Mar
25

FireDogLake Book Salon on BROKE

On Sunday, March 25, from 5-7pm Eastern/2-4pm Pacific, I am live-blogging about Broke: How Debt Bankrupts the Middle Class at FireDogLake's Book Salon. My host is Edwin Walker, a retired bankruptcy practitioner with over twenty five years of experience. I am certain that he will prompt a lively discussion. I am looking forward to his questions and to engaging with the public on these issues. All Credit Slips readers are welcome to join in the conversation.

Mar
23

Nothing Goes Down in a Straight Line

 

 

Look… I hate being a porcupine in a balloon factory, so I’m not trying to take anything away from the numbers that are even slightly better than they’ve been in the recent past.  In fact, I’m an optimist by nature, so I hate being the one that comes off like Calamity Jim.

And, nothing I say should ever stop someone from buying a house in which they plan to live.

But, the structural problems we face have NOT changed, so I see no possibility that we aren’t going to see some continued weakening in the housing market in the years ahead, and I don’t care whether we’re talking Phoenix, or wherever else.

Nothing goes down in a straight line.  

The Dow nearly doubled between March of 1935 to March of 1937 and smack dab in the middle of the Great Depression the economy appeared to be back on track.  But, it gave up those gains the following year in a crack-that-whip sort of slide slide and a new recession saw unemployment back at 20%.  After that, the DOW barely puttered along for the rest of the 1930s, never coming close to recapturing its March 1937 high.

Well, since our economy went off a cliff in 2007 we’ve had several periods during which “experts” have proclaimed that “the worst is behind us.”  None has been anywhere close to correct… and many have had a vested interest in what they’re reporting.  I understand that optimism is both fun, and a hard thing of which to let go, but the result of blind optimism during a crisis is that we won’t deal with the structural problems that are sure to continue kicking of our collective ass for years to come, and by years I do mean decades.

Lending in this country is… in a phrase, a complete train wreck.

To begin with, the federal government has essentially taken over consumer lending, at least as far as the $10 trillion home mortgage market is concerned.  The government’s share of new loans now approaches 100%.  Today, the three fastest growing government insurance programs are the FHA, the USDA’s single-family guarantee program, and … yawn… Ginnie Mae.

FHA is flat out bankrupt and after the election will be making headlines as the next bailout.  Over the last few years it’s become the new sub-sub-prime.  It’s leveraged at a little under an eye-popping 1,000 to one, which dwarfs Fannie’s previous record of 174 to one… and we know how well that never worked out.  I want to say defaults are in the 20% range, but that number could be one or two points off in either direction.

The US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) single-family guarantee program is the poster child for underpricing risk.  Ed Pinto, a former chief credit officer at Fannie Mae, and an expert on government lending programs, recently explained that a borrower with a FICO score of 620 is able to get a zero down payment loan of say $150,000. According to Pinto, the all-in cost of the USDA loan is at least $12,000 below what Freddie Mac would require for the same borrower paying five percent down.  What’s going to happen down this path shouldn’t be much of a mystery.

Going, going… it’s gone.

We haven’t had a private securitization of mortgage debt since 2007, and we won’t have one for a long time… certainly not until we correct the inadequacies of the system that created our current economic catastrophe, or until institutional investors take stupid pills en masse.  That means a market dependent on the government for essentially all lending, and with Europe living on a razor’s edge, that’s just not good.  The credit markets remain broken and we won’t see a real rebound until they have been substantively repaired.  The way we’re facing facts lately, that could take a generation.

Demand for residential real estate is simply going to be much lower than in the past… half of homeowners are underwater and therefore unable to move.  Saddled with debt and unable to find good paying jobs, first time buyers are delaying family formation and therefore their purchases of homes.  The unemployment picture is little more than pre-election propaganda… the most recent numbers being largely the result of a warmer than usual winter.  And foreclosures in 2011 were simply suppressed last year by litigation, and as banks awaited the settlement with the state AGs… they’re headed higher as we speak.

That makes some comparisons between 2010 and 2011 appear favorable, but it is a meaningless illusion… similar to the illusion of a housing rebound in 2009-10 until we saw the impact of tax incentives and the Fed buying trillions in mortgage-backed securities coming to an end.

What’s next?  How about: “CASH FOR CRAP?” 

Bring in an old toaster and the federal government will give you $500.  Betcha’ that’s going to make for some very encouraging third quarter numbers.

Add to those factors the demographics of our aging baby-boomers, 78 million of us who will de facto be moving less and downsizing as we age.  And don’t forget the certainty of a European default at some point in the next couple of years, and it’s just not anywhere near as pretty a picture as we’re going to have painted for us during the election year that’s ahead.

And all of that lackluster performance is occurring in an environment of record low interest rates.  What do you suppose will happen to the housing market as those rates rise?  Defaults will unquestionably spike once again, and credit will tighten even further.  Prices simply have to fall farther before demand will increase enough to stabilize prices, let alone support any real broad based appreciation, because demand isn’t coming to the rescue, we’ve drowned it in a sea of judgmental punishment.

But again… nothing goes down in a straight line, so there will be moments where things will feel like the worst is behind us… followed by times where it will feel like it’s not.

What a house cost in the past, is entirely irrelevant.  Real estate prices are not set based on their past, no more than stock prices are priced that way, which is why no one should still be holding Cisco at $84.

A few days ago, to make my point, all the news was “happy-in-homeland.”  Today… well… not nearly as much…

From Bloomberg today…

The S&P Supercomposite Homebuilding Index fell 2 percent today. New-home sales fell 1.6 percent to a 313,000 annual pace, the slowest since October, from a 318,000 rate in January that was weaker than previously reported, figures from the Commerce Department showed today in Washington.  The median estimate of 78 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News called for 325,000.

KB Home (KBH), the Los Angeles-based homebuilder that targets first-time buyers, sank 8.9 percent to $10.24. Revenue in the first-quarter was $254.6 million, falling short of the average analyst estimate of $328.6 million.

And here’s Dave Rosenberg from CNBC today…

The current recovery is the weakest one ever and being driven by warm weather, not by fundamental improvements taking place in the economy, says Gluskin Sheff economist David Rosenberg.

Deficit spending and loose monetary policies have further propped up the economy, which is much weaker than otherwise improving economic indicators would suggest.

“Is it growing? How could it not be growing,” Rosenberg said on CNBC.

“We’ve got four years of trillion-dollar-plus deficits, we have a Fed balance sheet that’s tripled in size, zero policy rates for three years. Of course you’re going to get some growth.”

It’s that kind of artificial growth that should worry the country.

“If you want to take a big-picture perspective, this goes down as the weakest economic recovery ever, despite all the ramp up in government stimulus, and that really tells you something.”

While unemployment rates continue to fall, warm weather deserves more credit than policy.

Up to 40 percent of those jobs are weather-related, such as construction jobs coming on line earlier than scheduled.

Warm weather also gave more Americans money to spend due to lower heating bills, which further distorts economic reality.  “Employment data were affected by the seasonal adjustments,” Rosenberg says.

“It felt like March in February, and if you apply the March seasonal factors to February, employment would have actually declined.”

I get frustrated with the baseless cheer leading of the NAR and Mortgage Bankers Association because blowing sunshine up our skirts is preventing us from dealing with the very real structural problems we are most assuredly still facing today… as we were four years ago.  To-date we continue to largely run-in-place, economically speaking, and we wouldn’t be if we weren’t deluding ourselves with the idea that “hope” is a strategy for future growth.  Because, the only thing you get with Hope… is Crosby.

 

Mandelman out.

Mar
21

A Must Read on the Financial Crisis

Bethany McLean has a must-read article on Reuters about the role of the SEC's 2004 change in broker-dealer leverage requirements in the financial crisis.  The article thoroughly debunks the argument that "the SEC did it" by loosening broker-dealer deregulation. 

I'm really glad to see this article because there is so much sheer nonsense circulating around regarding the financial crisis and its causes. The "CRA-made-me-do-it" and the "it was the GSEs" arguments have been debunked in plenty of places, but it's good to see someone run down the SEC net capital rule argument. Irrespective of the 2012 election, I suspect we're in for a strong dose of self-serving financial crisis revisionism from financial institutions and anti-regulatory ideologues over the next few years as we hear arguments that there's "too much regulation" of banks.  

(Mind you, I'm often sympathetic to arguments that particular regulations are bad regulations, but the "too much regulation" argument is the surest sign that the proponent has no interest in whether regulation is done well; it is an argument against regulation, period, and that's a position that ideology should trump good government, facts be damned.)  

