Jul
21

What if the loan was not securitized, PART three

This week we are examining the consequences of the proposition that the entire securitization chain is in fact a fabrication. I have likened the situation to a trust, interestingly enough, that has never been funded. The intent to fund the trust does not justify treating the asset as owned by the trust. The intent to execute a deed does not justify the intended grantee claiming the property as LEGALLY his. And the INTENT to assign or indorse or deliver a note, does not justify treating it as though the act was completed. Anyone who has been active in the field of mortgage examination, analysis or litigation knows that they have been frustrated in their attempts to receive actual documentation demonstrating the assignment, endorsement, and delivery of the evidence of the obligation that arose when the borrower executed the closing documentation.

In case after case we find that the status of the obligation is at best questionable. The assignment of the note does not appear to be in existence. No evidence appears showing an endorsement of the note. No evidence appears showing that these security instrument has in any way been transferred, nor has such a transfer been recorded. The only time we see such documentation is in the course of litigation. As long as the party making the representation has the word “Bank” in its name the Judges are understandably influenced to believe that such a party would not take the risk of misrepresenting their status intentionally. But they are wrong, as many recorded cases have shown as reported on this blog.

There is a steadfast refusal to respond appropriately to a qualified written request or a debt verification letter. Even when a case goes to litigation, there is a steadfast refusal to respond to discovery. It is only when a court has ordered the showing code actual executed, notarized documentation that these documents of transfer miraculously appear.

The only way we know that a loan has been allegedly securitized news if someone makes that representation in court, usually without the slightest presentation of evidence in support of the representation. We must believe the representation. The courts are inclined to believe the representation; but in case after case, where a judge has taken the time to actually examine the documentation closely, it has repeatedly been shown that the intermediary parties in securitization have clearly fabricated the documents of transfer solely for the purpose of supporting their position in litigation.

This means that at the time a default is declared, or a notice of default is delivered, it is on behalf of an entity with which the borrower has never done business. These entities suddenly flood the room claiming they are part of a securitization chain when no prior notice has been given in any manner, shape or form, despite vigorous attempts on the part of the borrower to discover the identity of the parties involved and the status of their obligation after third-party payments have been recorded and allocated to the loan.

The intermediary securitization parties steadfastly refused to account for third-party payments and affirmatively represent that such payments are irrelevant to the balance of the obligation. Examination of the facts indicates that their reason for taking that position is that they have kept the third-party payments and neither distributed same to investors who advanced to the pool of money from which the loans were funded nor did they even give notice to those investors that they had received such payments.

In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that the servicers are in many if not most cases simply keeping the money they receive from borrowers and neither forwarding it to the original “lender” on record (the originating lender) nor to any other party.

Therefore we have actual facts emanating from both sides of this confrontation that suggests a legal paradox. On the one hand, it is apparent that the originating lender has been paid in full but remains on record where it is public notice to all interested parties that the originating lender legally owns the obligation, note and security instrument (deed of trust or mortgage). On the other hand, it is equally apparent that the originating lender did not in fact fund the loan made to the borrower. In virtually all cases the loan was a table funded loan as a matter of practice. Under regulation Z a of the Federal Reserve, this is presumptively a predatory lending practice, giving rise to a variety of remedies under the Federal Truth in Lending Act, which the courts have been reluctant to enforce. The act has teeth, and so does the RESPA, but the courts have mistaken the status of the parties and regard those remedies as windfall to the borrower when they are in fact providing a windfall to disinterested parties.

I am now of the opinion that virtually every document executed after the closing that recites some provision for assignment or transfer of the obligation, note or security instrument is void. The substitution of trustee, the notice of default, the introduction of previously unknown parties are all without substance.


Filed under: foreclosure
Jun
19

Federal Agencies Becoming More Helpful: Give them a Call, Give them a Push

Under pressure from the Obama Administration, Federal agencies that turned a deaf ear to consumers, borrowers and debtors, are starting to investigate, prosecute and reveal predatory, deceptive and illegal activities of the entire securitization chain.

Now is the time for us to make sure they get a copy of your qualified written request. And the QWR or DVL should be agency specific. Make sure you state both the category and the facts on each violation. Call them to ask what they are doing about it. You might get a pleasant surprise.

Can’t find your bank’s name or have a banking question? Contact any of the federal bank regulators noted below:

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency at (800) 613-6743

Federal Reserve Board at (888) 851-1920

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at (877) 275-3342

Office of Thrift Supervision at ( 800) 842-6929


Filed under: foreclosure
Mar
21

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant?

