Apr
17

RadLAX

Former guest slipster Ronald Mann has a nice post up at SCOTUSblog about RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, the Supreme Court case about credit bidding set for argument on the 23rd. While I've discussed the case here and over at Dealbook, Ronald covers the unique aspects of bankruptcy arguments before the Supreme Court, and explains why an issue that is so clearly important for "us" can be a bit of a muddle for the Supremes.

Be sure to take a look.

Apr
12

Subsidizing Shareholders (and the Sub Debt Too)

So there is a bit a kerfuffle going on between Luigi Zingales and Brad DeLong. By and large DeLong has the better of the argument, but there is one small piece where he could benefit from the services of an insolvency lawyer.

Oh wait, that's me.

So Zingales says:

    The “put options” offered to Bear Stearns Cos… were subsidies…

He's talking about the consideration given to Bear Stearns shareholders (originally $2, then $10) as part of Chase's takeover of the company.

And DeLong responds:

But Bear Stearns was not offered a put option. Bear Stearns was forced into liquidation over a weekend at a price of $2/share (then raised to $10/share). The market the previous Friday had guessed that it would be taken over at a price of $60/share. You can't call a Federal Reserve intervention that leaves a bank's shareholders $50/share poorer than they had thought they were the previous Friday a "subsidy'.    

I suspect DeLong is smart enough to know that's wrong. Until shareholder losses hit 100%, it is really irrelevant that they've suffered large losses already. And indeed if Bear Sterns was insolvent, and I think there is good reasons to think they were, shareholders are not even the right claimants to look at -- the real question is how much the subordinated debtholders should loose.

Apr
12

Recommended reading: Broome on Article 9 Financing Statements

A few weeks ago I wrote about the importance of giving priority to an Article 9 financing statement only from the date on which the debtor  actually authorizes the filing, and a proposed official comment contrary to this position. My colleague Lissa Broome has just posted on SSRN an article she has written about another dimension of the issue: when secured parties file financing statements with an indication of collateral that is far broader than what the debtor authorized in the security agreement. She discusses recent cases that do not deter this activity as well as potential implications, including the chilling effect on future lending transactions.

When the debtor's signature was eliminated as a requirement for a valid financing statement in Revised Article 9, the drafters justified the change by technology: medium neutrality and facilitating paperless filing. Functionally, though, the implications go far beyond technology when you combine this change with the opportunity to file all-asset financing statements AND the broadest possible reading of the first to file or perfect rule discussed a few weeks ago.

Apr
11

Lenders Returning to the Lucrative Subprime Market

Lenders Again Dealing Credit to Risky Clients Annette Alejandro just emerged from bankruptcy and doesn’t have a job, and her car was repossessed last year. Still, after spending her days job hunting, she returns to her apartment in Brooklyn where, in disbelief, she sorts through the piles of credit card and auto loan offers that … Read more Related posts:
  1. Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market
  2. William Black | Lenders Put the Lies in Liar’s Loans and Bear the Principal Moral Culpability
  3. Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit
Apr
09

Where People File Chapter 13

State Chapter 13 RatesBetween states, there is a big disparity in the rate at which people file bankruptcy. Over the past four years, Nevada has had the highest bankruptcy filing with an a yearly average of 9.32 persons per 1,000 population file bankruptcy. At the other extreme has been Alaska with just 1.39 persons per 1,000 filing bankruptcy. As points of comparison, consider that the national filing rate over 2008 - 2011 was 3.54 per 1,000 population and that the national filing rate over the last twelve months has been 4.26 per 1,000 population.

I wondered how the filing rates would break down if we looked at just chapter 7 and chapter 13 separately. The result is the chart to the right.

For the top 10 states in each category, the chart shows annual filings per 1,000 population. To minimize the effect of temporary local conditions, the results are taken from the years 2008 - 2011 and then calculated as an average annual filing rate.

There are clearly some states that just have experienced high bankruptcy filing rates overall such as Nevada, Indiana, and Illinois. These states appear in the top 10 for both chapter 7 and chapter 13. Other states are chapter 7 states--some of which have not been historically considered to be states with high bankruptcy rates. When chapter 7 alone is considered, some states stand out. Michigan, for example, has the second highest chapter 7 rate but only ranks 21st in chapter 13 rates. Colorado has the fourth-highest chapter 7 but only the 29th-highest chapter 13 rate. Arizona ranks 6th for in chapter 7 rates but only 30th for chapter 13 rates.

At the other end of the spectrum are states where people file chapter 13 at much higher rates. Louisiana presents the most extreme case, ranking 4th in chapter 13 rates but only 46th in chapter 7 rates. It will surprise bankruptcy specialists not at all to learn that other states that tip strongly toward chapter 13 are primarily in the South. Alabama has the second-highest chapter 13 rate but only the 29th-highest chapter 7 rate. Mississippi ranks seventh for chapter 7 rates and 34th for chapter 13. Even in places that do not have particularly high overall bankruptcy rates, there can be a chapter 13 culture. For example, South Carolina ranks 24th in chapter 13 rate but dead last in chapter 7 rate. Texas has the 22nd highest chapter 13 rate but is 50th for chapter 13s.

A different comparison would be to look at the states where the chapter 13 rate per 1,000 population is higher than the chapter 7 rate. Only five states fit that description: Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Texas.

Why particular states or regions tip more toward chapter 7 or chapter 13 would require more space and time than I have for this blog post. In any event, I am not sure that I know the complete answer. What I have been thinking a lot about is that we need to unpack the idea that there is one bankruptcy system in the United States. Given the numerical variation it cannot possibly be the case that differences in individual circumstances explain the differences in chapter 13 rates. Are people's life circumstances that different between Tennessee and Iowa such that Tennesseans should be sixteen times more likely to file chapter 13? People are experiencing U.S. bankruptcy system in very different ways depending on where they are located.

Apr
09

Cramming Funny Fees Onto our Phone Bills: Not so Funny

Two weeks in a row, the Haggler column in the New York Times focused on cramming, one of the most damning and profitable scams in the consumer world.  Cramming is tacking unrequested services onto land line bills and now cell phone bills, such as celebrity gossip news, daily horoscopes, even dating services. Our AGs office claims that cramming is one of the practices about which they get the most complaints. After reading last week’s Haggler column, I vowed to look over my consolidated bill with Century Link and Verizon (cell phones, landline, internet service) but never quite got around to it. It seemed to me the bill had stayed pretty much the same over the months and years. Sure enough, today I found a cram and am trying to straighten it out.  This can be a full-time job, which is why it is so easy to scam us in this way. Haggler also notes that while cramming is done by third parties, not phone companies, phone companies supposedly get one –third to one –half of the billions in revenues generated by this fraudulent practice, which is why some may be slow to correct the problem. If Haggler is right about the profits, shouldn't I be able to reverse this with my phone company?

This week’s Haggler column has an idea for the rest of you, that I’ll fadd to. Our phone providers have the capacity to block these short message services (SMSs) until we specifically sign up for them. Yes, Haggler, you are right. This should be automatic, and hopefully it will be very shortly, but in the meantime consumers can call right now and ask their carriers to block ALL third party changes on their phone bills. We can also take an additional step, that could protect us if they ignore us, and may even do something for the good of the overall cause. I suggest sending taking two minutes to send out something like this:

Dear  Phone Company:

Recent news suggests that third parties are now automatically signing consumers up for various short message services (SMSs). I (my family) have/has been a good customer of yours for __ years and request that you never allow any changes to our bill from third parties of any kind.  If we find these charges on our bill in the future, we will change phone carriers. 

We also request that you immediately begin disallowing these charges for all customers who have not specifically requested them, as we prefer to use a carrier that is protective of the rights of all its customers.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.

_________________

Who knows if it’ll work but at least you’ll have said your piece.

 

Apr
09

Thank You to Bill Maurer and Stephen Rea

Last week, Credit Slips was fortunate to have the thoughtful insights of Bill Maurer and Stevie Rea on payments systems. Their posts reflect years of research in the United States and overseas on the social meaning of money, the potential and perils of mobile money, and the future of cash. We thank them for sharing their ideas with us.

As anthropologists working in a field shaped by legal rules--and lack thereof, Bill and Stevie offered insights on the ways in which cultural beliefs, social networks, and other non-legal forces are likely to shape the regulation of payments system in the future. If you missed their posts, I highly recommend you treat yourself to them. In their final post, they offer a challenge to Credit Slips readers that I hope we'll take up:

Bill and Stevie write in their post, Platform, Infrastructure, Utility?

Our take-home message is threefold: (1) The genie is already out of the bottle, and it’s not going back. We’ve got a telecommunications network that is already—with prepaid airtime—functioning as a payments network. (2) The potential here is for mobile money to be “more” than a card on the phone. The potential is for mobile money to be a financial service suite on the phone. And to serve financial inclusion goals. (3) But let’s remember Mas and Porteous’s point: the payments grid has to function—and be regulated—more like a utility. So that’s the challenge for the Credit Slips community: regulators, policy makers, academics and lawyers with decades’ expertise dealing with other payment networks: how do we do this? What are the lessons learned from other payment networks, other infrastructures: social, technological, legal and everything in-between? That's an open question and we look forward to continuing this conversation!

 

Apr
09

Thank You to Bill Maurer and Stephen Rea

Last week, Credit Slips was fortunate to have the thoughtful insights of Bill Maurer and Stevie Rea on payments systems. Their posts reflect years of research in the United States and overseas on the social meaning of money, the potential and perils of mobile money, and the future of cash. We thank them for sharing their ideas with us.

As anthropologists working in a field shaped by legal rules--and lack thereof, Bill and Stevie offered insights on the ways in which cultural beliefs, social networks, and other non-legal forces are likely to shape the regulation of payments system in the future. If you missed their posts, I highly recommend you treat yourself to them. In their final post, they offer a challenge to Credit Slips readers that I hope we'll take up:

Bill and Stevie write in their post, Platform, Infrastructure, Utility?

Our take-home message is threefold: (1) The genie is already out of the bottle, and it’s not going back. We’ve got a telecommunications network that is already—with prepaid airtime—functioning as a payments network. (2) The potential here is for mobile money to be “more” than a card on the phone. The potential is for mobile money to be a financial service suite on the phone. And to serve financial inclusion goals. (3) But let’s remember Mas and Porteous’s point: the payments grid has to function—and be regulated—more like a utility. So that’s the challenge for the Credit Slips community: regulators, policy makers, academics and lawyers with decades’ expertise dealing with other payment networks: how do we do this? What are the lessons learned from other payment networks, other infrastructures: social, technological, legal and everything in-between? That's an open question and we look forward to continuing this conversation!

 

Apr
07

Platform, Infrastructure, Utility?

