May
21

How to Strategic Default? Ask the MBA.

images

If you want to know how to strategic default, ask the MBA… Mortgage Banking Association.

The CEO of the powerful Mortgage Bankers Association, John Courson, has said that underwater borrowers should keep paying on their mortgage loans and “should not walk away from lawful debts”.  In an interview this past year, Courson appeared genuinely concerned adding:

“What about the message they will send to their family and their kids and their friends?”

Obviously, Mr. Courson was not just speaking as a defender of financial institutions. Clearly, he was showing how much he cares for people and their personal relationships.  He believes the children are our future.  He thinks we should teach them well and let them lead the way.  That we should show them all the beauty they posses inside.  Give them a sense of pride.  To make it easier… let the children’s laughter… remind us how we used to be.

Thank you John… you’re no Whitney Houston, but you’ve got me all teary eyed over here.

images-1

There’s just one little, teeny-tiny, almost insignificant smidgeon of a problem with what the Mortgage Bankers Association’s CEO was saying: He was completely full of shit.

This past week, the Co-Star Group, Inc., indicated that it had agreed to buy the MBA’s 10-story headquarters building in DC for $41.3 million.  The only problem is that $41.3 million comes up a skosh shy of the $75 million first mortgage on the building that the MBA took out from PNC Financial Group way back in 2007, when they purchased the property for $79 million.

You remember 2007, don’t you John?  That was the last year that all of those irresponsible homeowners, thinking real estate prices would go up forever, kept over leveraging themselves, buying properties without the traditional 20% down payment.  What a bunch of irresponsible idiots, right Johnny Boy?  Now that the bubble has popped, those homeowners should just be taking their medicine like men, don’t you agree John?  The last thing they should do is walk away from their lawful debts, isn’t that what you said?

images-2

So I mean, what kind of message are YOU now sending to your family, your children, and your friends by walking away from your lawful $75 million debt?  Are they being morally harmed by your decision to stick the bank with close to $25 million?  And why aren’t you simply paying your mortgage as agreed, Mr. Courson? You’re not trying to destroy prices of commercial properties in Washington D.C. are you?

Just last year, you pointed out that defaults hurt neighborhoods by lowering property values, so borrowers would do less harm to our society were they just to repay what they owe.  You know… like the responsible homeowners.

(Oh, and this just in from my favorite bankruptcy attorney and all-around thought leader, Max Gardner, the MBA also defaulted on their payments and secured a forbearance agreement, prior to the short sale.  Nicely done, Johnny-O.  Maybe you should open a loan mod firm and start helping homeowners.)

Well, I think I’ve got your message, Mr. Courson.  I know exactly what you wanted to say to your family, your children and your friends…

Do as I say.  Not as I pay.

Does that about sum it up for you, Mr. John Courson?

Yeah, I thought so.

Jackass.

images-3

May
18

Utah Foreclosure News is Based on Garbage Stats


In Utah, foreclosures in March were up 74 percent over February.  In New Jersey, foreclosures in in April were up 72 percent over March.  In Tampa and Chicago, foreclosures in February were up 64 and 43 percent over January, respectively.

 

Now, here we are in mid-May and we’re to believe that everything has changed for the better?  That was then this is now, is that the idea?  Poppycock.

 

The Mortgage Bankers Association yesterday released a report claiming that the share of Utah’s home loans at least 30 days late dropped to 7.4 percent… from 7.58 percent in the previous three months.

 

Well, so what and who cares?  First of all, that’s just not a statistically significant difference, in fact, it would be well within the margin of error for any legitimate survey of such data.  And secondly, it’s an incomplete comparison.  One point being compared is presumably the “drop to 7.4 percent.”  And the other point against which the dropped 7.4 percent is to be compared, is a three month average of 7.58 percent.

 

If the last month of the three month average was 7.o percent, then this month’s 7.4 percent was actually an increase.

 

The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA”) also claimed that in the first quarter of this year, six percent of loans in Utah were in default — which the association defines being at least 30 days behind on payments.

