Aug
16

Any Bright Ideas?

Jean Braucher has noted the FHFA's RFI on foreclosure prevention. A huge problem with any proposal is the time to implementation for anything. It took months to develop flops like FHASecure, Hope4Homeowners, and FHAShortRefi. Any program where the government and/or private parties have to do much gets a major ding in my book because by the time its rolled out and the kinks are worked out, it'll be too late.

So here are some thoughts. First, the government needs to settle on its policy goal. Why are we trying to prevent foreclosures? Is it a macroeconomic goal of stabilizing the housing market? Is it a macroeconomic goal of deleveraging consumer balance sheets? Is it a moral goal of helping unfortunates? Is it an electoral goal of making people feel that the government is doing something/is on their side?

Second, there are obvious limitations on what the administration can do. Anything involving legislation is a non-starter with this dysfunctional Congress. Rule-making too might be problematic. But there's plenty the administration can do without legislation or rule-making. What's upsetting is that the adminsitration doesn't seem to be giving any consideration to these options because it will involve some tussling with the financial sector. It's easier to pretend that its hands are tied by Congressional acrimony and that ideas don't exist. 

So let me throw out an idea: why not have FHFA order the GSEs as a safety-and-soundness measure to write-down the principal on all underwater mortgages?  Or to offer all underwater homeowners with GSE loans a shared equity refinancing? At the very least, this could be done no question on GSE portfolio loans, and with some smart lawyering probably also on GSE securitized loans. (And if there is securitizaiton fail with the GSEs, then they're all portfolio loans!) That deals with (1) strategic default/negative equity, and (2) consumer balance sheet deleveraging. It doesn't take much to expand that move to FHA/VA, bank portfolio loans, and to private-label (ah, what a squandered opportunity the servicing consent orders were...).  

Now this won't help with unemployment, but deleveraging consumers is the key to increasing consumer credit and increasing consumer spending, which is the key to increasing job growth. It's all connected.  It probably won't kick in until 2013-2014 (Maybe just in time for it to be known as the Bachman or Romney or Perry recovery?  If so, the GOP can thank the bank regulators), but it's the right thing to do. 

Aug
25

Unconstitutionality of a Power of Sale

THIS IS FROM REUBEN NIEVES. IT IS A GOOD PIECE OF WORK AND HE WANTS COMMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS. HE HAS A FINELY MADE POINT HERE AND IT IS SELF-EXPLANATORY.

I have always said that the power of sale raises constitutional questions — namely, that no  person should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The fiction is that you can waive that right by contract. That premise is questioned here. But in addition, this piece raises the stronger point that even if one were to conclude that it is possible to contract away your most basic constitutional rights (like agreeing to be a slave), the manner in which it is being applied in the era of securitized loans is clearly unconstitutional.

There is also the fiction that use of the power of sale is not state action and THAT evades the issue of constitutionality. The answer to that argument is that if there is no state action then there is no sale, there is no new owner, and there is no new deed. The proponents speciously argue that you can take one part of the foreclosure process out of the courts and call that private while the rest is state action rubber stamping a foreclosure sale without due process under a set of presumptions that in most cases no longer apply.

The arguments for judicial economy and waste of money that lay at the foundation of the statutes permitting non-judicial sale simply are not present anymore. The obvious identities of the proper parties, accounting for the entire transaction, and the inevitability of the foreclosure by default without any real meritorious defenses that existed when these statutes were passed, do not pass even the smell test in today’s environment.

But the court need not reach the constitutional question. It is also a matter of breach of contract, jurisdictional standing and procedural due process. Once the borrower OBJECTS to the sale on the grounds that he denies the default, or denies the default as to the pretender lender, or denies the standing of the would-be forecloser as a creditor at all, the question should be resolved in the courts with all the usual trappings of proper pleading by the party seeking affirmative relief (the one seeking foreclosure). The requirements of good faith pleading and joining issues to be tried according to the normal rules of evidence should apply.

As it stands now, the power of sale is being used as an end-run around the requirements that the borrower even owe anything, much less to the party seeking foreclosure.

PLEASE KEEP US IN THE LOOP OF THIS DISCUSSION.

REUBEN NIEVES: As an addendum to my prior comment on the unconstitutionality of a power of sale provision in a mortgage contract with respect to federally chartered bank corporations created for public and national purposes I am submitting my research to this site and invite any opposition or legal commentator to dispel or affirm my research

The issue is one of First Impression because the Supreme Court of the United States has never decided whether a federally chartered bank corporation created under an act of Congress to provide an important public and national purpose could use a non- judicial procedure that allows the taking of a property interest without a hearing thus violating the 5th Amendment. The Court, however, has made numerous decisions which would have been relevant in determining whether non-judicial procedures were applicable given the nature of these corporations. Though several appellate courts have had occasion to determine the constitutionality of non-judicial procedures in the form of a trustee sale provision, none have vetted the corporations seeking this remedy. The issue goes to the core of the nature of federally chartered corporations created under special law for public and national purposes. This issue deals with the right of these corporations to put such a provision in a contract and rests on whether the act of foreclosure is a governmental act or a proprietary act. It is an issue which, in the context of the current economic crisis and massive foreclosures, sweeps the breadth of this nation like a plague destroying families and communities as it spreads, swelling the homeless population in its wake. This issue involves a constitutional right affecting the lives of millions of families across this nation.
It would allow homeowner a level playing field with the banks to negotiate loan modification. If the bank had to take them to court, the homeowner could raise affirmative defenses and a right to a jury trial. I ask that you look at the arguments proffered in this letter to make your decision and that you act quickly.
ARGUMENT
I. BANK’S USE OF NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES
IS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF A LAW OF CONGRESS
To resolve the issue of the constitutionality of a trustee sale by National banks and federal savings associations , we must first identify the nature of the corporations . NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS are federally chartered corporations created under acts of Congress (The Homeowner Loan Act (HOLA) and the National Bank Act(NBA) for a public and national purposes. In Conference of Federal Savings and Loan Associations et al v. Alan L. Stein et al. 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Circuit) (1979) the court related the history of HOLA and the reason for its’ creation:
The Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461 Et seq. (HOLA), was the result of congressional dissatisfaction with state law and practice in the financing of home construction.
….. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the Bank Board) was created with extremely broad powers to promulgate rules and regulations. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) provides in part:
…[T]he Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as ‘Federal Savings and Loan Associations’ * * * and to issue charters therefore, giving primary consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States.” [bold added]

A. BANKS CAN BE A GOVERNMENTAL
ACTOR IN VIOLATION OF THE 5TH AMENDMENT
National banks and federal savings banks are agencies of the United States created to promote its fiscal policies. National banks and federal savings banks benefit by not paying state taxes, avoiding state predatory lending laws through the concept of Federal preemption, allowing them to export high interest for the credit card thus avoiding the state usury laws. Federal Savings banks also have the same benefits and are no less instrumentalities of the federal government than national banks whose purpose is to promote its fiscal policies. Alexander Hamilton argued that the Central Bank was necessary to the nation in cases of emergency such as the financing of war… Hamilton believed that there was a symbiotic relationship between agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing, and that progress in each of these sectors was necessary for America’s economic development. (In the Report of Credit II, Dec. 1790)

B. A PARTY MUST STATE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO STATE A EITHER A
5th or 14th AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAIM
Non-judicial foreclosures have been the subject of a flurry of cases including the most current Apao v. San Diego Home Loans, Inc.,324 F3d 1091, Ninth Circuit (2002) a California corporation. Margaret Apao lost her home to a foreclosure and sale under Hawaii’s non-judicial foreclosure statute. The federal district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and that the sale was a purely private remedy. Apao appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the grounds that previous decisions of appellate courts upheld the constitutionality of similar non-judicial procedures. The Ninth Circuit held in Apao that the case of Charmicor v. Deaner, 572 F2nd 694 “was controlling” although the consumers in Apao attempted to distinguish it. In Charmicor, the consumers claimed that the statute offended due process by failing to provide a pre-sale hearing and that it offends civil rights statutes and the equal protection clause by discriminating against appellant’s shareholders, who are black. The court in Charmicor noted that the “complaint failed to state a claim for relief under the civil rights statutes, because the record was utterly barren of any facts or allegations that could support a claim under the equal protection clause”, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court in these cases made no reference to several Supreme Court decisions which examined the nature of corporations created under an act of Congress and were content with the notion that Congress could adopt the local customs on debtor creditor relations without further analysis. The fact of the matter is that the issue should be determined under federal law.

C. NATIONAL BANKS ARE PUBLIC
NOT PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

In Easton v. Iowa,188 U.S.220 (1903) the Court said of national banks:
. . .[W]e cannot concur in the suggestions that national banks, in respect to the powers conferred upon them, are to be viewed as solely organized and operated for private gain.
The Court in Easton went on to say at 188 U.S. 220 at p. 230 that the principles enunciated in McCullough v Maryland, 17 U.S. 316(1819), and in Osborn v Bank of United States, 22 U.S.738 (1824), though expressed in respect to banks incorporated directly by acts of Congress, were still applicable to the later and present system of national banks. The Court cited with approval the holding of the latter as expressed by Chief Justice Marshall:
The bank is not considered as a private corporation whose principal object is individual trade and individual profit, but as a public corporation created for public and national purposes. That the mere business of banking is, in its own nature, a private business, and may be carried on by individuals or companies having no political connection with the government, is admitted, but the bank is not such an individual or company. It was not created for its own sake or for private purposes. It has never been supposed that Congress could create such a corporation.[bold and italics added]

The court in Easton goes on to say:

‘National banks are instrumentalities of the Federal government, created for a public purpose, and as such necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States. It follows that an attempt by a state to define their duties or control the conduct of their affairs is absolutely void, wherever such attempted exercise of authority expressly conflicts with the laws of the United States, and either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties for the performance of which they were enacted.