While we’ve been blogging, Stevie has begun his dissertation fieldwork in Korea. He emailed Bill the other day: “Yesterday I opened a bank account here in Seoul, and conducted the entire interaction in Korean. For some reason, I don't get an ATM card, which is really strange. But in all likelihood I had no idea what the teller was trying to say to me, so I might end up getting a card in the mail next week or something. As ‘technophiliac’ as this culture seems to be, cash is still king; outside of the large department stores and global restaurant chains, I don't see any POS terminals.”

There’s hype, there’s reality, and there’s possibility around all the cashlessness claims that follow on the heels of mobile and other digital payment platforms. We want to conclude our guest blogging with a gesture toward some of the possibilities of mobile money--and a challenge for the Credit Slips community.

The other day, Bill received an email from a colleague at a large philanthropic organization:

"I heard you speak a while back at the foundation and was excited to see your blog reference to BTC."

At first Bill was confused—Bitcoin? He’d never written a blog about Bitcoin. Maybe she'd read his piece here.  But then he realized: BTC = Better Than Cash (see our first post). This is a useful little object lesson. When some people hear "digital currency" and "toward a cashless society" they immediately think, oh no, here come the money nutters wanting to end the Federal Reserve and put us on a gold standard. Or they think, hooray! Let’s end fractional reserve currency once and for all! But that's the BTC/Bitcoin side of the conversation. The BTC/Better Than Cash side is different, and it's important to stress those differences.

In a recent blog post at CGAP, Ignacio Mas and David Porteous make a case not for freedom from cash, but alternatives alongside cash--for everyone. They envision a world of “LiFi” – liquidity with fidelity – in which “every person has an electronic store of value which they can easily use to make and receive payments in real time” (our emphasis). They compare this to the electricity grid. And, yes, they argue “the payments grid in developing countries has to function more like a utility.” They argue that oversight of such a grid should fall to payment regulators. Mas and Porteous’s proposal is roughly in alignment with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Financial Services for the Poor unit’s new strategic focus, which includes “concentrating on connecting poor people to digital payment platforms and enabling them to access savings, credit, and insurance services over those platforms.”

What might mobile money as a payments platform that explicitly works as an enabling and inclusive technology that works with cash actually look like? It all hinges on two key elements that help mobile money interface with cash, and help mobile money services interface with other services and applications: 1) the agent network, which we've called a social infrastructure in our earlier posts, and 2) application programming interfaces (APIs): "You often have to rely on others to perform functions that you may not be able or permitted to do by yourself, such as opening a bank safety deposit box. Similarly, virtually all software has to request other software to do some things for it. To accomplish this, the asking program uses a set of standardized requests, called application programming interfaces (API), that have been defined for the program being called upon. Almost every application depends on the APIs of the underlying operating system to perform such basic functions as accessing the file system. In essence, a program's API defines the proper way for a developer to request services from that program" (from Computer World). So whereas agents facilitate the interoperability of cash and mobile money by acting as "cash merchants," APIs facilitate the interoperability of a mobile money service with other mobile money services or with applications that are built upon the mobile money platform like savings and insurance practices built on M-PESA (see Kendall et al. or this earlier version). Both agents and APIs extend the potential of mobile money, the former by connecting mobile money up with local social networks and the latter by encouraging the uptake of the mobile money platform by programmers and developers interested in designing new applications for that platform. A role for regulation here? or a sort of Underwriters Laboratories??

Our take-home message is threefold: (1) The genie is already out of the bottle, and it’s not going back. We’ve got a telecommunications network that is already—with prepaid airtime—functioning as a payments network. (2) The potential here is for mobile money to be “more” than a card on the phone. The potential is for mobile money to be a financial service suite on the phone. And to serve financial inclusion goals. (3) But let’s remember Mas and Porteous’s point: the payments grid has to function—and be regulated—more like a utility. So that’s the challenge for the Credit Slips community: regulators, policy makers, academics and lawyers with decades’ expertise dealing with other payment networks: how do we do this? What are the lessons learned from other payment networks, other infrastructures: social, technological, legal and everything in-between? That's an open question and we look forward to continuing this conversation!

Apr
06

Revival on the Head of a Pin: Do U Pari Passu?

Argentina and its most intransigent creditors are duking it out again (or still) in the Second Circuit, reviving the crazy battle over the meaning and import of the pari passu (equal treatment) clause in sovereign debt contracts. For the small but committed contingent of pari passu pointy heads, this is WorldCupOlympicMarchMadnessSuperBowl. For everyone else, this bears watching because an obscure turn in the Argentina story could open the door to enforcement against sovereign debtors in general. (Nope, this is not a closet Eupdate. Pay no attention to the man behind the blue-striped curtain.)

Recap: Argentina defaulted on roughly $100 billion in debt in 2001, then restructured about three-quarters of it in 2005 with a 60%++ haircut, depending on how you count. In 2010, it mopped up most of the rest. However, a small subset of expert holdouts keeps on suing, lobbying, and trying to collect by any means necessary. Last December, the long-suffering SDNY Judge Griesa ruled that the Republic breached the pari passu covenant in its debt contracts by (a) paying the holders of its restructured bonds but not the holdouts, and (b) passing a "Lock Law" that bars the government from paying the holdouts. On February 23, the judge issued an injunction, telling Argentina to pay the holdouts pro rata whenever it pays the holders of its restructured bonds. Argentina has appealed, pointing out among other things that paying people who took a massive haircut on par with those who took none was not exactly equal or equitable. This week, the U.S. Government filed a Statement of Interest, joining the New York Fed and the New York Clearing House at a friend-filled party.

For those who care about neither Argentina nor pari passu, this matters because a broad reading of the February 23 SDNY order would subject countries who pay some creditors, but not others, to injunctions of the sort just slapped on Argentina. Creditors who get paid while the holdouts are not, or even intermediaries routing payments for the debtor, might be exposed as well. Pari passu clauses are ubiquitous in New York and English law sovereign bonds. Since successful sovereign debt exchanges so far have all relied on a credible threat of stiffing non-participants, upholding the order could spell the end of the prevailing restructuring regime.

A narrow reading of the order would tie the injunctive remedy much more closely to Argentina's "Lock Law." The law can be read as a formal subordination of the holdouts (as distinct from selective payment)—a breach of the pari passu covenant under a reasonably conservative reading of the clause. Because this law is unusual, this would at least limit the effect of the order on the foreign sovereign debt market. But even a narrow reading would not solve the problem raised most forcefully in the U.S. Government brief—that the injunction would give creditors a worldwide remedy beyond the scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Now some might say that upholding the SDNY order, even broadly, would not be a bad thing: it would jolt a screwed-up legal regime, and might prompt sensible reform. The alternative appears to be effective impunity for sovereigns that, like Argentina, can afford to pay the nuisance tax of never-ending enforcement litigation, and bear what reputational cost it does in the markets. The argument obviously loses force with poor countries that cannot afford to stay out of the markets and live in court for a decade, and must choose between clean water and holdout creditors. Others might say that Argentina's continuing travails and the revival of pari passu as an enforcement device illustrate the cost to the international system of having no sovereign bankruptcy regime.

Few would rally behind the status quo as first best, not by a long shot. Even if the SDNY order is overturned as totally wrong (as I think it is), there is something quite dysfunctional about a market where the contracts do not map onto the background legal regime. Normal-looking clauses turn into arrant nonsense when you stick them in sovereign IOUs. This is because private debt contracts are presumptively enforceable (even if not always enforced), and can be restructured in bankruptcy. Substituting immunity for bankruptcy in the sovereign context destabilizes, and occasionally eviscerates, the meaning of the contract text.

Pari passu is the poster child for this proposition: because sovereigns cannot file for bankruptcy, there is never a moment of agreed insolvency or a waterfall of asset distribution. Instead, creditors owed on Monday might get paid, but those owed on Thursday might not. Is that subordination, or luck of the draw? The one agreed way to breach the covenant is to shout out "I subordinate"—but who does that?? (OK, maybe Argentina ... I don't think the Greek "Retro-CAC" Law is comparable.)

The biggest mystery, given such apparent dysfunction, is why the brilliant lawyers who draft sovereign debt contracts don't just fix pari passu once and for all, so that it would make sense. Smart people have offered thoughtful explanations. I suspect the answer has something to do with the dissonance of writing a totally, utterly, certainly unenforceable debt contract. That’s just not what lawyers do—or is it?

Finally, there is a weird political/PR dynamic at play here. Argentina and Greece, represented by the same law firm and threatened by the same holdout creditors, have apparently conflicting PR strategies. For Argentina, the key is to hitch its case to the European caravan, so everyone thinks that a ruling against Argentina would bring on global financial apocalypse. Hence the reference to Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland as potential victims in the Argentina brief. In contrast, the last thing Greece wants is to have the spectre of Argentina hover over its still-pending debt exchange. The holdouts want some combination of both -- they want Greece to feel threatened by the potential outcome in Argentina, but not so threatened that the U.S. and the EU establishment get scared too, and join the battle full force on Argentina's side.

All this for pari passu? Stay tuned for geek party of the century.

Revised to reflect the fact that the New York Fed did not file on appeal this time. It did file in a very similar case involving the same parties in 2004. Argentina refers to this earlier position in its 2012 brief.

Apr
06

Pari Passu Party (on behalf of Anna Gelpern)

This is Adam Levitin posting for Anna Gelpern.  Only the awful illiterative post title is mine.  Here's Anna:

Argentina and its most intransigent creditors are duking it out again (or still) in the Second Circuit, reviving the crazy battle over the meaning and import of the pari passu (equal treatment) clause in sovereign debt contracts. For the small but committed contingent of pari passu pointy heads, this is WorldCupOlympicMarchMadnessSuperBowl. For everyone else, this bears watching because an obscure turn in the Argentina story could open the door to enforcement against sovereign debtors in general. (Nope, this is not a closet Eupdate. Pay no attention to the man behind the blue-striped curtain.)

Recap: Argentina defaulted on roughly $100 billion in debt in 2001, then restructured about three-quarters of it in 2005 with a 60%++ haircut, depending on how you count. In 2010, it mopped up most of the rest. However, a small subset of expert holdouts keeps on suing, lobbying, and trying to collect by any means necessary. Last December, the long-suffering SDNY Judge Griesa ruled  that the Republic breached the pari passu covenant in its debt contracts by (a) paying the holders of its restructured bonds but not the holdouts, and (b) passing a "Lock Law" that bars the government from paying the holdouts. On February 23, the judge issued an injunction, telling Argentina to pay the holdouts pro rata whenever it pays the holders of its restructured bonds. Argentina has appealed, pointing out among other things that paying people who took a massive haircut on par with those who took none was an odd reading of equal treatment. This week, the U.S. Government filed a Statement of Interest, joining the New York Fed and the New York Clearing House at a friend-filled party.