 

Now, and you have to read this carefully to see the deception, they’re saying that at the end of the first quarter of this year… “2.5 percent of mortgage loans in Utah were in the foreclosure process.”

 

What the heck does that tell us?  Not a darn thing, although if you like to guess at things, here are a few things it could mean:

 

  1. Nothing has changed – That’s right, based on those two claims by the MBA, the State of Utah could still have six percent of loans at least 30 days late and 2.5 percent in the foreclosure process.
  2. Things have gotten worse – That’s right, based on those two claims, it’s possible that today there are more than six percent of loans in Utah more than 30 days late, and the 2.5 percent in the foreclosure process could be an increase from prior months.
  3. Servicers are still preparing to comply with DOJ settlement – If the 2.5 percent in the foreclosure process is lower than expected it could be… and moreover likely is, due to servicers getting ready to comply with the DOJ settlement, meaning they have to foreclose without robo-signing and the like.

 

The point is that reports like this one are a study in obfuscation, which means: “muddying” or “confusing,” or refers to a “smokescreen.”  They don’t really tell us anything, but they’re designed to make us think something has changed, when it has not.

 

Why do I say that?  For several reasons…

 

To begin with, nothing we’re dealing with is going to change that quickly.  It was a huge problem yesterday… it’ll be a huge problem tomorrow.  If positive trends stay constant over the course of a year… then that will be something to cheer about.

 

Another reason for my skepticism is that none of the underlying fundamentals have changed one bit.  In fact, last month’s unemployment data was a nightmare, much worse than expected.  How could things have improved so dramatically so quickly when things have otherwise been moving so slowly?  Answer: They couldn’t.

 

And lastly, it’s the report itself.  The comparison of loans “in default,” which they defined as being over 30 days late, with loans “in the foreclosure process,” which they do not define, is an attempt to set up a deceptive or fallacious argument.

 

At the very least it’s an “incomplete or inconsistent comparison,” meaning that either not enough information is provided to make a complete comparison, or where different methods of comparison are used in order to create a false impression of the overall comparison.

 

The data above also was surrounded by irrelevant comparisons that I removed to show the deceptive structure of the argument being made.  In the original presentation of the data, the MBA compared the loans in default to the national average, which they claimed to be 6.9 percent, and loans in foreclosure, which they claimed to be 4.4 percent.

 

 

Why should we care about such comparisons by themselves?  We shouldn’t.  They tell us absolutely nothing.  It’s like saying, “In recent coin tossing experiments more coins preferred heads over tails.”

 

RealtyTrac chimed in with other statistics designed to be both encouraging and misleading:

 

 1.     “Foreclosure starts decreased in 41 states and the rate of loans in foreclosures fell in 22 states.”

 2.     “Foreclosure activity in all the judicial foreclosure states combined jumped 15 percent versus April last year.” 

 3.     “Taken together, non-judicial states saw foreclosure activity fall 29 percent.”

 

The first one is total junk, it is meaningless… and confusing… in fact, if you study it too long your hair will likely fall out. Foreclosure starts decreasing may just mean that banks decreased the number they started.  And the same for the loans in foreclosure garbage.

 

Banks control how many foreclosures start and how many are in foreclosure process, not borrowers.

 

The last two are more devious.  They are woven throughout stories in the media this week in order to make us believe that it’s the courts that are causing the foreclosure crisis to be prolonged.  Bad courts.  The clear implication being that if the courts weren’t in the way of the banks, we’d all be much better off, much sooner.  Abigail Field wrote a fabulous piece HERE.  Among many other things in her article, she wrapped up flawlessly:

Those darn courts, wrecking the housing market by slowing foreclosures and costing all of us more money.

Due Process is the Solution, Not the Problem

See where all this is going? Enough messaging like this and some states may change foreclosure laws more to the bankers’ liking. Short of that, people will target the courts as the problem instead of the bankers.

Whenever you read banker talking points embedded in news like this, remember: our Constitution guarantees Due Process for a reason. Due Process is essential to the rule of law and a fundamental check against the abuse of power. Don’t let the bankers sell you or your representatives into taking it away.

