosure, no accounting is required except for when the property is sold (see other blog posts on bid rigging at the courthouse steps documented by Charles Koppa).

If they modify the loan or approve the short sale then an accounting is required. That is a bad thing for the investment bank. But if they don’t modify any loans and don’t approve any short-sales, then questions are going to be asked which will be difficult to answer.

You make plans and then life happens, my wife says. All these brilliant schemes were fraudulent and probably criminal. All such schemes eventually get the spotlight on them. Now, with criminal investigations ongoing in a dozen states and the federal government, the accounting and the questions are coming anyway—despite the efforts of the titans of the universe to avoid that result.

All those Judges that sarcastically threw homeowners out of court questioning the veracity of accusations against pretender lenders, can get out the salt and pepper as they eat their words.

“Why are they not in jail if they did these things” asked practically everyone on both sides of the issue. The answer is simply that criminal investigations do not take place overnight, they move slowly and if the prosecutor has any intention of winning a conviction he must have sufficient evidence to prove criminal acts beyond a reasonable doubt.

But remember the threshold for most civil litigation is merely a preponderance of the evidence, which means if you think there is more than a 50-50  probability the party did something, the prima facie case is satisfied and damages or injunction are stated in a final judgment. Some causes of action, like fraud, frequently require clear and convincing evidence, which is more than 50-50 and less than beyond a reaonsable doubt.

From the NY Times: ————————

The New York attorney general has started an investigation of eight banks to determine whether they provided misleading information to rating agencies in order to inflate the grades of certain mortgage securities, according to two people with knowledge of the investigation.

by LOUISE STORY

Andrew Cuomo, the attorney general of New York, sent subpoenas to eight Wall Street banks late Wednesday.

The investigation parallels federal inquiries into the business practices of a broad range of financial companies in the years before the collapse of the housing market.

Where those investigations have focused on interactions between the banks and their clients who bought mortgage securities, this one expands the scope of scrutiny to the interplay between banks and the agencies that rate their securities.

The agencies themselves have been widely criticized for overstating the quality of many mortgage securities that ended up losing money once the housing market collapsed. The inquiry by the attorney general of New York, Andrew M. Cuomo, suggests that he thinks the agencies may have been duped by one or more of the targets of his investigation.

Those targets are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Crédit Agricole and Merrill Lynch, which is now owned by Bank of America.

The companies that rated the mortgage deals are Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service. Investors used their ratings to decide whether to buy mortgage securities.

Mr. Cuomo’s investigation follows an article in The New York Times that described some of the techniques bankers used to get more positive evaluations from the rating agencies.

Mr. Cuomo is also interested in the revolving door of employees of the rating agencies who were hired by bank mortgage desks to help create mortgage deals that got better ratings than they deserved, said the people with knowledge of the investigation, who were not authorized to discuss it publicly.

Contacted after subpoenas were issued by Mr. Cuomo’s office late Wednesday night notifying the banks of his investigation, spokespeople for Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank declined to comment. Other banks did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

In response to questions for the Times article in April, a Goldman Sachs spokesman, Samuel Robinson, said: “Any suggestion that Goldman Sachs improperly influenced rating agencies is without foundation. We relied on the independence of the ratings agencies’ processes and the ratings they assigned.”

Goldman, which is already under investigation by federal prosecutors, has been defending itself against civil fraud accusations made in a complaint last month by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The deal at the heart of that complaint — called Abacus 2007-AC1 — was devised in part by a former Fitch Ratings employee named Shin Yukawa, whom Goldman recruited in 2005.

At the height of the mortgage boom, companies like Goldman offered million-dollar pay packages to workers like Mr. Yukawa who had been working at much lower pay at the rating agencies, according to several former workers at the agencies.

Around the same time that Mr. Yukawa left Fitch, three other analysts in his unit also joined financial companies like Deutsche Bank.

In some cases, once these workers were at the banks, they had dealings with their former colleagues at the agencies. In the fall of 2007, when banks were hard-pressed to get mortgage deals done, the Fitch analyst on a Goldman deal was a friend of Mr. Yukawa, according to two people with knowledge of the situation.

Mr. Yukawa did not respond to requests for comment.

Wall Street played a crucial role in the mortgage market’s path to collapse. Investment banks bundled mortgage loans into securities and then often rebundled those securities one or two more times. Those securities were given high ratings and sold to investors, who have since lost billions of dollars on them.