Our conclusions, upon principle and authority, are that Congress, having power to create a system of national banks, is the judge as to the extent of the powers which should be conferred upon such banks, and has the sole power to regulate and control the exercise of their operations…[bold, underline and italics added]
In view of the holding in Osborn which Justice Marshall held that banks were public and not private bank corporations, which was approved and held applicable to later national bank corporations not directly created by Congress by the Supreme Court in Easton, why should we now consider national banks private corporations? And why not consider them “agencies of the Federal government” as referred to in Easton? And why should the same reasoning not apply to FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS .
In Osborn at p. 22 U.S. 823 the court said of these national banks:
The charter of incorporation not only creates it, but gives it Every faculty which it possesses. The power to acquire rights of any description, to transact business of any description, to sue on those contracts, is given and measured by its charter, and that charter is a law of the United States. Take the case of a contract, which is put as the strongest against the Bank. . . [H]as this being a right to make this particular contract? .. . .[T]his question, too, depends entirely on a law of the United States [underline added]

The court in Osborn at p. 823, made it clear that federally chartered corporations created under acts of Congress could “. . .acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is not authorized by a law of the United States. It is not only itself the mere creature of law, but all its actions and all its rights are dependent on the same law”.[underline and bold added]
In an excerpt from Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505,509,510 ,citing Osborn, the court said:
A corporation has no powers and can incur no obligations except as authorized or provided for in its charter. Its power to do any act which it assumes to do, and its liability to any obligation which is sought to be cast upon it, depend upon its charter, and when such charter is given by one of the laws of the United States there is the primary question of the extent and meaning of that law;[underline & bold added]

In Runyan v. Lessee of Coster, 39 U .S. 122 , p. 129 (1840) the court Said:

…[T]hat a corporation “possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. That corporations created by statute must depend for their powers and the mode of exercising them, upon the true construction of the statute.
… The corporation must show that the law of its creation gave it authority to make such contracts.” . [underline and bold added]
Did the law of its creation (HOME OWNER LOAN ACT or NATIONAL BANK ACT ) give National banks and federal savings associations the right to make this contract with this provision?
Can it then be said that the provision in a mortgage contract requiring a mortgagor to transfer his rights to a trustee with a power of sale for the non-payment of a mortgage is authorized by the federal charter? Is this not the right to foreclose on an owner without resort to judicial process and a hearing? Is this not the right to deprive a person of procedural due process? We must then ask the question: Is the act of the national or federal savings association in foreclosing non-judicially within the scope of a law of Congress? Can the government by way of a federal charter authorize a right to a bank to do what it is forbidden to do itself? It is fundamentally clear that the government can impart no greater power through a charter than they possess themselves. The power to deny a person of procedural due process is denied to the government under the 5th Amendment and is equally denied to the banks. As John Locke said nearly 300 years ago: “…Nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself “ [John Locke, TWO TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II] The courts in Osborn and Shoshone and Runyan show us that the conduct of banks in pursuit of non-judicial foreclosures must be done under the authority of the federal charter which is a “law of the United States” and therefore “under color of federal law”. Thus National banks and federal savings associations Mortgage fsb could be considered a “governmental actor” like the assumption made by the First Circuit in Gerena v Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc., 697 F. 2d 447(1st Cir. 1983)

D. CONGRESS CANNOT AUTHORIZE OR
DELEGATE A RIGHT OR POWER THAT
IT CANNOT EXERCISE ITSELF
If all the acts, rights and obligations of corporations with federal charters must be done under the authority of the federal charter and a law of the United States, including rights created in contract, how can Congress authorize a provision that it could not exercise itself? The provision can only be validated by what it represents and the constitutional implications it may give rise to. In United States v Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) the Supreme Court decided that very issue and the court citing Justice Marshall at 220 US pg. 517 said.

It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. [underline bold & italics added]

E. A POWER OF SALE PROVISION UPON DEFAULT IS
ULTRA VIRES AND NULL AND VOID
As the Supreme Court said in Concord First Nat’l Bank v Hawkins 174 U.S. 364 p. 371:
The doctrine of ultra vires, by which a contract made by a corporation beyond the scope of corporate powers is unlawful and void and will not support an action, rests as the Court has often recognized and affirmed, upon three distinct grounds: the obligation of anyone contracting with a corporation to take notice of the legal limits of its powers, the interest of the stockholders not to be subject risks which they have never undertaken, and above all, the interest of the public that the corporation shall not transcend the powers conferred upon it by law.[bold added]
The powers of a corporation are express and incidental. Runyan at p. 129 supra. If Congress cannot confer the power to foreclose non judicially to National banks and federal savings associations then the provision is ultra vires and void.

II. THE LENDING FUNCTIONS OF
OF NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS ARE GOVERNMENTAL
In Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Co. of St. Paul, 314
U. S. 95 (1941) the court was faced with determining
whether the lending functions were proprietary or governmental. The court said:
The argument that the lending functions of the federal land banks are proprietary, rather than governmental, misconceives the nature of the federal government with respect to every function which it performs. The federal government is one of delegated powers, and from that it necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise of its delegated powers is governmental. Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 306 U. S. 477. It also follows that, when Congress constitutionally creates a corporation through which the federal government lawfully acts, the activities of such corporation are governmental. (cites)
As part of their general lending functions, the land banks are authorized to foreclose their mortgages and to purchase the real estate at the resulting sale. They are “instrumentalities of the federal government, engaged in the performance of an important governmental function.”(cites)
In Federal Land Bank v. Board of Kiowa County., 368 U.S. 146 the court said :

“the Federal Government performs no ‘proprietary’ functions. If the enabling Act is constitutional and if the instrumentality’s activity is within the authority granted by the Act, a governmental function is being performed.”
It is well settled that the enabling Act, Home Owner Loan Act (HOLA) is constitutional . Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21. Like federal land banks, the lending functions including foreclosures of federal savings assn’s/federal savings banks, such as National banks and federal savings associations Mortgage fsb, a federal instrumentality , should be treated as governmental just as the court in Bismarck held. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Co. of St. Paul, 314 U. S. 95, p. 102 (1941)
A. GOVERNMENT CANNOT EVADE ITS MOST SOLEMN CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS BY SIMPLY RESORTING TO THE CORPORATE FORM
Can Congress divest itself of its identity with a corporation created and participated in for a public purpose sufficiently to allow the corporation to use a procedure that does not allow a hearing? That question was asked and answered in Lebron v National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 513 U.S. pgs 374, 375 when the court said:
c) There is a long history of corporations created and participated in by the United States for the achievement of governmental objectives. Like some other Government corporations, Amtrak’s authorizing statute provides that it “will not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government,” [cite]
(d) Although § 541 is assuredly dispositive of Amtrak’s governmental status for purposes of matters within Congress’s control–e. g., whether it is subject to statutes like the Administrative Procedure Act-and can even suffice to deprive it of all those inherent governmental powers and immunities that Congress has the power to eliminate-e. g., sovereign immunity from suit-it is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions. The Constitution constrains governmental action by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken…
(e) Amtrak is an agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the Constitution. This conclusion accords with the public, judicial, and congressional understanding over the years that Government-created and -controlled corporations are part of the Government itself.(cites) ; A contrary holding would allow government to evade its most solemn constitutional obligations by simply resorting to the corporate form, Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907, 908 (other cites).
Like Amtrak, national banks and federal savings associations are federal instrumentalities and members in banking systems created for a public purposes and controlled by the director of The Office of Thrift Supervision and the director of the Comptroller of the currency. Like Amtrak it is not for Congress to make the final determination of the status of these corporations as government entities for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions. Consumers are citizens whose constitutional rights are affected when non- judicial foreclosures are exercised by federally chartered corporations like National banks and federal savings associations . To paraphrase an old saying, “that with great power comes great obligations.” This is no less true when Congress confers enumerated and incidental powers on a corporation it creates for an important governmental function. It must follow that with the immunities from taxation and state laws that frustrate the activities of corporations for which an act of Congress was enacted, the constitutional obligations of the government must also attach. For as Justice Scalia said in Lebron, at p. 399:
But it does not contradict those statements to hold that a corporation is an agency of the Government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government rather than the “privileges of the government,” when the State has specifically created that corporation for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and not merely holds some shares but controls the operation of the corporation through its appointees.
In this case control of the operations is exercised by the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision and the director of the Office of the Comptroller of Currency independent federal regulatory agencies vested with plenary authority to administer the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA) and the National Bank Act, The Director of the OTS is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. (12 USC §1462c) The Director of the Comptroller of the Currency is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate.(12 USC § 2) The issue of the government’s control over the operations of federal savings associations is clarified by the court in Fidelity Fed. S. & L. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) at p. 161 when the court said:
The broad language of § 5(a) expresses no limits on the Board’s authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans. As one court put it, “[I]t would have been difficult for Congress to give the Bank Board a broader mandate.” [cites] And Congress’ explicit delegation of jurisdiction over the “operation” of these institutions must empower the Board to issue regulations governing mortgage loan instruments.