 

Obviously, the banking lobby would like it much more if they didn’t have to deal with things like… well, you know… like laws, for example.  Courts can be a real nuisance, I completely understand.

 

Look, if you’re doing just fine and you want to buy a house, go for it… I don’t care one way or the other.  If you’re planning on living there for a long time and you can afford the payments, what difference does it make if it goes up or down in the next so many years?  It’s a house, not a stock.  Buy it to live in it, not as an investment you’ll flip out of in five years.

 

But, of you’re struggling in this economy, at risk of losing a home, and stories like these make you feel like you’re alone in your financial misery, and that everyone is doing better while you’re not… please don’t feel that way because it’s all nothing more than one big pile of steaming freshness.  I’m not seeing anything improve anywhere.  In fact, I’m only seeing things worsen ahead.

 

So, just ignore it, and it will go away.  It’s like a ghost in your closet… go back to sleep and it’ll be gone in the morning.

 

Mandelman out.

 

May
10

Reuters | Florida Foreclosure Case Could Slam Banks – BONY v PINO

Florida foreclosure case could slam banks PINO’S STORY The Florida case provides a startling example of abuses that allegedly take place in the foreclosure process – and the strategies lenders use to overcome them. Roman Pino, a shy, 35-year-old drywall hanger, bought his home in 2006 during the housing boom. He put 20 percent down … Read more Related posts:
  1. Pino v BONY | Florida Supreme Court to Review Dismissed Foreclosure Lawsuit Against Greenacres Man
  2. BONY V PINO | Florida Supreme Court Oral Arguments Live Thursday May 10, 2012 @ 9:00AM EST
  3. Just How Much Foreclosure Fraud Exists? Presenting the MBA’s Brief in the Florida Supreme Court Pino Case
Apr
25

Just How Much Foreclosure Fraud Exists? Presenting the MBA’s Brief in the Florida Supreme Court Pino Case

“The fact that the MBA is this concerned should speak volumes about the magnitude of foreclosure fraud in Florida.” ~ Mark Stopa ~ Just How Much Foreclosure Fraud Exists? The Florida Supreme Court is currently deciding whether a plaintiff should be able to voluntarily dismiss a pending lawsuit when a defendant is seeking sanctions for … Read more Related posts:
  1. Pino v. The Bank of New York Mellon | Case Involving Alleged Foreclosure Fraud Headed to Florida Supreme Court
  2. Florida Supreme Court to Address Foreclosure Fraud | ROMAN PINO vs THE BANK OF NEW YORK
  3. Bank Satisfied Mortgage in PINO after Fraudclosure Exposed But Can’t Seem to Pay Off Four Judges in the Florida Supreme Court
Mar
23

GSE’s to Taxpayers – We Need More Money! As They Spend $600K at MBA Convention

GSEs Spend $600K at MBA Convention Prompting OIG Review This is the third of three evaluation reports released today by the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) ... Related posts:
  1. The Market Ticker – First The GSEs, Now The Monolines….
  2. Other People’s Money | Fannie and Freddie, Still the Socialites
  3. The Subtle Nationalization of the Banks and Housing Market – How the Taxpayers Support the Banks through Pseudo Nationalization – We Own the Financial Junk and the Banks Collect the Profits – The Stunning SIGTARP Report
Mar
02

Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC) to Attend MBA’s National Fraud Issues Conference 2012

Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC) to Attend MBA’s National Fraud Issues Conference 2012 Palm Harbor, Fla. (PRWEB) February 29, 2012 With a constantly changing landscape, mortgage servicers are called to meet new and evolving challenges nearly every day. Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC) continues to meet that challenge. As the nation’s leading post-closing services provider for the … Read more Related posts:
  1. KABOOM | Illinois Attorney General MADIGAN ISSUES SUBPOENAS Against Lender Processing Services (LPS) & Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC)
  2. WTF? PerfectChain℠ – Nationwide Title Clearing (NTC) Helps Homeowners and Borrowers by Identifying Cloud on Title of Properties
  3. Nationwide Title Clearing | Scientology founder’s tenets drive Pinellas title company, under fire for rapid document processing
Dec
21