Here's a simple test of whether there is too much regulation of the banking sector:  what's the demand for banking charters?  I am unaware of any banks deciding to throw in the towel and surrender their charters, and I'm also unaware of any lack of demand for a banking charter.  The question isn't whether financial institutions can operate profitably--it's a question of how profitably.

From a public policy perspective, the specific level of profitability is irrelevant, as long as there is enough profit potential there for private risk capital to step up and provide financial services to society. The continued presence of private risk capital is a shibboleth of "overregulation." It's pretty clear that we haven't hit "peak banking" yet. 

I've found this to be a very hard conversation to have with people in the financial services industry, as many have a hardwired mindset that there is an entitlement to a particular level of profits (and that level can only increase). I guess this is the "endowment effect" in a corporate setting. But it's so fundamentally part of the worldview, that any action that might as an incidental effect reduce (as opposed to eliminate) profits is viewed as beyond the Pale of civilized activity.  

Mar
20

Atty. Bruce Levitt of Kemp v. Countrywide – A Mandelman Matters Podcast


The more you learn about the Kemp v. Countrywide case, the more you realize how unlikely it is that anything like it will ever happen.  This was the case on which the banking industry went to school.  On behalf of the plaintiff, was New Jersey’s own, bankruptcy and foreclosure defense attorney, Bruce Levitt, of South Orange, who actually had taken over the case from another lawyer only a couple of weeks in advance of the trial.  Not a whole lot of time to prepare, as big, complicated law suits go.

However, as luck would have it, Bank of America’s star witness was Linda DeMartini. (See graphic at top of page, lol.)

Linda kind of stole the show right from the beginning, and made the plaintiff’s case seemingly within a few minutes of taking the stand, not that Bruce Levitt didn’t handle everything brilliantly, mind you… he absolutely did.

Join Bruce and me, as we talk about the Kemp v. Countrywide case, about a much anticipated New Jersey Supreme Court decision, and a whole lot more.  Just turn up your speakers and click PLAY, on this… A Mandelman Matters Podcast.

Mandelman out.

Mar
16

Katie Porter Named Independent Monitor for California’s Part of National Mortgage Settlement

California Attorney General Kamala Harris has appointed Credit Slip's own Katie Porter as independent monitor for California's part of the national mortgage settlement. The five financial institutions involved in the settlement have committed to provide California homeowners with up to $18 billion in benefits in the settlement. Katie will be monitoring on behalf of the California AG to ensure that they comply. For details, see http://oag.ca.gov/news/press_release?id=2646 and http://www.latimes.com/business/money/fi-mo-banks-settlement-20120315,0,5768422.story. Congrats to General Harris on a wise choice!

Now for the local news: Although Katie won’t be commenting here on the national settlement or California’s part of it as a Credit Slips blogger, she will still be able to comment on other issues involving consumer credit and consumer bankruptcy, as time permits. She will also continue to be a law professor at the University of California-Irvine. We also wouldn't be surprised if she builds some empirical research into the monitoring process, given her commitment to data-driven legal enforcement and policy-making.

Mar
16

Promoting Integrity in the UCC Article 9 Recording System

On January 1, 2011, Larry files a UCC-1 financing statement against David indicating David's equipment as collateral. At this point, David doesn't even know Larry, has not given him a security interest, and has not authorized this filing. On February 1, 2012, David meets and borrows money from Larry and signs a security agreement listing equipment as collateral (which, under UCC 9-509, automatically authorizes the filing of a financing statement against equipment). What is the relevant date for determining Larry's priority? The language of Article 9 itself strongly implies that February 1, 2012 is the relevant date. UCC 9-509 makes clear that financing statements are not valid unless authorized by the debtor - a pretty minimal burden to cloud the debtor's title. But a little-discussed 2010 amendment to the official comments of Article 9 says otherwise: to the drafters, if the filing is later authorized, Larry gets the benefit of the 1/1/2011 filing date for purposes of the "first-to-file-or-perfect" rule and other priority rules or competitions. 

The most relevant portion of the new paragraph (an addition to comment 4 to 9-322) reads as follows:

"When a financing statement that is ineffective when filed becomes effective thereafter, the policy underlying the notice-filing system determines the 'time of filing' for purposes of subsection (a)(1). For example, the unauthorized filing of an otherwise sufficient initial financing statement becomes authorized, and the financing statement becomes effective, upon the debtor's post-filing authorization or ratification of the filing. See Section 9-509, Comment 3. Because the notice value of the financing statement is independent of the timing of authorization or ratification, the time of the unauthorized filing is the 'time of filing' for purposes of subsection (a)(1). The same policy applies to the other priority rules in this part."   

Recent comments on a commercial law listserve suggest that the drafters viewed this comment as an expression of current law. Whether or not that is the case, this issue deserves more sunlight and discussion. Authorization as the relevant date is, of course, messier than the bright line of the unauthorized filing. But any such benefits must be weighed against the negligent or even fraudulent behavior encouraged by this interpretation. This kind of official comment practically invites parties to file unauthorized financing statements against potential debtors because of the priority advantages associated with early filings. Article 9 gives a debtor damage remedies and the right to request termination of an unauthorized statement, but exercising these rights takes time and resources. Why shift the burden this way? Promoting a notice filing system doesn't seem to be enough of a justification.      

My sense (which could be wrong) is that many people who might be similarly concerned are unaware of this amendment to comment 4 of 9-322. But it isn't too late to generate more discussion about it. According to the Uniform Law Commission website, the majority of states have not yet enacted the 2010 amendments to Article 9.  

Mar
15

The Real Question re Goldman

Why doesn't Goldman have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements?

Mar
14

HUD Inspector General fills in some details on robo-signing and other abuses

For those without enough reading after the legal document dump on Monday in the national mortgage settlement (see http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/03/national-mortgage-settlement-details-posted-on-the-web.html), there's more. Also released Monday were five audit reports about the robo-signing and other abuses in the foreclosure processes of the five financial institutions involved in the settlement. http://www.hudoig.gov/reports/featured_reports.php These reports indicate that higher ups were directing many of the abuses, evaluating line employees based on high volume production of documents without concern for their accuracy.

Mar
14

Of Babies and Bucks

The Credit Slips bloggers are engaged in a virtual enterprise, which means we sometimes don't see each other for a long time. One of my fellow bloggers recently asked "What's up?" and learned that I had a new baby three months ago. That experience, along with trying to stem the tide of "I want it! I need it!" that comes with having two preschoolers during the holidays, has left me thinking about how we teach children about money, debt, and consumerism.

There apparently is very little research on financial education for children ages 2-7. Chapter 3 in Consumer Knowledge and Financial Decisions (ed. Douglas Lamdin; Springer 2012), explores the relationship between cognitive development and children's understanding of personal finance. I found its identification of the key concepts of personal finance for young children helpful. They list:  numbers, time, income, markets and exchange, institutions, and choice. They also explore how some concepts emphasized in young children, for example being "nice" or "fair", are hard to square with the idea of a financial transaction as a matter of price and market conditions. For me personally, this explained a great deal of the reasons that the Monopoly board game has for generations resulted in children in families fighting with each other!

The Wall Street Journal had a recent article that reviewed several money games for kids. Disney, Visa, and several other companies have online games that aim to teach money skills. They include fun gimicks like the "inflation wolf." Even Sesame Street has ventured into financial education for young children, as shown in this clip reviewed by PBS. My oldest son's kindergarten class requires the children to "price" the daily snack they brought for the class. All the kids have a stock of coins that they use each day to "purchase" the snack. My little financial wizard Luke has priced his snack every time at 10 cents--for 7 months now! (I think we can rule out a career as a corporate finance  lawyer at Wachtell for the little guy).

I know in my house we aren't going to do allowances or paying for grades. But I haven't gotten much further than this as a way of showing the value of a credit card. Suggestions welcome! What strategies have you used in teaching your children about financial concepts? What did your parents do that worked or did not work?

Mar
13

United States Sued and Settled Suit Against Major Mortgage Servicers for Unfair and Deceptive Practices

To add to Jean's post on the National AG's mortgage settlement, we now have a copy of a complaint that formed the basis for the AG settlement, in which the United States of America (along with all the states but Oklahoma) sued most of the major  servicers for committing misconduct in connection with the origination and servicing of single family mortgages. Here is the complaint (Download US v Servicers), but to give you a flavor the suit alleges, among other things, failing to discharge underwriting obligations, failing to do modification underwriting, losing the paperwork, failing to train or maintain sufficient staff to deal with the modification processes, allowing borrowers to stay in trial modifications for excessive periods of time, wrongfully denying modifications, misleading consumers in connection with modifications, and foreclosing while a customer is in modification.

Mar
13

I’m Confused

What, exactly, is so gosh-darn newsworthy and exciting about the fact that distressed debt investors exist, and want to buy claims in MF Global? 