Banks were put on notice last summer that investigators of all sorts were looking into their mortgage operations, when requests for information were sent out to all of the big Wall Street firms. The topics of interest included the way mortgage securities were created, marketed and rated and some banks’ own trading against the mortgage market.

The S.E.C.’s civil case against Goldman is the most prominent action so far. But other actions could be taken by the Justice Department, the F.B.I. or the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission — all of which are looking into the financial crisis. Criminal cases carry a higher burden of proof than civil cases. Under a New York state law, Mr. Cuomo can bring a criminal or civil case.

His office scrutinized the rating agencies back in 2008, just as the financial crisis was beginning. In a settlement, the agencies agreed to demand more information on mortgage bonds from banks.

Mr. Cuomo was also concerned about the agencies’ fee arrangements, which allowed banks to shop their deals among the agencies for the best rating. To end that inquiry, the agencies agreed to change their models so they would be paid for any work they did for banks, even if those banks did not select them to rate a given deal.

Mr. Cuomo’s current focus is on information the investment banks provided to the rating agencies and whether the bankers knew the ratings were overly positive, the people who know of the investigation said.

A Senate subcommittee found last month that Wall Street workers had been intimately involved in the rating process. In one series of e-mail messages the committee released, for instance, a Goldman worker tried to persuade Standard & Poor’s to allow Goldman to handle a deal in a way that the analyst found questionable.

The S.& P. employee, Chris Meyer, expressed his frustration in an e-mail message to a colleague in which he wrote, “I can’t tell you how upset I have been in reviewing these trades.”

“They’ve done something like 15 of these trades, all without a hitch. You can understand why they’d be upset,” Mr. Meyer added, “to have me come along and say they will need to make fundamental adjustments to the program.”

At Goldman, there was even a phrase for the way bankers put together mortgage securities. The practice was known as “ratings arbitrage,” according to former workers. The idea was to find ways to put the very worst bonds into a deal for a given rating. The cheaper the bonds, the greater the profit to the bank.

The rating agencies may have facilitated the banks’ actions by publishing their rating models on their corporate Web sites. The agencies argued that being open about their models offered transparency to investors.

But several former agency workers said the practice put too much power in the bankers’ hands. “The models were posted for bankers who develop C.D.O.’s to be able to reverse engineer C.D.O.’s to a certain rating,” one former rating agency employee said in an interview, referring to collateralized debt obligations.

A central concern of investors in these securities was the diversification of the deals’ loans. If a C.D.O. was based on mostly similar bonds — like those holding mortgages from one region — investors would view it as riskier than an instrument made up of more diversified assets. Mr. Cuomo’s office plans to investigate whether the bankers accurately portrayed the diversification of the mortgage loans to the rating agencies.

Gretchen Morgenson contributed reporting


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, politics, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: accounting, Bank of America, BofA, bundled, BURDEN OF PROOF, Charles Koppa, Citigroup Inc, Countrywide Home Loans, damages, Deutsche Bank AG, Fitch ratings, Goldman Sachs, GRETCHEN MORGENSON, guaranteed to fail, injunction, JP Morgan Chase, Louise Story, Merrill Lynch, modifications, Moody's Investor Service, prima facie case, rebundled, securitization, short sales, Standard & Poor's, Substitute Trustee, The New York Times, yield spread premium
May
10

Moody’s Gets Notice from SEC: May Lose Status as Rating Agency

Editor’s Note: Hard to say which way this will go, but it SHOULD go negative for Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s. This was appraisal fraud at the OTHER end of the lending chain. Investors were misled as to the value of the security not only because the home appraisals were inflated, and not only because the viability of many of the loans ran from “sure to fail” to dubious, but because the amount of funding from the investors was far more than the amount of funding of the mortgages.

Deep in the pile of documentation, credit enhancements. etc. is the fact that investment bankers took money from investors and DIDN’T invest it. The ratings agencies all had people who realized this and reported it internally. The Triple AAA ratings came spewing out nonetheless because the rating agencies, like the property appraisers and mortgage brokers, were getting paid a premium to lie.