Hang Your Hat Here | 2012 MBA Servicing Conference Feb 21-24 in Orlando, Florida

Servicers Wear Many Hats | 2012 MBA Servicing Conference Feb 21-24 in Orlando, Florida ~ 2012 MBA Servicing and Expo in Orlando, Florida ~ 4closureFraud.org TweetNo related posts. No related posts.
Sep
22

Mortgage Bankers Association No Longer Trusts MERS with its Data Standards Initiative

According to Housingwire… MBA takes MISMO back from MERS “A lot of noise has been made about the new MERS CEO and the recent court wins for the company, but I find it rather interesting that the MBA no longer trusts the company with its data standards initiative,” the source said. Where has the love … Read more
Aug
01

Mortgage Bankers Association Letter to the Federal Reserve RE “Skin in the Game” and the Ability of Borrowers to Repay

Mortgage Bankers Association Letter to the Federal Reserve RE “Skin in the Game” and the Ability of Borrowers to Repay The MBA believes this proposal and the Credit Risk Retention/Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) rule, to which we are responding in a separate comment letter, are the two most significant mortgage-related rules required by Dodd-Frank concerning … Read more
Feb
27

Guest Post: Principal Reduction Modification Math, by Rick Rogers, JD/MBA

I first met Rick Rogers at Max Gardner’s Bankruptcy and Litigation Boot Camp, when I attended the 5-day intensive training program for attorneys last October.  About 15 lawyers all met at Max’s 160 acre ranch in the western mountains of North Carolina.

Well, Rick Rogers, of The Rogers Law Group in Chicago, and I shared the Riverview Cabin, I believe is what Max calls it, and we got along right from the start.  He’s a really smart lawyer who also has his MBA so we spoke the same language for the most part, and we both share an intense interest in how loan modifications work and why servicers are often unbearably annoying.  Last week Max asked both of us to speak to the 200+ attorneys that attended Operation Strike Back in Las Vagas, Nevada, which was held at the Paris Hotel and Casino… on the subject of HAMP, the NPV Test, and the REST Report.

I invited Rick to Guest Post on Mandelman Matters, and what follows is his Special Report on the new HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative, a new program being offered as part of the Making Home Affordable initiative.  I hope you enjoy it and find it valuable…

Principal Reduction Modification Math

A Report by Rick Rogers, JD/MBA

February, 2011

Lenders will receive far more value from Principal Reduction modifications than from other mortgage modifications.

Intuitively, that statement doesn’t sound right.  How could a bank make more money by reducing a $250,000 mortgage to $200,000?  Here’s how:

If enforcing a $250,000 mortgage is likely to result in foreclosure, the Lender will probably recover less than $100,000.  If reducing the principal balance to $200,000 is likely to avoid foreclosure, the Lender will likely recover the entire new $200,000 balance, which is more than double what it might recover if it refuses to reduce the principal balance.

In order to calculate the Lender’s financial advantage or disadvantage of granting Principal Reduction modifications, numerical probabilities must be established for the likelihood of outcomes mentioned above.

This report will compare the Net Present Value (NPV), of standard Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), modifications with Principal Reduction Alternative HAMP (PRA HAMP) modifications.  If the mortgage principal balance on a home exceeds 115% of its market value, PRA HAMP will reduce the principal balance by that difference over a three year period, if the borrower stays current on the mortgage during that time.  PRA HAMP will also reduce interest rate, extend term, and include principal forbearance, if necessary, to reduce the monthly payment to 31% of gross income.  Standard HAMP modification will do all but reduce principal balance.

Participating HAMP Lenders and Servicers, herein collectively referred to as Lenders, were required to start evaluating cases for PRA HAMP in the last quarter of 2010.  Regardless of the outcome of those evaluations, no PRA HAMP modification would ever be required of the Lender.  PRA HAMP modification is strictly optional.  A Lender could reject the application for any reason or for no reason at all.

It’s encouraging that some Lenders have issued PRA HAMP modifications with large principal reductions.  That suggests those few Lenders understand the economic advantage of PRA HAMP, but it’s too early to tell how many will embrace the concept and actively participate.