Mar
12

National Mortgage Settlement Details Posted on the Web

So maybe there is a settlement after all. Details have been posted on the National Mortgage Settlement web page today. http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ I won't try to summarize all this here immediately, but stay tuned for analysis of the good, the bad and the ugly. News outlets are reporting that settlement documents were also filed in federal court in Washington, D.C., today. The documents filed include a complaint and five consent judgments with hundreds of pages of detail on the settlement but much less on the underlying offenses. The settlement with state and federal regulators was announced February 8, and details have been eagerly awaited since then.

Mar
11

Girl Scouts Add Consumer Finance to the Badges

People with young girls may already have heard about this. Girl Scouts has rolled out a few new badges just in time for its 100 year anniversary. The badges have not been changed since 1987. Good bye fashion and makeup, hello Science in Style which covers nanotechnology in fabric and the chemistry of sunscreen. The new badges include thirteen related to financial literacy, that look like this. They include money counts, making choices, money manager, philanthropist, business owner, savvy shopper, budgeting, comparison shopping, financing my dreams, financing my future, on my own, and good credit. The "Financing My Future" badge requires girls to create a plan for paying for college, and the "Financing My Dreams" badge requires demonstrated skill in budgeting. "Good Credit" requires an understanding of the various ways to borrow money and what goes into building a good credit score.

As a daily finance article put it, “most of us understand intuitively that the Girl Scouts of America aren't just about selling cookies. What you might not know is that the green-sashed entrepreneur who preys on your weakness for Thin Mints is also preparing to be your son's boss." That's girl power you can take to the bank!

Mar
06

At Last, A Credible Threat of Default: Too Little-Too Late Eupdate?

At long last, Greece is starting to resemble a normal restructuring--you know, the kind where the debtor just might not pay if it does not get the relief it is asking for. Everyone else has done it this way, including the proverbial opposites, mean Argentina and nice Uruguay--but not Greece.

From the start, Europe's crisis management strategy has revolved around flatly denying the possibility of default within the Eurozone. This strategy has given us record-deep yet voluntary haircuts, bizzarre contortions to exempt central bank holdings, and mass confusion around CDS triggers. But even as it denied the possibility of nonpayment--thereby denying Greeks the smidgeon of agency debtors enjoy at the precipice--Europe failed to proffer an alternative "or else." As a result, creditors might be forgiven for wondering whether the alternative to haircuts just might be payment in full. Next to payment in full, the offer of English law in restructured bonds looks like a pathetic consolation prize (they will not survive the next restructuring anyway).

And so a bunch are threatening to hold out on the eve of Thursday's exchange deadline. This is not the long-lost evidence of creditor coordination problems to support calls for sovereign bankruptcy--presumably, countries that do not default do not file either--but rather proof that if you keep swearing you will pay, people will take you up on it.

Now at last, with 48 hours to go, Greece has (sort of) promised to default if the offer fails. With so much on the line, it feels like we are cutting it awfully close.

Mar
06

No Surprise: Bankruptcy Filings Jump in February

Monthly Filing Trends 2008 to 2011

Bankruptcy filings rose in February, but the spike in filings keeps with historical trends. According to data from Epiq Systems, there were over 104,000 bankruptcies in February 2012. Spread over the 20 business days during the month, the daily February filing rate was 5,221 as compared to only 4,399 in January. This is a rise of 18.7% in one month, a matter of concern perhaps at first glance but no surprise on further analysis.

It seemed time to update a chart I have used in the past. The graph to the right shows month-to-month changes in the daily U.S. bankruptcy filing rate from 2008 through 2011. Late winter and early spring always see a spike in bankruptcy filing rates -- the cylicality persists even in previous years.

The graphs also show an amazingly consistent trend where the daily bankruptcy filing rate slowly erodes throughout the year. A simple regression on each year implies that the daily filing rate erodes an average of around 1.3% each month from its high in the early part of the year. This downward trend over the course of the year is true even in years like 2009 and 2010 when the total annual bankruptcy rate increased as compared to the previous year. Thus, when bankruptcy filings go up on an annual basis, the bulk of the increase comes in the early part of the year.

Looking at where we have started, it looks more like 2012 will see another decline in bankruptcy filings. Instead of an increase, bankruptcy filings continue to go down. On a year-over-year basis, the February 2012 daily filing rate is a decline of 9.5%.

Although it is still early to put too much stock in such an analysis, extrapolating the filing rate for the first part of 2012 suggests that there will be just under 1.3 million total bankruptcy filings for the year. For comparison, in 2010, just two years ago, annual bankruptcy filings were 1.56 million.

The reason for the decline is two-fold. First, there was less consumer borrowing happening in 2008 and 2009, leaving less of an "inventory" of debt for bankruptcy discharge today. Second, consumers who are living close to the financial edge and who might be candidates for bankruptcy are finding it a little easy to come by more credit today than was true a year ago. This marginal extra bit of liquidity can be enough to stave off a bankruptcy filing. Looking at the long term -- two or three years out -- I would expect to see bankruptcy filing rates begin to move back up as consumers' balance sheets begin to fill back up with debt. Any contractions of the availability of consumer credit also are likely to lead to increases in the bankruptcy filing rate.

Mar
06

Loyola Chicago Law School Hosts Symposium on the Effects of Crisis

Image1A couple weekends ago, I attended a conference at Loyola Chicago School of Law on the Effects of the Financial Crisis on Consumers.  In one panel, Creola Johnson from Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law, gave a fascinating talk on punishments that should ensue for various fakers (fake landlords), breachers (owner-landlords who are collecting rent and not paying the mortgage), deceivers (foreclosure rescue scammers), and slackers (banks and bulk property buyers), which include putting the fraudsters’ photos on big billboards, along with what they did, like this:

Chris Petersen of Utah law provided a clear description of how MERS works and a great summary of the status of some of the pending litigation. Fellow blogger  Alan White of Valparaiso (but visiting at CUNY right now) gave a very useful description of the missing documents mess, especially helpful to me in a case in which I just wrote and amicus brief.  I especially liked it when he said that he knows of no case in which a plaintiff-lender has prevailed in a foreclosure when challenged without producing the original note. Kathleen Engel of Suffolk posed various creative solutions to the crisis, including non-bankruptcy cramdown ideas. Later in the day, after a fantastic luncheon speech by Dan Lindsay of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago about real world harms of the crisis on clients, Albany Law professor Elizabeth Renaurt enlightened us on the problems in non-judicial foreclosures and possible solutions, including some that’ll make them more like judicial foreclosures, and Richard Alderman of Houston Law Center discussed the intersection of fair debt collection cases and arbitration clauses. Dee Pridgen of Wyoming School of Law and Max Huffman of the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law both discussed various behavioral economics theories in two different contexts, including Truth in Lending and many other consumer laws for Dee and antitrust for Max.  Stay tuned for the upcoming issue of the Loyola consumer Law journal, which will publish the papers coming out of the conference.

 

Mar
06

CFPB to Share Information with Attorneys General

Carter Dougherty of Bloomberg reports this morning that  the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is entering into an  information-sharing agreement with state attorneys general, that will help states enforce consumer protection laws. The agreement will “establish a general framework to share data on consumer financial protection issues,” according to an advance copy of a speech Cordray will give to the National Association of State Attorneys General later today in Washington. Cordray will also collaborate with state AGs offices on a “national strategic plan” to address abuses in various areas, but debt collection, an area regulated on both state and federal levels,  was specifically mentioned.  I can think of a couple of other areas where such collaboration would also be useful, but this is a good start.  

Mar
06

Lehman’s Plan Goes Effective

Leaving one third of the historically significant insolvency case complete-ish (I count London and SIPA as the other bits).

Download The Notice

Mar
06

Evaluating Mandatory Financial Education in Bankruptcy

In 2005, Congress amended bankruptcy law to require individual debtors with primarily consumer debts to complete an "instructional course on personal financial management" to be eligible to receive a discharge of their debts. Adding financial education as a bankruptcy requirement divided the bankruptcy community, even debtor advocates, judges, academics, and others who almost uniformly did not like the 2005 amendments. Part of the mixed sentiment about the financial education may be that it is hard to dislike something as innocuous-sounding as education (although Professor Lauren Willis makes a good case against it in this article). And there were certainly bigger fish to fry in opposing the 2005 laws. Still, many complained that this was one more example of creditors getting Congress to lard on duties for debtors, driving up the cost and work of obtaining bankruptcy relief and setting up debtors to have their cases dismissed if they tripped up by failing to complete the educational course.