In National Banks the governments control was made clear in Easton when the court said:
Our conclusions, upon principle and authority, are that Congress, having power to create a system of national banks, is the judge as to the extent of the powers which should be conferred upon such banks, and has the sole power to regulate and control the exercise of their operations…[bold, underline and italics added]

B. THE POWER TO FORECLOSE IS AN
INCIDENTAL POWER OF THE NATIONAL BANKS
AS WELL AS FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKS
The history of national banking legislation has been “one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental `powers’ to national banks” as well as federal savings associations[which include savings banks]. Bank of America et al v City of San Francisco et al 309 F.3d 551 (Ninth Circuit) (2002) Consider this hypothetical. The California legislature would makes a law that as a matter of public policy foreclosures of any kind will not be permitted on a homeowner’s primary residence. The OTS is charged with the supervision of the Home Owner Loan Act like the Office of the Controller of Currency is ”charged with supervision of the National Bank Act” NationsBank of N.C.N.A. v Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. 513 U.S. 252, 256(1995) The OTS and the OCC would promulgate rules allowing the banks to foreclose on the homes that have defaulted and in concert with the banks claim that the power to foreclose was an incidental power of national banks and also federal savings banks and therefore would preempt state law. The State would challenge that decision in court. Both Acts are silent on the necessity of banks foreclosures to secure the residential property in the event of default. The Acts, however, do bestow upon banks the authority to exercise by its board of directors, or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as necessary to carry on the business of banking. . .”12 U.S.C.§24(Seventh). The OTS authority to preempt state laws affecting its lending practices lies in 12 cfr §560.2. Because these sections are not explicit on the limits of “incidental powers”, an inquiry as to whether the NBA or HOLA would support the use of either one or both methods of foreclosures (Judicial foreclosures and/or non-judicial foreclosure) would be necessary. The holding in United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506(1911) would apply. The NBA or HOLA could authorize the former but not the latter because the government could not exercise the power to foreclose non-judicially itself.
C. NATIONAL BANKS AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS MORTGAGE FSB CAN BE
CONSIDERED “AGENCIES” OF THE GOVERNMENT
In Acron Investments, Inc. et al v Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation , 363 F.2nd 236 (9th Circuit, 1966) the court was given the task of determining if the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was an “agency”. After reviewing all the relevant code sections the court concluded that the corporation was an “agency” under 28 USC 451 because the control of the government over the corporation was more than custodial or incidental. In Acron at paragraphs 27 & 28 the court said:
…[T]he Reviser’s Note under 18 U.S.C. § 6 states that “The phrase `corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest’ is intended to include those governmental corporations in which stock is not actually issued, as well as those in which stock is owned by the United States. It excludes those corporations in which the interest of the Government is custodial or incidental.” (Emphasis added.) 28 …Since the control which Congress and the United States exercise over the Corporation is clearly more than “custodial or incidental,” it would appear that the Corporation fits within the definition of “agency” of 28 U.S.C. § 451 and thus within the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1345. [bold added]
Under the Ninth Circuit’s own test national banks and federal savings associations are “agencies”. Any doubt as to government’s control over the “operations” as being “custodial or incidental” is dispelled in Fidelity Fed. S. & L. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) at p. 161 when the court said:
The broad language of § 5(a) expresses no limits on the Board’s authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans. As one court put it, “[I]t would have been difficult for Congress to give the Bank Board a broader mandate(cites) And Congress’ explicit delegation of jurisdiction over the “operation” of these institutions must empower the Board to issue regulations governing mortgage loan instruments

With respect to National Banks the holding in Easton would apply as the court said:
Our conclusions, upon principle and authority, are that Congress, having power to create a system of national banks, is the judge as to the extent of the powers which should be conferred upon such banks, and has the sole power to regulate and control the exercise of their operations…[bold, underline and italics added]

CONCLUSION
The subject corporations cited share a common heritage with National banks and federal savings associations. They are corporations federally chartered and created under acts of Congress for important public and national purposes for which the Supreme Court has ruled on that premise in a number of cases that their activities were governmental. Thus in Bismarck the Court ruled that the lending functions were governmental not proprietary; and that foreclosure was part of the general lending functions. In Lebron, the Court ruled that the corporation was part of the government for the purpose of determining its constitutional obligations toward the rights of citizens affected by its actions.
The Ninth Circuit and other appellate courts have yet to apply the settled principles enunciated by these Supreme Court cases which lead to one conclusion— that National banks and federal savings associations’ use of a Trustee Sales(non-judicial foreclosures) must be a governmental acts and a 5th amendment violation of due process.
Constitutional powers conferred on a corporation should not be used to produce an unconstitutional result. The fallacy is that state law cannot determine the manner of foreclosure, but federal law with respect to the corporations created under acts of Congress. And federal law cannot authorize a non-judicial foreclosure , nor can the Constitution allow it.
Respectfully submitted,

___________¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬________ Date:___________, 2010
Reuben Nieves


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, investment banking, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee Tagged: 14th Amendment and Due Process, due process, foreclosure, power of sale, rueben nieves, slavery
Aug
20

LivingLies UPDATED Plan of Engagement: What to Do

UPDATE: This is THE OUTLINE of a plan that is current in its evolution but by no means complete or the last word. It replaces the entry I made in February of this year. The assumption here is that even without taking mortgage foreclosure cases into consideration, the percentage of cases that actually go to trial is between 5%-15% depending upon how you categorize “cases.” On the other hand, if you are not prepared for trial and counting on settlement, your opposition will generally know it and have the upper hand in negotiating a settlement. They are going to play for keeps. You should too. Don’t assume that the note in front of you is the actual original. Close inspection often reveals it is a color copy.

And for heaven sake don’t stand there with your mouth hanging open when someone says you are looking for a free house. You are looking for justice. You had your purse snatched in this transaction, you know there is an obligation, but you also know that they didn’t perfect the security interest (not your fault) and they received multiple payments from multiple parties on these securitized loans. You want a FULL accounting of all such transactions to determine what balance is due after insurance payments, who is subrogated or substituted on claims, and an opportunity to negotiate a settlement or modification with someone who actually has advanced money on THIS transaction and can show it to be so.

WORD OF CAUTION: IF YOU ARE ALREADY IN PROCESS, YOU ARE REQUIRED TO ACT WITHIN THE TIMES SET FORTH BY STATE LAW, FEDERAL LAW, OR THE LAWS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. FAILURE TO DO SO LEAVES YOU IN AN UPHILL BATTLE TO REVERSE ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN. ON THE OTHER HAND ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN “FIX” THE POSITION OF YOUR OPPOSITION, SINCE THEY CAN NO LONGER ASSERT CHANGES IN CREDITOR, LENDER OR TRUSTEE. THUS IT MIGHT BE EASIER, ACCORDING TO SOME SUCCESSFUL LITIGATORS OUT THERE, TO WAIT UNTIL THE SALE HAS OCCURRED AND THEN ATTACK IT AS A FRAUDULENT SALE, THAN TO TRY TO STOP IT WITH A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ETC.

CONSIDER BANKRUPTCY, ESPECIALLY CHAPTER 13, WHERE THERE ARE MORE REMEDIES THAN YOU MIGHT THINK IF YOU FILL OUT YOUR SCHEDULES PROPERLY. WE ARE SEEING BETTER RESULTS IN SOME BANKRUPTCY COURTS THAN FEDERAL OR STATE CIVIL COURT PROCEEDINGS.

  1. Get your act together, stop fighting amongst the members of your household and make a decision as to what you want to do — fight or flight?
  2. GET SOME HELP NO MATTER WHAT YOU DECIDE. GET THE LOAN SPECIFIC TITLE SEARCH, GET A SECURITIZATION SEARCH, AND GET A LAWYER LICENSED IN THE COUNTY WHERE YOUR PROPERTY IS LOCATED AND MAKE SURE HE/SHE IS NOT STUCK ON THE PROPOSITION THAT YOU SHOULD LOSE.
  3. If you choose flight, then by all means try the short-sale or jingle mail strategies that have been discussed on this blog. Do not try to make money on the short-sale, since nobody is going to give it to you. You can make a few dollars by riding out the time in foreclosure without making payments (and hopefully saving the money you would have paid) and by negotiating as high a price (a few thousand dollars)  as you can in a deal known as “cash for keys.” Even for this, you should employ the services of a local licensed attorney — at least for consultation. There are several short-sale options that have evolved. Google Edge Simonson or Prime financial. I’ve been working on a short-sale-leaseback option that seems to be picking up steam.
  4. STRATEGIC DEFAULTS RISING: More and more people of all walks of life including those that have some considerable wealth, are walking away from these properties that were the subject of transactions in which the presumed value of the property was preposterous. This is an option that scare the hair off the pretender lenders because it pouts the power in your hands. They in turn are trying to scare the public with threats of deficiency judgments etc and collections. It is doubtful that many or indeed any deficiency judgments would be awarded, even if they were allowed. But in many cases, particularly in non-judicial states, deficiency judgments are NOT allowed. A version of the strategic default that many people like is to stay as long as possible without paying and then walk. If you are smart about it, you raise your own capital by socking away the payments you would have made.
  5. If the decision is fight — then the second decision to make is to answer the question “fight for what?” If you want to buy time, there are many strategies that can be employed, which basically are the same strategies as those used if you are fighting for real. And you might be surprised by the result. Some people get a year or two or even more without payments. You are going to take a FICO hit anyway so why not put some cash in your pocket while you hold back payments.
  6. AVOID crazy deals where you give your property or share your property with a stranger. If you persist in engaging such people at least call references and make sure the references are real. Ask questions about their situation and how they feel it worked out to them. Get as much detail as possible.
  7. AVOID mortgage modification firms. If you persist in engaging such people at least call references and make sure the references are real. Ask questions about their situation and how they feel it worked out to them. Get as much detail as possible. My opinion is that if they don’t pursue an aggressive litigation strategy the statistical probability of you accomplishing anything by going to them is near zero.
  8. In all cases, if at all possible:
  9. (a) Get all your information together along with a short executive summary of your “journal” (even if you create the journal now). That means all closing documents, any information you have on title, recording in the county recorder’s office, the names of all parties who were “at” closing (that means not just the actual people who were there, but he names of companies that were represented or mentioned at closing). Also, include in the file any notices of default(NOD) or notice of Trustee sale (NOTS) or summons from a court.