Moody’s Gets “Wells Notice,” SEC May Order Ratings Agency To “Cease And Desist”

Possible blockbuster news buried in Moody’s 10Q and discovered by Zero Hedge:

The SEC has hit Moody’s with a “Wells Notice” pertaining to the company’s application to be recognized as a ratings agency. Wells Notices are usually precursors to full SEC complaints (and most of them result in the agency going forward with charges). The SEC is preparing to file a “cease and desist”.

It’s not clear how broad the threat is here. It might just require Moody’s to re-file its application.  If the action could be a “cease-and-desist from being a ratings agency,” however, Moody’s is potentially screwed.

Here’s the complete language from the 10Q:

On March 18, 2010, MIS received a “Wells Notice” from the Staff of the SEC stating that the Staff is considering recommending that the Commission institute administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against MIS in connection with MIS’s initial June 2007 application on SEC Form NRSRO to register as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.

That application, which is publicly available on the Regulatory Affairs page of http://www.moodys.com, included a description of MIS’s procedures and principles for determining credit ratings. The Staff has informed Moody’s that the recommendation it is considering is based on the theory that MIS’s description of its procedures and principles were rendered false and misleading as of the time the application was filed with the SEC in light of the Company’s finding that a rating committee policy had been violated. MIS disagrees with the Staff that the violation of a company policy by a company employee renders the policy itself false and misleading and has submitted a response to the Wells Notice explaining why its initial application was accurate and why it believes an enforcement action is unwarranted.

And here’s the finding and commentary from Zero Hedge:

And now for today’s bombshell – literally at the very end of Moody’s 10-Q filed last night, we find this stunner:

On March 18, 2010, MIS received a “Wells Notice” from the Staff of the SEC stating that the Staff is considering recommending that the Commission institute administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against MIS in connection with MIS’s initial June 2007 application on SEC Form NRSRO to register as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.


Filed under: bubble, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: appraisal fraud, cease and desist, credit enhancements, Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Fitch, home appraisals, investors, MIS, Moody's, moodys.com, ratings agencies, SEC, SEC Form NRSRO, Standard and Poor's, Triple AAA ratings, Wells Notice, Zero Hedge
Apr
29

ID THEFT: Example of one person’s response

Editors’ Note: In response to my post on ID THEFT I received a number of comments and ideas. Here is one example of how someone stuck to the message and forced the issue using ID theft as a defensive tactic as well as preparing for an offensive response.

Are you reading my mind?
Out of the blue in Oct. Got a letter with my mortgage company letterhead stating “welcome to new mortgage company”. Said they changed their name. Separate letter said on Nov 6. stop making payments to them by their name and Nov. 7 start making payments to them by new name.
I know about contracts so I attempted to not contract with new name. It’s been a disaster.

