- U.S. SECURITIES COMMISSION v CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC | $285 Million Citi Settlement With SEC Rejected by Judge Jed Rakoff
- Unsealed Complaint | Citi Tried to Pass Off Madoff Exposure – Irving Picard, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC v Citibank and Citigroup Global Markets Limited
- JPMorgan’s Independent Foreclosure Review Firm Deloitte & Touche LLP Recenly Sued for Failing to Detect Fraud that Led to more than $7 Billion in Losses
Loreley Financing v. Citigroup Global Markets | Citigroup Sued for Fraud Over $1 Billion of CDOs
Michigan | Kim v. JP Morgan Chase Bank – Family Fights Foreclosure, Beats Bank in Court (VIDEO)
- Kim v. JP Morgan Chase Bank | Court Sets Aside Foreclosure Sale Where Assignee Of Mortgage Failed To Record Its Interest Prior To Sale
- Complaint | RICO Case Against JP Morgan/Chase – LINDA ZIMMERMAN V JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA
- Case Unsealed | IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, Plaintiff, v. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, and J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES LTD
Adam Levitin | The Restatement of Property and the Road to Mortgagocracy
The Restatement of Property and the Road to Mortgagocracy
I recently did a string of blog posts of the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC's Report on the enforcement of negotiable mortgage notes. I'm still planning a final installment there, but I came across another document that just floored me in showing how across another American Law Institute product that just floored me in how deeply captured and compromised part of the legal elite is.
The document in quest is section 5.4(c) from the Restatement (2d) of Property. The Restatements are an ALI-only product (unlike the UCC, which is jointly done with NCCUSL), and they are the ALI's signature product. They are meant to "restate" the law, meaning summarize and improve it, sort of the way Yiddish versions of Shakespeare plays were unironically advertised as farbesert un fartaytsht (improved and translated). That is to say the restatements are meant to be positive summaries of the law, but they often have normative spins.
Section 5.4(c) appears to stand for a very simple and uncontroversial principle (pace FNMA v. Eaton), that only the obligee of a mortgage note has the right to foreclose on the note:
A mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.
In other words, a naked mortgage's got nothin' (are you listening AZ Supreme Court?). But then the comments and illustration go off the deep-end. Here's Comment (e):
Illustration 10 is an example in which a past agency relations is grounds for finding a current agency relationship:Mortgage may not be enforced except by a person having the right to enforce the obligation or one acting on behalf of such a person...[including an agent or a trustee for the noteholder.] The trust or agency relationship may arise from the terms of the assignment, from a separate agreement, or from other circumstances. Courts should be vigorous in seeking to find such a relationship, since the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the mortgagor and the frustration of [the noteholder]'s expectation of security. See Illustration 10.
Mortgagee has often served as [noteholder's] agent in the past with authority to foreclose mortgages held by [Noteholder]. A court is warranted in finding on the basis of this pattern of prior conduct that Mortgagee is noteholder's agent for purposes of foreclosing the instant mortgage.
I've never seen anything like this before. The Restatement here is saying that "courts should bend over backwards to make sure that the lender wins no matter how badly the lender has screwed things up." Is it really an accurate restatement of the law to say "lenders win even if they screw up and don't follow the law"? That sure sounds like a Mortgagocracy. I suspect that many ALI members would be pretty shocked to find that's what the Restatement is saying. But it's got the ALI imprimatur on it.
I get that the borrower has no right to a windfall, but I can't see why that means that basic principal of agency law should be disregarded and agency relationships implied where they do not exist; the ALI's Restatement (2d) on Agency (sec. 15) is quite clear in stating that an agency relationship requirement mutual consent. It isn't an implied set of fiduciary duties, etc. Current agency is going to be implied from a past course of dealing? What if the scope of that agency varied in the past? Curiously, the Restatement cites NO cases in support of its point.
Let me be clear. I don't think anyone deserves a free house. But a mortgage is a contract, and a background term to that contract is that the foreclosure has to follow the law. That's part of the deal, no different from any other (non-severable), material term. Otherwise, why not allow self-help foreclosures and evictions?