Re-default Rate: As it relates to mortgage modifications, this is the rate at which homeowners default after receiving a modification.  Unless otherwise noted, re-default rate refers to the rate during the 12 months immediately following the modification.  The impact of a re-default will have the same financial result for HAMP and PRA HAMP modifications.

Re-default rate is the single most important factor when comparing the NPV of a PRA HAMP with that of a standard HAMP modification.  A lower re-default rate for Principal Reduction modification provides the Lender savings to offset the reduction in principal balance.  The key question when comparing PRA HAMP to standard HAMP modification is whether the savings from a reduction in re-default rate will be more or less than the amount of the principal reduction.  For the answer to that question, one can look to The Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report:

Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification and Re-Default by Andrew Haughwout, Ebiere Okah, and Joseph Tracy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no.417, December 2009; revised August 2010

This report, referred to herein as the FRB Report, was the result of no small effort.  It is a 46-page, well researched and crafted report utilizing a sample of tens of thousands of mortgage modifications on which to draw conclusions.  Principal reduction modifications were included in a sufficient number for the authors to state the following conclusion in the Abstract:  “… the re-default rate declines relatively more when the payment reduction is achieved through principal forgiveness as opposed to lower interest rates.”

On page 30, the report states “restoring the borrower’s incentive to pay in this way (referring to principal reduction) nearly quadruples the reduction in re-default rates achieved by payment reductions through interest rate modifications and term extensions alone.”  It goes on to state the conclusions “confirm the findings from previous research that borrower equity is a critical determinant of loan performance…”  The report concludes modifications will be more effective if program designs are more attentive to borrower incentives to pay, i.e., principal reduction.

HAMP vs. PRA HAMP: While the FRB Report does not specifically compare PRA HAMP with HAMP, it does provide an applicable estimate of the difference in re-default rates for principal reduction and non-principal reduction modifications.

Attached are NPV Test results with parameters of the above referenced typical case, comparing a HAMP to a PRA HAMP modification, utilizing the re-default rate differential used in the FRB Report.  Following are the inputs used for the test:

Mortgage Balance                   $250,000                     Market Value                          $175,000

Gross Income                          $    4,000                        Current House Payment         $    1,966

Re-default Rate                                                                 Principal Reduction                $  48,750

HAMP                         40.0%

PRA HAMP               10.7%

The NPV of a single, successful standard HAMP modification ($224,112 in the above case) will always be greater than the NPV of a single, successful PRA HAMP modification ($188,955 in the above case), due to the PRA HAMP principal reduction.  However, the FRB Report suggests 4 of every 10 standard HAMP modifications will fail, while only about 1 in 10 PRA HAMP modifications will fail.  Due to low Lender recovery rates in foreclosure ($69,043 in the above case), the average NPV for PRA HAMP modifications will exceed that of standard HAMP modifications.

Based on the above values, below is a simple calculation of the NPV of 10 standard HAMP modifications and that of 10 PRA HAMP modifications.

NPV Comparison of HAMP vs. PRA HAMP Modifications

NPV of 10 Standard HAMP Modifications:

6 successful modifications                  6 x $224,112 =            $1,344,674

4 re-defaults with foreclosure             4 x $  69,043 =            $    276,172

Total NPV for 10 modifications                                                         $1,620,846

NPV of 10 PRA HAMP Modifications:

9 successful modifications                  9 x $188,955 =            $1,700,598

1 re-default with foreclosure               1 x $  69,043 =            $      69,043

Total NPV for 10 modifications                                                         $1,769,641

NPV Advantage of 10 PRA HAMPs over 10 Standard HAMPs  =                         $   148,794

NPV Average PRA HAMP Advantage per individual modification =                   $     14,879*

* Inflated estimate due to rounding.  Actual advantage based on FRB Report re-default rate is $14,164 in this case.