    (b) Get a MORTGAGE ANALYSIS of the loan transaction itself. THIS INVOLVES THREE PARTS — (1) LOAN SPECIFIC TITLE SEARCH AND CHAIN OF TITLE, EXAMINATION OF THE DOCUMENTS, SIGNATURES, AND DATES OF DOCUMENTS PURPORTING TO BE REAL, (2) SECURITIZATION SEARCH THAT CHASES THE MONEY TRAIL AND WILL PROBABLY LEAD YOU TO SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES LIKE THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE “TRUST” ASSERTING IT HAS THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE AS WELL AS MONETARY ISSUES SUCH AS APPLICATION OR ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY THE INVESTOR WHO ADVANCED THE FUNDS FOR THE LOAN AND (3) COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS THAT IS USABLE BY AN ATTORNEY IN COURT SUCH THAT HE/SHE CAN ARGUE THAT THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT ENTITLING YOU TO PURSUE DISCOVERY. IF YOU WIN THAT POINT YOU ARE ON YOUR WAY TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. BUT NOBODY IS GOING TO MAKE IT EASY FOR YOU.

    (c) Who is your creditor? The TILA Audit alone does nothing without taking further steps. The Trustee’s “Take-down” report should be demanded in non-judicial states and if the house is in foreclosure, your written objection should be sent to the Trustee.

    (d) If someone tells you they are “pretty sure” or can “definitely”  stop your foreclosure or promises a favorable outcome, and asks for money up front, then run like hell. This is a scam. IF THEY TELL YOU THEY WILL DO WHAT THEY CAN, AND THEY GIVE YOU SOME EXAMPLES OF WHAT THEY WILL BE DOING FOR YOU THEN LISTEN AND GET REFERENCES.

    (e) Only a Court order stops foreclosure or a Trustee Sale. No letter of any form or substance will stop it unless the other side is intimidated into stopping the action, which sometimes happens when they know their paperwork is “out of order.”

    (f) Get a Forensic Mortgage Analysis Report OR AN EXPERT DECLARATION that summarizes in a few pages the potential issues that you should be investigating AND WHICH LENDS SUPPORT TOY OUR DENIAL OF THE DEFAULT, DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF THE OPPOSING PARTY TO CLAIM A DEFAULT, DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF THE OPPOSING PARTY TO FORECLOSE.

    (g) Get an Expert Declaration that uses the forensic report and the expert opinions of specific experts (like appraisers, title analysts) and which identifies the probable chain of securitization and the money trail. You’ll be surprised when you find out there were two yield spread premiums not disclosed to you and that they can total as much or more than the “loan” itself. GET EXPERT OPINION ON PROBABLE DAMAGES INCLUDING RETURN OF UNDISCLOSED FEES, INTEREST, ETC. (SEE LAWYER’S WORKBOOK FROM GARFIELD CONTINUUM).

    (h) Send the Forensic Report and expert declaration to the known parties, with an instruction to forward it to all other parties known to them in the securitization chain. Include a Qualified Written Request(QWR) AND a Debt Validation Letter(DVL) (which is really a debt verification letter). Don’t be surprised if your pretender lenders will come back and tell you your QWR is defective or improper in some way, but that’s OK, you have followed statutory procedure and they didn’t. With the help of an attorney and with consultation with your experts decide on what resolution you will demand — damages, rescission, etc.

    (i) Don’t believe a word about modification. Practically none of them go through. They are leading you into default so they can collect more service fees, and get money out of you that you think is stopping the foreclosure.

    (j) Don’t believe a word that any pretender lender or representative says or represents, even if they are a lawyer, particularly verbal communications that they refuse to confirm in writing. Challenge everything.

    (k) Don’t accept any document as authentic. Many documents are being fabricated or forged, including affidavits. This is why you need a lawyer and an expert and a Forensic mortgage analysis — to determine what documents and parties are suspect and what you should be asking for in discovery and in the QWR and DVL.

    (l) YOUR FIRST STRATEGY IS TO RAISE NOT PROVE ISSUES OF FACT. BY PRODUCING A FORENSIC REPORT AND EXPERT DECLARATION, NEITHER YOU NOR YOUR LAWYER NEEDS TO ACQUIRE EXPERTISE IN SECURITIZED LOANS. YOU ONLY NEED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF FACT BY SHOWING THE COURT THAT YOU HAVE EXPERTS WHO SAY THE PRETENDER LENDERS/TRUSTEES ETC. ARE NOT CREDITORS AND NOT AUTHORIZED AGENTS WORKING FOR THE CREDITORS. THEY SAY THEY ARE IN FACT THE CREDITORS OR HAVE SOME AUTHORITY GRANTED BY AN ALLEGED CREDITOR. IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT TO ACCEPT ONE VIEW OR THE OTHER, BUT RATHER TO ALLOW DISCOVERY AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING (SEE MANY RECENT CASES REPORTED SINCE FEBRUARY ON THIS BLOG).

    (m) Be very aggressive on discovery. They will argue that even if they are not the creditor and even if they refuse to disclose the identity of the creditor, they are still entitled to disclose because they are the holder of the note and/or mortgage. Your argument will probably be that they still have a duty to disclose the identity of the creditor and the source of the their authority to represent the creditor, along with proof that the creditor has received notice of these proceedings.


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: debt validation, expert declaration, forensic analysis, qualified written request, TILA audit, trustee
Jul
19

Banks Fighting Subpoenas From FHFA Over Access to Loan Files

WHAT IF THE LOANS WERE NOT ACTUALLY SECURITIZED?

In a nutshell this is it. The Banks are fighting the subpoenas because if there is actually an audit of the “content” of the pools, they are screwed across the board.

My analysis of dozens of pools has led me to several counter-intuitive but unavoidable factual conclusions. I am certain the following is correct as to all residential securitized loans with very few (2-4%) exceptions:

  1. Most of the pools no longer exist.
  2. The MBS sold to investors and insured by AIG and the purchase and sale of credit default swaps were all premised on a general description of the content of the pool rather than a detailed description with the individual loans attached on a list.
  3. Each Prospectus if it carried any spreadsheet listing loans, contained a caveat that the attached list was by example only and not the real loans.
  4. Each distribution report contained a caveat that the parties who created it and the parties who delivered it did not guarantee either authenticity or reliability of the report. They even had specific admonitions regarding the content of the distribution report.
  5. NO LOAN ACTUALLY MADE IT INTO ANY POOL. The evidence is clear: nothing was done to assign, indorse or deliver the note to the investors directly or indirectly until a case went into litigation AND a hearing was scheduled. By that time the cutoff date had been breached and the loan was non-performing by their own allegation and therefore was not acceptable into the pool.
  6. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE PROPERTY WAS MAINTAINED BY THE HOMEOWNER EVEN AFTER FORECLOSURE AND SALE. The actual creditor who submitted a credit bid was not the creditor. The sale is either void or voidable.
  7. AT ALL TIMES LEGAL TITLE TO THE LOAN WAS MAINTAINED BY THE ORIGINATING “LENDER”. Since there was no assignment, indorsement or delivery that could be recognized at law or in fact, the originating lender still owns the loan legally BUT….
  8. AT ALL TIMES THE OBLIGATION WAS BOTH CREATED AND EXTINGUISHED AT, OR CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE CLOSING OF THE LOAN. Since the originating lender was in fact not the source of funds, and did not book the transaction as a loan on their balance sheet (in most cases), the naming of the originating lender as the Lender and payee on the note, both created a LEGAL obligation from the borrower to the Lender and at the same time, the LEGAL obligation was extinguished because the LEGAL Lender of record was paid in full plus exorbitant fees for pretending to be an actual lender.
  9. Since the Legal obligation was both created and extinguished contemporaneously with each other, any remaining obligation to any OTHER party became unsecured since the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust) refers only to the promissory note executed by the borrower.
  10. At the time of closing, the investor-lenders were the real parties in interest as lenders, but they were not disclosed nor were the fees of the various intermediaries who brought the investor-lender money and the borrower’s loan together.
  11. ALL INVESTOR-LENDERS RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A BOND — A PROMISE TO PAY ISSUED BY A PARTY OTHER THAN THE BORROWER, PREMISED UPON THE PAYMENT OR RECEIVABLES GENERATED FROM BORROWER PAYMENTS, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, AND THIRD PARTY INSURANCE.
  12. Nearly ALL investor-lenders have been paid sums of money to satisfy the promise to pay contained in the bond. These payments always exceeded the borrowers payments and in many cases paid the obligation in full WITHOUT SUBROGATION.
  13. NO LOAN IS IN ACTUAL DEFAULT OR DELINQUENCY. Since payments must first be applied to outstanding payments due, payments received by investor-lenders or their agents from third party sources are allocable to each individual loan and therefore cure the alleged default. A Borrower’s Non-payment is not a default since no payment is due.
  14. ALL NOTICES OF DEFAULT ARE DEFECTIVE: The amount stated, the creditor, and other material misstatements invalidate the effectiveness of such a notice.
  15. NO CREDIT BID AT AUCTION WAS MADE BY A CREDITOR. Hence the sale is void or voidable.
  16. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS.
  17. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT THAT IS UNSECURED.
  18. ANY BALANCE DUE FROM THE BORROWER IS SUBJECT TO AN EQUITABLE CLAIM FOR A LIEN TO REFLECT THE INTENTION OF THE INVESTOR-LENDER AND THE INTENTION OF THE BORROWER.  Both the investor-lender and the borrower intended to complete a loan transaction wherein the home was used to collateralize the amount due. The legal satisfaction of the originating lender is not a deduction from the equitable satisfaction of the investor-lender. THUS THE PARTIES SEEKING TO FORECLOSE ARE SUBJECT TO THE LEGAL DEFENSE OF PAYMENT AT CLOSING BUT THE INVESTOR-LENDERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THAT DEFENSE.
  19. The investor-lenders ALSO have a claim for damages against the investment banks and the string of intermediaries that caused loans to be originated that did not meet the description contained in the prospectus.
  20. Any claim by investor-lenders may be subject to legal and equitable defenses, offsets and counterclaims from the borrower.
  21. The current modification context in which the securitization intermediaries are involved in settlement of outstanding mortgages is allowing those intermediaries to make even more money at the expense of the investor-lenders.
  22. The failure of courts to recognize that they must apply the rule of law results not only in the foreclosure of the property, but the foreclosure of the borrower’s ability to negotiate a settlement with an undisclosed equitable creditor, or with the legal owner of the loan in the property records.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena
Posted on July 14, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
Wednesday, July 14, 2010