SEE ALSO BOE PAPER ON ABS DISCLOSURE condocmar10

If the Bank of England wants this information, how can this court deem it irrelevant? NOTE: BOE defines investors as note-holders.
information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.
Editor’s Note: As Gretchen Morgenstern points out in her NY Times article below, the Bank of England is paving the way to transparent disclosures in mortgage backed securities. This in turn is a guide to discovery in American litigation. It is also a guide for questions in a Qualified Written Request and the content of a forensic analysis.
What we are all dealing with here is asymmetry of information, which is another way of saying that one side has information and the other side doesn’t. The use of the phrase is generally confined to situations where the unequal access to information is intentional in order to force the party with less information to rely upon the party with greater information. The party with greater information is always the seller. The party with less information is the buyer. The phrase is most often used much like “moral hazard” is used as a substitute for lying and cheating.
Quoting from the Bank of England’s “consultative paper”: ” [NOTE THAT THE BANK OF ENGLAND ASSUMES ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION AND, SEE BELOW, THAT THE INVESTORS ARE CONSIDERED "NOTE-HOLDERS" WITHOUT ANY CAVEATS.] THE BANK IS SEEKING TO ENFORCE RULES THAT WOULD REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
borrower details (unique loan identifiers); nominal loan amounts; accrued interest; loan maturity dates; loan interest rates; and other reporting line items that are relevant to the underlying loan portfolio (ie borrower location, loan to value ratios, payment rates, industry code). The initial loan portfolio information reporting requirements would be consistent with the ABS loan-level reporting requirements detailed in paragraph 42 in this consultative document. Data would need to be regularly updated, it is suggested on a weekly basis, given the possibility of unexpected loan repayments.
42 The Bank has considered the loan-level data fields which
it considers would be most relevant for residential mortgage- backed securities (RMBS) and covered bonds and sets out a high-level indication of some of those fields in the list below:
• Portfolio, subportfolio, loan and borrower unique identifiers.
• Loan information (remaining life, balance, prepayments).
• Property and collateral (current valuation, loan to value ratio
and type of valuation). Interest rate information (current reference rate, current rate/margin, reset interval).
• Performance information (performing/delinquent, number and value of payments in arrears, arrangement, litigation or
bankruptcy in process, default or foreclosure, date of default,
sale price, profit/loss on sale, total recoveries).
• Credit bureau score information (bankruptcy or IVA flags,
bureau scores and dates, other relevant indicators (eg in respect of fraudulent activity)).

The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility requirement that each issuer provides a summary of the key features of the transaction structure in a standardised format.
This summary would include:
• Clear diagrams of the deal structure.
Description of which classes of notes hold the voting rights and what proportion of noteholders are required to pass a resolution.
• Description of all the triggers in the transaction and the consequences of them being breached.
• What defines an event of default.
• Diagramatic cash-flow waterfalls, making clear the priority
of payments of principal and interest, including how these
can change in consequence to any trigger breaches.
52 The Bank is also considering making it an eligibility
requirement that cash-flow models be made available that
accurately reflect the legal structure of an asset-backed security.
The Bank believes that for each transaction a cash-flow model
verified by the issuer/arranger should be available publicly.
Currently, it can be unclear as to how a transaction would
behave in different scenarios, including events of default or
other trigger events. The availability of cash-flow models, that
accurately reflect the underlying legal structure of the
transaction, would enable accurate modelling and stress
testing of securities under various assumptions.

March 19, 2010, NY Times

Pools That Need Some Sun

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

LAST week, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sued a throng of Wall Street companies that sold the agency $5.4 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities during the height of the mortgage melee. The suit, filed March 15 in state court in California, seeks the return of the $5.4 billion as well as broader financial damages.

The case also provides interesting details on what the Federal Home Loan Bank said were misrepresentations made by those companies about the loans underlying the securities it bought.

It is not surprising, given the complexity of the instruments at the heart of this credit crisis, that it will require court battles for us to learn how so many of these loans could have gone so bad. The recent examiner’s report on the Lehman Brothers failure is a fine example of the in-depth investigation required to get to the bottom of this debacle.

The defendants in the Federal Home Loan Bank case were among the biggest sellers of mortgage-backed securities back in the day; among those named are Deutsche Bank; Bear Stearns; Countrywide Securities, a division of Countrywide Financial; Credit Suisse Securities; and Merrill Lynch. The securities at the heart of the lawsuit were sold from mid-2004 into 2008 — a period that certainly encompasses those giddy, anything-goes years in the home loan business.

None of the banks would comment on the litigation.