There are also significant Lender tax benefits of PRA HAMP. In this case, the tax savings could amount to almost $20,000 in the first three years following the modification.  Without tax benefits, the PRA HAMP NPV advantage over standard HAMP is more than $14,000 per typical modification.  With tax savings, that Lender NPV advantage could double to over $30,000.  Tax benefits may vary widely among Lenders, and may provide no benefit at all for those with no profit to shelter.  With or without tax savings, the financial gains from PRA HAMP modifications are considerable.

Even if PRA HAMP re-default rates were twice that indicated in the FRB Report, or if the Lender received no tax savings, or if both of those unlikely events transpired, the NPV for PRA HAMP modifications would still exceed the NPV for standard HAMP.

Reserve Requirements: A PRA HAMP will give rise to an increase in Lender cash reserve requirements.  One could argue reserve requirements should be lowered by PRA HAMP, since those modifications are four times less likely to suffer re-default.  Reserve requirements may be of little or no concern to large Lenders, but it should be recognized as a by-product of PRA HAMP.

Accounting Treatment and Reserve Requirements are “paper” issues, if Lenders believe they are issues at all.  The solutions to these problems do not require Lender sacrifice of revenue, federal funding, jobs creation, or cutbacks in spending.  A couple of waves of the appropriate federal wands could nicely resolve these issues, if they are important to Lenders.  Principal Reduction modifications are far too important to the economic resurgence of this country to allow “accounting and administrative” issues to block the way.

Conclusion: The FRB Report demonstrates Principal Reduction modifications will significantly reduce re-defaults, thereby creating substantially more value to Lenders than other modifications.  When considering the Lender’s potential tax benefits, the already significant benefit of PRA HAMP is further increased.  In the unlikely event the Lender receives no tax savings and the re-default rate for PRA HAMP is double that projected in the FRB Report, the NPV for PRA HAMP modifications will still be greater than the NPV for standard HAMP modifications.

Under HAMP, a participating Lender is required to modify when doing so generates the most value for itself.  Consistent with the HAMP concept, a PRA HAMP modification should be mandatory for participating Lenders whenever its NPV exceeds that of both the standard HAMP modification and the “No Modification” alternatives.

For purposes of NPV calculation, the estimated PRA HAMP re-default rate should be 29.3 percentage points less than the standard HAMP re-default rate, as in the FRB Report.  Over time, historical re-default rates should replace this proposed initial rate.

Under PRA HAMP, Lenders will achieve far greater financial benefits than with any current modification program, and borrowers will have a fighting chance to regain equity and security in their home.  Even if prices remain flat and borrowers make no improvements to their homes, HAMP Principal Reductions combined with scheduled payments will reduce mortgage balances to within 5% of home values in just three years.  That fact will reinvigorate homeowners and provide inspiration to stay current on mortgage payments for the many who today have no incentive nor rational hope to save the home they once cherished.

About the Author: Rick Rogers, JD/MBA is Executive Director of the Rogers Law Group, NFP, a firm dedicated exclusively to Home Preservation.  For over 20 years, he has composed, utilized, and trained others in the use of NPV Tests for the purpose of comparing real estate alternatives nationally and internationally.  For the last 10 years, his practice has been devoted to foreclosure, mortgage default, and related matters.  He may be contacted at rrogers@therogerslawgroup.com or through www.therogerslawgroup.com .

Attachment:    PRA HAMP Standard Waterfall Process with Summary of HAMP and PRA                                                                                     HAMP NPV Results Based on Re-Default Rate Differential in FRB Report

Comparison of PRA HAMP vs Standard HAMP
NPV for PRA HAMP Loan Modification $176,354
NPV for Standard HAMP Loan Modification $162,190
PRA HAMP Advantage (Disadvantage) over HAMP $14,164
NPV for No Loan Modification $65,922
NPV Test Recommendation:


Modify using PRA HAMP


Current Desired
Mortgage Balance $250,000 $201,250
Principal Forbearance converted to Reduction $48,750
Additional Forbearance Necessary to reach 31% PITIA $0
Estimated Market Value $175,000 $175,000
Loan-to-Value Ratio 143% 115%
Borrower Total Gross Income $4,000 $4,000
Target PITIA – 31% $1,240
Principal + Interest $1,499 $774
Taxes $417 $417
Insurance $50 $50
Assessments & Other $0 $0
PITIA $1,966 $1,241
DTI 49% 31.02%
Loan Interest Rate 6.000% 2.000%
Months Remaining on Mortgage 330 341
For an affordable, sustainable mortgage, the following modified terms are requested:
- Loan re-amortized to 341 months
- $0 Principal Forbearance w/out interest, end of loan or pay-off Principal
- $48,750 Forgiveness
- Initial rate years 1 – 5 2.000% with P&I of $774
- Interest rate in year 6 3.000% with P&I of $840
- Interest rate in year 7 4.000% with P&I of $920
- Interest rate in year 8 4.740% with P&I of $984
- Interest rate in years 9 – 40 4.740% with P&I of $984
Aug
20

Mortgage Delinquencies Still Rising says MBA – More Americans Underwater

I have a lot of conversations with people about our economy, foreclosures and such… from clients to friends in business to attorneys. Everyone who’s asked me what I foresee coming I’ve told them that 2010 will be a very tough year and they better prepare now. We aren’t done yet folks… and the policies of the Obama Administration and our collective disaster we call Congress, are going to make things even worse – and very well will extend the recession quite painfully. I have told people to expect another wave of foreclosures. As long as you have no job creation and more job loss happening every day, this cycle won’t stop. It’s as simple as that.

And with that, I bring you fresh news…

Delinquencies Are Still Climbing and Threatening More Foreclosures on the Horizon, MBA Says

08/20/2009 By: Carrie Bay

More than nine percent of all mortgages in the United States are now delinquent, according to figures released Thursday by the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA).

The delinquency rate for mortgage loans on one-to-four-unit residential properties rose to 9.24 percent of all loans outstanding at the end of the second quarter, MBA reported. The new number breaks the record set in the first quarter of this year, when 9.12 percent of the nation’s homeowners were behind on their mortgage payments.

Important to note is that the biggest jump in delinquencies last quarter came from prime fixed-rate mortgages. These seemingly low-risk loans also accounted for one in three of the nation’s foreclosure starts in Q2. A year ago they were only one in five.

Like prime, Federal Housing Administration loans are generally thought to be “safe,” but foreclosure starts among government-insured mortgages jumped to 9.1 percent last quarter – a record-high for the agency.

The states of California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada continue to drag down the national numbers. These four had 44 percent of all the nation’s new foreclosures in Q2. Rhode Island, Georgia, and Michigan also posted foreclosure start rates above the national average. All

other states in the country fell below the national benchmark, and roughly half even saw their new foreclosure numbers decline.

But then, there’s the not-so-sunny Sunshine State. Florida has cemented itself as the worst state in the union for mortgage performance. Twelve percent of all mortgages there were somewhere in the process of foreclosure at the end of June, and another 5 percent were more than 90 days past due and about to cross that threshold. Based on MBA’s numbers, Florida has the highest foreclosure and delinquency rates in the country, and MBA’s chief economist, Jay Brinkmann, says he doesn’t expect to see a turnaround in Florida’s housing market for a long, long time.

Some fortunate regional markets are faring better and offsetting Florida’s bad numbers because the nation’s total foreclosure starts during the second quarter actually dropped slightly. Foreclosure actions were initiated on 1.36 percent of the nation’s outstanding mortgages, compared to 1.35 percent during the first three months of the year, MBA reported.

Despite the leveling off of foreclosure starts, the fact that loans 90 or more days past due continues to climb in all categories suggests an overhang of foreclosure activity and engorged inventories of repossessed homes may be looming in the coming months.

So, when is the foreclosure problem going to crest? Brinkmann, points out that unemployment is currently the primary driver behind missed mortgage payments.

The number of jobless Americans is forecast to peak in mid-2010, and Brinkmann says he expects delinquencies to top out at about the same time. But because of the lag time associated with foreclosure proceedings, he doesn’t see a break in the upward trend of foreclosures until six months later, at the close of next year.

Website Designed and Developed by Tampa Web Designer