I don't think it's too much to say that if you're going to engage in a major financial transaction like making a mortgage loan, you'll be expected to follow the law correctly or not enjoy its benefits. Both lenders and borrowers have to play by the rules. If you don't pay the mortgage and the lender follows the law, you lose your house. But following the proper legal procedure is no less important than the default in a foreclosure; both are equally important requirements. It's not a windfall. It's part of the mortgage contract.
What about the noteholder's "reasonable expectation of security"? There is none, and I don't see how the drafters possibly thought there was one. Just having a note without the security instrument doesn't make you meaningfully secured. The noteholder only has a reasonable expectation of security as long as it retains the security instrument or can prove its terms. If it doesn't, what expectation of security could it reasonably have?
Consider if the security instrument were destroyed prior to recordation, but not the note. Perhaps there could be an equitable mortgage or the like, but the noteholder would have a lot of trouble proving that the note was in fact secured. That creates a strong incentive to record, asap. If you don't control the security instrument physically, and it isn't recorded (and recording isn't required usually for enforceability against the borrower), how can you reasonably expect to remain secured? You can't take care of that security instrument if you don't have it and don't have an agent or trustee holding it for you. But apparently the good folks who did the Restatement of Property think that's quite reasonable. Or more precisely, they don't care if it's reasonable, as long as the lender wins.
It's really disturbing to see an ALI product moving so blatantly away from rule of law and towards mortgagocracy. Now the good news is that the Restatement isn't law. But this is a scary sign of how part of the legal elite, which used to fight for rule of law above the rule of monied interests, has been co-opted. More about that whenever I get to my final post on UCC Article 9.
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-4 v. EMC Mortgage Corp | JPMorgan Sued for $95 Million Over Mortgage Securities
- Daily Finance | Did Bear Stearns Know Its Mortgage Securities Were a House of Cards?
- E-mails Suggest Bear Stearns Cheated Clients Out of Billions and Now JPMorgan May Be on the Hook
- In Re Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Securities, Derivative, And Erisa Litigation | Motion to Dismiss Securities Fraud Complaint is Denied
Fannie Mae Servicing Guide Announcement SVC-2011-22 | Documentation Requirements for Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Referral Packages
Fannie Mae Servicing Guide Announcement SVC-2011-22 | Documentation Requirements for Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Referral Packages
Utah Federal Judge David Sam is WRONG (IMHO) RE ReconTrust is Operating Under the National Bank Act Regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
- No Federal Preemption by a Trustee of a Mortgage Backed Security Trust from Senior Counsel of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
- No Federal Preemption by a Trustee of a Mortgage Backed Security Trust from Senior Counsel of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
- Comptroller of the Currency Orders National Banks to Cover Up Foreclosure Scandal
FL 4th DCA | LAW OFFICE OF DAVID J. STERN, P.A., v. STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS
- FL 4th DCA | (Bank) Lawyers ARE Above the Law – STATE OF FLORIDA, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. SHAPIRO & FISHMAN, LLP
- Florida Judge Vacates Summary Judgement Wrongfully Obtained by Law Office Of David J. Stern for Deutsche Bank as Trustee for Securitized Mortgage Loan Trust
- OUTRAGEOUS – Law Office of David J. Stern Files Fraudulent Foreclosure on Family Including Federal Tax Lien of Another Man with Different SSN
FL 4th DCA Fraudclosure Reversed | McLEAN vs JP MORGAN CHASE BANK – The record lacked any evidence that Chase had standing to foreclose at the time the lawsuit was filed
- FL 1st DCA – Summary Judgment REVERSED – The Record Contains NO Evidence of Any Assignment or Comparable Transaction
- FL 1st DCA Fraudclosure Reversed | Mazine v. M&I Bank “None of the Requirements for Admission of a Business Record Were Met”
- FL 2nd DCA Smackdown | Summary Judgement REVERSED “Record reflected genuine issues of material fact regarding the purported assignment of mortgage”
Union tries to fire trustee who asked to audit taxpayer funded account
Accountability!
We should send out another big tip of the hat to Mark Flatten at the Goldwater Institute for yet another piece of investigative journalism where he discovers some of the rather shocking collisions which take place at the intersection of public employee unions and taxpayer dollars. (A pause here, while I realize that it’s probably [...]