Dr. Deborah Thorne and I have a new study that looks at how debtors themselves feel about the mandatory financial education course. It is a chapter in this book, Consumer Knowledge and Financial Decisions (ed. Douglas Lamdin, Springer, 2012) and available to read here. In the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, we asked debtors whether they believed that the information from the financial education class 1)would what they learned in the financial education class have helped them avoid bankruptcy originally, and 2) would help them avoid financial trouble in the future. While only 33% thought a financial instruction course similar to the one required of bankruptcy debtors could have helped them avoid filing, 72% thought it would help them avoid future financial trouble. As we report in detail in the chapter, some demographic groups were much more positive about the value of financial education than others.

About half (48.7%) of minority persons who filed bankruptcy, for example, thought the course would have helped them avoid bankruptcy; for whites, the response was 27.6%, a little more than half. Similarly, there significant differences in the perceived value of financial education--both to have helped prevent their bankruptcy and to help them keep out of future financial trouble. Those without a college degree, those aged under 25 years or 65 years or over, and those who less familiar with their household finances believed the course had more value. Note that the point is not that the course actually would have or will help debtors; the measure here is debtor's perception of value, which I think is well worth evaluating in a system that is designed to rehabilitate debtors.

Thorne and I suggest that the U.S. Trustee program take a little initiative and go beyond just approving providers of financial education based on vague curriculum standards. Instead, it could  develop tailored curricula for different demographic groups. Doing so would make the most of the opportunity to teach debtors and perhaps help provide value to the segment of debtors who did not find the course useful. This isn't a new idea; indeed, more than three years ago John Rao wrote on Credit Slips  about the need to go away from a general financial education curricula toward one that reflected the consequences of having filed bankruptcy (including differences in experiences depending on the chapter of bankruptcy filed). And in a prior study, Thorne and I noted that bankruptcy education could warn debtors about things like the heavy solicitations after bankruptcy with subprime borrowing offers (reported in detail in this study). But the U.S. Trustee curriculum standards are pretty vague and sound like something from a junior high home economics class: budget development, money management, wise use of credit (my favorite lecture topic to a group of people who just filed bankruptcy!), and consumer information. Mandatory financial education is here, and I suspect in my lifetime it will not disappear from the bankruptcy system--even if a radical overhaul is made. Why not make the best of the law with sophisticated, tailored curricula? Debtors are generally making the best of the mandate; the system should meet these financial education optimists more than halfway with strong curricula.

Mar
05

Confidence Game Documentary Trailer – The Demise and Collapse of Bear Stearns

Confidence Game – The Film Unraveling Mortgage Fraud There were bells and whistles going off,” said Nick, “in advance of the firm’s eventual collapse.” Listen to excerpt clip here. The money was flowing in to fund the trusts/bonds and mortgages were being written as fast as they could to fill the orders. This is starting … Read more Related posts:
  1. Lions & Tigers & Bear Stearns – OH MY! Securitization Fail (REMIC in FHFA v BoA Lawsuit)
  2. E-mails Suggest Bear Stearns Cheated Clients Out of Billions and Now JPMorgan May Be on the Hook
  3. Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-4 v. EMC Mortgage Corp | JPMorgan Sued for $95 Million Over Mortgage Securities
Mar
05

No Mortgage Deal but Banks get Free Pass

The national mortgage settlement among federal and state regulators and major banks, announced with much fanfare on February 8, still has not produced an actual written settlement agreement, judging by the dead link on the settlement web page. That hasn't stopped the Treasury Department from announcing that Chase and BankofAmerica will receive millions in HAMP payments previously being withheld because the banks were not complying with promises they made in their contracts with Treasury to modify loans. The announcement does not say the banks are now in compliance. This is a bit ironic, given that the point of the settlement was supposed to include improving mortgage servicer performance in preventing foreclosures. It does not bode particularly well for enforcement of any future promises made by the banks in the someday-to-be-released settlement.

Kudos to Arthur Delaney at HuffPo for reading the press release, with the anodine tag line "Obama Administration Releases February Housing Scorecard," all the way through.

Mar
01

New Jersey Supreme Court’s Guillaume decision meaningless – Should foreclosure defense rethink its strategy?

 

 

The foreclosure wars have always had two easily identifiable sides.  It’s homeowners in one corner… and banks and mortgage servicers in the other.  In the beginning the battle was largely over TILA and RESPA claims.  After that, we fell into loan modifications, and then into the HAMP guidelines that were never really followed by the servicers, or if they were on occasion, no one could tell.

 

Lawyers who went to court over HAMP “rules” quickly discovered that they were more like pointers, intimations, tips, or perhaps clues… but whatever they were, HAMP had no teeth, and if there was anything that could be construed as a rule or law, then there was no private right of action.  And as far as the HAMP contract between Fannie Mae/Treasury and the participating servicers, well… forget about it because borrowers were not considered third party beneficiaries to that contract.

 

I never liked any of these decisions one bit… and I still don’t.  But I’m no lawyer, so I went along with whatever the foreclosure defense attorneys thought best.  Obviously, on these points at least, the fix was in, so I climbed on the bus and went on down the road.

 

We arrived at the battleground called “securitization fail,” and soon everybody on the homeowner side was learning to sing a new version of their ABCs that went like this… A to B, B to C, C to D, which represented the steps required to properly negotiate a note into a REMIC trust, steps that were almost never followed… or maybe never followed.

 

The argument, however, was a technical one and judges weren’t exhibiting much patience for the technical learning that was required to understand the argument.  It seemed that the judges were having trouble seeing past the 300 cases on their dockets and the homeowner who hadn’t paid their mortgage payments in over two years.  The argument may very well have been rock solid, but many lawyers came back from court reporting that their judges had heads that were solid as rocks.

 

 

Next up was the media darling “robo-signing,” a practice that created documents to be filed in the records that were forged or signed without knowledge of anything, or illegally notarized, or whatever else you could think of… the paperwork was all wrong.

 

This debate is still raging, but it hasn’t done a lot of good for many homeowners, truth be told.  It certainly has delayed things, in certain instances, and it even slowed the number of foreclosures filed during the year… but it’s certainly not keeping people in their homes in any number.

 

The bank and servicer side of this argument says that it’s just sloppy paperwork, technicalities causing no harm to borrowers… to which the foreclosure defense side replies, “YOU’RE BREAKING THE LAW… and then in response we hear, “IT DOESN’T MATTER.”  “YOU’RE BREAKING THE LAW.”  “IT DOESN’T MATTER.”  It’s annoying… I’ll certainly give it that.

 

Good Morning, New Jersey…

 

Well, yesterday the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in the Guillaume case, a much-anticipated decision, so I’d been told… and the ruling says that in addition to the servicer’s name and address, the lender’s name and address must appear on the document that states that a bank intends to foreclose on a mortgage.  (You’ll find a copy of the case at bottom.)

 

Earth shattering news?  Yes, I thought so too.  File this one right next to “Brown v. The Board of Education,” or “Plessy v. Ferguson.”  I’m sure law schools all over the nation are rushing to change their curriculums to add a class on the “Much Anticipated but Meaningless.”

 

 140 Elmwood Ave, East Orange, NJ

 

The case involves an East Orange, New Jersey home owned by Maryse and Emilio Guillaume.  The couple received a notice of intention to foreclose in May of 2008, and that notice included the name and address of the mortgage servicer, America’s Servicing Co., but it failed to include the name and address of the lender.  And somehow, this issue made it all the way to the state’s Supreme Court.

 

The state’s high court ruled that because the foreclosure notice that the servicer sent to the Guillaumes did not include the name and address of the lender in addition to that of the servicer, it did fail to comply with New Jersey’s Fair Foreclosure Act.

 

The court said that, failure to include such information creates the potential for “significant prejudice” to homeowners.  According to the high court…

 

“A misunderstanding about a lender’s identity could prompt a homeowner to make a critical error at a time when he or she is struggling to avert foreclosure.”

 

From the sounds of that, you’d think that the decision represents some sort of a win for homeowners, right?  Not so much.

 

While the court ruled that the lower court judge was wrong about the need to include the lender’s name and address on the notice of intent to foreclose in addition to the servicer’s, the ruling also said that the lower court was correct to order a default judgment against the couple. Specifically, the court ruled that the couple did not make a case for “excusable neglect” or a “meritorious defense” related to their foreclosure, so the Guillaumes still lose their home.

 

Additionally, the high court also reversed a separate appellate decision, known as “Laks.”

 

The Laks decision said that a foreclosure should be dismissed if the notice of intent to foreclose did not comply with New Jersey’s Fair Foreclosure Act, and by reversing that decision, now trial court judges that find a notice that’s fails to comply, will be able to either dismiss the action, or simply order a corrected notice, or even select another solution they deem appropriate.