foreclosureblues.wordpress.com

Editor’s Note….Even  U.S. Government Agencies have difficulty getting
discovery, lol…This is another excellent post from attorney Isaac
Gradman, who has the blog here…http://subprimeshakeout.blogspot.com.
He has a real perspective on the legal aspect of the big picture, and
is willing to post publicly about it.  Although one may wonder how
these matters may effect them individually, my point is that every day
that goes by is another day working in favor of those who stick it out
and fight for what is right.

Loan File Issue Brought to Forefront By FHFA Subpoena

The battle being waged by bondholders over access to the loan files
underlying their investments was brought into the national spotlight
earlier this week, when the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the
regulator in charge of overseeing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, issued
64 subpoenas seeking documents related to the mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) in which Freddie and Fannie had invested.
The FHFA
has been in charge of overseeing Freddie and Fannie since they were
placed into conservatorship in 2008.

Freddie and Fannie are two of the largest investors in privately
issued bonds–those secured by subprime and Alt-A loans that were often
originated by the mortgage arms of Wall St. firms and then packaged
and sold by those same firms to investors–and held nearly $255 billion
of these securities as of the end of May. The FHFA said Monday that it
is seeking to determine whether issuers of these so-called “private
label” MBS misled Freddie and Fannie into making the investments,
which have performed abysmally so far, and are expected to result in
another $46 billion in unrealized losses to the Government Sponsored
Entities (GSE).

Though the FHFA has not disclosed the targets of its subpoenas, the
top issuers of private label MBS include familiar names such as
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch (now part of BofA), Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual (now part of JP Morgan Chase), Deutsche Bank and
Morgan Stanley. David Reilly of the Wall Street Journal has written an
article urging banks to come forward and disclose whether they have
received subpoenas from the FHFA, but I’m not holding my breath.

The FHFA issued a press release on Monday regarding the subpoenas
(available here). The statement I found most interesting in the
release discusses that, before and after conservatorship, the GSEs had
been attempting to acquire loan files to assess their rights and
determine whether there were misrepresentations and/or breaches of
representations and warranties by the issuers of the private label
MBS, but that, “difficulty in obtaining the loan documents has
presented a challenge to the [GSEs'] efforts. FHFA has therefore
issued these subpoenas for various loan files and transaction
documents pertaining to loans securing the [private label MBS] to
trustees and servicers controlling or holding that documentation.”

The FHFA’s Acting Director, Edward DeMarco, is then quoted as saying
““FHFA is taking this action consistent with our responsibilities as
Conservator of each Enterprise. By obtaining these documents we can
assess whether contractual violations or other breaches have taken
place leading to losses for the Enterprises and thus taxpayers. If so,
we will then make decisions regarding appropriate actions.” Sounds
like these subpoenas are just the precursor to additional legal
action.

The fact that servicers and trustees have been stonewalling even these

powerful agencies on loan files should come as no surprise based on

the legal battles private investors have had to wage thus far to force

banks to produce these documents. And yet, I’m still amazed by the

bald intransigence displayed by these financial institutions. After

all, they generally have clear contractual obligations requiring them

to give investors access to the files (which describe the very assets

backing the securities), not to mention the implicit discovery rights

these private institutions would have should the dispute wind up in

court, as it has in MBIA v. Countrywide and scores of other investor

suits.

At this point, it should be clear to everyone–servicers and investors
alike–that the loan files will have to be produced eventually, so the
only purpose I can fathom for the banks’ obduracy is delay. The loan
files should, as I’ve said in the past, reveal the depths of mortgage
originator depravity, demonstrating convincingly that the loans never
should have been issued in the first place. This, in turn, will force
banks to immediately reserve for potential losses associated with
buying back these defective mortgages. Perhaps banks are hoping that
they can ward off this inevitability long enough to spread their
losses out over several years, thereby weathering the storm caused (in
part) by their irresponsible lending practices. But certainly the
FHFA’s announcement will make that more difficult, as the FHFA’s
inherent authority to subpoena these documents (stemming from the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) should compel disclosure
without the need for litigation, and potentially provide sufficient
evidence of repurchase obligations to compel the banks to reserve
right away. For more on this issue, see the fascinating recent guest
post by Manal Mehta on The Subprime Shakeout regarding the SEC’s
investigation into banks’ processes for allocating loss reserves.

Meanwhile, the investor lawsuits continue to rain down on banks, with
suits by the Charles Schwab Corp. against Merrill Lynch and UBS, by
the Oregon Public Employee Retirement Fund against Countrywide, and by
Cambridge Place Investment Management against Goldman Sachs, Citigroup
and dozens of other banks and brokerages being announced this week. If
the congealing investor syndicate was looking for political cover
before staging a full frontal attack on banks, this should provide
ample protection. Much more to follow on these and other developments
in the coming days…
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Posted by Isaac Gradman at 3:46 PM


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure mill, forms, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, trustee Tagged: assignment, delivery, discovery, Edward DeMarco, FHFA, foreclosureblues, indorsement, investor-lender, Isaac Gradman, pools, table funded loan, third aprty payment
Jul
09

Notes on Hearings I Attended

NOTES ON HEARINGS

W. David Merrill was sworn. He said that he worked for American Home Mortgage Servicing as a senior loan consultant working in mitigation, mediation, and litigation. Hence, the witness only entered the picture long after the loan was declared in default, a notice of default was served, and a notice of sale was served. By definition, his personal knowledge was limited to that point in time when the case was handed over to him for mitigation, mediation, or litigation. More likely, his first brush with the case occurred shortly before the hearing in the afternoon of June 23, 2010 before Judge Hollowell.

Debtor’s attorney raised an objection based upon lack of personal knowledge. The judge overruled the objection. Debtor’s attorney further objected to the copy of the document that was allegedly signed as requiring foundation. The lack of foundation derives from the lack of competence of the witness.

The witness stated that AHMS was the service or for Deutsche Bank. By a written agreement, which was not produced, the witness stated that AHMS was the successor to America West. All objections were overruled.

The witness stated that he was the records custodian for AHMS. However, no foundation for that statement was offered, nor could the witness adequately answer questions on cross examination that were directed at the so-called business records and directed at the witnesses claim that he was in fact the records custodian. Anyone with familiarity of securitized loans knows very well that the servicer is not the records custodian. The attempt by Debtor’s attorney to raise this issue was overruled. In fact, earlier that morning in another case, the judge threatened Debtor’s with contempt of court.

The judge in both cases declared that she was using the doctrine of a colorable claim as she understood it to apply to a motion to lift stay.

The so-called business records were admitted in evidence over objection. The pooling and servicing agreement was admitted as Exhibit 6, but the terms of the pooling and servicing agreement were ignored. Based upon the naked assertion by AHMS, it was presumed that the substitute service or was properly authorized, and that issues raised by the expert  (me) were irrelevant to the preceding and that a very low threshold was required for the movant to obtain relief from stay.

Adding to the confusion, the judge herself stated on the record that the witness was not competent.

The judge was clearly viewing the claims raised by the debtor as a mere stalling tactic.

The concepts repeatedly introduced by Ryan in his pleadings and by myself as an expert witness were completely ignored. The judge refused to seriously consider the possibility that the multiplicity of parties who were in plain sight within the pooling and servicing agreement could present a problem of standing, real party in interest, whether the MOVANT was a creditor,  whether a proper accounting had been rendered, and us whether the balance due as claimed in the notice of the fault was correct or had material deficiencies, to wit:  (1) the identity of the beneficiary, trustee, and servicer was not properly stated and (2) the amount claimed to be in default was  fictitious.

The moving party presented a witness who attempted to justify the filing of three promissory notes as evidence of the obligation, each of which was different. The last and final promissory note was first shown to the expert witness for the  first time on the day of the hearing. This last note showed endorsements which were not apparent on previous “original” notes filed with the court. The Court expressed concern about this.