Assembly Bill No. 284 | Potential Felony Charges Make Servicers (aka Illegal Debt Collectors) Pause Nevada Fraudclosures
- Nevada Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto Expected to File Criminal Charges Against Bank and Title Company Employees, as well as Notary Publics, Over Robosigning
- KABOOM | A Lawsuit That Dirty Debt Collectors Should Be Worried About
- A New Foreclosure Tactic – Lenders / Debt Collectors Holding Second Mortgages Freeze Bank Accounts
A lighthouse keeper in the desert sun
Thinking about the return of the Delaware/SDNY venue debate and the bankruptcy court's decision to deny appointment of a trustee in the case of bankrupt solar panel maker Solyndra, up now at Dealbook.
White Paper | An Evolving Foreclosure Landscape: The Ibanez Case and Beyond
Eaton – Dividing the Mortgage Loan and Affirming the Consequent
UPDATED – Action Alert | JURY FRAUDCLOSURE TRIAL IN CLEVELAND OHIO POSTPONED
Safe Harbors Gone Wild
Yesterday's decision from the District Court court in the Madoff-Mets litigation is yet another example of why Congress desperately needs to revisit the safe harbors which exempt a host of financial transactions from the workings of the Bankruptcy Code (in this case, the Code as incorporated into SIPA).
The opinion is available here, but briefly, Judge Rakoff blew a giant hole in the trustee's suit against the owners of the Mets, dismissing all claims based on preference and constructive fraudulent transfer, whether under the Code or New York Law. The basis? Section 546(e) of the Code, which provides
Madoff was a stockbroker, in the loose sense that he was registered as a stockbroker. We now know that he was not actually doing any stockbroker like things for his investors. The Judge does not look into the definition of stockbroker in §101(53A) of the Code -- I think there might be an argument Madoff didn't meet it -- and moves right to the analysis of whether the transactions involved securities contracts and settlement payments.
Of course, there is no real reason to apply the safe harbors to this case. Madoff's transactions are not going to disrupt the financial markets if they were subjected to avoidance actions -- there was essentially no link to the financial markets whatsoever. But the Judge went with the planing meaning of the statute, which contains no such common sense exception. Hence the need for Congress to get involved.
Wells sues JPMorgan over 800 mortgage loans
ATTN: PENSION FUNDS | Where does the money go when the trusts “liquidate” the homes in REO?
4th DCA Meenu Sasser REVERSED | La Salle Bank v. Parker – Affidavit of Diligent Search and Inquiry was Insufficient, Final Judgment Voidable
The Myth of the “Free House”
This is a great post by Katie Porter and I fully agree with her on every point. I have this discussion on a regular basis with people on all sides of this issue. First, homeowners who signed a note and borrowed money don’t deserve a free and clear house. They may even achieve that on rare occasions but they don’t deserve that. Katie is right on and her point is based on logical reasoning…. the borrower signed a note, someone has the right to the payment of that note. There is an entity that is the real party in interest. Dismissing a foreclosure case filed by a servicing institution against a homeowner does NOT in any way, give the homeowner a free and clear house. The security instrument is still a lien on the property and, like Katie discusses, the issues can be corrected in the future and the case can be re-filed.
If the bank or servicer or trustee commit fraud in the process of trying to foreclose, they deserve every sanction they get for that which could and maybe should include the extinguishment of the deed of trust or mortgage. That’s for the court and jury to decide, case by case.
But this soap box argument that dismissing a foreclosure case or finding in favor of the homeowner or against the servicer is NOT the same as giving the homeowner a free and clear house. Let’s just be clear and be able to articulate this point when in court and this issue comes about because it is this exact sentiment that I believe causes judges to skew their rulings because they truly think their ruling will amount to a “free and clear” house.