 

So, now… after all this… while it’s true that the lenders name and address has to be included on the notice of intent to foreclose along with the name and address of the servicer’s, in the event that the lender’s name is missing, that will no longer necessarily mean that the foreclosure will be dismissed and the servicer will have to start over.  Now, the judge will have the discretion to simply order a corrected notice and allow the foreclosure will proceed.

 

Throughout last year, uncertainty over how the court would ultimately rule in this case led servicers to postpone foreclosures in New Jersey, and as a result foreclosures were down by 80 percent.

 

Now, I’m not saying that’s necessarily a bad thing, and if it were the goal, then I would call it a success. But, time is the natural enemy of a loan modification, because the longer the delay, assuming no mortgage payments are being made, the greater the amount of arrearages that have to be dealt with in order to modify the loan.

 

Now consider that reports all indicate that there are at least 100,000 New Jersey foreclosures that were stalled throughout last year, and that will now move forward.  That’s 100,000 or more homes that have less chance of being modifiable today than they would have a year ago.  So was the delay truly beneficial to homeowners?

 

I suppose for those that have no chance to  save their home by getting their loan modified, they got an extra year living in the house, but  even these people might have been better off dealing with it  a year ago and today being one year closer to rebuilding their credit and buying their next home, assuming that’s they’re goal.  The point is that a delay can be a dual edged sword, because it almost never leads to saving homes from foreclosure.

 

Lawyers that represent servicers all appeared quite happy with this decision because now a process that’s been clogged by uncertainty has been clarified by the court, and foreclosures will be free to move forward.

 

But it occurs to me… homeowners would not have been happy regardless of how this decision had gone.

 

I suppose I could be missing something, but I just don’t see a potential win in this case for homeowners no matter what.  It was from its outset, a lose – lose scenario.

 

Bloomberg, covering news of the decision, quoted Rebecca Schore of Legal Services of New Jersey, an attorney for the Guillaumes, saying that…

 

“While she was pleased with the ruling on the need to name the actual lender in a notice of intention to foreclose, she was disappointed that the court didn’t require dismissal of the complaint.”

 

Okay, I hate to say this but… does any of this really matter to homeowners?  Aren’t both positions merely a delay, and not much of a delay at that? 

 

I mean, one way the notice of intent to foreclose includes the name and address of the lender in addition to the servicer, and the other way the notice doesn’t.

 

It seems to me that we’re pretty much exclusively fighting for delays, these days… in the hope of gaining leverage… all to achieve one thing… an affordable and therefore sustainable loan modification, because that is the only way homeowners are remaining in their homes in any number.  Everything else seems to carry the odds of a Hail Mary at best.

 

 

Why are we giving our government a pass?

 

In February of 2009, our president introduced a plan that was to provide a path to precisely that, a sustainable loan modification, but when the participating servicers weren’t following that program’s rules, no one was willing to enforce them.  And because of that entirely unacceptable and unforgivable unwillingness to enforce the programs rules, our entire nation has endured unspeakable suffering and financial pain.

 

But we didn’t turn to our legislature to demand that something be done to correct the unjust situation, we followed other paths instead, perhaps for good reason.  But the fact remains that we have largely ignored the fact that the failure of HAMP is our government’s failure. As such, it is our government that should be held accountable.  And as this is an election year, it seems the timing for such efforts is fortuitous.

 

I’m certainly not saying that people and their attorneys shouldn’t be doing whatever they can to protect their homes, and I’m sure there are times when a delay is advantageous.  All I’m saying is that when the rules set forth by a federal program are being ignored it’s up to our elected representatives to do something to make damn sure those rules are followed because they were written in best interests of the program’s participants.

 

EPILOGUE…

 

The rules set forth under HAMP should be followed.  Now, with whatever the AG settlement says, we’re about to have a new round of rules… and since it’s possible that Congress will again refuse to enforce those rules, I believe that we should be working to structure and demand a private right of action and attorneys fees to allow homeowners and trial attorneys to turn to the courts for relief. 

 

To be blunt, it seems to me to be insane that our president should be allowed to announce and implement a $75 billion program designed to save homes from foreclosure, in order to rescue our economy and protect our middle class population, and then when program applicants are abused because program rules are not followed, that our legislature sit on their hands pretending that nothing can be done… as we go off to try other approaches.

 

It also seems ridiculous that a $75 billion program, three years after its launch, has only spent five percent of its budget, and no one says a word.  If we had a $75 billion program for rats and mice, and three years later only five percent of the budgeted amount had been spent, there would be people screaming about how we’ve underserved the rats and mice.  In fact, I don’t think I’ve ever heard of a government program under-spending to this degree.  Has it ever happened before?

 

 

 

Why is there no effort to hold the administration and member of Congress accountable for what has clearly been their failure related to the federal government’s loan modification initiative?  Why are we accepting such utter failure and holding them accountable for nothing, when in point of fact, their failure has cost the country trillions, and destroyed the lives of millions?

 

Instead it seems that we’re being corralled into a position where almost all of our efforts, even if successful, only have the potential to lead to a delay… a delay that in most cases reduces the potential to save the home.

 

We still have a democracy of sorts, do we not?  Isn’t it the responsibility of our elected representatives to protect us from abuses caused by inadequacies in federal programs?  Aren’t we supposed to be holding them accountable and demanding they so something. That’s how democracy is supposed to function, is it not?  Why are we not trying to force our democracy to function, as it was intended to function… as it has functioned for hundreds of years?

 

 

Or, what about at the state level?  Our AGs settled and let us down.  That much seems water under the bridge, so fine.  Well, I for one want the “new” servicer standards or guidelines to be more than mere suggestions… can they be codified at the state level.

 

I’d certainly feel a lot less let down by the AG’s settlement if the servicer standards were made into law that had a private right of action and a provision for attorneys fees because that would save homes and stop foreclosures, and it would do so more effectively than any amount of money.

 

Let’s UNITE homeowners around fairness, instead of DIVIDING them over delays…

 

I’m not talking about bailouts for borrowers, I just want the rules associated with a federal program to be followed and enforced, and I think every homeowner in the country should and would want that too, regardless of whether at risk of foreclosure or not at this moment.

 

Every homeowner in America should have an interest in federal programs operating as they were intended to operate.  It’s not about who is at risk of foreclosure and who isn’t.  It’s simply about being in favor of basic fairness in our federal or state programs.  And basic fairness, competence and accountability from our elected officials.  No one should, and few would, oppose any of those ideals, and those that suffered as a result of being deprived such fairness would engender sympathy from others.

 

Technically deficient paperwork, on the other hand, as was the crux of the Guillaumes decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, is an entirely different matter.  Guillaumes will appear to many to be a distinction without a difference.  Who cares if the lender is mentioned on the notice or not… the answer is most assuredly not many people.

 

It will also appear to be a transparent a stall tactic, since even if the judge were to dismiss a foreclosure that failed to comply with the state’s Fair Foreclosure Act, the remedy would simply be to begin again.  I realize that this would buy a homeowner some time, but it would not buy much, and the time it would buy would make it that much harder to get the loan modified, as time is the enemy of modifications.

 

The truth is, Guillaumes is what it appears to be… stalling… hoping for leverage, and losing a house to foreclosure.  And that does not engender sympathy from homeowners not facing foreclosure.  What it does is further divides those in foreclosure from those who are not.

 

Delays for technical reason are never going to make homeowners in foreclosure look good to those not in foreclosure.  Don’t shoot the messenger, but it’s one thing if you’re being treated unfairly… screwed around by a government program where participating servicers who are receiving money from the program are not following the rules.  That’s wrong in anyone’s book.

 

It’s quite another when it appears that all that’s happening is a delay of the inevitable based on what’s perceived as relatively trivial or technical, and that’s what comes to pass.  This decision helps no one but servicers, and does significant further harm to the image of homeowners at risk of foreclosures as “deadbeats” postponing the inevitable.

 

I believe it is to large degree indicative of a need to re-think our strategy on behalf of homeowners and the foreclosure crisis.  The track we’re on far too often has no win available, and can cause significant harm to the cause and the individual homeowners we’re trying to help.

 

 

I would appreciate responses to the ideas presented in this post, at least the  Epilogue… Thank you.

 

Mandelman out.

 

US Bank National Association v. Guillaume

Feb
27

BONY-Countrywide Settlement Removal Reversed by 2d Circuit

Lost in the attention to the state-federal mortgage servicing settlement is the other major servicing fraud settlement:  the $8.5B deal between BONY as trustee for various MBS trusts and Countrywide (Bank of America) over putback claims for securitization of mortgages that didn't comply with the requirements of the securitization documents.  