In the complaint, the Federal Home Loan Bank recites a list of what it calls untrue or misleading statements about the mortgages in 33 securitization trusts it bought. The alleged inaccuracies involve disclosures of the mortgages’ loan-to-value ratios (a measure of a loan’s size compared with the underlying property’s value), as well as the occupancy status of the properties securing the loans. Mortgages are considered less risky if they are written against primary residences; loans on second homes or investment properties are deemed to be more of a gamble.

Finally, the complaint said, the sellers of the securities made inaccurate claims about how closely the loan originators adhered to their underwriting guidelines. For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank asserts that the companies selling these securities failed to disclose that the originators made frequent exceptions to their own lending standards.

DAVID J. GRAIS, a partner at Grais & Ellsworth, represents the plaintiff. He said the Federal Home Loan Bank is not alleging that the firms intended to mislead investors. Rather, the case is trying to determine if the firms conformed to state laws requiring accurate disclosure to investors.

“Did they or did they not correspond with the real world at the time of the sale of these securities? That is the question,” Mr. Grais said.

Time will tell which side will prevail in this suit. But in the meantime, the accusations illustrate a significant unsolved problem with securitization: a lack of transparency regarding the loans that are bundled into mortgage securities. Until sunlight shines on these loan pools, the securitization market, a hugely important financing mechanism that augments bank lending, will remain frozen and unworkable.

It goes without saying that after swallowing billions in losses in such securities, investors no longer trust what sellers say is inside them. Investors need detailed information about these loans, and that data needs to be publicly available and updated regularly.

“The goose that lays the golden eggs for Wall Street is in the information gaps created by financial innovation,” said Richard Field, managing director at TYI, which develops transparency, trading and risk management information systems. “Naturally, Wall Street opposes closing these gaps.”

But the elimination of such information gaps is necessary, Mr. Field said, if investors are to return to the securitization market and if global regulators can be expected to prevent future crises.

While United States policy makers have done little to resolve this problem, the Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, is forging ahead on it. In a “consultative paper” this month, the central bank argued for significantly increased disclosure in asset-backed securities, including mortgage pools.

The central bank is interested in this debate because it accepts such securities in exchange for providing liquidity to the banking system.

“It is the bank’s view that more comprehensive and consistent information, in a format which is easier to use, is required to allow the effective risk management of securities,” the report stated. One recommendation is to include far more data than available now.

Among the data on its wish list: information on the remaining life, balance and prepayments on a loan; data on the current valuation and loan-to-value ratios on underlying property and collateral; and interest rate details, like the current rate and reset levels. In addition, the central bank said it wants to see loan performance information like the number and value of payments in arrears and details on bankruptcy, default or foreclosure actions.

The Bank of England recommended that investor reports be provided on “at least a monthly basis” and said it was considering making such reports an eligibility requirement for securities it accepts in its transactions.

The American Securitization Forum, the advocacy group for the securitization industry, has been working for two years on disclosure recommendations it sees as necessary to restart this market. But its ideas do not go as far as the Bank of England’s.

A group of United States mortgage investors is also agitating for increased disclosures. In a soon-to-be-published working paper, the Association of Mortgage Investors outlined ways to increase transparency in these instruments.

Among its suggestions: reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies by providing detailed data on loans well before a deal is brought to market, perhaps two weeks in advance. That would allow investors to analyze the loans thoroughly, then decide whether they want to buy in.

THE investors are also urging that loan-level data offered by issuers, underwriters or loan servicers be “accompanied by an auditor attestation” verifying it has been properly aggregated and calculated. In other words, trust but verify.

Confidence in the securitization market has been crushed by the credit mess. Only greater transparency will lure investors back into these securities pools. The sooner that happens, the better.


Filed under: brad keiser, bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, Forensic Analysis Workshop, GTC | Honor, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Motion Practice and Discovery, securities fraud, Securitization Survey, Servicer, workshop Tagged: ABS Disclosure, arrangement, asymmetry of information, balance, Bank of England, bankruptcy, BEAR STEARNS, cash-flow waterfalls, countrywide, Credit Suisse, current rate, current valuation, David J. Grais, default, delinquent, descriptions, Deutsch Bank, diagrams, discovery, event, Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, foreclosure, fraudulent activity, Grais and Ellsworth, Gretchen Morgenstern, interest rate, levels, LITIGATION, loan-to-value ratio, loss on sale, Merrill Lynch, Moral Hazard, mortgage backed bonds, mortgage backed securities, New York Times, noteholders, performing, portfolio, prepayments, profit on sale, qualified written request, remaining life, RMBS, sale price, subportfolio, total recoveries, triggers, value of payments in arrears
Mar
16

A Thought About Bankruptcy Petitions: Creditor ID

Upon finding that a portion of those payments should be applied to the subject loan, the declaration of default would be invalid because it would either be wrong inasmuch that the third party payments would at least be prepayments of future monthly payments, or wrong because the third party payments reflected an inaccurate accounting of the principal due.