As challenges to whether a “bank” (usually actually a securitized trust) has the right to foreclose because it owns the note and mortgage become more common, rumors swirl about the ability to use such tactics to get a “free house.” There are a few instances of consumer getting a free house, see here and here, for examples, but these are extreme situations not premised on ownership, but on a more fundamental flaw with the mortgage. In general, the idea that even a successful ownership challenge will create a free house to the borrower is an urban myth. I’ll explain why below, but there is a policy point here. The myth of the free house drives policymakers to complain about the moral hazard risks of holding mortgage companies to the law and tries to set up homeowners who are paying their mortgages against those who are not. It serves the banks’ political agenda to be able to point to the “free house” as an obviously unacceptable alternative of consumers winning legal challenges. It’s key then to understand that the “free house” is largely a creature of consumers’ and banks’ over-active imaginations.
In sorting out why even a successful ownership challenge does not give homeowners a free house, it is helpful to parse some key concepts. The first one is standing, which is the right of a party to ask a court for the relief it seeks. This comes in different flavors, including constitutional standing, but in the foreclosure context, usually boils down to whether the moving party is the “real party in interest.” In re Veal, the recent decision from the 9th Circuit BAP authored by Judge Bruce Markell, mentioned previously onCredit Slips , contains a discussion of standing in the foreclosure context. At least in part, the concern of the real party in interest doctrine is to make sure that the plaintiff is the right person to get legal relief in order to protect the defendant from a later action by the person truly entitled to relief. Note that standing is a concept that only applies in court; here that means in judicial foreclosures. In states that allow non-judicial foreclosure, the issue is slightly different. Does the party initiating the non-judicial foreclosure have the authority to do so under the state statute authorizing the sale? For example, cases such as In re Salazar discuss whether a recorded assignment of the mortgage is needed, as opposed to an unrecorded assignment, to initiate a foreclosure. Under either standing or statutory authority, a “win” by the homeowner leads to the same result. The foreclosure cannot proceed.
But this win is not the same as a free house. Just because a party lacked standing or statutory authority does not mean that there is not some party out there that does have the authority to foreclosure. Nor does a win on standing mean that there cannot be action taken to give the initial foreclosing party the authority that they need, which might occur by transferring possession of the note or by executing a series of assignments, to foreclose at a later date. Unless other problems exist, there is still a valid note that obligates the homeowner to pay money due and there is still a mortgage encumbering the house. The homeowner does not get a free house. Rather, the homeowner just doesn’t lose her house today to foreclosure. These are pretty different outcomes!
This doesn’t mean that I think the standing/ownership issue is inconsequential. For homeowners, a successful challenge that results in the dismissal of a foreclosure can lead to a loan modification or the delay itself can give the homeowner the time to find another solution. For investors in mortgage-backed securities, the problems with paperwork likely increase their loss severities in foreclosure, both because of increased litigation costs and because of delay in correcting problems. (And there may be even more serious problems for investors relating to whether the transfers even succeeded in putting the homes in the trust.) But we shouldn’t confuse these issues with the idea that what is at stake in sorting out this mess is giving a “free house” to some Americans, despite the lamentations of this LaSalle Bank lawyer after a judge ruled that LaSalle as trustee lacked standing to foreclose. A fruitful discussion of these issues needs to begin with a clear understanding of the consequences of the problem, as well as empirical evidence on how widespread these problems are. The free house is political handwringing, not legal reality.
NY AG Unsheathes Excalibur
NY AG Eric Schneiderman came out with guns blazing in the proposed Countrywide investor settlement litigation. It his filing intervening in the action and suing Bank of New York Mellon for breach of fiduciary duty, persistent fraud, and violations of the Martin Act (the "Excalibur" of the NY AG), General Schneiderman didn't mince words. He explained that the loan transfer documentation for lots and lots of mortgages is FUBAR and that servicers and their vendors are trying to fraudulently paper over the problems (spiced, I might add, with a healthy dose of legalese):
One of BNYM’s primary obligations as trustee under these PSAs wasto ensure the proper transfer of loans from Countrywide to the Trusts. The ultimate failure of Countrywide to transfer complete mortgage loan documentation to the Trusts hampered the Trusts’ ability to foreclose on delinquent mortgages, thereby impairing the value of the notes secured by those mortgages. These circumstances apparently triggered widespread fraud, including BoA’s fabrication of missing documentation.