BONY filed an Article 77 action in NY state court, which is a CYA procedure for a court to bless BONY's actions as trustee.  A large group of institutional investors (the Institutional Investors) supported the deal, but many other MBS investors (and the NY Attorney General) intervened in opposition.  

The investors removed the case to Federal District court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), where the sharp-eyed district judge immediately saw what was up and noted that BONY was dancing around like a marionette with strings being pulled by BoA and the Institutional Investors, rather than acting as an independent trustee and fiduciary.  The removal order was appealed to the 2d Circuit, which reversed.  [Yves Smith is surprised that the NY AG did not file a brief supporting removal.  I'm not (and don't think it would have affected the outcome here).  State AGs have to be very careful about how they treat their state courts; these are relationships that affect many cases. Pushing for removal is not how an AG makes nice with home court judges.  Silence here speaks loudly.]

On the surface, this is just a venue ruling; it is not a substantive ruling on the merits of the settlement of the putback claims.  But there are real concerns in this case that venue matters--why else would BONY fight removal?

The reversal was because CAFA's removal provision has an exception for securities claims. The investors pushing removal argued that their claims were not related to securities but derived independently from NY trust law.  I'm sympathetic with these investors, but I'm having trouble seeing their argument under the statute--while BONY is a trustee, all of the trust's beneficiaries exist only by way of securities; absent the issuance of the RMBS, I'm not sure who BONY would be a trustee for.  Assets are held in trust for someone;  they aren't just held in trust.  The RMBS create the beneficiaries for the trust.  That's why the PSA is both the indenture for the RMBS and creates the trust.  I'm open to being persuaded otherwise, but from reading the 2d Circuit opinion, I just wasn't seeing the removal argument.  

That said, what is up with the 2d Circuit describing "Bank of New York Mellon, acting in its capacity as trustee of trusts established to hold residential mortgage-backed securities"?  BONY is trustee for a trust that holds mortgages, not RMBS.  The trust issues RMBS.  The 2d Circuit generally seems to get securitization, so this misdescription at the beginning of the opinion was pretty glaring.  

Feb
27

Littwin on Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer

A few weeks ago, Katie Porter noted the release of the new book, Broke: How Debt Bankrupts the Middle Class. We are trying to feature posts from the authors of Broke about their contributions. Today's post comes from Professor Angela Littwin of the University of Texas School of Law and a founding member of Credit Slips:

After a long absence, I am temporarily back on Credit Slips, blogging about my contribution to Broke, the new book edited by Credit Slips’ own Katie Porter. My chapter is about consumers who file for bankruptcy without a lawyer (known as filing “pro se”). The chapter is entitled The Do-it-Yourself Mirage: Complexity in the Bankruptcy System. which should give you a pretty good idea of my take on the matter. Using data from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, I found that pro se filers were significantly more likely to have their cases dismissed than their represented counterparts. My most interesting result deals with education. My analysis suggests that consumers with more education were significantly more likely than others to try filing for bankruptcy on their own, but that their education didn’t appear to help them navigate the process. Pro se debtors with college degrees fared no better than those who had never set foot inside a college classroom. I argue that bankruptcy has become so complex that even the most potentially sophisticated consumers are unable to file correctly.

This bad news, however, is not the entire story.

As I wrote my chapter, I started to think about how remarkable it was that the consumer bankruptcy system processes more than a million cases per year with relatively little fuss. Yes, things almost certainly got worse in the wake of the 2005 amendments. (When I compared data from the 2001 and 2007 iterations of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, I found that the percentage of dismissals had increased between the two years and that the 2007 debtors were plagued by motions to dismiss on technical grounds.) But my background is in poverty law, and when I compared consumer bankruptcy to other programs that serve financially struggling individuals – such as welfare or disability benefits – the bankruptcy system started to look pretty good.

The more I thought about it, the more I became convinced that the reason consumer bankruptcy worked so well might relate to the very problem I had started off with: the role of lawyers. Being unable to afford a lawyer puts some consumer debtors at disadvantage in our current bankruptcy system, but the fact that most debtors have lawyers – and paid lawyers, at that – may partially account for the fact that consumers don’t emerge from bankruptcy feeling abused and humiliated, as they do with the poverty programs. I called this observation “the affordability paradox” and expanded on it in a law review article by that name.

Feb
27

Economy Recovering? No, it’s not. Housing? NO. Unemployment? NO. Stock Market? NO.

A couple of quick clarifications related to stories now in the news:

 

A. NO, housing has NOT hit bottom.  If anyone tells you they think it has, just reply by saying: “Shut up, shut up, shut up, shut up.”  Until they go away.

 

The way things stand today, housing won’t “bottom” this year, it won’t bottom next year, and it won’t bottom the year after that, and should you come across someone who has money and disagrees vehemently, please give them my email so I can make some extra cash on the side.

 

How do I know this?  Well, I’ve been right since 2007 and that would be pretty remarkable if there was anything else that could possibly have happened… but there couldn’t have been, so the more interesting question is how can all these people running our show be so consistently wrong?  That’s the question, and I’ve asked it before… are they stupid or lying?

 

Housing can’t bottom because there’s essentially no demand for housing, okay… very little demand for housing… and you don’t need a calculator to figure this one out.  Follow me here…

 

  1. At least half the homeowners in this country are under water or effectively underwater, so they can’t move.  And they used to be about 66 percent of home sales, those who would sell a home in order to buy another one.
  2. Getting a loan today requires 20 percent down at least and a fairly high credit score, and we’re short a few million people with either of those things going for them, right?  (Average FICO at Fannie Mae still over 760.)\
  3. The only people selling now are those who have to, because this isn’t exactly the best time to cash in your equity position.  And the only people buying are trying to steal something.
  4. The burden of student loan debt continues to cause people to delay family formation, and that means fewer first time buyers than in the past.  (Allan Carlson PhD, president of The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society has an excellent research paper here.)
  5. There’s a shadow inventory, made up of homes that have gone back to the bank but are not being put on the market.  Why?  Because there’s no one to buy them, silly.  In Maricopa County, which is Phoenix et al, has about 16,000 properties listed in the MLS and roughly 112,000 REOs.  Beverly Hills has a dozen homes on the market at the moment, and 186 REOs.  Just for future reference, that’s not what a “bottom” looks like, millions of distressed and deteriorating homes being kept off the market.
  6. Foreclosures haven’t slowed down.  No they haven’t.  No… they haven’t.  Banks slowed down on foreclosing this past year because they were waiting for the AG settlement to provide them with immunity from the whole fraudulent paperwork thing.  They’re about to kick foreclosures back into high gear again, so NO THEY HAVEN’T.  And there’s no reason for them to.
  7. Is that enough, or do you want to hear about aging baby boomers, changing attitudes about homeownership, or consumer debt ratios?  ‘Nuf said, right?  If you want more, it looks like Michael Olenick has a great piece on this subject this morning on Naked Capitalism here.  (I haven’t read it all yet though, so let me know if I missed something important.  I’m pretty sure that he and I agree on most everything related to this subject.)

 

Just try to remember what I’ve said countless times… NOTHING goes down in a straight line.

 

Warren Buffett admitted yesterday that he was “dead wrong” about housing when he predicted it would recover by now.  That’s cute, isn’t it?  The billionaire made a boo-boo.  Ooopsie!  But, he’s still a billionaire and the people that listened to him in 2009 and 2010 are the current wave of foreclosures at FHA, which by the way, is the new sub-prime and the next bailout for sure.

 

Buffett has no idea what he’s talking about.  He’s been living in the same house in Omaha, Nebraska since 1958.  Have you been to Omaha, Nebraska?  Well, I have.  And the fact that some multi-billionaire is still living in the same house he bought in 1958 in Omaha is not quaint… it’s not “old school.”  It’s f#@king nuts.  Insane.  Weird.  Like, as in… needs some sort of clinician to diagnose it, sort of weird.

I don’t know what his deal is… but I’ll bet it’s difficult to pronounce.

 

B. NO, unemployment is NOT “down.”  The only thing that changed to any significant degree is the participation rate, which dropped to its LOWEST point in 29 years. 

 

That means that more people stopped looking for work, not that more people found it.

 

The participation rate sunk to 63.7 percent last month, which is the lowest since May of 1983!  Do you remember 1983?  I do, and it was God awful.  It means that roughly 88 million people in this country over 16 years old not only didn’t have a job, but weren’t even trying to find one.  Not even trying.

 

I’ll bet they’re a cheery, upbeat bunch.  Probably all out looking for houses to buy now that we’re hitting the bottom and all.  Maybe Buffett will put them to work so they can all buy homes in Omaha…. and then kill themselves.