For those who care about neither Argentina nor pari passu, this matters because a broad reading of the February 23 SDNY order would subject countries who pay some creditors, but not others, to injunctions of the sort just slapped on Argentina. Creditors who get paid while the holdouts are not, or even intermediaries routing payments for Argentina, might be exposed as well. Since successful sovereign debt exchanges so far have all relied on a credible threat of stiffing non-participants, upholding the order could spell the end of the prevailing restructuring regime.

A narrow reading of the order would tie the injunctive remedy much more closely to Argentina's "Lock Law." The law can be read as a formal subordination of the holdouts (as distinct from selective payment)—a breach of the pari passu covenant under a reasonably conservative reading of the clause. Because this law is unusual, this would at least limit the effect of the order on the foreign sovereign debt market. But even a narrow reading would not solve the problem raised most forcefully in the U.S. Government brief—that the injunction would give creditors a worldwide remedy beyond the scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Now some might say that upholding the SDNY order, even broadly, would not be a bad thing: it would jolt a screwed-up legal regime, and might prompt sensible reform. The alternative appears to be effective impunity for sovereigns that, like Argentina, can afford to pay the nuisance tax of never-ending enforcement litigation, and bear what reputational cost it does in the markets. The argument obviously loses force with poor countries that cannot afford to stay out of the markets and live in court for a decade, and must choose between clean water and holdout creditors. Yet others might say that the persistence of Argentina and the revival of pari passu as an enforcement device show again the cost to the international system of having no sovereign bankruptcy regime.

I would not go so far. But even if the SDNY order were totally wrong (and I think it is), there is something quite dysfunctional about a market where the contracts do not map onto the background legal regime. Normal-looking clauses turn into arrant nonsense when you stick them in sovereign IOUs. This is because private debt contracts are presumptively enforceable (even if not always enforced), and can be restructured in bankruptcy. Substituting immunity for bankruptcy in the sovereign context destabilizes, and occasionally eviscerates, the meaning of the contract text.

Pari passu is the reigning poster child for this proposition: because sovereigns cannot file for bankruptcy, there is never a moment of agreed insolvency or a waterfall of asset distribution. Instead, creditors owed on Monday might get paid, but those owed on Thursday might not. Is that subordination, or luck of the draw? The one agreed way to breach the covenant is to shout out "I subordinate"—but who does that?? (OK, maybe Argentina ... I don't think the Greek "Retro-CAC" Law is comparable.)

The bigger mystery, given such apparent dysfunction, is why the brilliant lawyers who draft these contracts don't just fix the provision once and for all, so that it would make sense. Smart people have offered thoughtful explanations. I suspect the answer has something to do with the weirdness of writing a totally, utterly, certainly unenforceable debt contract. That’s just not what upstanding lawyers do—or is it?

Finally, there is a weird political/PR dynamic at play here. Argentina and Greece, represented by the same law firm and threatened by the same holdout creditors, have polar opposite PR strategies. For Argentina, they key is to hitch its case to the European caravan, to demonstrate that ruling against Argentina would bring on global financial apocalypse. Hence the reference to Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland as potential victims in the Argentina brief. In contrast, the last thing Greece wants is to have the spectre of Argentina hover over its still-pending debt exchange. The holdouts want some combination of both -- they want Greece to feel threatened by the potential outcome in Argentina, but not so threatened that the US and EU establishment get scared too and join the battle full force on Argentina's side.

All this for pari passu? Stay tuned for geek party of the century.

 

Apr
05

Does this Look like a Valid Credit Card?

DSCN0962I thought so.  This is actually the key to my room from a recent business trip. I guess the symbolism is that the credit card concept is also the key to life, right? It is also another example of how credit card companies have infiltrated college campuses.

Apr
05

Does this Look like a Valid Credit Card?

I thought so.  This is actually the key to my room from a recent business trip. I guess the symbolism is that this is also the key to life, right? It is also another example of how credit card comanies have inflitrated college campuses. DSCN0962

Apr
05

Cash as Social Infrastructure

Sticker in San Francisco: "Of course it's cash-only, it's the Mission."

Overheard: "Oooh, yeah, no, we don't take cards. Because the coffee is, like, local?" (both items courtesy Lana Swartz)

The word “cash” derives from Latinate words referring to “a chest or box for storing money,” not the money itself. The term originally meant the practices of storing, and the objects used to store items of value – not just money -- as well as the act of going to those storage devices to receive money (to “cash” a bill of exchange,, meant to go to the specific box where the money was). Cash as we know it today is more than a store of value and a medium of exchange; it has symbolic, pragmatic and artistic functions. In the US, even before Durbin, small merchants placed an extra surcharge on credit or offered discounts if customers used cash. Research being conducted at the Institute for Money, Technology and Financial Inclusion (IMTFI) is bringing to light a host of social, ritual and religious uses of cash and coin beyond their economic functions. What's their relationship to, say, mobile money? For us, they are design challenges more than anything else (see, e.g., the Royal Canadian Mint's MintChip, or discussions among developers about Google Wallet). Building an infrastructure for digital payments, especially in places that have been cash-only, entails some connection to the existing social infrastructures of cash.

As Janet Arnado, one IMTFI researcher, notes: "Informal wealth storing strategies exclusive of formal or informal financial institutions may always be practiced by the rural poor in the developing world, side by side with people’s utilization of financial institutions, because these practices have social dimensions as much as it has economic significance." At a Buddhist temple in Seattle, devotees build money trees to raise funds; in Ghana, brides are showered with money on their wedding day (they used to use Ghanaian currency but when it was redenominated, they could no longer afford bills. Rather than pelt the bride with coins, they switched to Nigerian naira).

Mobile money has not obviated or eliminated the use of cash in any of the places that it has been implemented. Instead, people have incorporated mobile money into their monetary pragmatics alongside the use of cash. They use mobile money as a means for short-term value storage and P2P value transfer, mostly of small sums, i.e. as a “bridge” to cash, as Ignacio Mas et al. have put it. Curiously, mobiles and money both represent modernity and tradition. For people accustomed to transacting in shells, pigs and state issued currency, the latter is "modern." But when people incorporate cash into ritual practices, it becomes a symbol of "tradition." The mobile phone is a high-tech marker of having a modern identity; but it's also a link to others, to distant kin, and its workings partake of a magical aura sometimes symbolically associated with the gods and other spirits. Put mobile and money together and you get some interesting results: whereas mobile money makes gifting sums of money more easy, say, to pay for the costs of a religious holiday celebration, it also makes it harder to make those gifts secretly and anonymously according to tradition. Mobile makes traditional practices such as pooling cash and the social interaction surrounding those activities different as well.

We think Mas and company are on to something when they describe mobile money services as offering a “bridge to cash.” A bridge is an infrastructure that permits a passage without regard to the freight carried over it. It is an intermediary that permits any kind of person or thing over it and to the other side. In most mobile money systems, human agents, sometimes dubbed “cash merchants,” facilitate the exchange between cash and e-money stored in mobile money systems and themselves become “bridges” to and from cash and e-money. The benefits of e-money for branchless banking are indisputable: financial inclusion on the scale of M-PESA would not be possible without mobile. Yet at the end of the day, for the people that use mobile money it all comes back to cash: sending it, obtaining it, saving it. As Sarah Rotman has noted , from a financial inclusion perspective all of the excitement about going cashless for cashlessness' own sake doesn't really help financially excluded people who need to be able to access cash for their everyday purchases.This gets us back to the heart of USAID's Better Than Cash challenge and its chief differences from Bitcoin or other such endeavors--the financial inclusion imperative. It's important to treat this with the same seriousness as we give privacy or criminality. Doing so also adds another element of consumer protection into the mix, especially for very poor, illiterate or otherwised disadvantaged people.

With mobile money, there's a potential to harness the cash side of the equation to aid in consumer protection and financial literacy (we're being a little pie-in-the-sky here, but bear with us!). Consider how the agent network for mobile money has turned kiosk vendors into “cash merchants.” This turns cash into a kind of commodity it might not have been before (I am "buying cash" the same way and at the same place I buy rice, but with e-money in my mobile wallet instead of paper currency). But it also situates agents as one of the key components of a new financial infrastructure: a social infrastructure. We believe that cash, too, is a social infrastructure, evidenced in its use in solidifying social, religious, and other relationships.

Now, the bridge metaphor also suggests a new means of tolling, a potential privatization of currency—something lurking not too far underneath the surface for some anti-cash proponents—an enclosure of the commons and culture of payments. The task is to hold that part of the metaphor at bay, while taking a more careful look at what digital platforms for payments--with the lessons learned from our decades of experience with card networks--may actually afford. We'll take that up in our final post.

Apr
05

Downward Bankruptcy Filing Trend Continues

2012 Projected Filings from MarchBankruptcy filings for March continued to show a year-over-year decline. According to the latest release from Epiq Systems, there were an average of 5,550 daily bankruptcy filings in March, which represented a 12.8% decline from the same time last year. This decline keeps with the same trend we have been seeing for the past eleven months.

Extrapolating from the first quarter of 2012 and based on the experience of the immediate past three years, a projection for total bankruptcy filings this calendar year would be in the 1.21 - 1.25 million range. My projection of a 9 - 12% decline in bankruptcy filings for 2012 is somewhat higher than the projection from Fitch for a 4 - 5% decline. Although the Fitch projection is not outside the realm of possibility, it would require a historically unusual pattern where bankruptcy filings stay closer to their peak in the annual cycle that sees February and March as the months with the highest U.S. daily bankruptcy filing rate.

Apr
05

Why Us?

What does it mean that the two most common forms of comment spam on this blog are people trying to sell sunglasses or handbags?

Apr
05

Why Us?

What does it mean that the two most common forms of comment spam on this blog are people trying to sell sunglasses or handbags?

Apr
04

Cash: Killing It, or Building Bridges to It?

Much has been written about the inherent riskiness of cash. It is dangerous because it can be lost, stolen, eaten, destroyed, etc. It is dangerous because it is difficult to track, thereby helping to facilitate crime. Many a potboiler plot hinges on a cache of unmarked bills. Anyone remember Trixie Belden? “‘That governess of yours won’t argue when I tell her to leave a fat roll of unmarked bills under a stone at the Autoville entrance tonight. She won’t notify the police either.’ He reached up a grimy hand and touched one of Honey’s shoulder-length curls. ‘Not when I send her a lock of your pretty hair with the note, eh?’” (Julie Campbell, Trixie Belden and the Red Trailer Mystery, New York: Random House Children’s Books, 1950, p.180).