The testimony and the evidence both pointed to the same practice in both hearings.  For reasons relating to the securitization practices on Wall Street including but not limited to the repackaging of loan portfolios, mortgage-backed bonds, and the creation of collateralized debt obligations which in turn were sold as mortgage-backed bonds, the securitizations of the loans required that no actual formal assignment, endorsement,  or delivery be executed until the instructions were received from the lawyer for the investment banker that was the underwriter of the original series of mortgage-backed bonds. This was the testimony of the witness for the Movant.

Thus,  the legal owner of the loan remains the original party identified as the lender on the deed of trust (or the mortgage) until those instructions are received. Evidence from the industry including but not limited to the statistical probability that a particular loan or bond will be in litigation, strongly suggests that at least 97% of all securitized loans have never been the subject of a legal transfer of the obligation, note and mortgage as required under applicable state law regarding the transfer and recording of interests in real property, and the assignment and endorsement of the note.

In fact, the securitization parties were merely trading in an “expectation” of receivables generated through several channels, each of which depended upon the existence or stated existence of a performing loan. In actual practice, therefore, it may be fairly stated that in nearly all cases involving securitized loans, only the revenue streams arising from all parties and co-obligors were the subject of any trading or transfer activity.

Thus  the status of nearly all securitized loan could be fairly described as legally owned by the originating lender, who in all cases was not left with a receivable upon the closing of the loan transaction. The public records in which property interests are recorded clearly corroborate the conclusions stated herein. The only party that shows on those public records as having an “interest” in the loan is the originating lender. Since the originating lender has been paid in full –an uncontroverted fact– the obligation from the borrower to the originating lender was both created and satisfied at the time of closing.

Since the actual source of the funds that were borrowed by the debtor or borrower came from a remote source (a group of investors) who received a bond from a third party rather than receiving the note executed by the borrower, it is difficult to justify the position that third-party payments are irrelevant. It is equally difficult to construct a scenario under which anyone other than the originating lender had a legal claim under the original loan documents. However, there appears to be an equitable claim by the remote source of funds (the group of investors) for recovery of all payments made and received from all parties in the securitization chain. As to parties other than the borrower in the securitization chain, it appears that the remote source of funds (the group of investors) probably also have legal claims against the various parties in the securitization chain that created, sold and managed debits and credits attributable or allocable to the investor and to the loan accounts of the borrowers.

In the hearings I attended, many documents were offered in evidence that are not normally found in any type of foreclosure proceeding, nor would they be accepted in a judicial foreclosure proceeding without expensive foundation an explanation for their use. Limited powers of attorney, designation as limited signing officer, ratification of prior acts that don’t appear to have ever occurred, certificates of limited authority for certain named individuals to act as officers (obviously raising the question as to whether or not these individuals were ever officers of the entity in any other respectful), substitutions of trustee, endorsements from nonexistent entities, and other documents executed by parties outside of the chain of title, together with the use and confusion between assignments, endorsements, allonges.

Before the era of securitization of mortgage loans it was extremely rare to find any such documentation clouding the chain of title in a foreclosure proceeding. In this case ALL of those documents are present, as they are in millions of other foreclosure proceedings. Judges who have scrutinized these documents have universally arrived at the conclusion that the documents invariably suggest fabrication, forgery, unauthorized signatures, breaks in the chain of title, and frequently all of the above.

In this case, as in all cases where I have been an observer, no person or witness has been willing to testify that they know where these documents came from, when they were created, by whom they were created, or that they know the individuals who executed said documents. In my opinion, this corroborates my conclusion that no such documentation exists in nearly all cases. And further court corroborates my conclusion that any such documentation offered in support of a foreclosure was prepared after the declaration of the fault, after the notice of default, and after the notice of sale.

/s/ NEIL F GARFIELD


Filed under: bubble, CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure mill, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motions, Pleading, securities fraud, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee
Apr
29

Berating the Raters and Appraisers

“of AAA-rated subprime-mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006, 93 percent — 93 percent! — have now been downgraded to junk status.”

Editor’s Note: What homeowners and their lawyers, forensic analysts, and experts need to realize is that the ratings scam on Wall street was only one-half of the equation in a scheme to defraud homeowners. If you don’t understand how an appraisal of a home is the same thing as the rating of the security that was sold to fund the home, then you are missing the point and the opportunity to do something meaningful for borrowers.

TILA and Reg Z make it clear that the LENDER is responsible for verification of the appraisal. The LENDER is responsible for viability of the loan, NOT THE BORROWER. IT’S THE LAW! Instead the media and Wall Street PR and lobbyists are drumming a myth into our heads — that 20 million homeowners with securitized loans cooked up a scheme to get a free house. Where did they meet?

We have ample evidence that the entire scheme depended upon reasonable reliance upon those who were in fact not reliable and who were lying to us. If you bought a house for $600,000, the odds are:

  • the house was actually worth less than $400,000
  • the appraiser put the value at $620,000
  • the rating agency called it a triple AAA loan
  • you thought the house was worth what you were paying
  • the house is now worth $300,000
  • your mortgage is at least $500,000
  • Even if you can afford the payments, you will not be able to sell your home for more than the amount owed on it until at least 15-18 years have passed.
  • You will not be able to sell your home for what you paid for at least another 25-30 years, and that is only with the help of inflation
  • Counting inflation, you will never sell your home for what you paid for it or the amount you thought it was worth when you refinanced it

Besides obvious violations of federal and state lending statutes it is pure common law fraud. You are now faced with options that go from bad to worse, UNLESS you sue the people who caused this and your lawyer understands the basic economics of securitization. Your opposition knows all of this. That is why the cases, for the most part ,never get to trial. These cases are won or lost in demanding discovery, enforcing your demands, and relentless pursuit of the truth.

REGISTER NOW FOR DISCOVERY AND MOTION PRACTICE WORKSHOP MAY 23-24

April 26, 2010
Op-Ed Columnist

Berating the Raters

Let’s hear it for the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Its work on the financial crisis is increasingly looking like the 21st-century version of the Pecora hearings, which helped usher in New Deal-era financial regulation. In the past few days scandalous Wall Street e-mail messages released by the subcommittee have made headlines.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that most of the headlines were about the wrong e-mails. When Goldman Sachs employees bragged about the money they had made by shorting the housing market, it was ugly, but that didn’t amount to wrongdoing.

No, the e-mail messages you should be focusing on are the ones from employees at the credit rating agencies, which bestowed AAA ratings on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of dubious assets, nearly all of which have since turned out to be toxic waste. And no, that’s not hyperbole: of AAA-rated subprime-mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006, 93 percent — 93 percent! — have now been downgraded to junk status.

What those e-mails reveal is a deeply corrupt system. And it’s a system that financial reform, as currently proposed, wouldn’t fix.

The rating agencies began as market researchers, selling assessments of corporate debt to people considering whether to buy that debt. Eventually, however, they morphed into something quite different: companies that were hired by the people selling debt to give that debt a seal of approval.

Those seals of approval came to play a central role in our whole financial system, especially for institutional investors like pension funds, which would buy your bonds if and only if they received that coveted AAA rating.

It was a system that looked dignified and respectable on the surface. Yet it produced huge conflicts of interest. Issuers of debt — which increasingly meant Wall Street firms selling securities they created by slicing and dicing claims on things like subprime mortgages — could choose among several rating agencies. So they could direct their business to whichever agency was most likely to give a favorable verdict, and threaten to pull business from an agency that tried too hard to do its job. It’s all too obvious, in retrospect, how this could have corrupted the process.

And it did. The Senate subcommittee has focused its investigations on the two biggest credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; what it has found confirms our worst suspicions. In one e-mail message, an S.& P. employee explains that a meeting is necessary to “discuss adjusting criteria” for assessing housing-backed securities “because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.” Another message complains of having to use resources “to massage the sub-prime and alt-A numbers to preserve market share.” Clearly, the rating agencies skewed their assessments to please their clients.

These skewed assessments, in turn, helped the financial system take on far more risk than it could safely handle. Paul McCulley of Pimco, the bond investor (who coined the term “shadow banks” for the unregulated institutions at the heart of the crisis), recently described it this way: “explosive growth of shadow banking was about the invisible hand having a party, a non-regulated drinking party, with rating agencies handing out fake IDs.”

So what can be done to keep it from happening again?

The bill now before the Senate tries to do something about the rating agencies, but all in all it’s pretty weak on the subject. The only provision that might have teeth is one that would make it easier to sue rating agencies if they engaged in “knowing or reckless failure” to do the right thing. But that surely isn’t enough, given the money at stake — and the fact that Wall Street can afford to hire very, very good lawyers.

What we really need is a fundamental change in the raters’ incentives. We can’t go back to the days when rating agencies made their money by selling big books of statistics; information flows too freely in the Internet age, so nobody would buy the books. Yet something must be done to end the fundamentally corrupt nature of the the issuer-pays system.

An example of what might work is a proposal by Matthew Richardson and Lawrence White of New York University. They suggest a system in which firms issuing bonds continue paying rating agencies to assess those bonds — but in which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the issuing firm, determines which rating agency gets the business.

I’m not wedded to that particular proposal. But doing nothing isn’t an option. It’s comforting to pretend that the financial crisis was caused by nothing more than honest errors. But it wasn’t; it was, in large part, the result of a corrupt system. And the rating agencies were a big part of that corruption.