And how about this one:
Any action to foreclose requires proof of ownership of the mortgage. This must be demonstrated by actual possession of the note and mortgage, together with proof of any chain of assignments leading to the alleged ownership. Moreover, complete mortgage files give borrowers assurance that their properties are properly foreclosed upon. The failure to properly transfer possession of complete mortgage files has hindered numerous foreclosure proceedings and resulted in fraudulent activities including, for example, “robo-signing.” These fraudulent activities have burdened borrowers as well as the courts with flawed foreclosure proceedings.
BNYM is putting on a brave face, but I don't see how they have a leg to stand on in this. The last thing they really want to do is go to the mat on whether the loan documentation is up to snuff. It ain't. The only questions are when they settle on this, what terms the settle on, and whether they can settle by themselves, without pulling CW/BoA into the deal. And if that happens, it sets the floor for settlements with the other major servicers.
I should mention that this is hardly the first time the NY AG has had to clean up the mortgage trustee business. In the 1920s and 1930s, the NY AG had to deal with mortgage guarantee certificates (an early sort of securitization) that featured rampant fraud and real estate bond houses, which again featured rampant trustee fraud (using principal payments from one bond to hide defaults on interest payments on others, etc.) The result was eventually the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. Guess what the TIA doesn't cover? MBS. Maybe it's time to change that. Rep. Brad Miller has legislation (H.R. 1783) that would do just that.
Good News on Mortgage Modifications
Isn't it about time for some good news on mortgage modifications? Here is some, in the form of a paper titled Who Receives a Mortgage Modification? Race and Income Differentials in Loan Workouts. The authors use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to assess borrower characteristics against the incidence of loan defaults and modifications on a group of more than 100,000 subprime loans.
The first two findings are depressing and not surprising: loan modifications are rare, and minority borrowers are more likely to be delinquent. The good news is that minorities are faring well in seeking modifications. As a descriptive matter, among those 60 or more days delinquent, 11 percent of blacks and 9 percent of Hispanics received a loan modification, compared to 5 percent of whites. In regression modeling that controlled for borrower, loan, and housing/labor market conditions, blacks were slightly more likely to get modifications, conditional on being delinquent, than other races. This effect persists even when researchers control for the fact (also good news in my mind) that borrowers who got a high-cost loan are more likely to get a loan modification. In further analysis, the authors find that blacks receive a similar interest rate reductions to borrowers of other races.
As with any empirical study, there are some limitations. The authors use data from only trustee (although several servicers) and examine loans originated in only three states--all Western and all non-judicial foreclosure. And, as the authors note, they cannot assess whether there are differences in loan modification denial rates. Put concretely, if blacks are applying at twice as high of a rate for loan modifications as whites, their analysis would not pick up this high rate of denial compared to applications. This paper ends with interesting thoughts on the racial disparities in loan origination, and why these patterns are not found in loan modifications. It asks whether there are lessons from HAMP or the loan modification process generally that could be useful in designing loan origination programs that reduce the longstanding racial disparity in that crucial financial transaction.
CAPACITY, CAPACITY, CAPACITY- READ THE TRANSCRIPT
There is a major defect in almost every foreclosure case, and it continues even today, this late in the game. We are still allowing unknown, unidentified and unauthorized Plaintiffs to appear in Florida courtrooms and ultimately take title to property.
All across this state, hundreds of millions of dollars in real property is changing hands and shifting around and back and forth between shadowy trusts, ill-defined entities and national institutions, but no one has any idea who these entities are, where they are based, how they are governed and how to track them down when things go wrong.
It all starts with a basic failure in pleading….the failure to plead capacity which is quite simply the failure to tell the court who you are and where your place of business is. All sorts of things flow from this basic failure. For instance many of these Plaintiffs rely on Powers of Attorney to execute documents such as Assignments of Mortgage….one of the problems is that an assignment based on a failed power of attorney is invalid and a power of attorney is not valid when the entity is a trust corporation that is not validly registered to do business.
On a more personal note, I’m trying to collect a judgment entered in my favor against “US Bank, Trustee”, capacity was never plead and now I’m having a devil of a time trying to figure out how to collect this judgment because I cannot track down, “US Bank”. Read the documents below…
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Investors Suing Banks Are On The Same Side As Homeowners In Foreclosure
It’s next to impossible to get any information while you’re in foreclosure from the servicer or trustee. Reasonable discovery requests for basic information are objected to and almost never complied with. It’s not just homeowners receiving the cold shoulder…the investors are as well….JUST WHAT ARE THEY HIDING?
JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMC Mortgage, facing homeowner lawsuits over foreclosures, was sued by the trustee of a mortgage portfolio for refusing to turn over documents detailing the quality of loans bought by the trust.
Wells Fargo & Co., the trustee, is seeking access to files for more than 2,000 underlying mortgages in the Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR2, according to the complaint filed today in Delaware Chancery Court in Wilmington.
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Truly Mind Boggling Disclosures of Documentation Errors in Mortgage Loan Pools
I run a tight, very organized and fairly lean organization. In these unfortunate economic times, I could grow fast and manage a large operation, but I want to do things correctly and be able to keep my eyes on everyone and my hands in all my files. Quite simply, I don’t want things to grow sloppy and out of control. A major reason for this crisis is the banks and institutions failed to accurately document and close massive transactions involving billions of dollars. Rather than do things slowly and carefully, things spun wildly out of control.
Have a long and detailed read of the document attached here that relates to a federal bankruptcy case. It provides a sobering and sickening look into document problems for trusts that (theoretically at least) own billions of dollars in loans. Now if I were closing billions of dollars in loans, you can be darn sure I’m going to work hard to prevent the types of errors like the ones reported in this report from occurring.
It’s very hard to digest, but read it carefully and consider the impact of all of this on the larger economy…..we’re all paying for this after all……
As of the most recent reports, there exist missing or defective loan file documents for several billion dollars in original principal amount of loans.
Repurchase Claims, the Trustee asserts that, based on its information and belief regarding the mortgage loan securitization market, such claims will exist with respect to 2% to 30% of the aggregate original principal balance of the loans in the Trusts (i.e. $908,468,758 to $13,627,031,372).
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BANK OF AMERICA DEPOSITION RENE HERTZLER- I SIGN DOCUMENTS BUT DON’T READ THEM
YOU MAD YET? WHY DON’T WE JUST TURN OVER ALL THE HOMES IN AMERICA TO THE BANKS? WHY DON’T WE ALL JUST DISPENSE WITH THE CHARADE OF COURTS OR LEGAL PROCESS AND TURN IT ALL OVER TO THE BANKS….WAIT WE ALREADY HAVE.
READ THE DEPOSITIONS IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
6 Q. And you signed this affidavit.
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Did you read it before you signed it?
9 A. No.
10 Q. You did not.
11 A. No.
12 Q. Is there a particular reason why you didn’t
13 read it?
14 A. I typically don’t read them because of the
15 volume that we sign. And we have the Power of
16 Attorney and also the Corporate Resolution.
17 So part of the process is that we don’t
18 read them before we sign them.
19 Q. You don’t read them, meaning affidavits?
20 A. Documents.
21 Q. Documents.
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. Any documents.
24 A. Correct. We have a team of people who screen them for us and prepare them for us to sign.
2 Q. So you’re in the habit of signing documents
3 without reading them.
4 A. That’s correct.
5 Q. Including this affidavit.
6 A. That’s correct.
A. “That I am the Vice President of The Bank
13 of New York Mellon, formerly known as the Bank of
14 New York as Trustee, for the Benefit of the
15 Certificateholders, CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed
16 Certificates, Series 2007-5ES, Series 2007-5.”
17 Q. Is that statement true?
18 A. No, but I have the Power of Attorney as a
19 vice president.
20 Q. So it’s false?
21 A. I’m a vice president of Bank of America,
22 but I have the Power of Attorney –
23 Q. I didn’t ask you if you had a Power of
24 Attorney. The statement in Paragraph 1 is you’re a
39
1 vice president of the Bank of New York Mellon. And
2 I’m asking you if that statement was true.
3 A. No, I’m not a vice president of Bank of New
4 York.
5 Q. Have you ever been a vice president of the
6 Bank of New York?
7 A. No.
8 Q. So it was false when you signed it.
9 A. Yes.
40330704-Renee-Hertzler-deposition
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