In the comments on our last post, we can clearly see two poles of the cash debate: cash is for criminals, but digital payment will welcome Big Brother into our wallets. Why so stark a choice? Last year, the Fletcher School held a conference titled, “Killing Cash.” It was framed explicitly in terms of the possibility that “mobile money”—mobile phone enabled payment and money transfer services, like Safaricom Kenya’s much vaunted M-PESA—heralds the possible end of cash and coin. Most of these services work on a prepaid model via the mobile telecommunications network – basically like prepaid airtime minutes for a top-up (not subscription) phone (nice article here on e-money in Central Africa by Andrew Zerzan; short piece here on mobile money regulation). I put cash into the system by visiting an agent. The agent sells me “e-money” in exchange for my cash, and gets a commission. I can now send e-money to another client on the network, who goes to another agent to cash it out (usually without a commission). Or, I leave the value in my mobile wallet, for a little while or for a long time. This is not an “end of cash” scenario, however. It’s an addition of e-money to what had been—for the poor, without access to financial services and digital financial platforms—a cash-only world.

Some of the debate at Fletcher: 1) The advantages of e-money over cash: “Cash is addictive and easy to spend; e-money controls temptation. Cash bill payments and transfers over long distances are time-consuming and costly. Electronic budgeting is extremely useful. Cash offers no payment tracking. Cash is easily lost and stolen... There is no privacy with cash—children, neighbors, and relatives can see it. Cash limits choice in financial management.” “Cash is NOT free—it is an expensive instrument for which the social cost is often in excess of the cost of electronic payments. Even worse, cash is opaque—its costs are concealed.” 2) In defense of cash: “Studies show that people actually perceive a greater loss when using cash over electronic forms of payment. Most transactions actually occur within villages, for which paying a flat fee for M-PESA is needlessly expensive. E-budgeting requires financial literacy. Cash offers anonymity—something valued by many, not just criminals. At least the security of cash rests with the owner as opposed to third parties. … Cash is a public good free and open to all. Alternatives to cash are run by the private sector and carry transaction costs and fees. Cash is reliable—it will always work, even when the mobile towers go down. E-money may not be as sustainable as we think. If it were, why would we so often have to fund it with public sector resources?”

The anti-cash folks say that cash is risky, costly, cannot be tracked (and therefore facilitates crime, corruption, terrorism, etc.), and limits financial choices. The pro-cash position argues that cash is a public good and transactions can be done without having to pay fees, that it has an intrinsic affective value, that its anonymity is a benefit (not only to criminals), that alternatives are unproven, potentially unsustainable and require technological and financial literacies. The audience felt that the pro-cash position won the debate.

Public, private; tangible, intangible: These are core concerns over the purportedly inevitable disappearance of cash.

Between the date of the Fletcher conference and the USAID pronouncement, we’ve see the rise of experiments like Bitcoin (an anonymous “cryptographic currency” online that seeks to provide an alternative both to PayPal and to “fractional reserve banking”), the rapid uptake of some new payment technologies like Square, and a proliferation of mobile money transfer and payment schemes especially in emerging markets (see the Mobile Money Deployment Tracker). But our question is: why are these seen as supplanting cash, rather than adding to the portfolio of payment options? One argument made by USAID is that electronic means of payment permit “oversight.” Yet this is precisely what adherents of Bitcoin seek to avoid. Both mobile money and Bitcoin are technological fixes to a particular payment problem—but what, exactly, is that problem imagined to be? Why all the fuss, really? Mobile money does not kill cash – it builds bridges to it. This then raises a next question: what kind of technological platform is cash itself? And how is that platform interfacing with new digital platforms in actually existing mobile payment systems today? We turn to the first part of this question in our next post.

Apr
03

Deepthroat: Debt Collector Edition

The American Banker has been running an important series on credit card debt collection (here, here, and here) that Joe Nocera highlighted in his NY Times column today. The story that they're telling, however, is only part of the picture. To fully understand the debt collection industry, it's necessary to take Deepthroat's advice, and "follow the money." 

I haven't gone very far down this rabbit hole, but it's clear to me that there's another important angle to this story, namely, who is funding the debt collectors. 

A lot of debt collection is done by law firms, because if you can't convince the borrower to pay on unsecured debt, then you've got to go to court in most cases. So enter the law firms. These aren't law firms as anyone would traditionally recognize them, however. A traditional law firm would have a bunch of lawyers supported by paralegals and administrative personnel.  It would fund its operations from cash flow and perhaps a line of credit and partners' contributions. And the income-generating work would be done by lawyers.

That doesn't describe a lot of the collections law world. Instead, collections law firms are the dystopia of the legal industrial complex. These firms take the theory of the firm serious and rather often the "firm" is little more than an lawyer or two and their law license. Everything else, from the office equipment to the support staff, is contracted out. Most of the work is done by non-lawyers, and the lawyers are essentially renting out their law license to firms that supply the equipment and staffing. Instead of rent-a-BIN or rent-a-charter, it's rent-a-license lawyering. Robosiging?  Of course--the whole point of the operation is to be industrial.  It's transaction processing with a legal heksher. And it is the antithesis of the sort of judgment and counsel that lawyers have traditionally prided themselves as providing. 

These firms also often work in network pyramids--a national contractor firm will then farm work out to regional contractors, who ultimately farm it out ot the locals.  (That's the LPS network model, for example). Again, industrialized transaction processing and economies of scale. 

But back to the money. Who do you think is funding the firms that are renting the law license? That's Wall Street money. It wouldn't shock me at all if some of the Holier than Thou financial institutions mentioned in the stories happened to have a sizable stake in a firm that provides virtually everything but the law license for debt collection. And if that's right, then what's really going on, is a PR move, in which Wall Street can claim that it isn't engaged in debt collection abuses, while it profits from it all the same. 

Again, follow the money. 

Apr
03

One Answer to Why People Hate Banks

My last post mentioned a column by Joe Nocera on debt collection practices. Nocera's column is entitled "Why People Hate the Banks," and it appears on the penultimate page of the national print edition of today's New York Times. In a moment of sweet, sweet irony, Citi provides another reason to hate the banks just by turning the page.

The last page of the New York Times national print edition has a full-page color ad touting the achievements in the bank's 200-year history. The print ad evokes the same idea as currently appearing on the Citi home page, but the print ad has a more detailed time line:
  • 1812: Citi opens in New York
  • 1866: Citi funds the first transatlantic cable
  • 1904: Citi funds the Panama Canal
  • 1948: Citi supports the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe
  • 1956: Citi backs uniform cargo containers
  • 1958: Citi backs the commercial jetliner
  • 1977: Citi pioneers the ATM
  • 2011: Citi is the first card in Google Wallet

Exactly. For the first 150 years, the bank helped build infrastructure that made the U.S. the largest economy in the world. For the past 50 years, it has been figuring out how to get fees out of consumers' wallets and pocketbooks.

Apr
03

American Banker on Credit Card Debt Collections

Jeff Horwitz at the American Banker has been doing some great reporting on abusive debt collection practices in the credit card industry. Joe Nocera's column took up the subject today. Robo-signing and other abuses have been a problem for a while with credit card debt collections, and Horwitz and Nocera do a public service by drawing attention to the problems. The situation cries out for congressional hearings and for regulatory investigation. It is great to see the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau make debt collection practices one of its top priorities.

Horwitz's articles at the American Banker include:

Maria Aspen at American Banker separately reported how the sloppy sales of delinquent credit card accounts and shoddy debt collection practices were a nightmare for one Maryland woman.

Apr
02

Toward Cashlessness?

One of my students came across a humorous blog post from February, 2012. Titled, “What your payment method reveals about you,” the author listed a series of unlikely payment actions and a line on the presumed personal characteristics of the payer. The humor appeals to… well, us, anyway, and probably you, too.

Slinging your card down: You've definitely shoved a dog's face away from you because "move."
Slinging cash down: You've consumed alcohol that's involved whipped cream in the past week.
Using your Hello Kitty-themed card: You have many other credit cards.
Handing a bag of nickels and dimes, uncounted: You are nine.

Around the same time, the United States Agency for International Development launched an initiative to replace the use of cash in aid efforts with electronic forms of value transfer:

"If you care about reducing poverty, then you must also care about reducing the reliance on physical cash. We begin a movement to do just that.  USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah is announcing a broad set of reforms [in order to] reduce the development industry’s dependence on cash.  This includes integrating new language into USAID contracts and grants to encourage the use of electronic and mobile payments and launching new programs in 10 countries designed to catalyze the scale of innovative payments platforms."

The USAID “Better Than Cash” program was the culmination of at least a year’s discussion internally and with major donor agencies over the costs of cash for the poor--the heightened risk of theft associated with physical currency, the anonymity of cash, the difficulty in transporting and storing cash for those without access to formal financial institutions. Our own work has been enlisted in this effort, yet we are a bit more circumspect: although there are  very real problems associated with cash, there are also virtues. One of these virtues is that cash is publicly issued, not privately enclosed and tolled like most electronic forms of value transfer, and almost always accepted at par value. We’ll return to this topic as we examine some mobile phone-enabled money transfer and payment systems in the developing world, and regulatory responses to them, that might provide useful models. Over the course of the week, we will look closely at cash and how the debate over cashlessness—at times downright silly—is getting more serious, as at least some major actors shift from “the evils of cash” to “the benefits of an agnostic digital payment platform.” We think this is a consequential shift.


And we’re agnostic ourselves: we find virtues in proposals for digital payment platforms, but don’t want to lose certain aspects of cash—its social and public nature.

Indeed, the cashlessness rhetoric is getting a little crazy. Shortly after the USAID announcement, David Wolman, author of a new book titled, The End of Money, appeared on numerous radio talk shows throughout the United States. Among other things, Wolman dallies with the purveyors of literally apocalyptic predictions that money itself must end for the final redemption of Man. Just last week, Maurer witnessed an Occupy protestor doing a sort of interpretative dance with a dollar bill that culminated in its being set ablaze, accompanied (naturally) by primal chanting and drumming. And in this election year, the Tea Party movement on the American right has brought critiques of currency and the Federal Reserve back into political discourse. PYMNTS.com last week produced a roundup of recent discussions on the end of cash... and its continued dominance for everyday payments; and Bloomberg posted a more sober commentary on how "the road [to a cashless society] will not be as smooth and straight as enthusiasts might suppose." We agree, and we'll be circling back to this theme during the week.

From Nigeria’s “Cashless Lagos Project” to mobile phone-enabled services that promise to help the poor go cashless or “cash-light,” new technologies—and protests from the Tea Party to Occupy—are calling cash into question. Something’s definitely up. Cash is attracting heightened scrutiny, and from a wide (really wide) cast of characters. This week, we’ll be looking at what’s going on with cash today, why so many diverse constituencies are looking for alternatives, and why we might want to pause before announcing its demise.