1. No assignment 5 months out, in the Official Real Estate Records.
2. Real Trustee still holds title. I contacted him, but he only represents the beneficiary ‘who has the note and an interest secured in the home”.
3. Checked all three credit reports, 5 months out. Two show old name one show new name all have the same info. I disputed new name in the credit report that had it – stating I didn’t know them.
4. I disputed old name in another credit report since they are no longer exist to force identification of who is updating that report. Got copies of all.
4. Checked SEC filings. Investors bought the first name corporation in 2008. Then on Nov. 6, 2009 they merged the bank into their business. That explains why they said to stop paying one name.
5. Foreclosures under old name on file in Deed of Trust has been without assignment or transfer filings. Using Substitute Trustee. Three problems. Original Trustee still holds title. I already wrote him and know this. Deed of Trust on file has no provision for Substituting the Trustee. By virtue of the ‘merger’ they should have the original documents.
6. Spent 5 months asking them to validate their claim. They send a copy of the Certified copy of my Deed of Trust on file in the public (that does not name them), and a copy of a Certified copy of the Promissory note (that does not name them). Two problems They can’t attach to the Deed of Trust without assignment..name change or not…their name is ‘not’ the named Lender nor beneficiary in the Deed of Trust. And the Promissory Note was made out to a specific entity. You can’t possibly assume that I have to know that when you sell it, they can come up and say ‘pay me’ when the promissory note is supposed to be held by the person you promised to pay. If they sell it, that’s a different agreement between them and the other buyer, but I can’t be forced into their third party agreement as long as I agree to pay you..you stay right there and let me pay you..but don’t force me to pay someone I did not ‘promise to pay’.
7. They’ve hired a law firm (setting up for a substitute trustee situation). I contacted the firm. (not pro bono, not pro se, no attorney..just me and told them I don’t recognize the other company and I have asked them to validate and they respond with stronger demand for money.) Maybe that’s why I got the ‘copies’ I did get from the mortgage company that does not support their claim.
8. Informed the attorney of their violation of FDCPA by forwarding information to another party and by not disclosing the amount attempted to collect is in dispute.
9. I wouldn’t trust an attorney at this time. The United States is in Bankruptcy, China filed a lien for 45 Million dollars in December 2009.
10. Have a copy of a Substitute Trustee sale by this company. They never released the lien on the debtor they foreclosed on after the sale. If they had the papers they could have released the lien.
11. Once you admit there is a contract you can’t use Statue of Frauds which helps me because I have refused to contract and have refused to pay and requested validation of their claim of a debt owed to them.
Thinking seriously about filing SEC complaint and sending the ‘Communications, Notice and Order’ to the named person listed in their SEC filing and a copy of that to the law firm listed with the words “With a copy to” – in their SEC filing
My identity has been stolen by the company. When I establish an account with one firm, that does not give a right to another firm to step up and say I have the account, change the name, change the terms of your initial agreement and start paying me now because I have a ‘new name’. How can you have an account demanding payment when there is no agreement and you are really a new entity, not just a new name?
I’m learning about Statute of Frauds. It would also appear that Deceptive Trade Practices can be proven in this mess. A company who has no contract attaches to your credit report as if you’ve established business agreement with them? They have no definition in your Deed of Trust, yet they can get an attorney to represent their interest in your document and start nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. If they have the papers it takes to change the name on the credit report, they should have the papers it takes to file an assignment/transfer and change the name on the Deed of Trust.
I’ve not paid them any money, but I have filed FTC and Attorney General complaints. Not sure if I have to pay the 5 months in arrears as Threat, Duress, and Coercion to get some action done by these public resources I’m using to filing the compliant.


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: assignment, beneficiary, credit reports, DEED OF TRUST, disclosure, discovery, dispute credit report, FDCPA, foreclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, fraud, FTC Complaint, HERS, ID Theft, identity theft, lender, SEC Complaint, SEC filings, securitization, Substitute Trustee, transfer, trustee
Apr
28

Identity Theft as a Cause of Action

From Beth Findsen, Attorney in Scottsdale, AZ, she comments that ID Theft may just be the heart of the matter in seeking damages. The logic is simple: they used every borrower’s signature for selling a pool of loans that included OTHER borrowers and a huge undisclosed profit was generated by using the borrower’s signature. Without that signature there would have been no deal. This is especially true if the person was one of the top tier tranche borrowers with 800 FICO scores etc. Without them making the pool look pretty there would have been no sale. Those people were neither compensated nor informed of the use of their very personal information.

The elements are pretty clear. Use of a person’s ID without their consent. Loss to another person. This is another connection between the interests of the borrower and interests of investors.

The essence of securitization of loans has been the unauthorized use of the borrower’s ID to create a collection of loans that were sold as more valuable than any single loan would have been priced, based upon the presence of multiple parties who had no idea that their name and identifying information was being passed around the world like a “whiskey bottle at a frat party” as reported by MSNBC.

Privacy is a commodity. It is constitutionally and statutorily protected. It can be waived or it can be bought, if the person is willing to sell it or waive it. But it cannot be taken by a “lender” (pretender or otherwise) to use for their own profit. That profit belongs to the person or persons whose identity and privacy have been violated — along with punitive damages if it can be applied.

Quoted from Beth:

is it “consent” if it’s based upon a fraudulent misrepresentation or failure to disclose?

in AZ

13-2008. Taking identity of another person or entity; knowingly accepting identity of another person; classification
A. A person commits taking the identity of another person or entity if the person knowingly takes, purchases, manufactures, records, possesses or uses any personal identifying information or entity identifying information of another person or entity, including a real or fictitious person or entity, without the consent of that other person or entity, with the intent to obtain or use the other person’s or entity’s identity for any unlawful purpose or to cause loss to a person or entity whether or not the person or entity actually suffers any economic loss as a result of the offense, or with the intent to obtain or continue employment.