OK let’s be clear that I don’t know bankruptcy well enough to even have an opinion, but I do have an idea and I would like this post forwarded to bankruptcy attorneys to get their reaction.

Here is the proposition: A Petitioner files for bankruptcy where one of the issues is a securitized loan. My idea is that the schedules NOT show the any of the known parties as creditors, because they are not. Especially if you have an expert opinion that describes the creditors as being unnamed but readily identifiable investors if the servicer will respond properly to the Qualified Written Request.

Upon reflection I don’t see why we would name the pretender lenders as creditors at all. I would leave them off the list of creditors (on any new cases filed) because they are not creditors. Maybe file amended schedules removing them. I would disclose the non-judicial foreclosure attempt wherever you can do that of course. Show the house as an asset with undetermined value. Wouldn’t that force them into being proactive? They would have to say “Hey! We are creditors secured by this property.” That would force the burden of proof onto them even as to standing, wouldn’t it?

Can someone who is not a creditor on the schedules file a proof of claim? What happens if you deny the claim and deny they are creditors? Do THEY have to file the adversary? Your position would be that you have this Expert Declaration that identifies the creditors, at least by description, and these would-be foreclosers don’t meet the description. So you disclosed the fact that they were claiming a default but you deny they are even creditors, much less secured.

It would seem that this would force them into proving to a bankruptcy court that they actually have authority which in turn would require them to produce all the documents granting them that authority. It also seems to me that they would have to come up with a full accounting for all payments from all parties, including from credit default swaps, insurance and Federal bailouts.

In the course of the proceedings, your allegation would be that they did in fact receive third party payments as has been widely reported by the press. They would probably answer something like those payments are irrelevant.

Your response to their assertion is to ask the court, who decides whether third party payments are relevant or not — the court or the creditor? The court would most likely order them to disclose all such third party payments along with documentation thereon so that the court could determine whether the payments should be applied to the pools in which the subject mortgage loan is Located” (assuming the assignments are valid), and then in turn determine what percentage of the payment should be allocated to the subject loan.

Upon finding that a portion of those payments should be applied to the subject loan, the declaration of default would be invalid because it would either be wrong inasmuch that the third party payments would at least be prepayments of future monthly payments, or wrong because the third party payments reflected an inaccurate accounting of the principal due.

Comments?


Filed under: bubble, CDO, CORRUPTION, currency, Eviction, expert witness, foreclosure, GTC | Honor, Investor, Mortgage, securities fraud, Servicer Tagged: accounting, adversary, bankruptcy, credit default swaps, creditor, Federal Bailout, foreclosure, insurance, schedules, secured claims, securitized mortgage, third party payments, unsecured creditors
Mar
14

Arming Attorneys with the Ammo to Win

Forensic Mortgage Analysis Workshop

Hosted By Brad Keiser Of Foreclosure Defense Group

CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION

Winning Strategies Require Attorneys Have:

  • Leverage of a credible threat
  • Issues of fact that shift or heighten the burden of proof to the foreclosing party
  • Evidence vs Allegations
  • Understanding of your Opponent – Right hand isn’t often talking to the Left hand
  • Guns with only one bullet (e.g. produce the note) are for Russian Roulette
  • You need a full magazine in case you misfire a couple rounds
  • KISS – Keep it Simple Stupid…so the Judge can Understand

Difference between a “Loan Audit” and Mortgage Analysis

Assessing Lender Compliance at Origination

It’s all about Disclosure Requirements

How to Analyze and Identify Material TILA RESPA HOEPA Violations Yourself

Rescission: What it is and what it isn’t

Right ways and Wrong ways to apply TILA and other Loan Compliance Findings

Evidence or Characteristics of “Predatory” Lending

Using the Qualified Written Request (QWR)

Requirement to Disclose the True Owner

What Forensic Mortgage Analysis uncovers that the “canned TILA audit” doesn’t

Securitization for Dummies

Public Domain Evidence – SEC filings and What They Can Reveal

Important Questions SEC Filings Don’t Reveal That Should be Answered

What a periodic distribution report to the Certificate holders can determine

Chain of Title – Perfected Interest or Clouded Toxic Title?

APPRAISAL REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT


Filed under: foreclosure
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