One of my students came across a humorous blog post from February, 2012. Titled, “What your payment method reveals about you,” the author of the post, Erin Sullivan, listed a series of unlikely payment actions and a line on the presumed personal characteristics of the payer. The humor appeals to… well, us, anyway, and probably you, too.

 

Slinging your card down: You've definitely shoved a dog's face away from you because "move."

Slinging cash down: You've consumed alcohol that's involved whipped cream in the past week.

Using your Hello Kitty-themed card: You have many other credit cards.

Handing a bag of nickels and dimes, uncounted: You are nine.

 

Around the same time, the United States Agency for International Development launched an initiative to replace the use of cash in aid efforts with electronic forms of value transfer:

 

If you care about reducing poverty, then you must also care about reducing the reliance on physical cash. We begin a movement to do just that.  USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah is announcing a broad set of reforms [in order to] reduce the development industry’s dependence on cash.  This includes integrating new language into USAID contracts and grants to encourage the use of electronic and mobile payments and launching new programs in 10 countries designed to catalyze the scale of innovative payments platforms

 

The USAID “Better Than Cash” program was the culmination of at least a year’s discussion and debate internally and with major donor agencies over the costs of cash for the poor -- costs related to the heightened risk of theft associated with physical currency, the anonymity of cash, and the difficulty in transporting and storing cash for those in the developing world without access to formal financial institutions. Our work has been enlisted in this effort, yet we are a bit more agnostic: although there are  very real problems associated with cash, there are also virtues. One of these virtues is that cash is publicly issued, not privately enclosed and tolled like most electronic forms of value transfer, and almost always accepted at par value. We’ll return to this topic as we examine some mobile phone-enabled money transfer and payment systems in the developing world, and regulatory responses to them, that might provide useful models. Spoiler alert: over the course of the week, we will look closely at cash and how the debate over cashlessness—at times downright silly—is getting more serious, as at least some major actors shift from “the evils of cash” to “the benefits of an agnostic digital payment platform.”

 

And we’re agnostic ourselves: we find virtues in proposals for digital payment platforms, but don’t want to lose certain aspects of cash—its social and public nature. We will discuss this in a subsequent post.

 

Shortly after the USAID announcement, David Wolman, author of a new book titled, The End of Money, appeared on numerous radio talk shows throughout the United States, speaking of the necessity for a successor to this centuries-old form of payment. For Wolman, the issues are similar to those identified by USAID, but he also dallies with the purveyors of literally apocalyptic predictions that money itself must end for the final redemption of Man. Just last week, Maurer witnessed an Occupy protestor doing a sort of interpretative dance with a dollar bill that culminated in its being set ablaze, accompanied by primal chanting and drumming. And in this election year, the Tea Party movement on the American right has brought critiques of currency and the Federal Reserve's monetary policy back into political discourse.[Stephen R1] 

 

From Nigeria’s “Cashless Lagos Project” to mobile phone-enabled services that promise to help the poor go “cashless” or “cash-light,” new technologies—and protests from the Tea Party to Occupy—are calling cash into question. Something’s up. Cash is attracting heightened scrutiny, and from a wide and diverse cast of characters. Over the next series of posts, we’ll be looking at what’s going on with cash today, why so many diverse constituencies are looking for alternatives, and why we might want to pause before announ[Stephen R2] cing its demise.


 [Stephen R1]I added this bit just as a way of foreshadowing Bitcoin/Ron Paul/conservative money nutter stuff around cash, but I'm not certain of the wording. I don't know if it's really a “bringing back” into political discourse and not more of weird attention being given to the Fed in a way that maybe it wasn't in 2008.

 [Stephen R2]I love this, very straightforward.

Apr
02

An Insider’s View of an Actual RMBS Securitization at Mandelman U.

 

 

So, do you remember the article I posted the other day about accounting for a pool of loans and how values are based on assumptions about the performance of the pool into the future?  It was really Part 1 … meaning you should read it first…  and it was called…

If We owned a pool of loans, would WE allow principal reductions?

Well, think of this as Securitization Accounting, Part 2… at Mandelman U.

It’s complexity we eschew, and everyone’s welcome at Mandelman U.


I thought it might be exciting if I showed you something very few people have ever seen… an honest to goodness peek behind the curtain, if you will.

What follows below are slides from an actual presentation of a Residential Mortgage-backed Securities – RMBS/REMIC deal… but NOT the slides from a “road show” presentation to potential investors… what you’re about to see are slides from an INTERNAL meeting that was actually held back in February of 2006 when WMC Mortgage’s management presented the company’s second RMBS securitization deal to the management from parent company, GE.

And it’s not a proposal being presented to GE’s management… it’s an explanation of a deal WMC had already closed back in late 2005, the mortgage subsidiary’s second such deal… “GE-WMC 2005-2.”

By the way… WMC’s history is fascinating squared.  Want to know it?  Okay, follow me…

Weyerheuser Lumber Company had a finance company they called Weyerheuser Mortgage Company, or WMC… and they sold it in 1997 or 1998 for $192 million to a company called Apollo Global Management, which was founded by Leon Black in 1990, and today manages an estimated $100 billion in assets.  And although you’ll never find it in print, much less prove it in court… the rumor on The Street has always been that Leon’s “silent partner” in Apollo… none other than Michael Milken.

If you’re old enough to remember the first bubble that wiped out your retirement savings, then you’re old enough to remember Leon… he was the Managing Director – of Mergers & Acquisitions at Drexel, Burnham & Lambert… although he didn’t make a stop in federal prison as did Mr. Milken, before getting into the mortgage business and going on to become a billionaire several times over.  By the way, it might interest you to know that Mike Milken’s son, Lance Milken, still works at Apollo.  Perhaps it was decided that young Lance needed some mentoring, and who better than Leon to make sure his career went swimmingly?

(And I’m not beating up on Mr. Milken, I’m just jealous of Lance.  What?  Yeah, like you’re not.)

Okay, here’s my favorite part of the story… Leon’s net worth reportedly fell to just $1 billion after the 2008 market meltdown, but before you shed any tears… in the BOOM years since then… he’s done quite well and by 2011, was reportedly right back up to a net worth of $3.5 billion… proving that you just cannot keep a good man down.

So… after Apollo Management acquired WMC, they started adding value primarily by mandating the liberal use of GE-inspired-jargon and redecorating their offices with Six-Sigma-drapes and other window dressings, purchased after a three-hour presentation using a 450 slide deck of Power Point slides… with a corroborating opinion from McKinsey, of course.

And wouldn’t you know it, in 2004, Apollo had no trouble selling WMC to GE for $650 million, thus giving the mortgage company access to the virtually unlimited capital of Wall Street’s darling-of-those-days, the triple A rated… GE, then under the leadership of Jeffery Immelt.  You’ll notice when you look at the cover slide of the presentation below, that the name of this securitization deal is “GE-WMC 2005-2,” and WMC Mortgage called itself, “A GE Money Company.”

Back then, if you didn’t already know, GE was a BIG deal… one of only 7 companies in the country with an AAA credit rating.  It’s interesting, because if you go back to the early 1970s, there were 60 US companies rated AAA… fast forward a decade to 1982, and that number had been cut in half to 30.  By the early 1990s, we were down to just 20 AAAs, and at the dawn of our new millennium you could count America’s AAA-rated companies on two hands even if you’d lost a finger… only 9 remained.

A precious 7 of our AAAs managed to make it to 2009… when the list bade farewell to two companies that no one ever thought would go… Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway and the venerable GE itself… were both downgraded to a relatively disgraceful… AA.

Yes… Tommy Edison’s electric candle company, that had been the first to bring good things to light… one of the original 12 companies that made up the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and the only one of those 12 still part of the Dow today… along with the Oracle of Omaha’s private mutual fund they call Berkshire Hathaway… yes, they both fell from grace at the hands of irresponsible sub-prime borrowers during the housing bubble.

(In case you’re wondering, the remaining five are Microsoft, Pfizer, Exxon-Mobil, Johnson & Johnson and ADP.)

When GE purchased WMC in 2004, all that WMC did was “whole loan sales,” meaning that it would loan out money for mortgages, and then sell the loans to Wall Street investment banks, who would package and securitize those loans.

So, basically, with GE’s essentially unlimited and AAA-rated access to cheap cash, each month WMC would get, let’s just say, $100,000 from GE, which it would loan out on a mortgage, and then sell that loan to Wall Street.  In the beginning anyway, that $100,000 loan would sell for $106,000… then later for $105,000… and then for $104,000… $103,000… $102,000… $101,000.  Near the end… before such loans couldn’t be sold to Wall Street at any price and WMC shut its doors during the Spring of 2007… it went all the way down to 25¢ on a hundred dollars, which I think would make the sale of a $100,000 loan… $100,025.

Okay, so you want to see how this sort of thing happens?  Follow me and I’ll show you.

Leon Black received his undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College in 1973.  Jeffrey Immelt graduated from Dartmouth College too… but five years later in 1978.  No reason to think they knew each other back then, five years is a big difference at that age.  Leon then got his MBA at Harvard Business School in 1975.  Jeff got his MBA from HBS too… but seven years later in 1982.  No reason to think they knew each other at that time either… seven years difference is a long time.  I have no idea, for example, who graduated from one of my alma maters seven years before or after I did.

But then, in 2000, Jeff Immelt became GE’s CEO, after the legendary Jack Welch stepped down.  That’s a BIG JOB to be named CEO of GE… especially to follow the larger-than-life, Jack Welch… awfully large shoes to be filled there.  In 2000, to be named CEO of GE… well, you might as well have been named King of American Conglomerate-land.

Interesting though… that in 2002… Leon Black became a member of the Board of Trustees for… wait for it… oh yes… Dartmouth College.

Now, in case you have never considered the job description for members of the Board of Trustees at a college or university… you can be sure there’s some fund raising involved… not let’s hold a raffle fund raising… I’m talking BIG TIME fundraising… the kind of fundraising one does by calling on alums who have made it to the top.  And nothing says, “the top,” like the C-suite at GE.

And it’s just two years after Leon joins Dartmouth’s Board… and Leon’s company, Apollo starts dressing in Six Sigma garb,  that WMC is acquired by GE for $650 million.  And you don’t have to be Inspector Clouseau to figure out what went on there, do you?

(Leon… you totally rock… I am not worthy.)

GE – Imagination at Work…

If you imagine WMC selling just one of those $100,000 loans to Wall Street every month for one year… for let’s just say $106,000… you’ll quickly see why the mortgage origination business became Wall Street’s version of a Cash Call Payday Loan.  Do the math… $6,000 a month… equals $72,000 a year… by loaning the same $100,000 twelve times and selling all twelve loans to Wall Street bankers.