Filed under: CASES, CORRUPTION, expert witness, foreclosure, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: Beth Findsen, borrower, failure to disclose?, fraudulent misrepresentation, ID Theft, identity theft, investors, Scottsdale, use of identifying information
Apr
23

Discovery and Motion Practice: Watch Those Committee Hearings on Rating Agencies

Editor’s Note: As these hearings progress, you will see more and more admissible evidence and more clues to what you should be asking for  in discovery. You are getting enhanced credibility from these government inquiries and the results are already coming out as you can see below.The article below is a shortened version of the New York Times Paper version. I strongly recommend that you get the paper today and read the entire article. Some of the emails quoted are extremely revealing, clear and to the point. They knew they were creating the CDO market and that it was going to explode. One of them even said he hoped they were rich and retired when the mortgage mess blew up.
Remember that a rating is just word used on Wall Street for an appraisal So Rating=Appraisal.
  • The practices used to corrupt the rating system for mortgage backed securities  were identical in style to the practices used to corrupt the appraisals of the homes.
  • The appraisals on the homes were the foundation for the viability of the loan product sold to the borrower.
  • In the case of securities the buyers were investors.
  • In the case of appraisals the buyers were homeowners or borrowers.
  • In BOTH cases the “buyer” reasonably relied on an “outside” or “objective” third party who whose opinion was corrupted by money from the seller of the financial product (a mortgage backed security or some sort of loan, respectively).
  • In the case of the loan product the ultimate responsibility for verification of the viability of the loan, including verification of the appraisal is laid squarely on the LENDER.
  • Whoever originated the loan was either passing itself off as the lender using other people’s money in a table funded loan or they were the agent for the lender who either disclosed or not disclosed (nearly always non-disclosed).
  • A pattern of table funded loans is presumptively predatory.
  • The appraisal fraud is a key element of the foundation of your case. If the appraisal had not been inflated, the contract price would have been reduced or there would have been no deal because the buyer didn’t have the money.
  • The inflation of the appraisals over a period of time over a widening geographical area made the reliance on the appraiser and the “lender” even more reasonable.
  • Don’t let them use that as proof that it was market forces at work. Use their argument of market forces against them to establish the pattern of illegal conduct.
April 22, 2010

Documents Show Internal Qualms at Rating Agencies

By SEWELL CHAN

WASHINGTON — In 2004, well before the risks embedded in Wall Street’s bets on subprime mortgages became widely known, employees at Standard & Poor’s, the credit rating agency, were feeling pressure to expand the business.

One employee warned in internal e-mail that the company would lose business if it failed to give high enough ratings to collateralized debt obligations, the investments that later emerged at the heart of the financial crisis.

“We are meeting with your group this week to discuss adjusting criteria for rating C.D.O.s of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals,” the e-mail said. “Lose the C.D.O. and lose the base business — a self reinforcing loop.”

In June 2005, an S.& P. employee warned that tampering “with criteria to ‘get the deal’ is putting the entire S.& P. franchise at risk — it’s a bad idea.” A Senate panel will release 550 pages of exhibits on Friday — including these and other internal messages — at a hearing scrutinizing the role S.& P. and the ratings agency Moody’s Investors Service played in the 2008 financial crisis. The panel, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, released excerpts of the messages Thursday.

“I don’t think either of these companies have served their shareholders or the nation well,” said Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, the subcommittee’s chairman.

In response to the Senate findings, Moody’s said it had “rigorous and transparent methodologies, policies and processes,” and S.& P. said it had “learned some important lessons from the recent crisis” and taken steps “to increase the transparency, governance, and quality of our ratings.”

The investigation, which began in November 2008, found that S.& P. and Moody’s used inaccurate rating models in 2004-7 that failed to predict how high-risk residential mortgages would perform; allowed competitive pressures to affect their ratings; and failed to reassess past ratings after improving their models in 2006.

The companies failed to assign adequate staff to examine new and exotic investments, and neglected to take mortgage fraud, lax underwriting and “unsustainable home price appreciation” into account in their models, the inquiry found.

By 2007, when the companies, under pressure, admitted their failures and downgraded the ratings to reflect the true risks, it was too late.