 

The employment-to-population ratio, which is the percentage of Americans that have jobs… HAS NOT CHANGED AT ALL.  It’s 58.5… the SAME as it was in January 2010.  Oooh baby… what our dust, we’re recovering now.

 

 

Oh, wait.  That’s right… I totally forgot… everything’s fine… it’s a “jobless recovery,” remember?  So, why is Bernanke so worried about the whole unemployment thing anyway?  It’s “jobless” so we’re right on track, we’re in line with the forecasts… hitting the numbers perfectly.

 

 

The “headline” unemployment rate in which we like to bathe in this country only counts people who answer the phone and tell the survey taker that they’re actively looking for work.  And if more people were looking, then the unemployment rate would be a lot higher.  So, what Obama really needs is for more people to STOP LOOKING.  And if that doesn’t make you want to chew on glass all by itself, then I don’t really know what to say to you.

 

Seems like most folks are cooperating though, because at the beginning of this month, based on the latest census data, the Labor Department increased the number of working age people by 1.5 million, and of those 1.25 million were not even looking for work, so you gotta’ figure they’re all Obama supporters, right?  Just doing their part.

 

Bloomberg’s got the data here, in case you feel a need to check my numbers.

 

C. NO, the stock market at 13,000 doesn’t mean anything good.  Think of it as Bernanke pushing string. 

 

The Fed chief continues to do the only thing he can do, I suppose… come right out and promise low interest rates until at least 2014 and pump money into the system like a mad man.  The problem is that money isn’t exactly going places.

 

Since the recession in 2008, M1 money supply has increased by an absolutely jaw-dropping 60 percent, coming in over $2.2 trillion in January of this year, and with no end in sight… it’s going higher for sure.  And tons of cash makes the stock market happy, but today’s cash flood isn’t doing much for the economy.

 

Money supply is one part of the equation, but the other component to the deal is called “velocity,” and the velocity of money in this country has fallen off a cliff, going from 10.37 in late 2007 to 7.09 as of late 2011.  Ouch.

 

Velocity of money is about how fast money is changing hands, buying goods and services… you know, making for economic activity.  And the scads of money Bernanke continues to pump into the system with reckless abandon isn’t moving… it’s not changing hands… he’s just pushing string, get it?

 

 

As a result of all this, what they call the M1 “multiplier” has stayed below the 1.0 level for the last three years.  The multiplier effect is an economics term that refers to the amount of commercial bank money that’s created by central bank money.  So, it’s like the Fed increases it’s loans to banks and its purchases of government securities (called bonds) and by doing so pushes money into the commercial banks who are in turn supposedly “encouraged” to loan it out and earn interest, and thereby turn the Fed’s one dollar into more than one dollar.

 

Except it’s not happening, right?  In fact, between August 2008 and November 2009, bank reserves grew by 500 fold, from $2 billion to one trillion.  The banks didn’t lend it out.  They didn’t find the excess money very encouraging.  Do you know why?  Because they knew that we were getting screwed, that’s why.

 

They knew we were in debt big time, because they’re the ones that put us there, and they knew that we’d be getting no help from the government, so there weren’t a whole lot of people to lend it to without taking on too much risk.  So, they just kept it.  And that’s why I keep saying, it’s not a liquidity crisis, it’s a credit crisis.

 

So, you know you have a credit crisis if the money multiplier is 1, right?  Because if banks were lending the money out, the multiplier would have to be greater than one, right?

 

And when you have a credit crisis, then many people can’t buy houses, and that means that the prices of houses will go DOWN.  And that means that we won’t spend like we used to when our houses were worth a lot more and there was credit available, and that means companies will make less money and lay people off.  And that leads to more foreclosures, which puts additional downward pressure on house prices, which leads to more foreclosures still.

 

So… super low interest rates for an extended period of time… literally trillions in cash sitting in bank reserves with more being pumped into the system every day, but with the velocity of that money falling and a multiplier that stays at 1… add it all up and what do you get?

 

 

 

Well, on one hand you get a stock market that’s artificially pumped up by the Fed’s assurance of continued low rates, and a free flowing money supply.  But on the other hand you have anemic velocity, a multiplier stuck on 1, and unemployment that’s only getting worse, which means company’s won’t be growing they’ll be shrinking… so you has is an economy that’s deflating.

 

Bernanke would rather deal with just about anything than deflation, so he just keep a-printing and a-pumping hoping against hope that one day the banks will be so bloated with cash that they loan it to anyone that asks.  It’s really quite sad, if you think about it.  Poor little man… only knows one trick and when it isn’t working all he knows to do is just try it over and over again.  Makes me get all teary eyed, poor guy.  Someone should really teach him a new trick.

 

Last thing… take the artificially pumped up stock market and hold it up next to the dog-doo economy and what do you see?  You see some seriously over valued stocks, which is another way of saying that you see stocks priced to deliver some exceptionally poor returns to investors.

 

 

Because one day, the Fed won’t be able to pump, because the pump she will run dry, as all pumps do.  And then what will be holding up the market at these levels… uh oh… no clothes… run away!

 

Then you’ll hear, “Come Mr. Tally man, tally me banana,” and daylight will come and you’ll want to go home.

 

So… housing is not, not, not at bottom, – check.  Unemployment not improving – check. And does the stock market at 13,000 mean something to the economy?  Nothing good – check.

 

Oh yeah… and then there’s always Greece, et al.  Can’t forget them.  Opah!

 

You might want to bookmark this page, so as the election gets closer and thing get even better than they are today, you’ll be able to contain yourself.

 

Mandelman out.

Feb
27

Bank sues itself, wins, and then forces itself into bankruptcy to satisfy judgment


During the mortgage madness of 2003 – 2006, banks wore many hats related to the complex derivatives and mortgage-backed securities being packaged and sold to investors all over the world.  Then, the meltdown forced many mortgage originators into bankruptcy and saw numerous financial institutions become insolvent.  When the surviving banks acquired the various assets of the fallen… it became difficult or in some cases near impossible to ascertain from where certain risks might come.

 

Of course, the banking lobby has successfully resisted efforts aimed at breaking them up into more manageable entities, less capable of causing systemic damage to the global financial system.  The industry’s position seems to be that every thing is just fine.  Goldstein Such’s CEO, Lord Blankcheck, speaking at the dedication ceremony of the American Securitization Memorial, had the following to say…

 

“The size of our financial institutions is not the problem.  Just because in some instances I have not been aware that we created a market in which we took a significant position and then on another floor were aggressively shorting that position, should not be a cause for concern.  Remember, when that happened last year, we were able to unload our position as soon as we discovered it, and it was the Germans who ultimately took the hit.  That’s what we mean when we say our systems are both agile and resilient.”

 

Critics, however, point to a recent case involving HPMagnum Chaste who, after acquiring the assets of Snare Burns and Punxsutawney Federal, buying some of the default servicing rights of Hemann Bros., the trustee division of Bakeley’s, a pool of loans once owned by World Slavings that had been originated by Dog Beach Mortgage before being sold to Dowdy Savings & Moan, which was later acquired by USA Bunko, and then buying Credit Default Swap counterparty positions once owned by Goldstein Suchs, but used as collateral for repo agreements involved in the hedging of assets tied to the commercial paper markets, until in 2008, the global  financial behemoth began to arbitrage by becoming the bond holder and master servicer of a sub-set of loans that had been originated by Countrywide before BofA sold put options and preference shares to Morgan Stanley under an agreement whose terms may not be disclosed.

 

Apparently, Citibank was serving as trustee for the mezzanine tranches of some of the loans, and was the investor in the AA- 2-year CDO squared, but says the bank hired Wells Fargo to short AIG in order to protect itself from volatility in the asset-backed commercial paper market and the possibility of margin calls resulting from exposure to default by Greece, if it occurred in the third quarter of 2011, but through leveraging inverse interest rate swaps against bonds offered by Wachovia, through Merrill Lynch as trustee, IndyMac ended up as custodian, and servicer, with Deutsche as depositor.

 

In a bizarre twist of fate, when a homeowner is Shitsburgh, Tennessee lost his job at the local crayon manufacturing plant, and failed to make three months of mortgage payments, the entire structure unwound like a spring load bear trap, causing Moody’s to downgrade the country of Luxembourg from AA- to BB+, which forced MBIA to file for bankruptcy protection, and one of  Jamie Dimon’s vacation homes to be sold at a trustee sale.

 

Goldman Sachs, however, says that it will record an $11 billion profit from the compound transaction although a spokesperson from the investment bank says the firms is not yet exactly sure why.  “We know it’s a gain,” said Mimi Guffaw, a partner in charge of Goldman’s Double-barreled Default Anticipation Yield desk, known as D-DAY.  “It’s always a gain. We just can’t put our finger on precisely where it’s coming from.”