I know, I’m over-simplifying, but I’m also correct when I describe that as making 72 percent on your money with no appreciable risk.  Of course, WMC also had to keep the lights on, no pun intended… but we haven’t even talked about loan origination fees and other “closing costs,” that always find their way into a mortgage transaction.

The first slide is to show you the overall structure of the deal… remember the one I was describing in the last article on pool accounting I said was an over-simplification?  So, now you’ll see what happens when some complexity is added…
GE-WMC 2005-2 Deal Summary Remic Chart

 

Okay, next we’ll take a look at how the deal was rated by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, related to its “tranches,” which is French for “slices,” in case you’d forgotten.  This deal had 17 tranches, by the way, so on this slide they’ve been condensed… in a minute you’ll see them in an expanded view.

Follow my directions, and I’ll point out and explain in simple terms, everything of importance on each slide.

Start on the left side of the slide.  Look at the first line of the chart and you’ll see that between 75.4 and 77.5 percent of the deal is rated AAA (S&P) and Aaa (Moody’s).  I looked it up here and this means that roughly three-quarters of the RMBS certificates in this deal were supposed to have a .52 percent chance of defaulting.  That’s about a one-half of one percent chance of default, which admittedly would have to be considered a pretty darn safe investment, but it also highlights one of the many fallacies at work in these deals.  U.S. Treasuries are also rated AAA, but U.S. Treasuries are treated as “cash,” with essentially no chance for default.  So, how can anything less be rated the same?

From there, scan down and you’ll see AA+/Aa1. AA+/Aa2 and so on… and all the way down past the BB+/Ba2 you’ll find a line identified as being O/C… and that stands for “Over Collateralization,” and if you recall, at the end of my article on how we valued loans in a pool based on expectations, over collateralization consists of things like extra loans in the pool, and/or cash, and was done to make triple A investors feel that much more secure that they still wouldn’t incur losses even if loan defaults turned out to be higher, or happen sooner than expected.

And you know why, right?  Investors don’t receive the amounts designated as O/C, nor are they paying for the amounts of O/C when they buy their certificates.  The over collateralization amounts are purely there to absorb first losses, especially those that occur in the first two years that could easily be the result of fraudulent reps and warranties about underwriting standards.  If all loans pay as agreed, the O/C amounts will be returned to the issuer, in this case… GE-WMC.

Now look at the right-hand side of the slide and you’ll see the first bullet… “Higher O/C equals less up-front cash and higher back-end residual,” and that sentence is telling GE’s management that because of the over-collateralization in this deal, GE will receive less cash from selling certificates to investors, but in exchange can expect a larger back-end payout.

Just so everyone understands… and this is REALLY IMPORTANT to your education here at Mandelman U...

I realize that on the last slide, you might have noticed indications that millions in cash payments were going here and there, but you’d never be able to figure out much of anything from trying to follow the amounts and arrows on that diagram.

So, I can tell you that in this specific deal there was $46 million in O/C cash, which initially represented 3.25 percent of the deal.  But that doesn’t mean that WMC or GE wrote a check for $46 million.

The $46 million in O/C could be some cash… it could also be generated by some extra loans in the pool.  But, it could also be handled as a claim against excess interest that’s been built into the deal’s assumptions… remember the “assumptions about the future of the loans” from my last article on valuing loans in a pool?  Well, if you change a few assumptions, you’re financials would show some excess interest payments and you could consider those amounts when calculating the amount of O/C as well… get it?  Just lower an assumption about loan prepayments for the pool… or lower the number of expected defaults, or reduce the loss severity associated with defaults… reduce the amount of any of those forecasts and presto… extra cash in the deal that can be classified as O/C.

See… isn’t accounting fun?

This specific deal was structured so that during the first two years there would be a relatively higher amount of O/C than after the first two years had passed.   Ostensibly, that was done to create the appearance that the triple A investors were being protected from the sort of early loan defaults that would have to be the result of shoddy underwriting or even fraud.  You know… like in case WMC was lying in their representations and warranties about the underwriting of the loans.

So, with the high O/C during the first two years, I’m sure investors felt safe as far as being protected from WMC just packing this deal with loans that would never make a payment or default in year one or two.  After two years of making payments, one could no longer blame a loan that defaults on its originator.  Loans that default after two years, result from life events and other factors that are beyond what a loan’s underwriting could reasonably foresee or prevent.

To illustrate all of this, this deal provided that GE would receive $28.5 million from the O/C at month 26, assuming no “triggers” had already required that money to be used to absorb early losses.

The next bullet states that WMC believes that they’ve made some progress convincing Moody’s that their loans were of such high quality, that in the future they wouldn’t need as much O/C to get the ratings they needed to make the deal attractive… which was obviously included to please GE management about the potential for future deals to require less cash.

The next heading is telling GE management that it’s the same process that they’ve used successfully in the past when they only sold whole loans, and again this is included as a warm and fuzzy for GE management.

And lastly, on that slide… there are a couple of points about split ratings.

A split rating occurs when the same bond is rated differently by rating agencies.  For example, a bond could be rated AAA by one agency and AA  or A, by another.  This can occur because one rating agency places a different amount of emphasis on certain variables, or because one agency views something about the issuer differently than another… perhaps a recent acquisition by the issuer is seen more or less favorably.

Split ratings also occur simply because the different ratings agencies each handle ratings differently… S&P ratings are said to measure the probability of default… Moody’s, on the other hand is said to be measuring the amount of the expected loss in the event of default.

(Think car insurance for a moment… S&P would rate me as a driver with emphasis placed on the probability of me having an accident… while Moody’s would base my rating primarily on the cost of the car I was driving.)

It’s a slightly different perspective on what’s most important in a rating, and you can see why investors want to trade based on Moody’s… they’re concerned with how much they might lose. The Basel Accord, by the way, is seeking to mandate that BOTH perspectives be provided to investors… leave it to the Europeans (who originated Basel), to introduce common sense to Wall Street.

In this deal, and remember this is referring only to the non-investment grade bottom tranches, rated BBB- and below… it says that the “tranches trade at Moody’s rating,” but the second bullet says that these tranches have already been priced as if the ratings were dropped, which appears to protect the investors.
GE TRANCHES

 

The next slide shows you all of the different investors that bought pieces of this deal, and because this presentation was used by WMC to show its parent company, GE, just how fabulous everything was… the slide’s title reads: “Strong Investor Demand.”

The column on the left shows who bought the AAA/Aaa tranches, in the middle you can see who who bought the “Mezzanine tranches,” which those in “the biz” would just call “the mez.”  The column on the right shows investors in the various ‘B’ rated tranches, and below that is a list of those that bought the unrated “NIM,” or some would say, the “equity tranche.”

The “NIM” refers to the securitization of the excess or residual cash flows from one or more mortgage-backed or asset-backed security, which mostly come from the spread that exists between the interest rate on the mortgage-backed security… and the interest rate on the underlying pool of mortgages… the amounts that are not needed to absorb losses or increase the amount of credit enhancement in the underlying deal or deals.

Years ago, those issuing mortgage-backed securities earned this excess interest as the mortgages aged over time, but we should all know by now that Wall Street hates waiting for anything, least of all money that might otherwise be pocketed today.  So, once again, thanks to “financial innovation” and/or “market efficiencies,” issuers discovered that they could securitize their residual interests and sell them to investors… and the NIM… or “Net Interest Margin” bond was born.

NIMs became a fast growing sector in the home equity and mortgage market because they traded at much higher yields than bonds with similar ratings… back in 2002, we’re talking 8-9 percent.

One reason NIM bonds could be sold to investors was that companies like Radian Group Inc. started providing “credit enhancement” for NIM bonds.  In 2005, for example, Radian’s 10-K showed the company had written $99 million of default insurance risk on NIMs.  (Radian’s peers include PMI, MGIC, Ambac, et al.)

NIMS in the 1990s v. after 2000…

Because the cash flows into NIMs are subordinated to the needs of the deal… meaning that NIMs take the first losses, or that the excess cash generated may be needed to increase the amount of credit enhancement in the deal… the volatility of prepayments that could occur when interest rates fell,  and/or the timing and severity of losses resulting from defaulting loans, often had a huge impact on a NIM’s performance.  (Now do you see why prepayment penalties were invented?  To protect bond holders, but especially the NIM bond holders because they take the first loss.)

Certain “triggers” were written into these deals that would change how cash flows  would be allocated and therefore impact the amount of excess spread that would be allocated to the residual holder.  The two most common cash flow triggers used were a “delinquency trigger,” and a “cumulative loss trigger.”

Such triggers might  require an increase in the targeted amount of O/C (over collateralization, remember?)  These were known as “step-up” events.  Or, a trigger could prevent a release of O/C… in which case it would be called a “step down” event.

Some triggers are considered to be “NIM friendly” triggers because they don’t allow for an increase… or “step-up” in O/C, above whatever initial amount of O/C was in the deal, and/or because they didn’t come into play until the step-down date.  But other deals had more onerous triggers that could cut off cash flows to the NIM by prohibiting any decrease… or “step-down” in the amount of O/C, or by requiring an increase in the amount of O/C once triggers were hit.

Now, don’t get overwhelmed by this stuff… it isn’t hard to get… read it again slowly if you’re feeling overwhelmed.  The concepts are simple, it’s the terminology that takes some getting used to, I understand.

The financial services industry, and especially the bond market in my opinion, goes out of its way to make things sound like you need one of their experts to decipher a secret code in order to participate in the race to riches.  But the truth is… it’s all about debt.  Someone is loaning money, someone is borrowing money… maybe someone else is insuring that something will happen, or betting that it won’t… and several different someones are setting up the deal, managing the deal, or selling the deal.

It’s like my favorite line from the movie “Bull Durham.”

“This is a very simple game.  You hit the ball, you catch the ball, you throw the ball.  Sometimes you win, somethings you lose, and sometimes it rains.  Think about that for a while.”

The Investors in this Deal…

This slide is going to be fun, I promise…

Start top left… under the heading “Investor.”  See it… FHLMC… Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company… otherwise known as good old Freddie Mac.  Out of roughly $1.4 billion… Freddie bought $319.3 million of the Aaa-2yr, and by the way… the FHFA is currently suing GE, and all the GE companies, Morgan Stanley (the deal’s ‘adviser’), Credit Suisse (co-manager and underwriter), et al.

Just so you know… as a result of the FHFA’s suit… the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California convened a Grand Jury, and the FBI is currently investigating to determine whether a crime has been committed.  So, now… with these slides… you can follow along and play the Mortgage Securitization Fraud Game at home.