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, expert witness, Fannie MAe, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, HERS, investment banking, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, STATUTES, trustee, workshop Tagged: Appraisal, appraisers, lender, Moody’s, PAUL KRUGMAN, Raters, rating agencies, Reg Z, Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Standard & Poor’s, TILA, verification
Apr
20

Rally in Tally: Homeowner Relief and Housing Recovery Act is a Sham and Shame

Editor’s Note: Due process requires that nobody be deprived of life, liberty or property without a judicial determination on the merits of claims against them. Non-judicial procedure runs a thin line that has not actually been tested constitutionally. Assuming it is valid by virtue of the “freedom of contract” doctrine, it still cannot be used to abuse and trick people into losing their homes when in fact the trickster has no interest in the loan, the property or the originating transaction. The attempt in Florida to increase the number of states using non-judicial procedure is abhorrent to anybody who conceives this country as a nation of laws. Non-judicial procedure is in my opinion, inapplicable to most, if not all, securitized loans.

The reason is simple: non-judicial foreclosure sales are meant to achieve judicial economy without prejudice to anyone. In securitized loans there are so many potential stakeholders that non-judicial sale prevents notice and due process and even encourages tricksters to use it against the interests of those who might have an interest. It not only increases moral hazard, it assures a growing cloud on the title of all properties that have been or will be the subject of foreclosure sales.

The pandemic effect on an already unstable marketplace is being amplified by these legislative attempts to legalize unjust enrichment of intermediaries who have no financial interest and who who are not subject to any financial loss for a loan, with it is performing or non-performing.

Posted by Malcolm Doney

The following letter was sent to all 14 members of the House Criminal & Civil Justice Council the day before the Bill was killed. We have reason to believe that it was instrumental in causing the death of that Bill and of the Senate Bill. It was authored by me assisted by three other founding members of Mortgage Justice an activist and educational not for profit. It is now widely circulated to many of the people going to the Rally in Tally. Any of your readers is free to use it as a tool to fight the fraudsters.
1. The Florida Bankers Association is attempting to use the power of the Florida State Legislature as an instrument to commit fraud upon its citizens and House Bill 1523 is inappropriately named The Homeowner Relief and Housing Recovery Act.
2. This Bill and its sister Bill in the Senate SB 2270 will not relieve any Homeowners and neither will it aid any Housing Recovery. On the contrary these Bills, if enacted, will add to the personal burdens of this States’ citizens, deepen the recession, add to the destabilization of communities, the breakup of families, an increase in blue collar crime and hundreds of millions of Dollars in lost Court revenue to the State.
3. HB 1523 adds to the deception in its introduction by adding to the ‘deadbeat borrowers myths’ [whereas it was deliberately planned and executed by Wall Street Investment Banks, Main Street Banks, mortgage lenders and their cohorts], falsely suggests that the cure is to expedite foreclosures to bottom out the market and that somehow this unsupportable economic theory will revitalize the economy, allow citizens to pay their taxes and Housing Associations to maintain communities.
4. If enacted, the passage of these Bills would shift the burden of proof to foreclose from the foreclosing parties to the homeowner, thus denying those homeowners their existing rights of due process and simultaneously, circumvent the recently imposed Supreme Court of Florida’s requirement placed upon foreclosing parties to substantiate under penalty of perjury that they have the legal authority to foreclose on real property given as security in a Mortgage to the true Owner of a Promissory Note and to engage in mandatory mediation. These requirements are the real reason for these proposed laws, because they can no longer hide their crimes from our Courts.
5. Because all members of the legislature are unaware of the fraudulent intent behind the Florida Bankers lobbyists who proposed this draft legislation we have concentrated most of our detailed efforts upon exposing the frauds rather than pointing out the serious deficiencies of the Bills as we know that other groups and individuals are adequately bringing such reviews to the attention of the legislature.
6. However, of paramount importance is the fact that lines 216 to 225 of the original draft clearly backdates the effect of these proposed laws to time immemorial. By the clever use of the words “agreed in substance in the security instrument” the drafters are seeking to remove the requirement contained in Florida Mortgages in clause 22 that all foreclosures must be conducted through the Judicial system by obliquely [but not specifically] referring to clause 16 in which the signor has acknowledged that the whole document is subject to Federal and State Law. The intent of the signing parties of all such Mortgages was that clause 22 of that unilateral contract would apply for the life of that instrument and that imprecise words such as “agreed in substance” would not be used in future laws to imply that they had agreed to a major change in the terms of those Mortgages and if enacted it will negatively impact basic human, property and contractual rights guaranteed under the Federal and State constitutions.
7. Mortgage Justice wishes to reveal that the truth behind the mortgage meltdown is:-
(a) The Housing Bubble was deliberately planned and implemented by Wall Street entities and the Main Street Banks.
(b) Mortgage and other loans were deliberately set up to fail.
(c) The lenders shown on Promissory Notes and Mortgages were not the Lenders, but were misappropriating the use of their licenses to transact mortgage business in the various states and were funded by Wall Street Brokers from the proceeds of the sale of Derivatives in wrongly described AAA rated Mortgage Backed Securities, for which they were paid excessive ‘yield spread premiums’ as a commission.
(d) Notes and Mortgages were not sold in the secondary market, neither were they transferred into securitized mortgage pools. It was impossible for pretend lenders to sell what they did not own.
(e) Contrived sales in the secondary market were documented in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s public records to entitle these pretend lenders to avoid paying federal taxes upon their profits by appearing to comply with IRC 860 and ‘selling’ loans into Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMIC). Documents filed in the SEC provide proof that all these mortgages failed to comply with IRC 860.
(f) SEC documents establish that none of the mortgage loans that they say were put into REMIC Trusts, ever reached those Trusts and that the majority of the ‘so-called’ Trusts were not Trusts but a form of perpetual LLC with zero reporting requirements filed in the State of Delaware for the benefit of those major Banks and/or GSEs, as the true beneficiaries of all the frauds. These ‘Trusts’ are named Delaware Statutory Trusts, they are neither Statutory, nor are they Trusts.
(g) The true beneficiaries of the frauds also sold undisclosed and unregulated multiple default insurances and credit default swaps sold through the International Swaps and Derivatives Association on every new mortgage created to guarantee receipt of multiples of sums they had pretended to lend as and when the planned defaults occurred.
(h) It is therefore a fact that in almost every mortgage foreclosure action the foreclosing entity is not the owner of the Note or the Mortgage, never lent any money, is an integral part of a criminally motivated group has already reaped criminal profits, will share in multiple proceeds from insurances, all the Notes have been deliberately eliminated as admitted to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Florida Bankers Association and all Notes are already paid in full.
8. Mortgage Justice understands that the above text contains major allegations of fraud levied against some of the biggest and most powerful institutions in the land and does not make these accusations lightly. We are fully prepared upon request given adequate notice to furnish irrefutable documentary evidence supporting those accusations and if required to justify them with documentary evidence are willing so to do in order to demonstrate why this proposed legislation must be unanimously rejected by the Florida Legislature for the benefit of its present and future citizens.
9. We also request Public Hearings be scheduled prior to any passage of these proposals and we suggest inviting all interested parties, including representatives of finance and banking who are apparently promoting these Bills, consumers and their advocates.
10. Finally, we refer you to informative videos that can be accessed via the Internet. In our opinion the most reliably informative and professional presentations of the truth behind the housing bubble are those involving the eminent Academic, Criminologist, Economist, Lawyer, Accountant, author of the book entitled ‘The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One’ and a former lead regulator during the savings and loans crisis. Professor William [Bill] Black. To authenticate what we have revealed, please watch Bill Moyers’ PBS interview of Bill. WE BELIEVE this interview OFFERS AN EXCEPTIONAL OVERVIEW OF THE CAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AND FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE BANKING INDUSTRY ON THE AMERICAN CITIZEN AND WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU WATCH AND HEAR THIS VIDEO.
11. Bill Black submitted himself to further questioning in a recent five-part interview on an Internet news channel, Real News. Please watch and listen to these questions and answers also. Political rhetoric, spin and sound bites are no answer to the serious crimes exposed in these interviews. He speaks openly, with a sincere honesty and integrity, almost extinct in our country today. His interview makes us starkly aware that the Banks are striking at the heart of our Republic and government, in all of its branches, but especially the judicial branch. Now that Courts are more closely examining foreclosure cases filed against homeowners in Florida and other jurisdictions the truth is beginning to emerge. Courts in Florida and in many states are finding that the banks lack standing, are filing frivolous lawsuits and are unable to prevail when a homeowner enters a properly pled defense. Mortgage justice strongly believes that the preservation of citizen rights to defend these actions is as vital to the Citizens of Florida as it is to the banks to destroy it. Preserving those rights will establish the truth, disclose extensive violations of state and federal laws by the banking industry, put an end to the power of the banking industry in our state legislature and the resultant backlash of public opinion will reverberate throughout our nation and the world. After nearly destroying the Global Economy, after lowering by twenty percent the net worth of our citizens, and after borrowing billions from them and reaping record profits without any legislative reform or inquiry they now attempt to make it even easier to take the homes of the citizens and deprive them of their legal rights. We urge you to carefully consider, investigate and reject this proposed legislation on behalf of the homeowners and citizens of Florida.
Sincerely,

MORTGAGE JUSTICE,
for our members and the Citizens of the United States, April 12, 2010.

P.S. Internet links – Please copy and paste the following links into your browser:- http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/04032009/watch.html

Then listen to – To rob a country, own a bank Pt5 – put this into Google and follow the links to 5 part video of Black on Real News.