Large-scale downgrades over the summer and fall of that year “shocked the financial markets, helped cause the collapse of the subprime secondary market, triggered sales of assets that had lost investment-grade status and damaged holdings of financial firms worldwide,” according to a memo summarizing the panel’s findings.

While many of the rating agencies’ failures have been documented, the Senate investigation provides perhaps the most thorough and vivid accounting of the failures to date.

A sweeping financial overhaul being debated in the Senate would subject the credit rating agencies to comprehensive regulation and examination by the Securities and Exchange Commission for the first time. The legislation also contains provisions that would open the agencies to private lawsuits charging securities fraud, giving investors a chance to hold the companies accountable.

Mr. Levin said he supported those measures, but said the Senate bill, and a companion measure the House adopted in December, did not go far enough.

“What they don’t do, and I think they should do, is find a way where we can avoid this inherent conflict of interest where the rating companies are paid by the people they are rating,” he said. “We’ve got to either find a way — or direct the regulatory bodies to find a way — to end that inherent conflict of interest.”

Although the agencies were supposed to offer objective and independent analysis of the securities they rated, the documents by Mr. Levin’s panel showed the pressures the companies faced from their clients, the same banks that were assembling and selling the investments.

“I am getting serious pushback from Goldman on a deal that they want to go to market with today,” a Moody’s employee wrote in an internal e-mail message in April 2006.

In an August 2006 message, an S.& P. employee likened the unit rating residential mortgage-backed securities to hostages who have internalized the ideology of their kidnappers.

“They’ve become so beholden to their top issuers for revenue they have all developed a kind of Stockholm syndrome which they mistakenly tag as Customer Value creation,” the employee wrote.

Lawrence J. White, an economist at the Stern School of Business at New York University, said he feared that the government’s own reliance on the rating agencies had “endowed them with some special aura.”

The House bill calls for removing references to the rating agencies in federal law, and both bills would require a study of how existing laws and regulations refer to the companies.

The addition of new regulations might inadvertently serve to empower the agencies, Mr. White said. “Making the incumbent guys even more important can’t be good, and yet that’s the track that we’re on right now,” he said.

David A. Skeel, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, said the Senate bill “basically just tinkers with the internal governance of the credit rating agencies themselves.”

Ending the inherent conflicts of interest is “more ambitious, but if you’re ever going to talk about it, then this is the time,” Mr. Skeel said.

Binyamin Appelbaum contributed reporting.


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: admissible evidence, appraisals, Carl Levin, collateralized debt obligations, corrupt, credibility, David A. Skeel, discovery, enhanced credibility, HERS, inflation of the appraisals, loan product, market forces, Moody’s Investors Service, Motion Practice, pattern of illegal conduct, rating agencies, rating system, Rating=Appraisal, reasonably relied, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEWELL CHAN, Standard & Poor’s, Stockholm syndrome, University of Pennsylvania
Apr
19

Proposed ABS Regulations Describe Abuses That can be Used in Litigation

33-9117 Proposed ABS Regulations

The recent financial crisis highlighted that investors and other participants in the securitization market did not have the necessary tools to be able to fully understand the risk underlying those securities and did not value those securities properly or accurately.


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud
Apr
01

Obama: A Bold U.S. Plan to Help Struggling Homeowners

YOU DON’T NEED TO BE DELINQUENT TO SETTLE OR MODIFY. It might just be a good time to pick up the phone right now and call the servicer, trustee, or whoever is saying they have your loan (even though they don’t) and make a deal. Think about it first. Don’t be too generous to them and don’t be to greedy for yourself.  It’s true they don’t serve the home or the new mortgage, but if you can get the terms you need, and you get a court order confirming it, it won’t matter that the investors got ripped off in the deal. That’s not your problem.

Editor’s Note: Now that the plan is more fully described, hold the presses. It would seem that Obama got our message. This plan addresses all homeowners with securitized mortgages that were over appraised, and aims to keep them in their homes to avoid the obviously needless and lawless displacement that has been the rule up till now.
But don’t get lulled into complacency. The Banks are no more able or willing to give you that modification than they were before, with the possible exception of BofA. You still need legal weapons and ammunition, you most likely still need a lawyer, and you still need to get title quieted through a court order. It’s all possible if the settlement or “modification” agreement provides the right terms.
March 26, 2010

A Bold U.S. Plan to Help Struggling Homeowners

By DAVID STREITFELD

Will it work this time?