Then we’ve got other investors you’ve heard of… Chase, PIMCO, BGI, the Agricultural Bank of China… HSBC London… Alaska Perm Fund… and just keep reading down the list and you’ll find BofA, JPMIM is a JPMorganChase… Societe General (don’t try to pronounce it, you’ll only butcher it… just say “Sock Gen.”) and then Fortis, Wharton… and it’s not “Robobank,” it’s “Rabobank,” although calling it “Robobank” is much funnier.  And remember… the amounts shown are in millions.

Then go down the middle column and see who’s there… Munich RE is an re-insurance company… Teachers, is the Teachers pension plan… Hyperion, which is a hedge fund… Hartford, insurance again… Highland Capital is another hedge fund… towards the bottom of the middle column, see “FIDAC- Annaly?”  Yeah, well they have a bunch of brand names, but they packaged and sold Collateralized Debt Obligations or CDOs, so they were probably buying the “Mez” in this deal to make it into a CDO, or CDO-squared… as were many of the others as well.  (After we’re done with the MBS portion of our class, we’ll move to CDOs.)

And notice the one labeled, “U/W Purchase?”  That’s Credit Suisse First Boston, or CSFB… this deal’s underwriter showing the other investors how much confidence they have in the deal by buying in at $12.6 million.

Then in the column on the right… the investors in the “Sub Tranches,” including Ellington, a hedge fund in San Francisco… JPMIM again, or JPMorganChase… Eurohypo, a German bank… Princeton, the university’s investment fund… Citi London… Fischer Francis is a fixed income investment management firm… Deerfield is another hedge fund… BUT STOP on C-Bass for a moment, because C-Bass was this deal’s loan servicer.

C-Bass, which stands for “Credit Based Asset Servicing and Securitization,” was basically a securitization advisor until they bought Litton Loan Servicing, which they sold to Goldman Sachs in 2007, and who sold it last year to Ocwen.  MGIC, a monoline insurer, owned 45.5% of C-Bass… and MGIC’s competitor, Radian ALSO owned 45.5% of C-Bass.  It’s so clubby.

C-Bass filed bankruptcy in 2010, and why not?  The company’s filing listed assets of $10 to $50 million… and debt… OMG at over $1 BILLION.

You’ve got to love these guys…

I mean, if you’ve only got $10 million… and you can go bankrupt for a BILLION… I say you win.  By the way… the CEO of C-Bass was a Goldman Sachs alum… and his partner came from Citigroup.

Just above the NIM you’ll see that GE-WMC bought in as well, which is another way to make investors feel like they’re not being viewed as a fatted pig that’s about to be served with an apple in its mouth.  As in… “Look, Tom… they’re investing in it too… it must be safe, right?”

Okay, finally there’s the investors in the NIM.  There’s Amaranth, a hedge fund… MKP, alternative investment advisers… and on down the list of mostly hedge funds that were all greedily swinging for the fences by investing in the deal’s un-rated, but crazy-high-yield, NIM bonds.

A COUPLE MORE KEY POINTS…

Now let’s talk about the question, “Who owns my loan?” 

The answer you often hear is, “the investors,” but you should be at least starting to see why that’s not a particularly helpful answer, right?  I mean, which investors?  This deal has 17 tranches, and 70 investors, although some are duplicates because the same company bought into more than one tranche.  And some of the investors are hedge funds, while others are buying in order to repackage what they bought into a CDO that they will be reselling.

So, who is the investor?  Well, not only do you heave to think in terms of which one?  But, depending on the tranche they bought, they may be receiving payments… or they may have already been wiped out by losses and that depends on the timing and the triggers and the over collateralization, or O/C, etc. etc.

And, let’s just say that we’re talking about one of the investors in the deal’s NIM bonds, and let’s say that investor has been wiped out due to losses resulting from loan defaults… but maybe that investor had purchased default insurance from Radian… then what?  Does that mean your loan was paid off when that investor’s NIM bonds defaulted?

Obviously, the answer is no.  Keep in mind, the deal we’re looking at was approximately a $1.4 billion dollar deal.  At the bottom right of the chart below, you’ll see that Citadel… a hedge fund… was an investor in the deal’s NIM bonds to the tune of $1.3 million.  Should those bonds default, assuming Radian had insured Citadel’s interest, Radian would be responsible to make the remaining bond payments with interest to Citadel.

However, even that simplified example assumes a lot.

The insurance companies that offer this type of insurance are known as the “monoline insurers,” because in 1989, the State of New York enacted Article 69, which amended the state’s insurance law to make “financial guaranty insurance” a separate line of coverage, and the new law prevented other types of insurers, such as property and casualty, life, and multiline insurers, from offering it. For years, the monolines claimed this exclusive focus made them stronger, but when the meltdown in the sub-prime bond market hit in July of 2007, their limited focus made it a certainty that they would be wiped out.

In early 2008, to give you an idea of how fast this last meltdown actaully melted down… when Fitch downgraded monoline insurer Ambac from AAA to AA, it triggered downgrades on more than 100,000 Ambac-insured bonds worth roughly half a trillion dollars.  Plus, the monolines got into the market of insuring CDOs, which today, for the most, part we call “toxic assets.”

Once insuring CDOs is was only logical that the monolines, like Ambac and MBIA, get involved in placing large bets on CDOs through the use of credit default swaps, but at the same time, others in the market were using the same sort of contracts to bet against MBIA and Ambac.

Ambac filed for bankruptcy in November of 2010, subsequently filing lawsuits against just about everybody on Wall Street, from JPMorgan to Bank of America to Credit Suisse to Bear Stearns… alleging improper underwriting and more.  Last month, Ambac received permission to emerge from bankruptcy and just yesterday, Ambac sued JPMorgan Chase saying that it has incurred over $200 million in claims on seven RMBS deals that Bear Stearns fraudulently induced it to insure.  According to Reuters, the securities in question have loss over $1.8 billion.

MBIA filed for bankruptcy in 2009, and a whole line of banks showed up to challenge the filing, claiming that MBIA wouldn’t be able to make good on its credit default swaps if it went ahead with its plan to restructure into two units.  Since then, MBIA has settled its credit default swap liability with Morgan Stanley and others, and… well… the saga continues.

The point is this… maybe there was default insurance purchased by some investors in certain tranches of a given RMBS, certainly not all investors purchased such coverage, and even so… the insurance carrier may have filed bankruptcy and  investor claims may not have been paid, or paid at a reduced amount.

And even if a given claim was paid to a given investor in a given tranche, the default insurance we’re talking about here, WOULD NOT be paying off a MORTGAGE in the underlying pool of loans, as some people have apparently been led to believe.

And lastly… when you read the list of the 70 investors in this deal, does it really seem like homeowners would be in any way better off negotiating with any of those hedge funds and assets managers for a loan modification than they are with their servicer?  I’m guessing that we’ve got a much better shot with BofA at its worst, than we would trying to convince a hedge fund or asset manager that has just lost fifty or a hundred mil.  I’m just saying…

Investors in GE Deal

 

The next slide discusses the deal’s “Key Assumptions,” just like I talked about in my last article on valuing loans in a pool… you remember, right?

Now, this slide was titled “Residual Value – Refresher,” because it was prepared to refresh GE’s executives as to the investment that GE made in the deal.  And under “Key Assumptions” at the top, you’ll see all the same terminology we’ve been using since the valuing a pool article…

  • Prepayment speeds (which includes refinancing of loans)
  • Losses (includes loan defaults, which reduce the amount of over collateralization)
  • Discount rate (that’s the rate used in the NPV calculation to arrive at the PV or present value)
  • Triggers Pass/Fail (and we just discussed these above when talking about the NIM)

Next the “residual” is discussed (just like we talked about above when discussing the NIM)

The excess spread is the amount earned in excess of what’s paid out to investors, and the bullets describe how it’s treated, first covering CREDIT LOSSES, which are LOAN DEFAULTS, and then going to maintain the O/C before release beginning in month 17, with the $28.5 million expected to be released in month 26.

Key Assumptions of Ge Deal

 

Once again… remember that the “Loss Assumptions” shown on the slide below, relate to GE’s investment in the deal.

Start at the chart at top left… DEFAULTS…

The loss assumptions data, which was provided by Merrill Lynch, separates out the first liens from the second liens and used 2003 as benchmark data.  Now remember… this presentation was created on a deal that closed during the fall of 2005.  Yet, the data being used as a benchmark is from 2003… roughly just 24 months later.

However… look at the graph on the right, which shows “Cumulative Defaults.”  Month 0 is when the deal begins its life and notice that 24 months from Month ’0′ the cumulative defaults are between 1-2 percent.  So, looking at only 24 months of default data from 2003 clearly wasn’t enough to predict defaults in this deal going forward… not to mention the fact that no one lost homes to foreclosure in 2003 when home prices were going nowhere but up.

So… the top left chart shows that defaults on first mortgages are supposed to be 8.83 percent, 8 percent on seconds.  The middle chart on left shows “Severity,” or as we’ve been calling it, “loss severity,” and it’s the amount expressed as a percentage that we think we’ll lose on the 8-9 percent defaulting loans.  And the bottom chart shows expected losses.

To see how it all works together, take the 8.83 percent… multiply by the loss severity of 35 percent… and you’ll get the 3.09 percent in losses, that appears in the chart at bottom.

Now, obviously, WMC didn’t have a whole lot of data on loss severity, which makes sense because in 2003 there probably weren’t any losses resulting from loan defaults to speak of… in fact, in 2003, a foreclosed home would have more than likely resulted in a gain as prices continued to rise.  So, the 35 percent loss severity that was plugged in would appear to use the SWAG methodology (that’s a “Scientific Wild Ass Guess,” in case you weren’t aware).

So, obviously using 24 months of data going forward from 2003 wasn’t sufficient, but what data should the issuers of these types of securities in 2005 used to forecast future defaults, loss severity percentages and prepayments?  I mean, 2000 to 2002 was a pretty bad recession, in case you’d forgotten, and going back into the 1990s would have been comparing completely different loan products.  I’m not defending them, nor am I saying it couldn’t have been better, but I just want to show you the nature of the problem from different perspectives.

The overriding point being that no one saw what was to come, specifically… and lots of people lost a lot of money… and there will be lots of litigation going on for lots of years to come as a result.

What went so terribly wrong was how our government handled it, choosing to provide untold TRILLIONS to banks, while abandoning America’s homeowners financially, leaving them to fend for themselves, and sending them hat in hand to giant financial institutions asking that their loans be modified.

I’m not defending the way the banks have handled the situation, but I don’t pay taxes to my bank, nor do I elect my bank’s President, and I certainly have never depended on my bank to protect my rights as an American citizen.

