Mar
06

At Last, A Credible Threat of Default: Too Little-Too Late Eupdate?

At long last, Greece is starting to resemble a normal restructuring--you know, the kind where the debtor just might not pay if it does not get the relief it is asking for. Everyone else has done it this way, including the proverbial opposites, mean Argentina and nice Uruguay--but not Greece.

From the start, Europe's crisis management strategy has revolved around flatly denying the possibility of default within the Eurozone. This strategy has given us record-deep yet voluntary haircuts, bizzarre contortions to exempt central bank holdings, and mass confusion around CDS triggers. But even as it denied the possibility of nonpayment--thereby denying Greeks the smidgeon of agency debtors enjoy at the precipice--Europe failed to proffer an alternative "or else." As a result, creditors might be forgiven for wondering whether the alternative to haircuts just might be payment in full. Next to payment in full, the offer of English law in restructured bonds looks like a pathetic consolation prize (they will not survive the next restructuring anyway).

And so a bunch are threatening to hold out on the eve of Thursday's exchange deadline. This is not the long-lost evidence of creditor coordination problems to support calls for sovereign bankruptcy--presumably, countries that do not default do not file either--but rather proof that if you keep swearing you will pay, people will take you up on it.

Now at last, with 48 hours to go, Greece has (sort of) promised to default if the offer fails. With so much on the line, it feels like we are cutting it awfully close.

Feb
21

The Disorderly Default in Your Closet Eupdate

Another day, another Greek deal to end them all (more on that soon). Amid the political din, legal and financial complexity, one thing has struck me: the entire enterprise is being justified as a way to avoid "disorderly default." But what exactly is disorderly default--that scary monster in the closet keeping many Eurocrats, foreign bondholders, and Greeks awake at night--and is it really the sole unthinkable alternative to the mess of the past year and, perhaps, some years to come?

Disorderly default, one that comes as a surprise to the markets, leading to contagion, capital flight, bank runs, a crashing collapse of the Euro, and widespread litigation, is surely unappetizing. But the alternative to disorderly default might also be a priced-in default with minimal contagion, a contentious restructuring with lots of litigation, or a slow-bleed near-default, complete with capital flight and bank runs, which destroys trust and political capital, depletes and redistributes resources that might have gone to finance recovery (see Roubini & Setser) ... and ends in default.

Mind you, I am not advocating disorderly default, but rather suggesting that it is of a piece with order, chaos, and other pure, but under-specified alternatives to messy reality. Disorderly default is evil in the same way that pristinely orderly bankruptcy is good. By taking default (orderly or otherwise) off the table early in the crisis, while refusing to finance a credible alternative, the European political leaders may have chosen the worst of all options.

As grandpa used to say, it is much better to be rich and healthy than to be poor and sick.

Feb
17

Conferring

Today I'm off to the Wharton Restructuring and Turnaround Conference, which looks to be a great, high level discussion of all things chapter 11ish. But it is surely a sign of the times that the keynote speaker is a banking lawyer.

Jan
13

Your Favorite Business Bankruptcy/Restructuring Lingo: A Word of Thanks

Just a word of gratitude to readers for providing great responses to the prior call for corporate bankruptcy lingo. Thanks to your help, UNC Law's advanced business bankruptcy students are collaboratively examining such terms through a wiki and this will help them make an even smoother transition into the professional world. If any new lingo comes to mind, don't hesitate to pass it along! 

Dec
28

Your Favorite Business Bankruptcy/Restructuring Lingo?

One more quick poll: off the top of your head, what lingo/cryptic terms do business bankruptcy professionals use regularly that are important to understanding the operation of the system in the real world (e.g., DIPs, cramdown, roll-ups, carve-out, stalking horse)? We talk about lingo in the basic bankruptcy class, but I want students to engage more with the concepts in the advanced class. Please list the first ones that come to your mind in the comments; you are also welcome to use bankruptcyprof@gmail.com.

Thanks, in advance, for your helpful feedback! 

Dec
08

This-Is-It EU Summit Eupdate

A few quick thoughts as the Make-or-Break, Life-or-Death, Now-or-Never EU Summit gets going.

Previews from Merkozy earlier this week got no love, and now that Mr. Draghi has shelved the Big Bazooka idea (HT Hank Paulson), I am not entirely sure what can possibly surprise on the upside. Then again, maybe the dithering is good news--if EU policy makers had really thought this was the abyss, surely they would have done something.

I would not claim summit reading as a specialty. Besides, I am exhausted from trying to unpack decisions that have had the average lifespan of a mayfly. That is why, instead of laboring through substance, this time I will be looking for glaring signs of fecklessness. So far this week I have seen two: Private Sector Involvement and Rule Obsession.

Private Sector Involvement (or PSI) hase been code for forced sovereign bond restructuring since the mid-1990s. In this crisis, Germany has insisted that private bondholders take losses in exchange for official support of their sovereign debtors. Ergo, European announcements for over a year have insisted that any sovereign support package shall be accompanied by PSI. But PSI is anathema to the European Central Bank, which for good and bad reasons has clung to the proposition that real countries pay their debts, which has led us to the ludicrous situation where Greek bondholders are asked to take 50% haircuts voluntarily. It is the sort of "voluntarily" that got Johnny Fontane a Hollywood movie part.

But guess what! This week's front page news is that PSI is off the table in future crises. Can bondholders sleep without fear of waking up next to a severed horse's head? Surely no one in their right mind would think so. Swearing or forswearing PSI, especially in the medium term, is feckless. If the official sector is short on money or political will, PSI will happen. If it long on both, there will be PSI-free bailouts. At best, one can believe officials demanding or forswearing PSI here and now (Greece). Empty talk of distant PSI (and of nonexistent "IMF procedures") just tells me that all is well in the petty squabbles department.

Rule Obsession is even more depressing. We are in the middle of a crisis whose central message has been that saying so in a treaty does not make it so on the ground (see Maastricht targets and no-bailout clauses). But listening to EU policy makers, you would think that Europe's biggest problem is squishy treaties and soft sanctions. Brittle rules of the sort exposed in this crisis are doubly harmful because they invite evasion, are quickly and publicly broken, and destroy faith in rules in general. It is worse with rules for sovereigns. Odysseus tied himself to the mast and lived to tell the tale. When sovereign try to do it, they break the mast, sink the ship, and cause a tsunami.

A policy of ramping up sanctions telegraphs worry about the underlying rules: seems like no one would follow them of their own accord. When that "no one" is sovereign, you might as well give up.

Oddly enough, throughout the crisis, Europe has had a commitment device that is better than all the treaties and constitutions combined: the Euro. Monetary union, and the financial and economic integration that followed, have already made break-up unthinkable, or at least catastrophic. It is not the sanction, but the underlying rules that are not credible. The task in Europe is to craft a viable economic compact against the background of commitment. But for some reason, the policy makers seem to prefer prefessing commitment while refusing to fess up to its implications.

If Europe unravels, it will not be because the treaties and constitutions were too weak--I can think of no legal sanction that can trump existing institutional integration. But talk of legal formalities displaces and obscures the cost of different policy options--including exit--to the public, who should be the ones making the decision.

Dec
13

Real estate firm Fairfield files for bankruptcy

Privately-held real estate company Fairfield Residential LLC filed for bankruptcy protection on Sunday, saying that the collapse of the U.S. real estate and capital markets has made it difficult to continue without restructuring.







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