Once again, the federal government is adding to its arsenal of programs for troubled homeowners, seeking to help those who urgently need it while neither angering nor creating perverse incentives for those who do not.

The new measures, announced by financial policy makers at the White House on Friday, are among the boldest to date. They are aimed not only at the seven million households that are behind on their mortgages but, in a significant expansion of aid that proved immediately controversial, the 11 million that simply owe more on their homes than they are worth.

Some of these people, if the government plan works, will emerge with a house whose payments they can afford and whose new mortgage reflects its market value. Unlike many previous modification recipients, they would presumably be less likely to re-default, helping to stabilize a housing market that remains queasy.

“We’re walking that delicate balance to make sure these solutions are sustainable and not temporary,” said David H. Stevens, commissioner of the Federal Housing Administration.

It is a balancing act in numerous ways. If the plan falls short — and some experts were skeptical on Friday — the Obama administration could find itself having to start over yet again in six months or a year.

“The housing market is the Vietnam War of the American financial system,” said Howard Glaser, a housing consultant. “The federal government is in so deep, they have to keep ramping up to find a way out.”

The latest programs, together with foreclosure assistance efforts already in place, are aimed at helping as many as four million embattled owners keep their houses. But the measures, which will take as long as six months to put into practice, might easily fall victim to some of the conflicting interests that have bedeviled efforts to date. None of these programs have the force of law, and lenders have often seen no good reason to participate.

To lubricate its efforts, the government plans to spread taxpayers’ money around liberally. For instance, it had previously planned to give homeowners that sell their homes rather than let them go into foreclosure a “relocation assistance” payment of $1,500. The plan announced on Friday increases that amount to $3,000.

All told, the new measures are expected to cost about $50 billion. The White House was careful to stress that the money will come from funds already set aside for housing programs in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. There will be “no additional commitment of taxpayer dollars,” Michael S. Barr, an assistant secretary of the Treasury, said at the White House briefing.

Here is what the $50 billion is supposed to buy:

The simplest component of the plan involves assistance to unemployed homeowners. Mortgage companies will now be encouraged to reduce payments for at least three months and possibly six months while the homeowner pursues a new job.

To be eligible, borrowers must submit proof they are receiving unemployment insurance. The new payments will be 31 percent or less of their monthly income. The missing money will be tacked onto the loan’s principal.

A second and more complicated program is a requirement that mortgage servicers consider writing off a portion of a borrower’s loan to get it down to a more manageable level.

Borrowers in the government modification plan who owe more than 115 percent of the value of their home and are paying more than 31 percent of their monthly income toward the mortgage are eligible. The write-downs are to take three years, with the borrowers in essence being rewarded for making their payments on time.

The third major new program strays the farthest from the government’s previous approach. Borrowers who owe more on their homes than they are worth will get a chance to cut their debt — providing the investor or bank who owns the loan agrees.

Mr. Stevens of the F.H.A. said the program was “for responsible homeowners who through no fault of their own find themselves in a situation of negative equity.”

There is no official requirement that these homeowners be in distress, but it would probably make the investor more receptive to a deal. Whether homeowners will scheme to get into the program is one of the big uncertainties.

The investors will write down the loans to 97.75 percent of the appraised value of the property, at which point the F.H.A. will refinance them through new lenders. The F.H.A., which currently insures about six million homes, will insure the new loans as well.

If the homeowner has a second mortgage, as many do, the total value of the new mortgage can be as much as 115 percent of the value of the property. The F.H.A. will spend up to $14 billion to provide incentives to the banks that service the primary loan as well as the owners of the secondary loans. Some of the money will also provide additional insurance on the new loans.

Numerous parties will have to work together to make these deals fly. The primary loan might have been bundled into a pool and sold to investors during the housing boom. The investor must agree to cut the principal balance for a deal to work, and any bank holding a second mortgage on the property would have to go along, too.

The only incentive for the first lien holder is a quick exit from a loan that might ultimately default. Payments for second lien holders will be made on a sliding scale.

Early reaction to the refinance program among lending groups was less than enthusiastic.

“The magnitude of this program will likely be measured in the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands of borrowers,” said Tom Deutsch, executive director of the American Securitization Forum. Both banks and investors belong to the forum.