To those who won’t like what I’m about to say… tough. 

The specific failure of which I speak rests on the Obama Administration ALONE.

Loss Assumptions Ge Deal

 

And on the next slide below, we have the basis for the deal’s “Prepayment Assumptions.”

These graphs and data presented were to examine most or all of WMC’s loan products, in different combinations with prepayment penalty and without… and WMC’s actual prepayment experience between 2003 – 2005… over 31 months.

This slide, which is showing WMC’s actual prepayment experience over that 31 month period, not only shows how they arrived at the key assumptions for this deal, but it also shows how frequently people were refinancing their mortgages between 2003 and 2005… which is pretty darn amazing, by any standard.

 

Prepayment Assumptions GE DEAL

 

Well… that’s all I’ll cover for now… I don’t want to overwhelm everyone… assuming anyone is actually still following along… so, we’ll leave the rest for the next installment.  Stuff like the Collateral and Due Diligence and Securitization Deal Structure… and the Computational Materials, which are the detailed data points they used for things like average life for each tranches, trigger events, and then swaps and the hedging strategies… things that sound more complicated than they actually are.

Nothing about this is truly hard to understand… it’s all grocery store math, really.

We’ll also be drilling down into all the different types of insurance involved in RMBS securitizations, that way maybe people will stop telling me they think their loan has been paid off three times.

And finally we’ll look at the Clean-Up Call, which is what happens at the END of a RMBS REMIC deal… here’s a preview to keep you coming back for more… the specific language in this deal says…

“The servicer may repurchase all of the mortgage loans and properties acquired on behalf of the Trust when the loans remaining have been reduced to less than 10 percent of the original balance.”

Oh my… I can hear the questions popping like popcorn.  Don’t worry… get this stuff down and we’ll move on to the next part in a few days.  I’ll have you securitizing your own pools of loans in no time.

Mandelman out.

Apr
01

Welcome to Guestbloggers Bill Maurer and Stephen Rea

Credit Slips welcomes Bill Maurer as a guest blogger this week. Bill is NOT a lawyer! Isn't that great? (We all need an occasional break from lawyers, even those of us who are lawyers.)

But Bill is one of my colleagues at the UC Irvine School of Law, where he has a joint appointment. He is a cultural anthropologist whose work focuses on law, property, and money and finance. Of great interest to Slips readers will be Bill's expertise on payment systems, and particularly on mobile money. He is the Director of the Institute for Money, Technology, and Financial Inclusion, a Gates Foundation-funded center for academic and policy research.

Bill's recent paper, Regulation as Retrospective Ethnography: Mobile Money and the Arts of Cash, examines how we are integrating mobile money products into our understanding of money, which traditionally has meant cash. He also has published work on BitCoin, Islamic banking, offshore financial structures, and other payments issues.

Bill will be joined by Stephen Rea, a graduate student in anthropology at UC Irvine. Stephen also is affiliated with the Institute for Money, Technology, and Financial Inclusion and has co-authored a forthcoming paper with Bill and another scholar on mobile money agents in the developing world.

We look forward to their insights.

Mar
30

Fannie and Freddie Charitable Donations?

I'm generally skeptical about corporate charitable donations.  My sense is that they are primarily a transfer of value from shareholders to managers, rather than a value-enhancing investment in goodwill.  So on the DC Metro, what did I see today, but a poster advertising the 2012 DC Servathon that featured the logos of a variety of corporate sponsors, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Aren't Fannie and Freddie insolvent and in conservatorship?  Whatever one thinks of corporate charitable donations, they are a lot harder to justify when the corporation is insolvent.  Critically, as far as I can tell, the sponsorship is from Fannie and Freddie themselves, NOT their charitable foundations--at least there is no indication that it is the foundations, not the GSEs involved. If that is correct, then why on earth is FHFA permitting Fannie and Freddie to make charitable donations? It is practically a fraudulent conveyance.  It is also using taxpayer money for charitable donations outside the appropriations process.  That strikes me as really problematic.  It also raises the question why FHFA will let Fannie and Freddie spend taxpayer money on charitable donations, but not on principal writedowns that might actually save taxpayers money in the long run.  

So what are Fannie and Freddie doing with their corporate sponsorship?  At best, it is an attempt to build goodwill.  Remember that Fannie and Freddie do no business with consumers (other than foreclosing on them).  And given that they are in a duoposony situation, they hardly have to advertise for their bank customers.  So the only thing I can see this advertising as being about is currying political goodwill, which is lobbying in another form, something that Fannie and Freddie are forbidden from doing.

I'm all for charitable giving (with my skepticism about whether it is better done by corporate entities than individuals--there are obvious economy of scale issues for fund-raisers that cut the other way) and this is a good cause, but I really hope insolvent GSE aren't funding charities.    

Update 4.1.12:  A reader in the know directed me to this FHFA Office of the Inspector General report on the GSEs' charitable activities.  Two points of interest.  First, GSE charitable giving from 2008-2011 has totalled $219 million.  Small potatoes relative to the scope of federal assistance, but still.  Second, in October 2008 (months into the conservatorship), FHFA expressly permitted the GSEs to continue their charitable activities "because of the supporting role that such activities would play during the economic downturn." For real? That seems WAY outside of the FHFA's purview as conservator.  Since when does conservatorship mean doing macroeconomic policy? And if it does, then let's talk about those principal reductions...  Then in 2010, the FHFA ordered the GSEs to wind down their charitable activities by the end of 2013. It seems that there are complications in winding up the Freddie Mac Foundation.  That aside, it's not clear to me why three plus years were necessary. imho, the FHFA should have stopped all new charitable giving as of the date of the conservatorship and allowed the Foundations to wind-down. I'm glad to see the IG has been on this issue.  

Mar
29

Tax Rebates Lead to Bankruptcy Filings

Jialan Wang has a blog post up summarizing her and her co-authors very interesting NBER paper estimating that at least 30,000 to 60,000 liquidity constrained households this will be priced out of bankruptcy because of the increased costs that came with the 2005 changes to the bankruptcy law. Actually, the research does not find that tax rebates lead to bankruptcy filings -- that was just a cheesy trick to get you to read the post. The researchers find that, after receiving tax rebates, people are more likely to file bankruptcy as they now have funds they can use to pay for the bankruptcy fees. They then use the randomization of the delivery of tax rebates in 2001 and 2008 to identify the effect that the higher fees caused on the bankruptcy rates of liquidity constrained households. It is a clever research design, and Credit Slips readers will want to check it out.

Mar
29

Is Loaning Money at a 350% APR Evil?

In the early part of this year, a new start-up called ZestCash launched. Founded by former Google CIO, Douglas Merrill, it appears to be an attempt at short-term consumer lending with a Google-like "don't be evil" approach and markets itself as an alternative to payday loans.The venture caught my eye when mentioned in the New York Times this weekend as part of a story about Gil Ebaz's work of adding value to different services by providing better, more reliable data.

ZestCash intends to use different information and algorithms to assess the likelihood of repayment. The New York Times story suggests that this information will include cell phone bills. As someone who works a lot with data, I have little doubt that there is a lot of information that will do a better job of predicting repayment than the information currently in credit reports. Better accuracy should translate into lower interest rates for consumers. If there is transmission of consumer information from an unrelated company to another, as a lawyer I wonder whether this can all be done without becoming a credit reporting agency and triggering regulation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. But, I presume (or at least hope) ZestCash has lawyers advising it on those FCRA isssues.

Here is the catch, ZestCash's own web site discloses that its maximum rates may have up to a 350% APR. There has been laudatory and not-so-laudatory coverage of ZestCash. As a friend of mine was fond of saying, personally I feel strongly both ways. Demand for short-term consumer loans is not going to go way. High-priced and abusive consumer lending needs solutions, and we should not discourage market-based experiments to provide better short-term loans. ZestCash does eliminate the abusive rollover feature of payday loans. Also, its bounced-check fee of $10 also strikes me as reasonable. ZestCash's web site even directs potential customers to legitimate web sites that help people deal with debt such as the Consumer Federation of America or the Center for Financial Services Innovation.

But, 350% APR . . . wow. Credit unions are offering products similar to payday loans at interest rates under 36%. To be fair to ZestCash, the 350% APR is the maximum rate. It would be useful to know at what actual rates ZestCash's lending is occurring, but the disclosures on its web site suggest rates much higher than what many credit unions offers for a similar product. ZestCash claims to have better predictive models on repayment, but such a high APR would still be suggestive of high default rates. Maybe it is fixed costs that just translate into a high APR, but even considering the fixed costs of a short-term loan, amortizing them over a two- to six-month should not yield such APRs approaching 350%.We need solutions to high-priced consumer lending, but those solutions are not more high-priced consumer lending.

Mar
28

New Panel Data!

The Fed has just released their data from the 2007-2009 panel Survey of Consumer Finances.  The SCF, conducted every three years, includes hundreds of variables on the assets, liabilities, income, and financial product shopping and utilization of American consumers.  Some questions include "what was the most important factor in your decision to refinance your mortgage?" and "during the past year, have you taken out a payday loan?".  The 2007-2009 panel data set is especially valuable because it offers a picture of household finances before and after the Global Financial Crisis; the 2007 survey respondents were resurveyed in 2009.  There is also a separate 2010 SCF survey, but those data have not been released yet. 

Possible research subjects one might explore with this data set include the relative wealth loss of different racial and ethnic groups, what type of consumers chose different types of mortgage loans and other credit products, and how financial product choice interacted with changes in consumer finances as the crisis unfolded.

The Fed staff's own summary of the data is here.  The paper describes wealth losses by wealth category and geographic region, but not by race or ethnicity.

Mar
28

Congress Has Its Own Limiting Principle

This is supposed to be a blog about credit and bankruptcy, but I can't help myself in making a short comment about one aspect of the oral argument and discussion from yesterday's challenge to the individual mandate. Credit Slips purists should note that many bankruptcy filers have lots of medical debt, so the topics are not completely unrelated.

There has been a lot of discussion about the search for the so-called "limiting principle." If Congress can make you buy health insurance, could it make you buy burial insurance or (gasp) buy broccoli to eat? If the Supreme Court does not protect us, what is to stop Congress from passing all sorts of dumb laws like these?

The same crowd who is aghast at the possibility of having people purchase health insurance are also the same crowd who always reminded us (or at least used to remind us) that it is not the Court's job to stop Congress from enacting dumb laws. Congress has its own limiting principle. It's called the ballot box.

Jamal Greene over at Slate makes a similar point. And, if you're still looking for a limiting principle, Charles Fried, Reagan's solicitor general, offers one in an interview with the Washington Post's Greg Sargent.

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