 

The Tennessee homeowner says that the whole thing started when his bank called him to tell him that he qualified and should apply for a loan modification.  He tried to explain that he had just bought the home a couple months back and had paid cash, but the Citibank representative said that it didn’t matter he would be receiving a Notice of Default later that month if he didn’t apply, or agree to pay 14 years of back taxes on the adjoining lot owned by a Danish concern.

 

In a related story, Bloomberg News is reporting that senior partners from cordovan loafer law firm, Mammoth, Pervasive & Bland LMNOP will testify in front of Senators Shelby and Bachus, along with several other members of the powerful Senate Banking Committee.  The two partners, Godim Pervasive and Arenti Bland told the senators that the new regulations imposed under Doss Frank requiring banks to keep track of their capital positions and disclose derivatives that leverage defaulting sinking funds with option-adjusted durations, are far too onerous and if not repealed, will make our nation as a whole unable to compete globally and deprive hundreds of thousands of retired rail workers of their dental plans.

 

Heinreich Svenerrrson Bjork-Hadern, Assistant Monday Morning economist for the International Literary Fund said they are studying the problem carefully, but at this point all they could say with certainly is that either Spain is on much more solid financial footing than previously assumed, or Canada has unexpectedly just gone into default, causing firefighters in Muncie, Indiana to ask AIG for $4 billion in collateral and leaving U.S. taxpayers to pick up the tab.

 

President Oblabla held a press conference to try and calm global currency markets by introducing the head of his new Global Asset and Confounded Equity Derivatives Exposure Security Task Force, known as GAACEDESTF.  No one noticed, however, and the president went to play golf with Herman Cain.

 

 

The Treasury Department is trying to unravel the global conflagration taking place in the over-the-weekend debt markets, which nobody had ever heard of, but apparently are crucial to keeping the power grid functioning in the mid-Atlantic states.  Former SIGTARP Neil Barofsky has promised to try to figure things out, but again suggested that in the future Ben Bernanke refrain from accepting baseball card collections as collateral for loans made by the Federal Reserve, that the too-big-to-fail banks not be allowed to do more than three or four things at a time, and that leverage of 200,000 to 6 is taking things a bit far.

 

Bernanke says he doesn’t see the problem, noting that the Fed didn’t actually take possession of the baseball cards in question; rather it created a new form of security that is being called a “Promise to Insure Structure and Securitize.”  Bernanke claims that by accepting PISS as collateral, the Fed is protected from fluctuations in the commodities markets that might otherwise lead to hyperinflation once oil prices have collapsed and the ongoing deflationary spiral has stalled.

 

“If something goes wrong, we won’t have the exposure that we might have had were we to be holding the actual cards, Bernanke explained.  Under this structure, no matter what happens, all we’ll have as collateral for the loans is the PISS.”

 

Bernanke closed by saying that he thinks the U.S economy remains strong, even though the reverse opportunity swaps now secured by the Social Security Trust Account will like cause the Singapore Sovereign Wealth Fund to foreclose on The second and third floors of The White House sometime this summer.

 

Clearly, the obfuscation of information conveyance from financial institutes to the end consumer is a paradigm best explained by specialist terminology synergizing with superfluously convoluted modes of communication.

 

 # # #

 

So, why did I write this?  Because it makes just as much sense as everything else that’s going on in this country, and at least it made me smile.

 

Mandelman out.

 


Feb
27

Robosigning 2.0: Coming to a Foreclosure Review Near You

Last October, I wrote a post entitled "Robosigning 2.0" that discussed some job ads for outsourced OCC foreclosure reviews. I predicted based on the job ad qualifications that the foreclosure reviews would be nothing other than a whitewash. The OCC doesn't want anyone digging too deeply into the solvency of the major banks or into the mess they've made of the mortgage paperwork system. Well, now there's evidence that this is exactly what's going on. The interview with this whistleblower is well worth reading. Put this one in the suspension of belief category:

Supervisors told his entire group that “Wells Fargo had submitted over 10,000 files to Promentory. Only 4 were found to be in question, and upon final review by Wells, no harm was found.” So, 10,000 homeowners submitted their complaints and all 10,000 were deemed to be models of perfection. 

It will be interesting to see the final figures on the reviews...if the OCC releases them. (Maybe I should brush up on my FOIA skills....) I really hope that mainstream news organizations pick up on this the way 60 Minutes did on DocX. I would say something about how we should be calling for the Comptroller's resignation, but who am I kidding. The story in consumer finance politics is that when it is banks vs. debtors, the debtors lose. That was the outcome in 2005. That was the outcome with cramdown. And that's the outcome with robosigning. There's no Association of American Debtors working the Hill. Consumers only win when the issue affects the middle class, not those falling out of it. Witness the CARD Act and the CFPB. And even those took a financial crisis of epic proportions. I worry where we'll be in five years once the memory of the crisis has faded and "it was overregulation's fault" revisionism has become respectible coventional wisdom for half of the polity. Sigh.  

Feb
27

Thank You to Philomila Tsoukala

Credit Slips has been fortunate to have my Georgetown colleague Philomila Tsoukala as a guest blogger the past couple weeks. The mainstream US media press coverage of the Greek financial crisis has focused on the dynamic between the Greek government and the EU, but as Philo's posts remind us, there is a complex internal dynamic in Greece, with the Greek population actually having to live with the deals its government keeps making.  Thank you Philo!

Feb
26

RDC App for Citibank?

Citibank is running commercials featuring the ability to deposit checks remotely via mobile device, a process known as remote deposit capture. Citi isn't the first retail bank to roll out RDC--USAA, for example, has been doing it for a while, but USAA has almost no branches, so checks have to be deposited remotely by their farflung depositor base.

There's no question that RDC will become a standard retail banking feature over the next few years, but I'm still puzzled how RDC will overcome its fundamental security problem:  multiple deposits of the same check. If I write a paper check to you and you deposit it remotely by sending in an image, you can still deposit/cash the physical check  elsewhere.  And you can, in theory, deposit the same check remotely multiple times. Moreover, the ability to deposit remotely means that check forgers don't need to bother obtaining magnetic ink, etc.  

There are things banks can do to limit the fraud risk, but RDC continues to appear very vulnerable to a coordinated kiting scam or other organized attack. I'm not sure what would prevent my cousin Boris in Odessa from making mass deposits of bogus checks and clearing out a whole bunch of accounts before anyone was the wiser, especially if he used a gang of smurfs.  It'll be interesting to see how long it takes before a bank takes a major loss from a RDC scam, if it hasn't happened already.   

[Updated 2.28.11:  Bob Meara, the leading RDC analyst, makes a very good point in the comments that makes me think I should clarify some points in the post, namely who is at risk with RDC.  The risk I was discussing is the risk of the depository banks, where the checks are deposited.  There is also potential risk for the bank on which the check is drawn, but that is a separate risk.  There really isn't much risk that I see for either honest depositors or honest drawers of checks.  If you didn't write the check, you shouldn't be liable, although there may be some hassle in getting your account recredited from a fraudulent draw.  

Instead, the issue here is the risk to the banks themselves, not to the payor or the payee.  There is a risk that the payor bank pays on multiple presentments of the same check, but as Bob Meara notes in his comment, that's an easy enough risk to address with computer systems that will allow only one payment on the same check number and check amount.  

The real risk is to the depository bank.  Banks have to make funds available per a schedule in Reg CC. The problem is that Reg CC sometimes mandates funds availability before checks have cleared--that is before the depository bank knows that the drawer bank will pay on the check.  Thus, the depository bank might pay out on a check, but be unable to collect.  There are ways to reduce the risk exposure here, such as deposit limits, neural networks looking for errant activity, and faster check clearing via electronic processing. (One wonders why check clearing hasn't become real time in most cases...) But the basic problem still remains--banks have to make funds available before they always know if they can collect on the check.  A smart fraudster will try and determine which checks will take the longest time to clear (my guess is that it means checks drawn on small banks) and try to clean out the funds made available before the depository figures out that the check has bounced. ]

Feb
24

Credit for Parenthood (in the Wall Street Journal)

Wall Street Journal Reporter Jessica Silver-Greenberg casts a spotlight on the market for fertility treatment loans - including loans that enable the purchase of other women's eggs  - in the article "In Vitro a Fertile Niche for Lenders."  (subscription required). Perhaps this will prompt some coverage of the adoption loan market, which also has very interesting not-for-profit lending options; the direct financial price of the credit may be low but some complicated strings are attached. My earlier efforts to broadly evaluate the impact of loans in these markets are here and here

Website Designed and Developed by Tampa Web Designer