The Mortgage Bankers Association, which represents the banks that service the primary loans and own outright many of the secondary loans, warned that “each servicer will need to determine whether this is the best approach to help the individual borrower.”

The new proposals irked many people, who flooded online forums Friday. Some said those in trouble deserved their fate. Others asked why the government was propping up housing prices when many renters still could not afford to buy a house. And some wondered about the message these rescue plans were sending to those who resisted the housing bubble.

Dave Juliette, a software worker in Pittsburgh, is in the last group. He paid off his loan eight years ahead of schedule and now owns his house free and clear. “I’m a homeowner in a more genuine sense of the word than many of these people with mortgages,” Mr. Juliette said. “But I won’t be seeing a dime.”


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: "modification" agreement, BofA, Complaint to Quiet Title, David Streitfeld, delinquent, friendly quiet title action, LAWYER, modification, Mortgage, Obama, quiet title, servicer, trustee
Mar
16

A Thought About Bankruptcy Petitions: Creditor ID

Upon finding that a portion of those payments should be applied to the subject loan, the declaration of default would be invalid because it would either be wrong inasmuch that the third party payments would at least be prepayments of future monthly payments, or wrong because the third party payments reflected an inaccurate accounting of the principal due.

OK let’s be clear that I don’t know bankruptcy well enough to even have an opinion, but I do have an idea and I would like this post forwarded to bankruptcy attorneys to get their reaction.

Here is the proposition: A Petitioner files for bankruptcy where one of the issues is a securitized loan. My idea is that the schedules NOT show the any of the known parties as creditors, because they are not. Especially if you have an expert opinion that describes the creditors as being unnamed but readily identifiable investors if the servicer will respond properly to the Qualified Written Request.

Upon reflection I don’t see why we would name the pretender lenders as creditors at all. I would leave them off the list of creditors (on any new cases filed) because they are not creditors. Maybe file amended schedules removing them. I would disclose the non-judicial foreclosure attempt wherever you can do that of course. Show the house as an asset with undetermined value. Wouldn’t that force them into being proactive? They would have to say “Hey! We are creditors secured by this property.” That would force the burden of proof onto them even as to standing, wouldn’t it?

Can someone who is not a creditor on the schedules file a proof of claim? What happens if you deny the claim and deny they are creditors? Do THEY have to file the adversary? Your position would be that you have this Expert Declaration that identifies the creditors, at least by description, and these would-be foreclosers don’t meet the description. So you disclosed the fact that they were claiming a default but you deny they are even creditors, much less secured.

It would seem that this would force them into proving to a bankruptcy court that they actually have authority which in turn would require them to produce all the documents granting them that authority. It also seems to me that they would have to come up with a full accounting for all payments from all parties, including from credit default swaps, insurance and Federal bailouts.

In the course of the proceedings, your allegation would be that they did in fact receive third party payments as has been widely reported by the press. They would probably answer something like those payments are irrelevant.

Your response to their assertion is to ask the court, who decides whether third party payments are relevant or not — the court or the creditor? The court would most likely order them to disclose all such third party payments along with documentation thereon so that the court could determine whether the payments should be applied to the pools in which the subject mortgage loan is Located” (assuming the assignments are valid), and then in turn determine what percentage of the payment should be allocated to the subject loan.

Upon finding that a portion of those payments should be applied to the subject loan, the declaration of default would be invalid because it would either be wrong inasmuch that the third party payments would at least be prepayments of future monthly payments, or wrong because the third party payments reflected an inaccurate accounting of the principal due.

Comments?


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer Tagged: accounting, adversary, bankruptcy, credit default swaps, creditor, Federal Bailout, foreclosure, insurance, schedules, secured claims, securitized mortgage, third party payments, unsecured creditors
Jan
05

Credit Suisse Appraisal Fraud Cited by Investors

A
Dec
07

SEC: Ex-New Century execs misled investors

Federal regulators on Monday accused three former top executives of collapsed mortgage lender New Century Financial Corp. of fraud, saying they misled investors as the company’s subprime loan business was failing in 2006.







BusinessNew CenturySubprime lendingU.S. Securities and Exchange CommissionFinancial services

Oct
28

Investors and Borrowers Unite!

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Aug
08

Single-family homes catch investors’ eyes

“Buyers focus on rental income more than appreciation potential”