Also essential viewing and listening to the latest on MSNBC,
http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?read=170712


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: cloud on the title, due process, Florida, Florida bankers Association, foreclosure sales, freedom of contract, Homeowner Relief and Housing Recovery Act, House Bill 152, House Criminal & Civil Justice Council, judicial determination, judicial economy, Malcolm Doney, merits of claims, non-judicial foreclosure sales, NON-JUDICIAL SALE, notice, Owner of a Promissory Note, rally, Tally, without prejudice
Apr
03

EVIDENCE OF THE OBLIGATION IS THE NOTE PLUS THE BOND

Assume that the transaction is a single transaction. The investor (creditor) lends the homeowner (debtor) money. Thus arises the obligation from the debtor to pay the creditor. In securitized loans a peculiar thing happens. The debtor signs a note like in all the old kind of mortgage loans, but the creditor gets a bond. As stated elsewhere on this blog this shell game leads to different or changing terms, conditions and even parties to the original obligation undertaken by the debtor, thus negatively impacting negotiability of the note, obligation and bond and probably negatively affecting the effectiveness of the security instrument (mortgage or deed of trust).

If the pretender lenders were legally correct in their premise the transaction would cease becoming an event and forever become a dynamic process wherein the beneficiary, payee, lender, and others would be constantly in motion depending upon the exigencies of the moment.

Their argument is that the reason their position should be sustained is the desirability of certainty in the marketplace. But their own behavior undermines their contention. By using nominees (e.g. MERS, or a “Trust” or “Trustee”) they fail to identify the real parties, whose identity is only revealed upon the happening of a future event or at least the passage of time The hapless borrower is left waiting in limbo for the creditor to be revealed.

It is usually stated in law books that the note is evidence of the obligation, it is not the obligation itself. And it is further stated that the mortgage or deed of trust is incident to the note and not the note. In securitized residential mortgage transactions, the evidence of the obligation is the note PLUS the mortgage backed bond, because it is the bond which the investor has received.

The bonds are sold with wording similar to JP Morgan wording as follows:

“The underlying certificates represent beneficial ownership interest in fixed-rate and adjustable-rate, conventional, first lien residential mortgage loans, substantially all of which have original terms to stated maturity of 30 years.”

It therefore follows that the evidence of the obligation consists of the NOTE and the BOND, since it is the BOND indenture that provides for conveyance of an ownership of the loans.

The obligation arose when the funds were advanced for the benefit of the homeowner. But the pool from which those funds were advanced came from investors who purchased certificates of asset backed securities. Those investors are the creditors because they received a certificate containing three promises: (1) repayment of principal non-recourse based upon the payments by obligors under the terms of notes and mortgages in the pool (2) payment of interest under the same conditions and (3) the conveyance of a percentage ownership in the pool, which means that collectively 100% of the investors own 100% of the the entire pool of loans. This means that the “Trust” does NOT own the pool nor the loans in the pool. It means that the “Trust” is merely an operating agreement through which the ivnestors may act collectively under certain conditions.  The evidence of the transaction is the note and the mortgage or deed of trust is incident to the transaction. But if you are following the money you look to the obligation.

The other peculiarity is that the name of the mortgagee or beneficiary is the name of an entity who serves as a nominee or in other words, in name only.

They never were the real beneficiary. In all securitized loans the named beneficiary is the nominal beneficiary — i.e., in name only. It means the Deed of Trust is void or voidable, but subject to reformation in court, which means they must file a lawsuit to reform the mortgage to comply with the real terms.


Filed under: foreclosure
Mar
05

Securitization and TILA Audits: You Can’t Do One without the Other

Article below submitted From the desk of Brad Keiser:

Editor’s note: This is a perfect example of why ignoring the complexities of securitization leaves all the red meat on the table. The commingling of funds that is cited in the article below is exactly what I have I have been talking about , exactly why the pretender lenders balk at a full accounting, and exactly why a full forensic analysis (like the one Brad will be presenting later this  month) is essential if you are going to battle.

see: Brad Keiser\’s Forensic Analysis Workshop

It is not enough to know about securitization. You must understand what effect it had on the transaction. It sounds counter-intuitive to say that when you know the homeowner has not made a  payment, the obligation might still be considered performing and NOT in default because the payments were made to the creditor.

This does not automatically  mean that you get a free house. But it does mean that the real creditor who has advanced the money, the creditor that the debtor owes money to, is the real party in interest and they might no longer be secured depending upon the nature of the payment and the handling of the accounts — which is why I think that accountants would be ideal candidates for Brad’s workshop.

Securitized loans are not a separate animal from the discrepancies that are revealed in TILA audits. They impact the TILA audit in a way that dwarfs all other factors. Like the fact that the $5,000 yield spread premium paid to the mortgage broker is just a small fraction of the yield spread pocketed by the investment banking crowd behind the curtain.

And what about the very significant impact of those spreads and premiums combined with the impact of a reset on the life of the loan, and the false appraisal? The APR is misstated in virtually every securitized loan not by small amounts or fractions but by multiples of more than 100% of the loan principal in some cases.

Moody’s warns on GMAC mortgage bond servicing
Thu Mar 4, 2010 3:07pm EST
Related News

* Moody’s upgrades GMAC on US Tsy capital infusion
Fri, Feb 5 2010

NEW YORK, March 4 (Reuters) – Moody’s Investors Service on Thursday said it may downgrade portions of 125 residential mortgage bonds based on unusual “cash management arrangements” of GMAC Mortgage LLC, which services loans in the securities.

The rating company said GMAC commingled cash flows from multiple bonds in a single custodial account, Moody’s said in a statement. This allowed GMAC to use cash from loans in one bond for principal and interest payments on another, it said.

By allowing the commingling, it “increases the likelihood that some RMBS deals may not be able to recover the amounts ‘borrowed’ by the servicer to fund advances or another RMBS deal if a servicer bankruptcy were to occur,” Moody’s said.

This could give rise to competing claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, the rater said.

Downgrades based on mortgage servicing, rather than credit, may add to concerns of bond investors who have been long accustomed to harsh rating cuts as delinquencies and foreclosures increase losses.

GMAC Mortgage is a unit of Residential Capital LLC. Residential Capital is owned by GMAC Inc.

For some commentary see this link:
http://market-ticker.denninger.net/

Brad Keiser

(513)289-5353


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud Tagged: affordability, APR, resets, securitized transactions, TILA audit, yield, yield spread, yield spread premium
Aug
20

Bank of America loses in Federal Ruling – Judge says investors own the loans

The report of the ruling below by this Federal Judge has several implications:

  1. Mortgage modifications may come to a halt again
  2. Attorney’s and anyone supposedly “helping” with modifications should be very, very wary
  3. The federal court in Manhattan is recognizing a couple very important issues:
    1. Servicers are NOT the owners of the loans (in the case of a securitized loan)
    2. Investors own the loans
    3. Servicers MAY be liable to buy back modified loans (subject to the terms of the PSA)

This ruling could ultimately end up being the demise of ALL foreclosure actions involving securitized loans. One thing is clear in that the federal court identifies the investors as the owners of the loan and is so doing the court also recognizes that the servicer/intermediaries/pretender lender have no authority to do ANYTHING in the way of enforcement, modification, collection through legal means such as a  foreclosure action because they simply have no standing (the alleged debt is not owed to anyone other than the investors).

Just because a secret deal between Wall Street, servicers, banks and MERS occurred to obscure the ownership and the transfers of mortgages doesn’t mean their deal will hold up under the careful eye of diligent judge who understands AND cares about the law being upheld.


Source: Reuters
BofA’s Countrywide loses court ruling on mortgages

Thu Aug 20, 2009 7:37am EDT

* Federal judge lacks jurisdiction, moves case to states

* Loan modifications can hurt mortgage investors

NEW YORK, Aug 20 (Reuters) – A federal judge has ruled that Bank of America Corp (BAC.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) cannot have a lawsuit by investors seeking to force it to buy back mortgages heard in federal court, saying he lacks jurisdiction to decide the case.

Tuesday’s ruling by Judge Richard Holwell of the U.S. District Court in Manhattan means the case will move to state court. Holwell did not decide the merits of the case.

“Congress passed two statutes within a year of each other to address the mortgage crisis,” the judge wrote. “In neither of these statutes did Congress federalize the case.”

The ruling is a win for investors, to the extent that Holwell rejected a claim by the bank’s Countrywide Financial Corp unit that new federal laws to encourage loan modifications to help struggling borrowers stay in their homes govern this case.

Countrywide had argued that the laws negated obligations it might have had to buy back modified loans. In 2008, Countrywide agreed with some 11 state attorneys general to modify $8.4 billion of loans made to roughly 400,000 borrowers.

Investors who own mortgage securities typically receive interest and principal payments. If servicers modified the underlying loans to reduce borrower obligations, investors would be harmed because they would receive lower payments.

Holwell did rule that investors bear the burden of showing that pooling and servicing agreements for their loans, taken “as a whole,” require Countrywide to buy back the loans.

Bank of America could not immediately be reached for comment. A published report said a spokeswoman agreed that the court did not rule on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.

The current case was brought by two investment funds holding Countrywide mortgages, Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3 LLC and QED LLC.

These investors complained they would be harmed if Countrywide shifted the burdens of loan modifications to 374 trusts into which loans had been repackaged and securitized.

These investors would rather Countrywide repurchase modified loans for the full unpaid amounts.

Countrywide had been the largest U.S. mortgage lender before Bank of America acquired it last July for $2.5 billion.

The case is Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage Fund 3 LLC and QED LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), No. 08-11343. (Reporting by Jonathan Stempel, with additional reporting by John Tilak in Bangalore)

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